Judgment 1. The Court: This is an application by Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. in short ONGC for setting aside an award dated June 10, 1995. 2. Principal grounds for setting aside of the said award in short are : (i) The arbitrators in making the said award manifestly disregarded the express terms of the contract dated 26th December, 1988 as varied by an Addendum dated 30th Nov. 1989. (ii) The arbitrators travelled beyond and outside the bounds of the said contract and acted without jurisdiction thereby misconducted themselves. (iii) The award is based on erroneous finding of facts which is apparent on the face of the award itself. (iv) The arbitrators arrived at erroneous conclusions of law from the admitted facts thereby misconducted themselves. (v) In examining the provisions of the contract the arbitrators reached at incorrect and erroneous conclusions which are apparent from the award and the documents expressly referred to and relied therein and adjudicated beyond the contract. 3. By a contract in writing dated December 26, 1988 the respondent agreed to let on hire the following equipments :- (i) Production Testing and Wireline Services (PTS & WL); (ii) Nitrogen (N2); (iii) Coiled Tubing Unit (CTU); (iv) Drill Stem Testing (DST); for production testing on shore and offshore rigs for one year from 26th December, 1988 with option to renew the same. 4. Ld. Advocate for the petitioner has referred to Clauses 2.9, 6.1 and 8.4 and has submitted that under the terms of the contract the respondent was obliged to keep the said equipments in full readiness at the location specified by ONCC to enable it to test the rigs and the rent for the said equipments was payable only if the respondent fulfilled its said obligations, and not otherwise. 5. Ld. Advocate has further referred to Clause 9.2 of the contract which provides that the said equipments will be transported from one location to another by inland transportation i.e. by road transportation, by a contractor to be engaged by the respondent with the approval of ONGC. 6. Clause 21 of the contract has also been referred to which provides for a Force Majeure Clause. 7. The period of the contract was varied by the Addendum dated 30th November, 1989 upto 1st June, 1990 or till the completion of testing of SME-4 of Calcutta Offshore Project at Haldia. 8. The contention of the ld. 6. Clause 21 of the contract has also been referred to which provides for a Force Majeure Clause. 7. The period of the contract was varied by the Addendum dated 30th November, 1989 upto 1st June, 1990 or till the completion of testing of SME-4 of Calcutta Offshore Project at Haldia. 8. The contention of the ld. Advocate for the petitioner is that from the correspondence referred to in the said award the admitted fact is that on 6th March, 1990, ONGC requested the respondent to arrange for transportation by road of the equipments from Agartala to Haldia by approved contractor and on 19th March, 1990 in terms of the said contract ONGC approved the transporter. ONGC also impressed upon the respondent that the said equipments were urgently required for the rig testing at Haldia and that the same should be transported to and received by ONGC at Haldia within 20 days, which was accepted. 9. In this connection he has referred to following correspondence Letter dated 6.3.90 from petitioner to the respondent. Letter dated 16.3.90 from respondent to the petitioner. Letter dated 19.3.90 from petitioner to the respondent. Letter dated 22.3.90 from the petitioner to the respondent. Letter dated 20.3.90 from petitioner to respondent. Letter dated 5.4.90 from respondent to Carrier. Letter dated 6.4.90 from Carrier to the respondent. 10. Further contention of the ld. Advocate for the petitioner is that the correspondence referred to above bears out a very important fact that had the respondent diligently complied with the instruction of ONGC, the equipments could have crossed Manas Bridge in Agartala long before April 11, 1990 and reached Haldia, long before the closure of Manas Bridge, referred to hereafter, by first week of April, 1990. It is an admitted fact that by reason of riot and revolt by Bodo rebels on 11th April, 1990, the said Manas Bridge by which the said equipments were to be taken by transport was damaged. On 7th September, 1990 admittedly the & aid Manas Bridge was reopened to traffic. 11. It has been further submitted that it will be apparent from the award itself that at least one equipment i.e. CTU could not be mobilised and utilised by the respondent at Haldia. 12. Ld. On 7th September, 1990 admittedly the & aid Manas Bridge was reopened to traffic. 11. It has been further submitted that it will be apparent from the award itself that at least one equipment i.e. CTU could not be mobilised and utilised by the respondent at Haldia. 12. Ld. Advocate for the petitioner has submitted that the arbitrators found as a fact that CTU, one of the four equipments, could not have been utilised by the petitioner for testing rigs at Haldia. He has referred to Clause 8.4 read with 2.9 of the contract which expressly provided that the petitioner would be liable to pay the rent only if the equipments were utilised at the place where the same were mobilised by the petitioner. Therefore, it has been submitted that the award of rent for CTU for the entire period until 12th October, 1990 is ex facie erroneous and contrary to the terms of the contract. In awarding rent upto October 12, 1990, the arbitrators completely disregarded the express terms of the contract. The arbitrators, therefore, travelled beyond and outside the bounds of the contract and acted without jurisdiction. The contention of the ld. Advocate is that the rent for CTU cannot be separated from the award. The award as a whole is bad. In support of his contention he has relied upon the judgement and decision in the case of Associated Engineering Co. vs. Gout. of Andhra Pradesh reported in AIR 1992 SC 232 . 13. In any event, it is the contention of the petitioner that the arbitrators awarded the rent for CTU by erroneous interpretation of Clauses 2.9, 6.1 and 8.4 of the contract. It is clear that the petitioner was liable to pay rent only if the respondent mobilised the equipments at Haldia as required by the petitioner. It is now established that the award on wrong interpretation of terms of the contract is bad. In this connection, he has referred to the judgement and decision in the case of Hindusthan Construction Co. Ltd. vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir reported in AIR 1992 SC 2192 . 14. It is now established that the award on wrong interpretation of terms of the contract is bad. In this connection, he has referred to the judgement and decision in the case of Hindusthan Construction Co. Ltd. vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir reported in AIR 1992 SC 2192 . 14. It has accordingly been submitted that the observation and finding by this Court in the case of Union of India vs. Bharat Construction reported in (1996) 1 CLT 284 is not binding since the finding of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision in the case of Hindusthan Construction Co. Ltd. vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir (supra) was not considered in the said judgement. 15. The contention of the ld. Advocate for the petitioner is that the arbitrators allowed rent for CTU and N2 units upto 12th October, 1990 on the finding that if permitted by ONGC the respondent could have transported the said equipments by rail to Haldia 'well in time'. It has further been submitted that basis for such finding according to arbitrators was a meeting held on 18th May, 1990 where possibilities for alternate mode of transport of the equipments was discussed. 16. Ld. Advocate for the petitioner has further submitted that minutes of meeting dated 18.5.90 have been referred to in the award. The said minutes clearly show that nothing was agreed at that meeting. But alternate mode of transport was merely agreed to be explored. The materials on record would show that by its letter dated 21.5.90, the respondent admitted the possibility of alternate mode of transport to be explored, but without success. It appears from the record that ultimately on 22nd June, 1990 after a lapse of more than a month from the said meeting on 18th May, 1990 the respondent requested ONGC to approve and permit transport of the equipments by rail from Agartala to Calcutta. It has accordingly been submitted that it is apparent from the materials on record that the error of finding of facts having a bearing on the award is patent and is easily demonstrable, such error would vitiate the award. Reliance was placed upon the judgement and decision in the case of State of Rajasthan vs. Puri Construction Co. It has accordingly been submitted that it is apparent from the materials on record that the error of finding of facts having a bearing on the award is patent and is easily demonstrable, such error would vitiate the award. Reliance was placed upon the judgement and decision in the case of State of Rajasthan vs. Puri Construction Co. Ltd. reported in (1994) 6 SCC 485 wherein the Supreme Court has expressly declared the law to be that the Court is entitled to scrutinise the materials on record to see if the finding by the arbitrators on facts are correct. 17. The finding with regard to rent for CTU in the award and rent of N2 for the entire period upto October 12, 1990 on the ground that the said equipments could not be transported across Manas Bridge before it was damaged by Bodo insurgents on 11th April, 1990 although there was no lack of diligence on the part of the respondent or its carriers is contrary to admitted facts. 18. It has also been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that from the correspondence expressly referred to in the award and appended thereto, it is apparent that the respondent and its carriers violated the instructions of the petitioner and acted negligently. The further contention of the ld. Advocate is that had the respondent or its carrier been diligent and acted in accordance with the instruction of the petitioner, the said equipments could have been transported across Manas Bridge long before 11th April, 1990 and utilised by the petitioner in Haldia in time. 19. In any case, award of the rent for all the four equipments till 12th October, 1990 is clearly contrary to the terms of the contract and its modification dated 30th November, 1989. 20. The arbitrators recorded the fact that the contract came to an end on 29th July, 1990, which was the date when the testing of SME-4 well in Haldia was completed. It has accordingly been submitted that in terms of the contract as modified, rent is to cease on completion of the testing of the said SME-4 well at Haldia. 21. The arbitrators recorded the fact that the contract came to an end on 29th July, 1990, which was the date when the testing of SME-4 well in Haldia was completed. It has accordingly been submitted that in terms of the contract as modified, rent is to cease on completion of the testing of the said SME-4 well at Haldia. 21. It has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that the award of rent beyond 29th July, 1990 is contrary to the express terms of the contract and by awarding the same the arbitrators travelled beyond and outside the bounds of the contract and therefore the award is without jurisdiction. The further contention of the ld. Advocate is that the arbitrator committed an error in making a finding that the 'Force Majeure Clause' did not apply. Since the equipments could be transported by rail which was an alternate mode of transport even if Manas Bridge was damaged, existence of an alternate mode of transport cannot by itself be a ground for non-application of 'Force Majeure Clause' according to ld. Advocate for the petitioner. He has also cited an illustration to the effect that if by earth-quake the Bridge is damaged, it cannot be contended that just because alternate rail route is there, the 'Force Majeure Clause' will not apply. 22. Mr. Bachwat ld. Advocate for the petitioner has further submitted that in any case, there is no question of any transportation of the equipments by rail, as the contract itself expressly stipulates that the same must be transported by road i.e. by inland transportation. He has referred Clause 9.2 which expressly provides and casts an obligation on the respondent to transport the equipments by road i.e. by inland transportation. 23. He has further referred to Clause 21.1 of the contract and has submitted that Force Majeure situation would be applicable in the event a party is rendered unable to perform any obligation required to be performed by it under the contract. The obligation under Clause 9.2 of 1 he contract of the respondent to transport the equipments by road i.e. inland transportation cannot be performed by reason of the damage to the Manas Bridge by Bodo revolt and riot makes the Force Majeure condition applicable. 24. The allegations and/or submissions made on behalf of the petitioner were strongly disputed by the respondent. 24. The allegations and/or submissions made on behalf of the petitioner were strongly disputed by the respondent. It has been contended that there was agreement subsequently to bring CTU units by rail route which the petitioner did not avail. There is no scope for application of the 'Force Majeure Clause'. 25. It has further been submitted on behalf of the respondent that the ld. Arbitrators considered the facts in detail and made their award and there is little scope for interference with the award. 26. I have considered the submissions of the ld. Advocates for the parties and the decisions cited. It appears from record that on 24.3.1990 instructions were given by the petitioner for mobilising the said four equipments from Agartala which were to be sent to Haldia for conducting a well testing in Haldia. However, since the bridge enroute to Agartala was damaged on 12th April, 1990 empty trailors for carrying the said equipments could not pass through the bridge to reach Agartala. 27. After negotiations between the petitioner and the respondent and the carrier, it was decided that two of the equipments could be removed from the containers and transported by trucks to Haldia. This was done and the concerned equipment reached Haldia in May, 1990. It is to be noted that on 18th May, 1990 the remaining two pieces of machinery were agreed to be transported by some alternate mode and it was also agreed that any additional expenses relating to such transport would be paid by the petitioner. 28. In the third week of June, 1990 the respondent suggested that the remaining two pieces of equipment should be sent by rail. The petitioner for reasons best known to it refused to permit such transportation. Thus, due to the default of the petitioner, the balance two pieces of machinery could not be transported from Agartala to Haldia and the petitioner awaited restoration for the bridge for normal traffic before allowing any action to be taken in this behalf. 29. Meanwhile, the work at Haldia also got postponed due to technical complications arising from the activities of the petitioner and also thus equipment came to be put to use ultimately in July, 1990. 30. 29. Meanwhile, the work at Haldia also got postponed due to technical complications arising from the activities of the petitioner and also thus equipment came to be put to use ultimately in July, 1990. 30. It is also noted that one of the machinery, namely CTU unit under the instructions of the petitioner continued to work at Agartala itself, till 26th April, 1990 under the same contract, so it could not have been taken to Haldia, whilst which was working at Agartala. It appears that the equipments were always at the disposal of the petitioner, in full readiness for use in terms of the contract. Therefore, in accordance with Clause 8.4 of the contract the respondent as it was entitled to do, raised the invoices for the rental of the equipment. However the claims were rejected by the petitioner. 31. In the aforesaid factual background, disputes were referred to Joint Arbitrators. Mr. Aloke Chandra Gupta, retired Judge of the Supreme Court of India was nominated by the petitioner as an Arbitrator on •its behalf and Mr. R. P. Bhatt retired Judge of the Bombay High Court and Senior Advocate was nominated by the respondent to act as an Arbitrator. The parties were heard at length. Oral and documentary evidence was tendered by both of them and ultimately the award was made. 32. The Arbitrators made their award on 10th June, 1995 and the same was filed in this Court on 6th July, 1996 and shortly thereafter this application was made under s. 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 for setting aside the award. 33. Several factual controversies were raised on behalf of the petitioner as already noted. It is well settled that no challenge can be raised in proceedings under s. 30 with regard to factual aspect. In fact, the Arbitrators on the basis of the facts and the evidence before them held inter alia as follows : 1. It may be stated that the relevant facts, in our opinion, necessary for determination of the claim are admitted and the oral evidence in the case has lost its importance. 2. In our opinion, the closure of the bridge because of the damage of the bridge did not constitute a Force Majeure situation as the claimant had requested the respondent that the equipment should be transported by rail which could have been done. 2. In our opinion, the closure of the bridge because of the damage of the bridge did not constitute a Force Majeure situation as the claimant had requested the respondent that the equipment should be transported by rail which could have been done. There was, an alternate mode whereby the equipment could be transported but the respondent had not granted permission to utilize the alternate mode. 3. The next submission in relation to payment of rental for the equipment is that the contract came to an end on 29th July, 1990 and therefore no rental is payable after July, 1990. The terms of Clause 8.4 read with Clause 20.1 are explicit namely that the rentals are payable till the equipment reaches the port of entry notwithstanding the expiry of the contract. The rental payments are from the port of entry and return to the port of entry and not merely at a point of time when the contract comes to an end or is terminated. Thus the claimant would be entitled to the rental of the equipments till they reach the port of entry. 4. The submissions were made on behalf of the respondent that they could not use two of the equipments because the same were lying at Agartala and could not be utilised at Haldia base. 34. It has been submitted on behalf of the respondent that the Joint Arbitrators, both gentlemen of unimpeachable integrity after full hearing reached their findings and/or conclusions on question of facts. There is no question of law as such involved in the matter. The Joint Arbitrators as they were entitled to do finally adjudicated on the factual issues. 35. It has been further submitted that no challenge can possibly be raised in proceedings under s. 30 with regard to factual matters. The Court in exercise of its jurisdiction does not enter into a re-appraisal of factual elements in an application for setting aside the award under s. 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. 36. In fact, the CTU unit which could not be transported was in use in Trichna base, Agartala till 26th April, 1990. The other unit namely N2 unit was mobilised by the claimant from Madras and transported to Haldia in time for use at SME-4 Well. Thus in our opinion the petitioner is entitled to be paid for all the four equipments upto 12th October, 1990. 37. The other unit namely N2 unit was mobilised by the claimant from Madras and transported to Haldia in time for use at SME-4 Well. Thus in our opinion the petitioner is entitled to be paid for all the four equipments upto 12th October, 1990. 37. The said finding is purely a question of fact and no proposition of law has been enunciated by the arbitrators in their award which has been shown to be unsound. 38. In the circumstances noted the doctrine of error apparent on the face of the award does not apply. One of the decisions which have been cited on behalf of the petitioner is the case of State of Rajasthan vs. Puri Construction Ltd. reported in (1994) 6 SCC 485 . The said decision, in my view, does not really assist the petitioner. In fact, G. N. Ray, J. speaking for the Supreme Court in paragraph 31 of the said judgement at page 502 held and observed as follows :- "A court of competent jurisdiction has both right and duty to decide the lis presented before it for adjudication according to the best understanding of law and facts involved in the lis by the judge presiding over the Court. Such decision even if erroneous either in factual determination or application of law correctly, is a valid one and binding inter parties. It does not therefore stand to reason that the Arbitrator's award will be per se invalid and inoperative for the simple reason that the Arbitrator has failed to appreciate the facts and has committed error in appreciating correct legal principle in passing the award. An erroneous decision of a Court of law is open to judicial review by way of appeal or revision in accordance with the provisions of law. Similarly, an award rendered by an Arbitrator is open to challenge within the parameters of several provisions of the Arbitration Act. Since the Arbitrator is a Judge by choice of the parties, and more often than not, a person with little or no legal background the adjudication of disputes by an arbitration by way of an award can be challenged only within the limited scope of several provisions of the Arbitration Act and the legislature in its wisdom has limited the scope and ambit of challenge to an award in the Arbitration Act. Over the decades, judicial decisions have indicated the parameters of such challenge consistent with the provisions of the Arbitration Act. By and large the Courts have disfavoured interference with arbitration award on account of error of law and fact on the score of misappreciation and misreading of the materials on record and have shown definite inclination to preserve the award as far as possible. As reference to Arbitration of disputes in commercial and other transactions involving substantial amount has increased in recent times, the Courts were impelled to have fresh look on the ambit of challenge to an award by the arbitrator so that the award does not get undesirable immunity. In recent times error in law and fact in passing an award has not been given the wide immunity as enjoyed earlier, by expanding the import and implication of 'legal misconduct' of an Arbitrator so that award by the Arbitrator does not perpetrate gross miscarriage of justice and the same is not reduced to mockery of a fair decision of the lis between the parties to Arbitration. Precisely for the aforesaid reasons, the erroneous application of law constituting the very basis of the award and improper and incorrect findings of fact, which without closer and intrinsic scrutiny, are demonstrable on the face of the materials on record, have been held, very rightly, as legal misconduct rendering the award as invalid. It is necessary however to put a note of caution that in the anxiety to render justice to the party to arbitration, the Court should not reappraise the evidences intrinsically with a close scrutiny for finding out that the conclusion drawn from some facts, by the Arbitrator is, according to the understanding of the Court, erroneous. Such exercise of power which can be exercised by an Appellate Court with power to reverse the finding of fact, is alien to the scope and ambit of challenge of an award under the Arbitration Act. Where the error of finding of facts having a bearing on the award is patent and is easily demonstrable without the necessity of carefully weighing the various possible viewpoints, the interference with award based on erroneous finding of fact is permissible. Where the error of finding of facts having a bearing on the award is patent and is easily demonstrable without the necessity of carefully weighing the various possible viewpoints, the interference with award based on erroneous finding of fact is permissible. Similarly, if an award is based by applying a principle of law which is patently erroneous, and but for such erroneous application of legal principle, the award could not have been made, such award is liable to be set aside by holding that there has been a legal misconduct. on the part of the Arbitrator. In ultimate analysis, it is a question of delicate balancing between the permissible limit of error of law and fact and patently erroneous finding easily demonstrable from the materials on record and application of principle if law forming the basis of the award which is patently erroneous. It may be indicated here that however objectively the problem may be viewed, the subjective element inherent in the judge deciding the problem, is bound to creep in and influence the decision. By long training in the art of dispassionate analysis, such subjective element is, however, reduced to minimum. Keeping the aforesaid principle in mind, the challenge to the validity of the impugned award is to be considered with reference to judicial decisions on the subject." 39. The disputes with regard to the factual aspect which have been raised by the petitioner are not open to challenge in an application under s. 30 of the Act. The jurisdiction which is exercised by the Courts in such an application is a limited jurisdiction. The limitations are prescribed by s. 30 itself, the opening words of which make it clear that, "............ an award shall not be set aside ............" except on the three statutorily prescribed grounds. In interpreting the section, the Courts have laid down that if the Arbitrator reaches a wrong conclusion on facts or in his appreciation of facts, the award in such a case is not liable to be set aside. The Court does not exercise an appellate jurisdiction and will decline to examine questions on the merits on the case and will not sit in appeal over the factual conclusions arrived at by the Arbitrator by re-examining and re-assessing, the materials in evidence that were before him. 40. The Court does not exercise an appellate jurisdiction and will decline to examine questions on the merits on the case and will not sit in appeal over the factual conclusions arrived at by the Arbitrator by re-examining and re-assessing, the materials in evidence that were before him. 40. Several decisions have been cited on behalf of the respondent which are mentioned hereinbelow :- (1) Union of India vs. N. P. Singh reported in AIR 1962 Cal 594 . (2) Hindustan Tea Company vs. K. Sashikant and Company reported in AIR 1987 SC 81 . (3) Sudarshan Trading Company vs. Government of Kerala reported in AIR 1989 SC 890 . (4) Port of Madras vs. ECC Limited reported in AIR 1995 SC 2423 . 41. In a case of Union of India vs. N. P. Singh reported in AIR 1962 Cal 594 where P.B. Mukherji, J. as He then was, sitting in the Division Bench of this Court held and observed as follows : "It is necessary to emphasise that in an application to set aside the award ............ The Court does not and should not make a roving and sifting investigation of the entire records and proceedings and constitute itself as a regular Court of Appeal, as if it were hearing the usual ordinary appeal from a lower Court. Such a course and such an attitude will defeat the very purpose of the principles of arbitration where parties select their private forum to be bound by their decision." 42. In a case of Hindustan Tea Co. vs. K. Sashikant & Co. reported in AIR 1987 SC 81 , where Misra, J. held and observed as follows : "The award is not open to challenge on the ground that the Arbitrator has reached a wrong conclusion or has failed to appreciate facts." 43. In a case of Sudarshan Trading Co. vs. State of Kerala reported in AIR 1989 SC 890 where Sabyasachi Mukherji, J. as He then was, held and observed as follows :"Appraisement of evidence by the Arbitrator is never a matter which the Court question and considers. The Arbitrator is the sole Judge of the quality as well as the quantity of the evidence and it will not be for the Court to take upon itself the task of being a Judge on the evidence............ " 44. The Arbitrator is the sole Judge of the quality as well as the quantity of the evidence and it will not be for the Court to take upon itself the task of being a Judge on the evidence............ " 44. In a case of Port of Madras vs. ECC Ltd. reported in AIR 1995 SC 2423 where Jeevan Reddy, J. held and observed as follows : "............ We are, of course, of the firm opinion that it was not open to the Division Bench to reappraise the evidence/materials ............ and come to a different finding of fact." 45. The award has been challenged also on the ground that the terms of the contract has been misconstrued by the Arbitrators. There cannot be any dispute that it was within the jurisdiction of the Arbitrators to decide questions relating to construction of the contract. On this aspect the Arbitration Clause is very clear. In view of the plain words, the Arbitrators are clearly empowered to construe the contract and in arriving at their conclusion in that behalf, it cannot be said that they committed any error at all. 46. This question has also been settled by the decision of the Supreme Court in a case of Food Corporation of India vs. Joginderpal Mohinderpal reported in AIR 1989 SC 1263 wherein Sabyasachi Mukharji, J., as He then was, held and observed inter alia in paragraph 9 of the said judgment at page 1268 as follows : "The Arbitrator had construed the effect of Cl. g(i) of the contract as mentioned hereinbefore. It cannot be said that such a construction is a construction which is not conceivable or possible. If that is the position assuming even for the argument that there was some mistake in the construction, such a mistake is not amenable to be corrected in respect of the award by the Court. This was a fair order after considering all the records. The conclusion arrived at by the arbitrators a plausible conclusion. The Court has, in our opinion, no jurisdiction to interfere or modify the award in the manner sought for by the appellant and in the manner done by the learned Subordinate Judge in the first instance in this case. This was a fair order after considering all the records. The conclusion arrived at by the arbitrators a plausible conclusion. The Court has, in our opinion, no jurisdiction to interfere or modify the award in the manner sought for by the appellant and in the manner done by the learned Subordinate Judge in the first instance in this case. In that view of the matter, the learned Additional District Judge was justified in correcting the order of the learned Subordinate Judge and the High Court was also justified in not interfering with the order of the Additional District Judge. The award on the aspect canvassed before us by Dr. L. M. Singhvi is a plausible construction of Cl. g(i) of the contract. It cannot, in our opinion, be interfered with either on the ground that there was error apparent on the face of the award or on the ground that the Arbitrator has misconducted himself in not giving the effect to the penal rate as contemplated under Cl. g(i) of the contract referred to hereinbefore in the award". 47. In fact, the same view has been reiterated in Sudarshan Trading Co.'s case (supra) by Sabyasachi Mukherji, J., as He then was, the following effect : "Once there is no dispute as to the contract, what is the interpretation of the contract is a matter for the Arbitrator and on which the Court cannot substitute its own decision." 48. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and considering the settled law on the point in my view the award passed by the learned Arbitrators does not call for any interference by this Court. Accordingly, the application for setting aside the award is dismissed. The cost will abide by the result of the decree. 49. The stay prayed for on behalf of the applicant is refused. The judgment upon award matter will appear in the list next Thursday, i.e. 10th October, 1996. Application dismissed.