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1996 DIGILAW 407 (ALL)

Balaji Oil And Ice Industries v. Divisional Level Sales Tax Exemption Committee

1996-04-04

B.M.LAL, D.S.SINHA

body1996
Judgment : B. M. Lal, J. 1. By this petition, the petitioner seeks a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 29.5.93 whereby the Divisional Level Committee in the review jurisdiction rejected the petitioner's review application denying the benefit of exemption to the petitioner under Section 4A of Trade Tax Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. The short facts leading to this petition are as under : The petitioner has installed a new unit under the name and style of M/s. Sri Balaji Oil and Ice Industries at village Bhadrauli, Tehsil Bah, District Agra for the manufacture and sale of mustard oil and ice candies. According to petitioner, it applied for exemption under Section 4A of the Act and the same was granted from the date of registration of the Unit dated 12.6.89 under the Factories Act. The petitioner, therefore, made a review application and prayed for grant of exemption from the date of application or from the date of first sale, i.e., 27.3.89. The review application of the petitioner has been rejected by the Divisional Level Committee vide impugned order dated 29.5.93, hence this petition. 3. Shri Rakesh Ranjan Agrawal for the petitioner states that the production of mustard oil started on 10.3.1989 and first sale took place on 27.3.1989. 4. The petitioner applied for registration under the Factories Act on 27.3.1989 and the registration was accorded on 12.6.89. Therefore, it is contended that the exemption from payment of trade tax should have been granted under Section 4A of the Act with effect from 27.3.89 but the exemption has been granted with effect from 12.6.89, i.e., from the date of registration under the Factories Act. While filing counter-affidavit, the respondent-State emerged with the plea that indeed the petitioner had applied for registration under the Factories Act on 27.3.89 but his application was defective inasmuch as the application had not been made in accordance with the provisions of the Factories Act. Therefore, the date of submitting the application, i.e., 27.3.89 cannot be taken into account. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 6. According to the Explanation inserted in sub-section (6) of Section 4A of the Act, registration under the Factories Act, 1948 is also one of the requirements for seeking exemption from payment of trade tax under Section 4A. Therefore, the date of submitting the application, i.e., 27.3.89 cannot be taken into account. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 6. According to the Explanation inserted in sub-section (6) of Section 4A of the Act, registration under the Factories Act, 1948 is also one of the requirements for seeking exemption from payment of trade tax under Section 4A. This provision reads as under : "(b) (i) which is registered under the Factories Act, 1948 ; or (ii) an application for registration in respect whereof has been made under that Act ; or Thus, from the perusal of the above referred Explanation clauses (b) (i) and (ii), the language used therein envisages that the unit must have been registered under the Factories Act, 1948 or an application in respect thereof must have been made. Here the application means a valid application and not a defective application. In the instant case, since the finding recorded by the authorities is that the application made on 27.3.89 for registration under the Factories Act, was defective and, thus, was not valid application, hence, in our opinion, petitioner was not entitled to the exemption from the date of application, Le., 27.3.89. However, subsequently, when petitioner removed the defects and his application became valid application, the same was considered and the registration was granted on 12.6.89 and from this date, the petitioner is entitled to the exemption. 7. Shri Rakesh Ranjan Agrawal, learned counsel for the petitioner then submitted that the provisions of Explanation (b) (i) and (ii) inserted in subsection (6) quoted above are not mandatory but directory in nature and, therefore, from the date of first sale which admittedly took place on 27.3.89, the petitioner is entitled to seek the benefit of Section 4A of the Act. For this proposition, he strongly relied on the decision rendered by Division Bench of this Court in M/. Sahu Stone Crushing Industries v. Divisional Level Committee, 1994 UPTC 1. Having perused this decision, we are of the opinion that the conclusion arrived at by the court was that the above referred provisions are not mandatory but directory. However, no ratio to that effect has been laid down discussing the point in issue how the above referred provisions are directory and not mandatory. 8. In our considered opinion, it is that ratio which binds the court and not the conclusion arrived at. However, no ratio to that effect has been laid down discussing the point in issue how the above referred provisions are directory and not mandatory. 8. In our considered opinion, it is that ratio which binds the court and not the conclusion arrived at. The conclusion arrived at in M/s. Sahu Stone Crushing Industries (supra) is, therefore, not binding on us. Since there is no discussion about the ratio (See S. P. Gupta and Others v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149 ). We may point out that one of the well-accepted tests for deciding as to whether a particular provision is mandatory or directory is to see whether the enactment provides for the consequences of non-compliance with the said provision and if the consequences are provided, the provision would be deemed to be mandatory. In the instant case, the consequences provided for noncompliance with the provisions of Explanation to sub-sections (6) (b) (i) and (ii) of Section 4A of the Act is that no exemption shall be granted. 9. Thus, a bare reading of this provision referred to above ex facie demonstrates that registration of the unit under Factories Act or a valid application for registration under the Factories Act is a condition precedent for seeking exemption under Section 4A of the Act. If neither the valid application for registration is made nor registration is granted, the unit-holder cannot be granted benefit of Section 4A of the Act. 10. Thus, the consequence flowing from non-compliance with the requirement prescribed under Explanation inserted in sub-sections (6) (b) (i) and (ii) of Section 4A of the Act is that in the absence of any one of the two conditions referred to above, i.e., (i) and (ii), the unit-holder is not entitled to the benefit of exemption and, therefore, the provisions are mandatory and not directory. The submission made by Shri Rakesh Ranjan Agrawal has, therefore, no force and it is accordingly repelled. At this stage, the learned Standing Counsel Shri V. K. Pandey pointed out that the matter in issue in M/s. Sahu Stone Crushing Industries (supra) is sub-judice before the Apex Court and the operation of that judgment has been stayed by the Apex Court in S.I.P. Therefore, that decision is not binding on this Court. 11. At this stage, the learned Standing Counsel Shri V. K. Pandey pointed out that the matter in issue in M/s. Sahu Stone Crushing Industries (supra) is sub-judice before the Apex Court and the operation of that judgment has been stayed by the Apex Court in S.I.P. Therefore, that decision is not binding on this Court. 11. Since we have already opined that it is the ratio which binds the court and not the conclusion, therefore, the decision rendered in M/s. Sahu Stone Crushing Industries (supra) is of no avail for the present petitioner on that court besides its operation being stayed by the Apex Court. 12. Thus, from the aforegoing discussion, we are of the opinion, that the registration under the" Factories Act or submission of a valid application is must for taking the benefit of Section 4A of the Act. Since none of these conditions has been complied with by the petitioner, therefore, the impugned order passed by the Divisional Level Committee granting exemption to the petitioner with effect from the date of registration, i.e., 12.6.89 does not warrant any interference by this Court. The petition thus has no merits and it is accordingly dismissed.