TIRATH S. THAKUR, J. ( 1 ) THIS writ petition calls in question order dated 11th of january, 1991 issued by the government rejecting the petitioner's request for payment of compensation on account of the premature termination of the lease held by her and seeks a mandamus directing the respondent to assess and pay the loss caused to her on that account. ( 2 ) A quarrying lease in respect of 100 acres of river bed of the krishna river underlying sy. No. 285 at tangadagi village in muddebihal taluk of bijapur district was granted to the petitioner for a period of 10 years commencing 29th of january, 1979 in terms of a lease agreement dated llth may, 1979. The lease in question was governed by the Karnataka minor minerals concession rules, 1969 and entitled the petitioner to remove sand from the leased area during the contractual period. ( 3 ) THE petitioner's case in the present writ petition is that on account of the construction of what is called 'upper krishna project', the entire leased area covered by the agreement aforesaid was submerged thereby preventing her from removing the minerals from the same. The lease in her favour was because of this supervening event terminated even in the absence of any formal order of termination which according to the petitioner entitled her for payment of adequate compensation under the terms of the lease agreement. That there was a lease agreement between the parties is not denied nor is it disputed that the same stood terminated due to the submergence of the leased area. All the same petitioner's application seeking payment of compensation for the loss allegedly suffered by her was turned down by the government vide the order impugned on the ground that there was no provision either in the rules under which the lease was granted or the lease agreement for payment of compensation to the lessee. Aggrieved by it, the petitioner has come up with the present writ petition for a certiorari quashing the same and for a mandamus directing determination of payment of the damages suffered by her. ( 4 ) APPEARING for the petitioner Mr. Narayana rao argued that the government had committed a palpable error in having declined the petitioner's request for payment of compensation on the ground that there was no provision either in the rules or lease agreement envisaging any such payment. ( 4 ) APPEARING for the petitioner Mr. Narayana rao argued that the government had committed a palpable error in having declined the petitioner's request for payment of compensation on the ground that there was no provision either in the rules or lease agreement envisaging any such payment. He referred to and relied upon clause 3 of the lease agreement in support of his submission that while the government had the power to determine the lease and resume the area covered by the same, it was also bound to pay compensation to the lessee concerned. He urged that the Provisions of clause 3 specifically obliged the government to appoint an officer for the purpose of assessing the amount of compensation and that any such officer was in the matter of determination of the compensation to be guided by the principles laid down in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. ( 5 ) CLAUSE 3 of the lease agreement may at this stage be extracted "clause 3. Liberty and power to the state government to determine, at any time by giving to the lessee six months' notice in writing the lease if the area for which the lease has been granted or any part thereof is required by the government for any public purposes and a declaration under the signature of the director that the area is so required shall as between the lessee and the government, be conclusive. On the determination of the lease under this power the area under the lease shall be resumed by the government and the lessee shall be paid such compensation as may be determined by an officer appointed by the government for the purpose and in assessing the amount of compensation, the officer so appointed shall be guided by the principles laid down in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for such assessment". A plain reading of the clause, clearly supports the submission made by Mr. Narayana rao, in that while it reserve in favour of the government the right to determine an existing lease it also entitles the lessee to the payment of compensation to he determined by an officer nominated by the government in that behalf. A plain reading of the clause, clearly supports the submission made by Mr. Narayana rao, in that while it reserve in favour of the government the right to determine an existing lease it also entitles the lessee to the payment of compensation to he determined by an officer nominated by the government in that behalf. The impugned endorsement issued by the state government rejecting the petitioner's claim on the ground that there was no provision for payment of compensation either under the rules or the Provisions of the lease agreement is therefore clearly unsustainable and in ignorance of the provision referred to above. ( 6 ) THAT however is not the end of the matter. The next question that falls for consideration is as to whether this court can in these proceedings issue a mandamus directing the respondents to appoint an officer for the determination of the compensation under clause 3, supra and command them to pay the amount so determined. ( 7 ) MR. Rao argued that since the lease agreement between the parties is executed in terms of the Provisions of Rule 20 of the minor minerals concession rules, the same has a statutory flavour and can be enforced under article 226 of the constitution. He urged that even though Rule 20 of the aforesaid rules did not specifically stipulate payment of compensation as one of the conditions of the lease yet in terms of sub-rule (2) thereof the competent officer had the authority to incorporate such other conditions in the lease agreement as were considered appropriate by him. The Provisions of Rule 20 (2), it was argued was the source from which clause 3 contained in the agreement flows so that clause 3 in so far as the same envisages appointment of an officer for determination of the compensation must be deemed to be a statutory provision. Support for this proposition was sought by Mr. Rao from a judgment of the apex court in Assam sillimanite limited and another v union of India and others. ( 8 ) RULE 20 of the Karnataka minor mineral concession rules, 1969 prescribes that every quarrying lease shall be in form-e and shall include the conditions set out thereunder. The Rule it is obvious is only an enabling provision, and all that it does is to set out some of the conditions that shall be included in every quarrying lease. The Rule it is obvious is only an enabling provision, and all that it does is to set out some of the conditions that shall be included in every quarrying lease. This is more so about sub-rule (2) of Rule 20 which empowers the competent authority to include in any such lease, such other conditions as may be deemed fit by it. In the circumstances therefore, if the competent officer incorporates a" condition in the lease agreement as to the manner of determination of the lease or the payment of compensation to the lessee, any such incorporation would be relatable to Rule 20 (2 ). The provision of the said Rule however being only an enabling provision for incorporation of appropriate conditions, it is not possible to exalt any such condition to the status of a statutory provision. It is one thing to incorporate a conditions in a lease executed in pursuance of a statutory provision and an entirely different thing to equate any such lease or stipulation contained thereunder with the statute itself. It is not therefore possible to treat the Provisions of clause 3 of lease agreement to be a part and parcel of the statutory rules so as to justify the issue of a mandamus for the appointment of an officer for assessment of the compensation envisaged therein. I am supported in this regard by the judgment of the Supreme Court in divisional forest officer v bishwanath tea company limited. That was a case where the lessee had in terms of a lease executed under the Assam land and revenue and local rates regulations claimed certain reliefs from the court on the basis that the lease was executed in terms of regulation 37 of the aforementioned regulations. It was argued that since the lease was in pursuance of a statutory provision, the terms contained in the same could be enforced by a writ court. Repelling the argument, their lordships held that the Provisions of regulation 37 were merely enabling Provisions pursuant to which the terms sought to be enforced by the lessee may or may not have been incorporated in the lease indenture. It was further held that the Provisions of a lease agreement could not be enforced in the camouflage of statutory rules for once the cloak was removed, it would appear that what was being relied upon was only a provision in the lease agreement. It was further held that the Provisions of a lease agreement could not be enforced in the camouflage of statutory rules for once the cloak was removed, it would appear that what was being relied upon was only a provision in the lease agreement. The following passage of the judgment is in this regard apposite: "shorn of all embellishment the relief claimed by the respondent was referable to nothing else but the term of the lease viz. , clause 2, part iv. may be, that this term is a mere reproduction of proviso to Rule 37 of Assam land and revenue and local rates regulations, but that by itself is not sufficient to contend that what the respondent was doing was enforcing a statutory provision". It thus can be demonstrably established that the respondent was trying to enforce through the writ petition the right to remove timber without the liability to pay royalty not under the proviso to Rule 37 which was merely an enabling provision, but the specific term of lease agreed to between the parties. Proviso to Rule 37 may not be incorporated in an indenture of lease. If incorporated after fulfilling precondition it becomes a term of lease. The high court, in our opinion, therefore, was in error in posing a question to itself as to whether the applicant (respondent herein) was entitled to the enforcement of legal right under the proviso to Rule 37 of the settlement rules. The camouflage successfully worked, but once this cloak is removed, it unmistakably transpires that the respondent was trying to claim benefit of clause 2 of the lease having fulfilled its precondition and obtaining the inclusion of its latter part in the contract of lease. The question, therefore, really is whether such contractual obligation can be enforced by the writ jurisdiction? How dangerous it is, can be demonstrably established in this case". ( 9 ) RELIANCE upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Assam sillimanite's case, supra, by Mr. Rao is in my opinion wholly misplaced. That was a case where their lordships were considering the question as to whether a suit for payment of damages after a period of 17 years during which period the writ petition had remained pending would be a fair course of action. Rao is in my opinion wholly misplaced. That was a case where their lordships were considering the question as to whether a suit for payment of damages after a period of 17 years during which period the writ petition had remained pending would be a fair course of action. The court in that context directed the matter to be referred to an arbitrator for determination of compensation, even though a civil action in a competent civil court was held to be the ordinary remedy open to the aggrieved lessee. There is in the present case, no provision for reference of the disputes arising between the parties to an arbitrator. There is no provision even in the statute or the rules providing for statutory arbitration in such a situation. In the circumstances therefore, these proceedings cannot possibly be used for making a reference to any such alternative forum. The fact that the Supreme Court made reference to an arbitrator will not in my opinion provide a sound basis for this court also to do so. The order passed by their lordships is obviously relatable to article 142 of the Constitution which cannot be invoked by this court. ( 10 ) IN the result, the petition succeeds but only in part and to the extent that endorsement dated 11th january, 1991 holding the petitioner disentitled to claim compensation is hereby quashed. The petitioner shall be at liberty to seek appropriate relief for recovery of the compensation in appropriate proceedings before a competent civil court subject to all just exceptions. No costs. --- *** --- .