JUDGMENT N.K. Jain, J. 1. In all the aforesaid four miscellaneous cases, the Commissioner of Income-tax, Bhopal, has filed applications under Section 256(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (for short, "the Act"), seeking a direction to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Indore, to state the cases and refer the proposed common questions of law, as extracted below for the opinion of this court : "1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in law in holding that the legal fiction of treating a registered firm as unregistered firm as provided in Section 271(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, has to be carried to its logical end so far as it relates to levy of penalty under Section 271(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ? 2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was correct in law in holding that for the purpose of levy of penalty the amount of advance tax paid by the registered firm should be computed in the manner as to what would have been the amount of advance tax, had it been an unregistered firm and the amount of advance tax should be deducted from the tax computed on the total income treating the firm as unregistered firm ?" 2. The assessee is a registered firm which was levied with penalties by the Assessing Officer for late submission of returns for the assessment years 1981-82 to 1984-85 by three separate orders passed on March 24, 1983 (for the assessment years 1981-82 and 1982-83), March 8, 1985 (for the assessment year 1983-84), and June 24, 1986 (for the assessment year 1984-85). All these orders were challenged successfully by the assessee firm in appeal before the Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax, Indore, who by a common order dated February 3, 1992, deleted the penalties holding that the assessee was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the returns in time. The order of the Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) was confirmed in second appeal by the Tribunal by a common order dated January 13,1993, passed in ITA Nos. 341/342/343/344/Ind/92. 3. As the Department was not satisfied with the decision of the Tribunal, it moved reference applications under Section 256(1) of the Act, requesting the- Tribunal to state the case and refer the aforesaid questions to this court. 341/342/343/344/Ind/92. 3. As the Department was not satisfied with the decision of the Tribunal, it moved reference applications under Section 256(1) of the Act, requesting the- Tribunal to state the case and refer the aforesaid questions to this court. These applications were also rejected by the Tribunal by a common order dated April 21, 1993, passed in R. A. Nos. 38 to 41/Ind/93 holding that the decision of the Tribunal is based on appreciation of facts and as such it does not give rise to any referable question of law. The Department has, therefore, come up before this court under Section 256(2) of the Act. 4. We have heard Shri D. D. Vyas, learned counsel for the applicant/ Department and Shri S. S. Samvatsar, learned counsel for the non-applicant/assessee. 5. The Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) while allowing appeals of the assessee has in para 8 of his order concluded : "After considering the facts of the case and the submissions of the appellant it is held that there was reasonable cause for the delay in filing the returns of income for the above years." 6. The Tribunal while affirming the aforesaid finding of the Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) observed : "Moreover, it is to be seen that the assessee has paid more advance tax than the assessed tax. This conduct of the assessee evinces that there was sufficient cause for non-finalisation of the accounts, since the assessee would not have caused delay in getting the refunds unless there was compelling reason for the delay." 7. It will be thus seen that the two appellate authorities after considering the facts of the case have concurrently held that there was sufficient cause for not filing of returns in time. This is a finding of fact which as observed by the Tribunal and rightly so, could not be questioned by the Department. Before us also, nothing substantial could be demonstrated by learned counsel for the applicant--Department--that the finding arrived at by the two authorities above was perverse and not supportable by the evidence on record. We are, therefore, satisfied that the order of the Tribunal is based on an appreciation of facts and as such does not give rise to any referable question of law. 8. We, thus, dismiss the reference applications but without any order as to costs. Counsel's fee is, however, fixed at Rs. We are, therefore, satisfied that the order of the Tribunal is based on an appreciation of facts and as such does not give rise to any referable question of law. 8. We, thus, dismiss the reference applications but without any order as to costs. Counsel's fee is, however, fixed at Rs. 750, for each side, in each case, if certified. 9. This order be retained in M.C.C. No. 485 of 1993 and a copy each be placed in the records of M.C.C. Nos. 486 of 1993, 487 of 1993 and 488 of 1993.