JUDGMENT J.N. Dubey, J. This miscellaneous appeal is directed against the order dated 14th January 1980 of the Sub Judge Madhepura refusing to set aside the abatement of the suit the appellants under Order 22 Rule 9 C.P.C. 2. It appears that the appellants filed Title Suit No. 50 of 1963 in the court of Sub Judge Madhepura for partition of the property in dispute. Defendant No. 1, Laxmi Mandal, died during pendency of the suit on 6.3.1965. The appellants moved an application on 15th March 1965 praying that the name of Laxmi Mandal be deleted from the says of parties and his sons, Ramji Mandal and Ramsaran Mandal, who were already on record, be substituted in his place, which was allowed. On 12.7.1971 the appellants moved an application stating that Laxmi Mandal had left behind five more heirs his widow and four daughter, who could not be included in the application dated 15th March 1965 through some inadvertence. It was prayed that they should also be substituted in suit in place of Laxmi Mandal. On 14.7.1971 they moved an application under section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing the second substitution application, claiming that the plaintiff no.1 Jai Kishun Mandal who had been doing Pairvi in the case developed some insanity and, therefore, could not mention the names of al the heirs of Laxmi Mandal in the first substitution application. The respondents filed counter affidavit on the same day stating that the delay in filing the second substitution application was not properly explained and, therefore, the application was liable to be rejected. On 14.7.1971 all the remaining heirs of deceased Laxmi Mandal were also directed to be substituted in his place. The respondents filed Civil Revision no. 889 or 1971 in this Court, which was allowed on 10.1.1975 and the court below was directed to consider the application of the appellants afresh treating it to be an application under Order 22 Rule 4 C.P.C. The court below, accordingly, heard the application afresh and dismissed it on 14.1.1980. Feeling aggrieved the appellants have filed this appeal. 3. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. Feeling aggrieved the appellants have filed this appeal. 3. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 4 Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the court below was not legally just fied in refusing to condone the delay in filing the second substitution application and rejecting the application in the facts and circumstances of the case. I find substance in the argument of the learned counsel. The appellants apart from filing several medical prescriptions also examined as may as twelve witnesses in support of their claim that the plaintiff no. 1 Jai Kishun Mandal, who had been doing pairvi in the case, developed some insanity during that period. The Court below rejected the application for condonation of dely with the observation that in view of the fact that no witness was examined to prove the medical prescription the same were inadmissible in evidence. Regarding oral evidence it observed oral evidence has been tendered on behalf of the defendants, whereby the case as set up by virtue of oral evidence led on behalf of the plaintiffs, has categorically been denied.” 5. In my opinion the court below has adopted a wholly wrong approach in dealing with the evidence of the parties. Even assuming that the medical prescriptions, not having been proved in accordance with law, were inadmissible in evidence, the application of the appellants for condonation of delay could not be legally rejected without considering their oral evidence in detail. Statements of twelve witnesses products by the appellants could not be legally ignored merely because the respondents had also produced few witnesses in support of their case. In my opinion, the court below was not legally justified in refusing to condone the delay in the facts and circumstances of this case. Moreover, it is now well settled that lenient view should be taken in the matter of condonation of delay. 6. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another Vs, Mst. Kantji and others (1987) 2 Supreme Court Cases 107, the supreme Court held as under:– “The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the India Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on merit! Kantji and others (1987) 2 Supreme Court Cases 107, the supreme Court held as under:– “The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the India Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on merit! The expression “sufficient cause” employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manger which sub-serves the ovds of justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been marking a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierology. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that : 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appellate. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. “Every day’s delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why no every hour’s delay, every second’s delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a no-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.” 7. In this case, as stated above, two heir of the deceased has already been brought on record within the prescribed period of limitation and, therefore, question of the suit abatig against the deceased did not arise. In this case, as stated above, two heir of the deceased has already been brought on record within the prescribed period of limitation and, therefore, question of the suit abatig against the deceased did not arise. In Daya Ram and others Versus Shyam Sndary and others ( AIR 1965 SC 1049 ) it was held that where a plaintiff or an appellant after diligent and bona fide enquiry ascertains who is the legal representatives of a deceased defendant or respondent are and brings them on record within the time limited by law, there is no abatement of the suit or appeal, the impleaded legal representatives sufficiently represent the estate of the deceased and a decision obtained with them on record will bind not merely those impleaded but the entire estate including those not brought on record. In a case where the person brought on record is a legal representative it would be consonant with justice and principle that in the absence of fraud or collusion the bringing on record of such a legal representative is sufficient to prevent the suit or the appeal from a aying. 8. This view was reiterated by the Supreme Court in several subsequent decisions. In Jagarnath Singh Versus Smt. Singhashan Kaur and other (1984 PLJR 217) a Full Bench of this Court after discussing entire case law on the point held as under– “From the discussions of he several Supreme Court decisions made above, it emerges that when one or ore heirs of the deceased defendant or respondent are on record, then the estate is fully represented in the suit or the appeal, as the case may be, and the suit or appeal will not abate for not bringing on record the other left out side. This will also include a case where some of the heirs at their own initiative are brought on the record of the case. Such heirs, who applied for bringing on record, would represent the entire estate. It may also include a case where through oversight on account of such doubt as to who the heirs are, any heir is left but to be brought on record, still the estate of the deceased is fully represented by the heirs brought on record. The left out heirs may subsequently apply to be brought on record, but there will be no abatement. The left out heirs may subsequently apply to be brought on record, but there will be no abatement. The aforesaid propositions are, however, qualified by the following exceptions:– (i). Where the heirs on record collude with the plaintiff or the appellants. (ii). Where a special case could have been put forward by the left out heirs and they did not get an opportunity to present such cause in the proceeding; and (iii). Where there is an act of deliberate omission to include an heir while bringing the other heirs on record which may be said to be mala fide.” 9. In view of the fact that the suit did not abate under Order 22 Rule 4 CPC it is not necessary, for me to record a detailed finding in favour of the appellants under section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act. 10. In the results the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The order of the court below is set aside and it is directed to decide the suit on merit after substituting the remaining heirs of deceased Laxmi Mandal in his place. No order as to costs. Appeal allowed.