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1996 DIGILAW 413 (KAR)

K. B. MACHAISH v. AJJITTIRA S. MANDANNA

1996-07-24

M.B.VISHWANATH

body1996
M. B. VISHWANATH, J. ( 1 ) THIS is defendant's second appeal filed under S: 100 of the C. P. C. ( 2 ) THE plaintiffs filed the suit O. S. No. 288/1978 on the file of the Additional Munsiff, Madikeri, Kodagu, against the defendant for declaration that the plaintiffs are entitled to manage Sri Rama Touring Talkies belonging to the defendant till the end of April 1979. ( 3 ) THE plaintiffs further prayed for permanent injunction to restrain the defendant from interfering with the possession and management of the above said touring talkies till the end of April 1979. ( 4 ) ALTERNATIVELY, the plaintiffs prayed for damages of Rs. 10,000/- against the defendant. ( 5 ) THE sum and substance of the plaintiffs' case is that the defendant, having allowed the plaintiffs to manage the talkies as per Ex. P-I, has been trying to interfere with the plaintiffs' management of the touring talkies. ( 6 ) THE defendant has admitted Ex. P-I. But he has denied the case of the plaintiffs. He has stated in the written statement that the agreement Ex. P. 1 is opposed to law. ( 7 ) SUBSEQUENT to the filing of the suit, the defendant has somehow managed to get the licence to run the touring talkies cancelled. ( 8 ) IN view of this subsequent event, the trial Court did not grant the declaration and injunction prayed for and decreed the suit for damages of Rs. 10,000/- against the defendant. ( 9 ) THE defendant preferred appeal in R. A. No. l6/1983 on the file of the Civil Judge, Madikeri, Kodagu. The learned Civil Judge, by his judgment dt/- 29-10-1985 dimissed the appeal filed by the defendant. 10,000/- against the defendant. ( 9 ) THE defendant preferred appeal in R. A. No. l6/1983 on the file of the Civil Judge, Madikeri, Kodagu. The learned Civil Judge, by his judgment dt/- 29-10-1985 dimissed the appeal filed by the defendant. ( 10 ) THE defendant has filed the present Regular Second Appeal under S. 100 of the C. P. C. ( 11 ) THE two substantial questions framed by this Court on 3-2-1986 while admitting the appeal are:1) Is the view of the lower appellate Court that S. 40 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 would be applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case is correct in law when the suit of the plaintiff for grant of either permanent or mandatory injunction has been found not tenable ?2) Is the view expressed by the trial Court that the plaintiff is entitled to damages in view of the breach of contract made by the defendant-appellant in view of the defendant-appellant having not obeyed the order of the Court is correct without there being any basis for computation of the amount of damages? ( 12 ) SECTION 40 (1) of the Specific Relief Act clearly says that in a suit for perpetual injunction, the plaintiff may claim damages either in addition to, or in substitution for, such injunction and the Court may, if it thinks fit, award such damages. ( 13 ) AS I have set out above, the plaintiffs have claimed relief of damages alternatively. Section 40 (1) of the Specific Relief Act is clear as day light. The plaintiff is entitled to claim damages in addition to perpetual or mandatory injunction. ( 14 ) SO I hold that the view taken by the first appellate Court is correct. ( 15 ) NOW I take up the second substantial question of law framed by this Court. Ex. P.-40 is the order passed by the District Magistrate on the application filed by the defendant. Ex. P-40 is dt. 21-10-1978. As per Ex. P.-40, the licence to run the above said touring talkies was cancelled. This was done at the instance of the defendant, though he had executed Ex. P-I in favour of the plaintiffs and though the plaintiffs were entitled to run the touring talkies up to the end of April 1979. Ex. P-40 is dt. 21-10-1978. As per Ex. P.-40, the licence to run the above said touring talkies was cancelled. This was done at the instance of the defendant, though he had executed Ex. P-I in favour of the plaintiffs and though the plaintiffs were entitled to run the touring talkies up to the end of April 1979. It is clear that the defendant just to annoy the plaintiffs got the licence cancelled He did not disclose when he filed the written statement that he got the licence cancelled. ( 16 ) THE plaintiffs, during the pendency of the suit in the trial Court, obtained temporary injunction order preventing the defendant from interfering with the management of the talkies. In spite of this temporary injunction, the defendant got the licence cancelled putting forward some lame excuse before the District Magistrate. Taking into consideration the conduct of the defendant, the learned Munsiff awarded damages of Rs. 10,000/ -. ( 17 ) THE learned Munsiff has referred to the evidence of the defendant himself who has stated that the plaintiffs would have earned profit of more than Rs. 25,000/- if they had exhibited good films upto April 1979. ( 18 ) IT is argued by the learned counsel for the appellant-defendant that there is no basis for awarding the damages by the Courts below in favour of the plaintiffs against the defendant. I have already stated that the defendant himself has stated that the plaintiffs would have earned a profit of Rs. 25,000/- if they had been permitted to manage the talkies till the end of April 1979. ( 19 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, I hold the second substantial question of law framed by this Court in the affirmative, in favour of the respondents-plaintiffs. ( 20 ) IT is argued by the learned counsel for the appellant-defendant that the agreement Ex. P-1 is opposed to the Karnataka Cinemas (Regulation) Act, 1964, and the Karnataka Cinemas (Regulation) Rules, 1971. The trial Court, with which the first appellate Court agreed, has extracted S. 9 of the Act and held that it applies only in case of transfer of licence and not in case of management. I also agree with the interpretation put by the Courts below. I therefore reject the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant-defendant. ( 21 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, this second appeal is dismissed. I also agree with the interpretation put by the Courts below. I therefore reject the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant-defendant. ( 21 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, this second appeal is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, each party to bear his own costs in this Court. Appeal dismissed. --- *** --- .