Judgment Aftab Alam, J. 1. Petitioner No.2 is reported to be dead and hence this application is confined to petitioner no.1 alone. 2. Petitioner no.1, Satyanarayan Poddar who at the material time was the general Manager of Hari Nagar Sugar Mills limited, Ramnagar seeks quashing of a first information report giving rise to Ramnagar rs. Case No.81/90 for an alleged offence punishable under Sec.7 of the Essentiel commodities Act. The first information report was instituted on the basis of a written report dated 17.01.1990 submitted to the police by the Additional Subdivision supply Officer, Bagha. According to the prosecution case the two accused commited an offence by lifting from the wholeseller all at the same time, 500 litres or kerosene Oil against the monthly supply permit issued to them by the District Supply officer. Though there was no such restriction in the monthly supply permit but, according to the F. I. R. , the accused by liftinct the 500 litres all at once violated the storage limit of 400 litres fixed in the storage permit issued in favour of the general Manager, Hari Nagar Sugar Mills ltd. The admitted position is that the storage permit was issued for the first time in the year 1966. In the original permit the storage limit was fixed at 500 litres of kerosene Oil. The permit was renewable from year to year and it was so renewed by the petitioner. At the time of the renewal of the permit in the year 1986, the storage limit was reduced from 500 to 400 litres, that is to say, in terms of this permit the petitioner was entitled to store at any given point of time kerosene oil not in excess of 400 litres. It is also an admitted position that the petitioner was issued monthly supply permits of Kerosene oil for industrial use by the District Supply Officer. It is also not in dispute that the monthly supply quota of the petitioner was 500 litres and a single supply permit for the same amount was issued by the District Supply Officer. Hence the sum and substance of the allegations is that against the supply permit of 500 litres of kerosene oil the petitioner used to lift the entire quota at one time which according to the prosecution case violated the storage limit fixed in the storage permit. Hence the sum and substance of the allegations is that against the supply permit of 500 litres of kerosene oil the petitioner used to lift the entire quota at one time which according to the prosecution case violated the storage limit fixed in the storage permit. Had the petitioner lifted the monthly supply of 500 litres in two or more instalments then there would have been no violation but it was their action in lifting the entire monthly supply at one time that according to the f. I. R. , constituted an offence punishable under Sec.7 of the Essential commodities Act. 3. On the admitted facts I am unable to see any mens rea and it is not clear to me as to what abuse or misuse of Kerosene oil, the authorities want to check and control by taking the petitioner to the court alleging that his aforesaid action being violative of the storage limit was a punishable offence under section 7 of the E. C. Act. In a converse case where on the basis of the storage permit alone one tried to lift kerosene oil in excess of the supply permit it is understandable that he would be receiving/using Kerosene Oil more than his monthly quota as determined by the supply authorities but in such a case where the monthly quota of supply is admittedly 500 litres and it is open to the petitioner to lift that quota either all at one time or in instalments within that month, it is not comprehensible to me what purpose would be served by prosecuting the petitioner for the alleged offence under Sec.7 of the Essential commodities Act. 4. At this stage I may also note the submission advanced on behalf of the petitioner that at the material time, that is, on 17.10.1990 there was no statutory provision requiring any storage permit for kerosene Oil for industrial use and it was an old permit which was being mechanically renewed every year and was being used by the petitioner. According to Mr. Mahto, learned counsel for the petitioner on the material day there was no requirement of any permit and hence any question of violating the storage limit fixed by a permit does not arise. 5. According to Mr. Mahto, learned counsel for the petitioner on the material day there was no requirement of any permit and hence any question of violating the storage limit fixed by a permit does not arise. 5. Before examining the petitioners submission, however, it would be useful to take a look at the provisions of law which according to the F. I. R. were violated by the petitioners. The following provisions of law are quoted in the F. I. R. in the light of which the petitioners action constituted an offence: i) Clause 4 (1) of the Kerosene (Restriction on Use and Fixation of Price)Order, 1966 ii) Clause 18 of the Bihar Trade Articles (Licenses Unification) Order, 1984. iii) Clause 11 (b) of the G. S. R. No.49 dated October 17, 1985 and iv) Condition 5 (iv) of the terms and conditions of the licence issued under the Licenses Unification Order. 6. It is to be noted that Kerosene (Restriction on Use and Fixation of Price)Order, 1966 was a Central Order, Clause 4 whereof imposed certain restrictions against storage of kerosene oil without any written permission from the District Magistrate or subdivisional Magistrate etc. The proviso (i)to Clause 4, however, provided an exception in the following terms : - "4. Exception.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Order, a State government or any authority nominated by it may, by special order, permit any person to use kerosene for any industrial purpose as it may consider to be essential. 7. Admitted position is that allotments of large monthly quotas of kerosene oil were being made in favour of the petitioner from 1966, it is thus apparent that the petitioner was given permission for use of kerosene for industrial purposes. It may further be noted that the facts stated in the f. I. R. do not constitute any violation of clause 4 of the 1966 order. 8. Next comes clause 8 of the Unification Order which is in the following terms: -18. It may further be noted that the facts stated in the f. I. R. do not constitute any violation of clause 4 of the 1966 order. 8. Next comes clause 8 of the Unification Order which is in the following terms: -18. Restriction on possession of trade articles.-No person shall, either by himself or by any person on his be-half, store or have in his possession at any time any trade article mentioned in schedule I and Schedule II in quantity exceeding the limits fixed- (i) under an order issued by the central Government, or (ii) by the State Government with prior concurrence of the Central Government by issuing a notification in official gazette from time to time. 9. It is undeniable that no limit in respect of kerosene oil has been fixed as yet in terms of clause 18 either by the central Government or by the State government and hence there can be no question of any violation of clause 18 of the unification Order. 10. Now coming to G. S. R. No.49, dated 17.10.1985 it is to be noted that notification was issued to fix the stock limits of trade articles under clause 3 of the Licences unification Order. Clause 3 deals with licensing of dealers. On the facts alleged in the F. I. R. it is undisputed that the petitioner was not a kerosene dealer but the supply permit of kerosene was given for industrial purposes and hence the stock limit fixed in relation to dealers under the aforesaid g. S. R. No.49, dated 17.10.1985 will have no application in this case. 11. Lastly, as regards the contravention of any of the terms of a licence issued under the Unification Order, it may be noted that the petitioner was neither obliged nor had he, in fact obtained any licence under the Unification Order and thus there can be no question of contravention of any terms of the licence. 12. Now conning to the storage permit a photostat copy whereof is at Annexure-2, it is to be noted that the permit itself does not mention any provision of law under which it was issued. 12. Now conning to the storage permit a photostat copy whereof is at Annexure-2, it is to be noted that the permit itself does not mention any provision of law under which it was issued. It may, however, be noted that clause 7 of an earlier Order namely the Bihar Kerosene Oil Dealers licensing Order, 1965 imposed restriction against storage in the following words : - "restrictions against storage.- No person other than a licensee shall keesp or store in any premises occupied toy him, or permit any other person to keep or store in any such premises a quantify of kerosene exceeding 37 litres (two tins containing eight imperial gallons) unless he has obtained a written permission from the District Magistrate or Subdivisional Magistrate or special Officer-incharge, Rationing, Patna, within the limits of whose jurisdiction the kerosene is kept or stored, authorising him to do so". 13. It was presumably under this provisions that the necessity arose and the storage permit was obtained by the petitioners in 1966. It may further be noted that by virtue of Sub-clause (3) of Clause 1 read with clause 32 of the Unification Orde the aforesaid Bihar Kerosene Oil Dealers licensing Order, 1965 stood repealed w. e. f.19/4/1984 and with the repeal of the Control order the permit issued under its provisions must also be deemed to have expired. 14. I thus find considerable force in both the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner that on the material date there was no storage limit in respect of kerosene oil in so far as the petitioner was concerned and even assuming that there was an offence it was purely technical, unintended and more in the nature of a bonafide lapse. 15. For the reasons stated above, I am of the considered opinion that the F. I. R. does not disclose any triable offence against the petitioner and continuance of any proceeding on that basis would amount to an abuse of process of the court. The f. I. R. in question and any proceeding or investigation on that basis are accordingly quashed. 16. In the result, this application is allowed, without any order as to costs.