K. RAMAMOORTHY ( 1 ) AN interesting question, whether the parties to a suit after filing a memorandum of compromise could resile from it and withdraw the petition on the only ground that they are no longer interested in the compromise and the petition filed by them should be dismissed, arises for consideration in this case. ( 2 ) THE suit was instituted in 1975. Even before that parties had been litigating and the relationship between them was not at all cordial. ( 3 ) THE following pedegree would show the relationship between the parties: ( 4 ) OUT of six brothers four brothers would appear to have started doing business in the grinding of wheat apart from buying and selling wheat and other cereals. The fourth brother established Kumar Roller Flour Mills in the same premises. On 10. 11. 1961 a partnership deed was executed. The following was the holding of shares in the partnership: ( 5 ) THE name of the firm was M/s Ashok Anil and Co. The firm was carrying on the business but a perusal of the pleadings gives me the impression that the business was not doing very well. ( 6 ) THERE was also an other partnership deed dated 28. 02. 1972 ( 7 ) ON account of the fact that the business was not doing well disputes arose between the parties. ( 8 ) ON 06. 12. 1972, Dr. B. D. Kumar and his sons who were holding of 37% shares in the partnership instituted the suit No. 515-A/72 in this court for the appointment of an Arbitrator for the adjudication of the disputes between the partners Shri Harivansh Lal Kumar who is the first defendant in this suit was the first defendant in that suit. The second defendant was Ashok Kumar, third defendant was the wife of Shri Ashok Kumar and the fourth defendant was Fateh Chand Kumar (plaintiff in the present suit ). ( 9 ) ON 05. 04. 1973, the Petitioner in Suit No. 515-A/72 filed a memo of compromise. The compromise was signed by Dr. B. D. Kumar and his family and defendants 1 to 3. Defendant No. 4 Fateh Chand Kumar did not sign the compromise. The application for recording the compromise is in the following terms: 1. ( 9 ) ON 05. 04. 1973, the Petitioner in Suit No. 515-A/72 filed a memo of compromise. The compromise was signed by Dr. B. D. Kumar and his family and defendants 1 to 3. Defendant No. 4 Fateh Chand Kumar did not sign the compromise. The application for recording the compromise is in the following terms: 1. That the plaintiffs in the above suit have arrived a compromise through the intervention of family friends and well-wishers and have settled all their disputes and differences in respect of the partnership firm M/s Ashok, Anil and Co. (hereafter referred to as the firm ), which are the subject matter of the above suit. 2. That the terms and conditions of the compromise are: That defendants Nos 1, 2 and 3 have paid by crossed payee s A/c Bank Drafts and Pay orders drawn in favour of the plaintiffs the following amounts towards their credit balances standing in their names as closing on 31st December, 1971, in the books of accounts of the firm. The amount of Rs. 1,61,932. 00 (Rupees one lakhs sixty one thousand and nine hundred thirty two) as debit balance of Dr. B. D. Kumar H. U. F has been adjusted and stands realised. II) The defendants Nos 1,2 and 3 have delivered to the plaintiff Nos 1 title-deeds relating to the premises No. 31/8 East Patel Nagar, New Delhi, which were given to the New Bank of India, Rajendra Nagar, New Delhi, as a co-lateral security towards the loan raised by Messrs. Kumar Roller Flour Mills from time to time. III) That the Plaintiff No. 1 shall be entitled absolutely to the Fiat Car-Registration No. DLE-4849 as Karta of the H. U. F. consisting of himself and his sons and which is registered in his name and the firm shall have no right title or interest or any lien or claim in respect to the said Car hereafter. Dr. B. D. Kumar is hereby declared to be absolutely entitled to the security deposit of Rs. 2,000. 00 (Rupees two thousand only) which is lying deposit in the Post Office in his name and the Pass Book,d which is lying with Messres Prem Nath Motors Pvt. Ltd. and he shall be entitled to take back the said pass book or utilise the said deposit in any manner he likes. 3. 2,000. 00 (Rupees two thousand only) which is lying deposit in the Post Office in his name and the Pass Book,d which is lying with Messres Prem Nath Motors Pvt. Ltd. and he shall be entitled to take back the said pass book or utilise the said deposit in any manner he likes. 3. In consideration of the said amounts mentioned in Clause I to IV of paragraph 2, the Plaintiffs declare that they have retired from the firm with effect from date of signing and the shares of 37% held by the plaintiffs in the flooring manner that is (Dr. B. D. Kumar as Karta of the said H. U. F. family - 10% Sri Anil Kumar, son of Dr. B. D. Kumar - 9% Rajiv Kumar and Sanjiv Kumar both minor sons of Dr. B. D. Kumar 9% each making together 18% shall stands transferred to and vested in favour of Defendants Nos 1,2 and 3 and the Defendants Nos 1,2 and 3 shall be entitled to allocate the same amongst themselves in such manner and shares as may be determined by them amongst themselves. 4. The Plaintiff s shall not be entitled to any profits or other benefits of the said partnership of Messrs. Ashok Anil and Co. , and shall not be responsible for any loss or liabilities in the said firm for the period after 1st January, 1972. The Defendants Nos 1, 2 and 3 shall be responsible for all losses, if any, and shall also be entitled to receive profits, if any, during the said period in between 1. 1. 1972 to the date of signing the compromise deed. 5. The balance sheets prior to the date 1. 1. 72 have all been settled and all losses and profits on account of plaintiffs realised and adjusted and the responsibility for the repayment of all the outstanding loans on that date shall be exclusively of the defendants. 6. 1. 1972 to the date of signing the compromise deed. 5. The balance sheets prior to the date 1. 1. 72 have all been settled and all losses and profits on account of plaintiffs realised and adjusted and the responsibility for the repayment of all the outstanding loans on that date shall be exclusively of the defendants. 6. The plaintiffs shall not be liable for any debt or claim against or any liability of the firmwhether accused, existing or arising or accuring in future except to the extent of their share as partners in respect of the Income Tax which may be assessed against the firm up to the period ending 31 st December, 1971, for which assessments are pending or may be opened by the Income Tax Department and shall pay their own Income liabilities. The plaintiffs will also be entitled to and shall be paid by the Defendants Nos 1,2 and 3 their shares as partners of the said firm, the sum or sums which may be refunded to the said from the amount of Rs. 81,100. 00 deposited by the said firm with the Income-tax department on account of firm tax for the period ending the 31 st December 1971. The Plaintiffs shall pay their share, if any excess demand is raised by the Income Tax Department for the period ending 31. 12. 1971. The plaintiffs shall have no whatsoever for payment or taxes which the firm may have to pay for the years 1972 and 1973 or thereafter. 7. That the plaintiffs 1 to 4 shall be considered to have retired the partnership of Messrs Ashok, Anil and Co. , with effect from the date of signing this agreement and without affecting the continuity of the firm and shall hereafter cease to have any right, title or interest in the partnership or its assets and goodwill thereafter. The Plaintiffs Nos 1 Dr. Dhagwandas Kumar and on his own behalf and on behalf of other plaintiffs, shall extend his co-operation to the continuing partners of the firm in getting the Income-Tax assessments of the firm completed for the period upto 31 st December, 1971. The Plaintiffs Nos 1 Dr. Dhagwandas Kumar and on his own behalf and on behalf of other plaintiffs, shall extend his co-operation to the continuing partners of the firm in getting the Income-Tax assessments of the firm completed for the period upto 31 st December, 1971. That the continuing partners of the firm shall hereafter be entitled to receive all amounts standing as debits in the account books from all parties, banks, Government Departments or any other organisations in the shape of deposits, securities, advances, consideration of the goods supplied or of any nature, whatsoever The Defendants Nos 1,2 and 3 shall always keep the plaintiffs indemnified or harmless against any loss, damage or liability incurred or which might be incurred after 31. 12. 1971 by the firm. The plaintiff shall not have any right, title or interest in the land, buildings, machinery, stocks or other assets of the firm or its goodwill, 10. That the plaintiff No. 1 has entered into this compromise on his own behalf and also as an attorney of plaintiff No. 2 and also as an guardian of plaintiffs No. 3 and 4. If any of the plaintiffs Nos 2 to 4 shall contest this compromise, then the plaintiff No. 1 shall be liable to indemnify the defendants No. 1 to 3 for any loss or damage or injury caused to defendants Nos 1 to 3. The power of attorney of plaintiff No. 2 in favour of plaintiff No. 1 is attached herewith. 11. The payments mentioned above in this application are made to plaintiffs No. 1 to 4 and Smt. Shanta Kumar are in full and final settlement of all the claims with respect to Joint Hindu Family of plaintiffs, individual of the plaintiff, with respect to the investment made by the plaintiffs and Smt. Shanta Kumar as creditors and also as partners. Nothing is due to the plaintiffs and Smt. Shanta Kumar from the partnership with respect to their debts or share in the partnership. In the aforesaid, premises, the plaintiffs respectfully pray that this Hon ble Court will be pleased to record the compromise arrived at between the plaintiffs on the one hand and defendants Nos 1, 2 and 3 on the other and dismiss the suit as withdrawn without any order as to costs and their compromise be read as part of their order. The receipt about the payments made by drafts to plaintiffs by defendants Nos 1 to 3 is attached herewith. SD/- illegible (Plaintiffs) Dr. B. D. Kumar for self as Karta of HUF and attorney of Plaintiff No, 2, Sri Anil Kumar and as guardian of minor sons, Rajiv Kumar and Sanjiv Kumar. (Defendants ) 1. SD/- Harvanshlal Kumar 2. SD/- Ashok Kumar 3. SD/- Smt. Shobha Kumar. New Delhi Dated: 5th April 1973 The application was numbered as IA No. 883/73 for recording of compromise and for lea veto withdraw the petition under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Dr. B. D. Kumar also filed IA No. 882/73 seeking permission of this court to enter into compromise as it was in the interest of his minor sons. ( 10 ) THE fourth defendant Fateh Chand Kumar (the plaintiff in present Suit) opposed the application. Dr. Vijay Sheel Kumar son of M. L. Kumar (brother of Dr. B. D. Kumar) filed IA No. 253/73 under Order 1 Rule 10 Civil Procedure Code to implead himself as a party and opposed the application for compromise. claiming the rights in the partnership. He also filed IA No. 894/73 praying that his application IA No. 253/73 should be taken up first and disposed of before the compromise is recorded. ( 11 ) ON 24th April 1973, Avadh Behari, J, passed the following order: By this order I propose to dispose of the said four applications. The disputes between the parties may be shortly stated thus: By a deed of partnership dated November 10, 1961, the plaintiffs and the defendants entered into an agreement to carry on the business of Rolling Floor Mills. Subsequently other partnership deeds were executed. the latest deed of partnership is dated February 28, 1972. According to the deed of partnership the shares of the parties are as under:it appears that the partnership business could not be continued. Disputes and differences arose between the partners. On December 6, 1972, the plaintiff made an application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act. In this application the petitioners have made the prayer that the arbitration agreement contained in the deed of partnership dated February 28, 1972 be filed in court under S. 20 of the Arbitration Act and the disputes between the parties be referred to the arbitrator to be appointed by the Court. Other prayers regarding appointment of receiver, injunction etc. In this application the petitioners have made the prayer that the arbitration agreement contained in the deed of partnership dated February 28, 1972 be filed in court under S. 20 of the Arbitration Act and the disputes between the parties be referred to the arbitrator to be appointed by the Court. Other prayers regarding appointment of receiver, injunction etc. have also been made. The defendants filed their reply to the main application. On January 19, 1973, H. L. Anand J. made an interim order. This order was made pending the consideration of the application under S. 20 of the Arbitration Act. By this order K. C. Khanna and Company, Chartered Accountants, were appointed as auditors to prepare the balance sheet and profit and loss account of the firm. The fees of the Chartered Accountant was fixed at Rs. 3000. 00 which was to be paid initially by the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 3 in equal shares. Other directions were issued in this order which were to operate only after the Chartered Accountant had submitted the balance-sheet and profit and loss account. The parties have not paid the fees to the Chartered Accountant and nothing has been done by the Chartered Accountant in the matter of the preparation of the balance-sheet and profit and loss account. On April, 1973, the plaintiffs moved two applications in this court. One application was IA No. 883 of 1973 stating that the plaintiffs and defendants 1 to 3 have arrived at a compromise and that this compromise be recorded and the plaintiffs suit be dismissed as withdrawn. The substance of the compromise as set out in this application is that the plaintiffs have received their share in the partnership and that they have obtained an indemnity from defendants 1 to 3 in respect of any liability which may be found to have been incurred by them or in respect of any amount which may be found due from them to other partners. The other application is IA No. 882 of 1973. In this application it was stated that the partnership business has been sustaining losses for the last five years and, therefore, the compromise is for the benefit of the minor plaintiffs 2 and 3 as it is not in the interests of the minors to carry on business any more. The other application is IA No. 882 of 1973. In this application it was stated that the partnership business has been sustaining losses for the last five years and, therefore, the compromise is for the benefit of the minor plaintiffs 2 and 3 as it is not in the interests of the minors to carry on business any more. The court was asked to give permission to plaintiff No. 1 to enter into this compromise on behalf of the minor plaintiffs 3 and 4. The counsel for the plaintiff has today made a statement in court stating that he does not press his application under Order 23 Rule 1 and 2 for having the compromise recorded. The only think he wishes to do is that he wants permission to withdrawn his main application made under S. 20 of the Arbitration Act. Defendant No. 4 who is admittedly a partner owing 4 per cent share in the partnership business opposes the prayer for withdrawal made by the plaintiffs. Defendant No. 4 has filed his reply and it is submitted that that I should not allow the plaintiffs to withdraw their application. One Doctor Vijay Sheel Kumar has also made an application under order I Rule 10 C. P. C. which is IA 253 of 1973. Subsequently he made another application IA 894 of 1973 in which he has stated that his application under Order 1 Rule 10 be decided first. These are all the four applications which I propose to decide. Mr. Najhawan, the counsel for Doctor Vijay Sheel Kumar at this stage has stated that he wishes to withdraw his two applications IAs 253/73 and 894/73. The two applications are, therefore, dismissed as withdrawn. The only question now left for consideration is: Should I permit the plaintiffs to withdraw their application under S. 20 of the Arbitration Act? Mr. P. P. Rao appearing for defendant No. 4 has strenuously opposed this application. He has submitted that in a partnership suit all the partners stand in the positions of plaintiffs and, therefore, his client, namely, defendant No. 4 may be transposed to the array of the plaintiffs in case the plaintiff s withdraw from the suit. He has submitted that the plaintiffs compromise should not be recorded since this will cause prejudice to the interest of defendant No. 4. I do not agree with this submission. He has submitted that the plaintiffs compromise should not be recorded since this will cause prejudice to the interest of defendant No. 4. I do not agree with this submission. I am not dealing with a partnership suit. The only application before me is an application under S. 20 for reference of the disputes between the partners to arbitration. The plaintiffs do not wish to prosecute this application. It may be that they have no disputes. It may be that they do not want the matter to be referred to arbitration. It may be that they have entered into a compromise and do not wish to raise any dispute before the court. I am not concerned with the motives which have actuated the plaintiffs to make this application for withdrawal. Mr. Rao has referred me to Shri Jagdish Chander Dhawan V. R. S. Amar Nath Mehra ILR 1969 Delhi 816 and Karuna Shanker Dube V Krishna Kant Shukla and others AIR 1972 All. 478 . In both these rulings the courts were concerned with partnership suits. In both these cases the defendants who were partners asked for relief against the plaintiffs. The courts held that in such a case it will not be fair to allow the plaintiffs to withdraw the suit unless notice is issued to the defendants who have raised a claim against the plaintiffs. In a partnership suit it appears that every party is a plaintiff. Order 20 Rule 19, C. P. C. shows that a decree for accounts may be passed in favour of a defendant against the plaintiff. It is, therefore, on the provision of Order 20 Rule 19, C. P. C. that both these decisions can be understood and the principles laid down therein are unexceptionable. The plaintiffs are the dominus litis of their suit. If they do not want their disputes to be referred to arbitrator, this court will not compel them to do so. The second prayer made before me with regard to transposition of defendant No. 4 to the array of the plaintiffs has little substance. There is no bar in the way of defendant No. 4 to make his own separate in pendent application for reference of the disputes to arbitration. In the result, application under S. 20 of the Arbitration Act is dismissed as withdrawn. The counsel for defendant No. 4 prays for costs. There is no bar in the way of defendant No. 4 to make his own separate in pendent application for reference of the disputes to arbitration. In the result, application under S. 20 of the Arbitration Act is dismissed as withdrawn. The counsel for defendant No. 4 prays for costs. In the peculiar circumstances of the case I have decided to leave the parties to bear their own costs. Suit is disposed of accordingly. SD/- Avdah Behari J : April 24, 1973 ( 12 ) THE effect of the agreement between Dr. B. D. kumar and Harivans Lal Kumar and his family was that the family of Harivans lal Kumar became entitled to 96% of the partnership. ( 13 ) EVEN during the pendency of the proceedings in Suit No. 515-A of 1972 the parties were not having any cordial relationship. Why I am referring to this aspect of the case is that even at that time the parties were dealing with each other at arms length and there was no scope for anybody reposing any trust or confidence in the other and subsequent to this if parties had come to some understanding that means that they had considered carefully on what they were bargaining for and it cannot be said that the plaintiffs in this case were over-reached by the other parties. ( 14 ) EVEN after the order dated 24. 04. 1973 in Suit No. 515-A/72 by this court several applications were filed by the parties and final orders were passed by Avadah Behari J on 18. 07. 1974 which put an end to the litigation in Suit No. 515-A of 1972. ( 15 ) THEREAFTER, it would appear that the plaintiff Fateh Chand Kumar filed a Civil Writ Petition No. 855/74 for a direction to the Commissioner Food and Supply and Licencing Authority with a view to causing impediment to defendants 1 to 3 carrying on their business. The main grievance of Fateh Chand Kumar in the Writ Petition was that defendants 1 to 3 had formed a new partnership with the assets of the partnership in which he held a share to the extent of 4%. ( 16 ) DEFENDANTS 1 to 3 by letter dated 2. 4. 1974 apparently provoked by the hostile attitude of the plaintiff called upon the plaintiff to explain as to why he should not be excluded from the partnership. ( 16 ) DEFENDANTS 1 to 3 by letter dated 2. 4. 1974 apparently provoked by the hostile attitude of the plaintiff called upon the plaintiff to explain as to why he should not be excluded from the partnership. The plaintiff sent reply through his counsel on 16. 04. 1974. ( 17 ) THE suit filed by the 9th defendant Dr. Vijay Sheel Kumar vide Suit 219/73 claiming 16% share in the partnership was also pending. In that suit Fateh Chand Kumar who was one of the defendants filed IANo. 905/75 for the appointment of a Receiver. On 23. 04. 1975, learned Single Judge dismissed that petition for the appointment of a Receiver. ( 18 ) IT may also be noticed that Fateh Chand Kumar filed a petition in Suit No. 515-A/72 to transpose himself as a plaintiff. That was rejected by the learned Single Judge and the appeal against that order was dismissed by the Division Bench in limine. ( 19 ) ON the 30th of May 1975, Fateh Chand Kumar presented the plaint in this suit claiming the relief of declaration that the partnership firm M/s Ashok Anil and Company stood dissolved on the 7th day of June 1972 and for taking up accounts of the partnership. 1. Defendant No. 1 Shri Harivansh Lal Kumar son of Sh. Ganesh Das. 2. Defendant No. 2 is Shri Ashok Kumar son of Shri Harivansh Lal Kumar. 3. Defendant No. 3 Smt. Shobha Kumar wife of Sh. Ashok Kumar. 4. Defendant No. 4 M/s Ashok Anil Company. 5. Defendant No. 5 Dr. Bhagwan Das Kumar son of Shri Ganesh Das. 6. Defendant No. 6 Shri Anil Kumar son of Dr. Bhagwan Das Kumar. 7. Defendant No. 7 Master Rajeev Kumar son of Dr. Bhagwan Dass Kumar. 8. Defendant No. 8 Master Sanjeev Das Kumar son of Dr. Bhagwan Das Kumar. 9. and Defendant No. 9 is Dr. Vijay Sheel Kumar son of Shri M. L. Kumar. ( 20 ) IT is not necessary to refer to the averments in the plaint in detail. The various acts of ommission and commission are alleged against defendants 1 to 3 and the plaintiff apprehended that the 9th defendant might not diligently prosecuted his suit No. 219/73 in this court. ( 21 ) ON 3. 10. 1975, the first defendant died. ( 22 ) THE whole year of 1976 was taken for service of notice. The various acts of ommission and commission are alleged against defendants 1 to 3 and the plaintiff apprehended that the 9th defendant might not diligently prosecuted his suit No. 219/73 in this court. ( 21 ) ON 3. 10. 1975, the first defendant died. ( 22 ) THE whole year of 1976 was taken for service of notice. On 04. 07. 1977 the plaintiff Fateh Chand Kumar died. In his place his Legal Representatives were brought on record. The following Pedigree will show the relationship between the plaintiffs:they were substituted as plaintiffs 1 to8. On 18 08. 1978 an order was passed permitting the plaintiff to amend the plaint. On 15. 09. 1978 amended plaint was presented. More or less the same allegations against defendants 1 to 3 were levelled as in the original plaint. Defendants 2 and 3 filed IA No. 31/ 79 for direction to the plaintiff to file amended plaint in accordance with the orders passed by this Court because according to them the amended plaint contended averments not permitted by this court. On 6. 5. 1980, DR (J) passed the following order: Counsel states that there is a possibility of compromise. Let the case be renotified before me for filing terms of compromise on 8th August, 1980. If the compromise talks fail case to be listed before me for admission/denial of documents. The same thing happened in the years 1981, 1982 and 1983. ( 23 ) ON 27. 04. 1984, the JR (A) passed the following order: Compromise talk is said to have failed. Renotify the case for admission/denial of documents on 25th July, 1984. No further opportunity shall be given thereafter for the purpose as this is a very old case. ( 24 ) THE plaintiff filed IA No. 4307/84 under Order 11 Rules 14 and 15 with Section 151 Civil Procedure Code praying for the issuance of directions to the defendants 2 and 3 to file the original documents shown in the list marked A, B and C filed alongwith the application. ( 25 ) ON 31. 10. 1984 IA No. 4307/84 was dismissed by this Court. The learned Single Judge while dismissing the application made the following observations: "certainly the plaintiff has not furnished the particulars of the year for which these books are needed nor it is made clear as to which partnership, these books relate to. ( 25 ) ON 31. 10. 1984 IA No. 4307/84 was dismissed by this Court. The learned Single Judge while dismissing the application made the following observations: "certainly the plaintiff has not furnished the particulars of the year for which these books are needed nor it is made clear as to which partnership, these books relate to. As has already been observed; prior to the dissolution of the partnership deed in the year 1972, the plaintiff is fully aware of the business activities while for the subsequent partnership they had no say in the matter. However, these books of accounts will have to be produced by the defendants before the Local Commissioner, in case Local Commissioner, if any appointed on the conclusion of the present suit. In view of the defective nature of the application, no order can be issued to the defendants for the production of the accounts books as prayed for in the present application which is hereby dismissed. " ( 26 ) THE plaintiff preferred an appeal to the Division Bench and the same was dismissed on 11. 07. 1985. ( 27 ) ON 21. 02. 1986 the Deputy Registrar passed the following order: "counsel for the parties state that they are negotiating for a compromise for which time is sought. For awaiting terms of compromise to be renotified for 24. 03. 1986. " ( 28 ) THE matter came up before the Deputy Registrar on 24. 03. 1986, 25. 05,1986, 04. 09. 1986, 06. 10. 1986 and finally on 15. 12. 1986. ( 29 ) THE plaintiff and defendants 2,3 and 4 filed IA No. 7074/86 praying for a decree in terms of the compromise. The compromise petition is in the following terms: APPLICATION UNDER ORDER 23 RULE 3 READ WITH SECTION 151 C. P. C AS ALSO THE ORIGINAL SIDE RULES OF THE DELHI HIGH COURT. The eight plaintiffs and defendants 2. 3 and 4 most humbly beg to submit as under:- 1. That Shri Fateh Chand Kumar, since deceased, had filed suit No. 588 of 1975 in the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi seeking relief regarding rendition of the accounts of dissolved partnership business known as Messrs. Ashok Anil and Company, defendant No. 4 herein, operating under the name and style of "kumar Roller Flour Mills, "new Delhi. 2. That Shri Fateh Chand Kumar, since deceased, had filed suit No. 588 of 1975 in the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi seeking relief regarding rendition of the accounts of dissolved partnership business known as Messrs. Ashok Anil and Company, defendant No. 4 herein, operating under the name and style of "kumar Roller Flour Mills, "new Delhi. 2. That Shri Fateh Chand Kumar, the sole plaintiff of the said suit No. 588 of 1975 has died intestate leaving his widow plaintiff No. 1, his four sons, plaintiffs 2 to 5 and his three daughters, plaintiffs 6 to 8 as his heirs-at-law. The said eight heirs of Shri Fateh ChandKumar have been brought on the record of this case after his demise and the said eight legal representatives of Shri Fateh Chand Kumar are the plaintiffs of this suit. 3. That in the beginning, the said partnership business operating under the name and style of Messrs. Ashok Anil and Company comprised Shri Harivash Lal Kumar, his son Shri Ashok Kumar, Dr. B. D. Kumar, and Shri Fateh Chand Kumar as the partners. In the said partnership deed/the share of Shri Harivansh Lal Kumar was 22%, the share of Shri Ashok Kumar was 3 7%, the share of Dr. B. D. Kumar was 37% and the share of Shri Fateh Chand Kumar was 4%. Shri Harivansh Lal Kumar, Shri B. D. Kumar and Shri Fateh Chand Kumar were real brothers. Later on Dr. B. D. Kumar, inducted his three sons as partners by dividing his said 37% interest in the business of Messrs. Ashok Anil and Company between himself and his said three sons. However, the share of profits in the said business relating to Dr. B. D. Kumar and his said three sons always aggregated to 37%. 4. That later on Smt. Shobha Kumar, wife of Shri Ashok Kumar and daughter- in-law of Shri Harivansh Lal was also admitted as a partner of the said running business "ashok Anil and Co. " whereby Shri Ashok Kumar transferred 19% out of his 37% share in the said business to Shrimati Shobha Kumar. A partnership deed was then executed on 28. 1. 1972, in which the recorded share of Dr. " whereby Shri Ashok Kumar transferred 19% out of his 37% share in the said business to Shrimati Shobha Kumar. A partnership deed was then executed on 28. 1. 1972, in which the recorded share of Dr. B. D. Kumar and his three sons, was 37% as before, the recorded share of Shri Harivansh Lal was 22 percent as before the recorded share of Shri Ashok Kumar was 18%, the recorded share of Smt. Shobha Kumar was 19% and the recorded share of Shri Fateh Chand Kumar was 4 percent, as before. 5. That Dr. B. D Kumar and his sons had filed arbitration petition under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, after its dissolution by notice dated 7. 6. 1972 given by Shri Harivansh Lal Kumar, defendant No. 1 since deceased through his counsel in this Hon 'ble Court which was registered as Suit No. 515-A of 1972 claiming that accounts of the partnership business Messrs. Ashok Anil and Co. , constituted as above by the partnership deed dated 28. 1. 1972, may be gone into, and the share of Dr. B. D. Kumar and his three sons be separated. In the said suit Dr. B. D. Kumar filed an application dated 24. 4. 1973 stating that he and his three sons had received the huge amounts stated in the said application from Shri Harivansh Lal Kumar, his son Shri Ashok Kumar and Smt. Shobha Kumar in lieu of their 37% right, title and interest in the assets of the business "ashok Anil and Company", and as such the said 37% interest in the said business stood transferred in favour of Shri Ashok Kumar, Shri Harivansh Lal Kumar and Smt. Shobha Kumar. Dr. B. D. Kumar had also then executed stamped receipts, for payment of money to him and his three sons by bank drafts alongwith the last mentioned application. Due to the above, the shares of Shri Harivansh Lal Kumar, his son Shri Ashok Kumar and Smt. Shobha Kumar were augmented to 96% in the assets of Messrs. Ashok Anil and Co. , defendant No. 4 herein and the remaining 4% of the said assets continued to vest in Shri Fateh Chand Kumar as hereto before. In view of the above adjustments suit No. 515-A of 1972 was not persued by Dr. B. D. Kumar, and his three sons after 24. 4. 1973. 6. Ashok Anil and Co. , defendant No. 4 herein and the remaining 4% of the said assets continued to vest in Shri Fateh Chand Kumar as hereto before. In view of the above adjustments suit No. 515-A of 1972 was not persued by Dr. B. D. Kumar, and his three sons after 24. 4. 1973. 6. That thereafter Shri Fateh Chand Kumar filed the present suit for rendition of the accounts of the dissolved firm Ashok Anil and Co. in respect of his 4% share in the said firm against Shri Harivansh Lal and other defendants of this suit, which was registered as suit No. 588 of 1975. 7. That Shri Harivansh Lal Kumar, the original defendant No. 1 died on 3. 10. 1975 leaving him surviving his son Shri Ashok Kumar and his two daughters Smt. Vimla Kanwal and Smt. Raj Sachdeva as his heirs-at law, but Shri Harivansh Lal Sachdeva as his heirs-at-law, but Shn Harivansh Lal Kumar had made a registered will whereby all his estate vested in his son Shri Ashok Kumar as his universal legatee. However, simply with a view to avoid any objections on the ground of non-joinder of proper parties, the plaintiff had also brought them on the record as defendants 1 (B) and 1 (C ). 8. That even though Dr. B. D. Kumar and his sons had already received full consideration in respect of their 37% share in the property of Messrs. Ashok Anil and Company as stated above from Shn Harivansh Lal, his son Shri Ashok Kumar and his daughter-in-law Smt. Shobha Kumar as recorded in the said application dated 24. 4. 1973 and the receipts filed therewith, the said Dr. B. D. Kumar and his three sons were also arrayed as defendants Nos 5 to 8 in this suit as partners of the firm Messrs. Ashok Anil and Co. as recorded in the said partnership deed dated 28. 1. 1972. Furthermore, Dr. Vijay Sheel Kumar, defendant No. 9 had also already filed a separate suit No. 219 of 1973, in the Hon'ble High Court claiming that he was a benami partner in Messrs. Ashok Anil and Company to the extent of 16% share in the said partnership through Shri Harivansh Lal Kumar, his benamidar. Due to the pendency of the said suit Shri Fateh Chand Kumar had also impleaded Shn Vijay Sheel Kumar, as a defendant no. Ashok Anil and Company to the extent of 16% share in the said partnership through Shri Harivansh Lal Kumar, his benamidar. Due to the pendency of the said suit Shri Fateh Chand Kumar had also impleaded Shn Vijay Sheel Kumar, as a defendant no. 9, in the present suit. The suit of Dr. Vijay Sheel Kumar is still pending in this Hon'ble Court. 9. That the contesting defendants to the suit have all along been Shri Harivansh Lal Kumar, the only partners of Messrs. Ashok Anil and Company as operating after the death of Shri Harivansh Lal Kumar. 10. That this compromise has been arrived at between the eight plaintiffs, the representatives in interest of Shri Fateh Chand Kumar, since deceased, the sole original plaintiff and the one hand and the three contesting defendants- Shri Ashok Kumar and Smt. Shobha Kumar and their partnership business Messrs. Ashok Anil and Company on the other hand. 11. That in terms of the said compromise between the parties aforesaid each of the eight plaintiffs-legal representatives of Shri Fateh Chand Kumar, original plaintiff since deceased, shall receive a sum of Rs. 15,000. 00 (Rupees fifteen thousand only) by bank draft as detailed hereunder, being compensation for goodwill and surrending their right, title and interest in block assets of the firm M/s Ashok Anil and Co. in respect of 4% share. By the receipt of the said sum of Rupees fifteen thousand each aggregating to Rs. 1,20,000. 00 (Rupees one lakh and twenty thousand only) in all the 4% right, title and interest of the said eight plaintiffs in the assets of Messrs. Ashok Anil and Co. shall stand transferred in favour of Shri Ashok Kumar and Smt. Shobha Kumar, to the exclusion of all other persons. It is also agreed between the plaintiffs and defendants 2,3 and 4 have also agreed and undertake to keep all the eight plaintiffs harmless and indemnified against all claim and demands pertaining to the firm "ashok Anil and Co". 12. That the defendant Nos 1 (B) and 1 (C) to this suit, the two daughters of Shri Harivabsh Lal Kumar, the brother of Shri Harivansh Lal Kumar namely Dr. B. D. Kumar, the three sons of Dr. B. D. Kumar and Shri Vijay Sheel Kumar, the son of Shri Manohar Lal Kumar, deceased are not parties to this compromise. 12. That the defendant Nos 1 (B) and 1 (C) to this suit, the two daughters of Shri Harivabsh Lal Kumar, the brother of Shri Harivansh Lal Kumar namely Dr. B. D. Kumar, the three sons of Dr. B. D. Kumar and Shri Vijay Sheel Kumar, the son of Shri Manohar Lal Kumar, deceased are not parties to this compromise. However, the plaintiffs being dominus lites state that they do not wish to prosecute this suit any longer in consideration of the receipt before this Hon'ble Court of the said eight bank drafts of Rs. 15,000. 00 each as detailed hereunder. The details of the bank drafts aforesaid are as follows:13. Thatas already stated herein the proforma defendant Dr. Vijay Sheel Kumar has filed Suit No 219 of 1973, for the redress of his claims in respect of firm Ashok Anil and Co That suit is still pending, and it is expressly agreed and declared by and between the eight plaintiffs herein and the defendants Nos 2, 3 and 4 herein, that this compromise shall never be deemed to affect in any manner, any claims and demands of Dr. Vijay Sheel Kumar, nor will the same affect any submissions of defendants 2,3 and 4 in that suit. 14. That Dr B. D. Kumar has also filed suit No. 609 of 1985 regarding the two plots of land on which the flour Mill business Kumar Roller Flour Mills of Ashok Anil and Company is operating, under the name and style of Kumar Roller Flour Mills, Kirti Nagar, New Delhi. The three sons of Dr. B. D. Kumar are also impleaded as parties in the above suit. The last mentioned suit is still pending and the eight plaintiffs and defendants Nos 2,3 and 4 herein expressly agree, declare and record, that this compromise shall not affect in any manner, any claims and demands of either Dr. B. D. Kumar, defendant No. 5 herein, or the submissions of defendants 2,3 and 4 herein in that suit. 15. That this compromise petition has been signed by plaintiffs Nos 1,2,3,4,6 and 8 personally, and the same is also executed on behalf of plaintiffs Nos 5 and 7 by their brother Shri Ishwar Chand Kumar, advocate, plaintiff No. 3 herein, who has been appointed as the General Attorney of the said plaintiffs Nos 5 and 7 by General Powers of Attorney dated 19. 7. 7. 1977 and 11. 8. 1977 respectively. The photostat copies of both the said General Powers of Attornye are also filed alongwith this compromise petition. The plaintiffs 1,2,4, 6 and 8 have also affirmed separate affidavits in support of the said compromise petition, the plaintiff No 3 has also affirmed a similar affidavit on his own behalf, and on behalf of plaintiffs Nos 5 and 7 as their General Power of Attorney. The affidavit by Smt. Kaushalya Devi has been executed by her thumb mark, as she is not literate. The contents of this compromise petition, and her accompanying affidavit have been explained to her by her son Shri I. C. Kumar, Advocate, plaintiff No. 3 herein, and she admits the correctness of the said application and the said affidavit after fully understanding the same. This compromise application and three separate affidavits of defendants 2,3 and 4 in support thereof have been executed and affirmed by the said defendants 2,3 and 4 in the presence of their said counsel. The application for compromise has also been signed by Shri I. C. Kumar, and Shri G. C. Kumar as advocates of plaintiffs, 1,4,5,6,7 and 8 as also on their personal behalf by the said two advocates of the said plaintiffs as well as by the advocates of defendant 2,3, and 4 namely Shri S. R. Bhagat and Shri Avtar Singh. Shri I. C. Kumar and Shri G. C. Kumar, Advocates certify that the plaintiffs have executed this compromise petition in their presence, after fully understanding the contents of the same, and admitting it to be correct and binding on them. In view of the foregoing, it is most humbly prayed that:- A) the plaintiff's suit be decreed in terms of this compromise and the said decree be also ordered to have been fully satisfied in so far as the said plaintiffs 1 to 8 are concerned, in terms of this compromise petition. B) It my also be recorded, that this compromise decree shall not affect the rights of Dr. B. D. Kumar, his three sons, and Dr. Vijay Sheel Kumar, the said proforma defendants as the same shall always be without prejudice to their claims and demands. Further, the claims and demands of Dr. B. D. Kumar and Dr. Vijay Sheel Kumar will be fully determined in the two pending suits Nos. B. D. Kumar, his three sons, and Dr. Vijay Sheel Kumar, the said proforma defendants as the same shall always be without prejudice to their claims and demands. Further, the claims and demands of Dr. B. D. Kumar and Dr. Vijay Sheel Kumar will be fully determined in the two pending suits Nos. 219 of 1973 and 609 of 1985 referred to above, so that all the contentions of the parties in those suits shall remain, and be deemed to remain in tact and unaffected. C) It may also be ordered that the court fee, if any payable on this compromise decree shall be paid by defendants 2,3 and 4 only, and otherwise the parties be left to bear their own cost. Prayed accordingly. Thumb impression SD/- SD/- (Smt. Kaushalya Devi) (G. C. Kumar) (I. C. Kumar) SD/- SD/- SD/- (Ramesh Kumar) (Rattan Chand) (Smt. Susheela Sikri) SD/- SD/- (Smt. Swaran Mehta) ( Smt. Savita Grover) PLAINTIFFS THROUGH SD/- SD/- (G. C. Kumar) (I. C. Kumar) Advocates for plaintiffs 1,4,5,6,7, and 8 SD/- SD/- (Ashok Kumar) (Smt. Shobha Kumar) for ASHOK ANIL and COMPANY SD/- ( Ashok Kumar ) Partner Defendants THROUGH SD/- SD/- (S. R. Bhagat) (Awtar Singh) Advocates for defendants 2,3 and 4. Delhi Dated 14. 12. 1986 In IA 7074 of 1986, it may be noticed that Plaintiff 1 to 8 had signed. Mr. G. C. Kumar and I. C. Kumar had signed in their capacity as advocates for plaintiffs 1,4,5,6,7 and 8. The second defendant and third defendant had signed on behalf of the 4th defendant. Mr. Ashok Kumar had signed as partner, ( 30 ) SMT. Kaushalya Devi the widow of Fateh Chand Kumar had sworn to an affidavit dated 14. 12. 1986 attested before an Oath Commissioner Mr. G. D. Nangia. The contents of the affidavit read as follows: Affidavit of Smt. Kaushalya Devi - Alias Lekhi Bai widow of late Fateh Chand Kumar since deceased resident of 21/27 West Patel Nagar, New Delhi. I, Smt. Kaushalya Devi, above named do hereby solemnly affirm and declare as follows:- 1. That I am plaintiff No. 1 in the above noted case and am conversant with the facts of the same and am able to depose. : 2. I, Smt. Kaushalya Devi, above named do hereby solemnly affirm and declare as follows:- 1. That I am plaintiff No. 1 in the above noted case and am conversant with the facts of the same and am able to depose. : 2. That Fateh Chand Kumar, since deceased, has filed Suit No 588 of 1975 in the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi seeking relief regarding rendition of the accounts of dissolved partnership business known as Ashok Anil and Company, defendant No. 4, herein, operating under the name and style of "kumar Roller Flour Mills", New Delhi. 3. That Shri Fateh Chand Kumar, the sole plaintiff of the said Suit No. 588 of 1975 has died intestate leaving his widow plaintiff No. 1, his four sons, plaintiffs 2 to 5 and his three daughters, plaintiffs 6 to 8 as his heirs-at-law. The said eight heirs of Shri Fateh Chand Kumar have been brought on the record of this case after his demise and the said eight legal representatives of Shri Fateh Chand Kumar are the plaintiffs of this suit. 4. That in the beginning, the said partnership business operating under the name and style of Messrs. Ashok Anil and Company comprised Shri Harivansh Lal Kumar, his son Shri Ashok Kumar, Dr. B. D. Kumar, and Shri Fateh Chand Kumar asthe partners. In the said partnership deed the share of Shri Harivansh Lal Kumar was 22%, the share of Shri Ashok Kumar was 37%, the share of Dr. B. D. Kumar was 37% and the share of Shri Fateh Chand Kumar was 4%. Shri Harivansh Lal Kumar, Shri B. D. Kumar and Shri Fateh Chand Kumar were real brothers later on Dr. B. D. Kumar, inducted his three sons as partners and/or as persons entitled to the benefits of the partnership by dividing his said 37% interest in the business of Messrs Ashok Anil and Company between himself and his said three sons. However, the share of profits in the said business relating to Dr. B. D. Kumar and his said three sons always aggregated to 37%. 5. That later on Smt. Shobha Kumar, wife of Shri Ashok Kumar and daughter- in-law of Shri Harivansh Lal was also admitted as a partner of the said running business "ashok Anil and Co. " whereby Shri Ashok Kumar transferred 19% out of his 37% share in the said business to Shrimati Shobha Kumar. 5. That later on Smt. Shobha Kumar, wife of Shri Ashok Kumar and daughter- in-law of Shri Harivansh Lal was also admitted as a partner of the said running business "ashok Anil and Co. " whereby Shri Ashok Kumar transferred 19% out of his 37% share in the said business to Shrimati Shobha Kumar. A partnership deed was then executed on 28. 1. 1972, in which the recorded share of Dr. B. D. Kumar and his three sons, was 37% as before, the recorded share of Shri Harivansh Lal was 22 per cent as before, the recorded share of Shri Ashok Kumar was 18%, the recorded share of Smt. Shobha Kumar was 19% and the recorded share of Shri Fateh Chand Kumar was 4 per cent, as before. 6. That Dr. B. D. Kumar and his sons had filed arbitration petition under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, after its dissolution by notice dated 7. 6. 1972 given by Shri Harivansh Lal Kumar, defendant No. 1, since deceased, through his counsel, in this Hon'ble Court which was registered as suit No. 515-A of 1972 claiming that accounts of the partnership business Messrs. Ashok Anil and Company, constituted as above by the partnership deed dated 25. 1. 1972, may be gone into, and the share of Dr. B. D. Kumar and his three sons be separated. In the said suit Dr. B. D. Kumar filed an application dated 24. 4. 1973 stating that he and his three sons had received huge amounts stated in the said application from Shri Harivansh Lal Kumar, his son Shri Ashok Kumar and Smt. Shobha Kumar in lieu of their 37% right, title and interest in he assets of the business "ashok Anil and Company" and as such the said 37% interest in the said business stood transferred in favour of Shri Ashok Kumar, Shri Harivansh Lal Kumar and Smt. Shobha Kumar. Dr. B. D. Kumar had also then executed stamped receipts, for payment of money to him and his three sons by bank drafts alongwith the last mentioned application. Due to the above, the shares of Shri Harivansh Lal Kumar, his son Shri Ashok Kumar and Smt. Shobha Kumar were augmented to 96% in the assets of Messrs. Ashok Anil and Company, defendant no. 4 herein and the remaining 4% of the said assets continued to vest in Shri Fateh Chand Kumar as heretofore. Due to the above, the shares of Shri Harivansh Lal Kumar, his son Shri Ashok Kumar and Smt. Shobha Kumar were augmented to 96% in the assets of Messrs. Ashok Anil and Company, defendant no. 4 herein and the remaining 4% of the said assets continued to vest in Shri Fateh Chand Kumar as heretofore. In view of the above adjustments suit No. 515-A of 1972 was not perused by Dr. B. D. Kumar, and his three sons after 24. 4. 1973. 7. That thereafter Shri Fateh Chand Kumar filed the present suit for rendition of the accounts of the dissolved firm Ashok Anil and Co. in respect of his 4% share in the said firm against Shri Harivansh Lal Kumar and other defendants of this suit, which was registered as suit No 588 of 1975. 8. That Shri Harivansh Lal Kumar, the original defendant no. 1 died on 3. 10. 1975 leaving him surviving his son Shri Ashok Kumar and his two daughters Smt. Vimla Kanwal and Smt. Raj Sachdeva as his heirs-at-law, but Shri Harivansh Lal Kumar had made a registered will whereby all his estate vested in his son Shri Ashok Kumar as his universal legatee. However, simply with a view to avoid any objections on the ground of non-joinder of proper parties, the plaintiff had also brought then on the record as defendants 1 (B) and 1 (C ). 9. that even though Dr. B. D. Kumar and his sons had already received fully consideration in respect of their 37% share in the property of Messrs. Ashok Anil and Company as stated above from Shri Harivansh Lal, his son Shri Ashok Kumar and his daughter-in Lal Smt. Shobha Kumar as recorded in the said application dated 24. 4. 1973 and the receipts filed therewith, the said Dr. B. D. Kumar and his three sons were also arrayed as defendants Nos 5 to 8 in this suit as partners of the firm Messrs. Ashok Anil and Company as recorded in the said partnership deed dated 28. 1. 1972. Furthermore, Dr. Vijay Sheel Kumar, defendant No. 9 had also already filed a separate suit No. 219 of 1973, in the Hon'ble High Court claiming that he was a benami partner in Messrs. Ashok Anil and Company to the extent of 16% share in the said partnership through Shri Harivansh Lal Kumar, his benamidar. 1. 1972. Furthermore, Dr. Vijay Sheel Kumar, defendant No. 9 had also already filed a separate suit No. 219 of 1973, in the Hon'ble High Court claiming that he was a benami partner in Messrs. Ashok Anil and Company to the extent of 16% share in the said partnership through Shri Harivansh Lal Kumar, his benamidar. Due to the pendency of the said suit Shri Fateh Chand Kumar had also impleaded Shri Vijay Sheel Kumar, as a defendant No. 9, in the present suit. The suit of Dr. Vijay Sheel Kumar is still pending in this Hon'ble Court. 10. That the contesting defendants to the suit have all along been Shri Harivansh Lal Kumar, deceased, Shri Ashok Kumar and his wife Smt. Shobha Kumar, the only partners of Messrs Ashok Anil and Company as operating after the death of Shri Harivansh Lal Kumar. 11. That this compromise has been arrived at between the eight plaintiffs, the representatives-in-interest of Shri Fateh Chand Kumar, since deceased, the sole original plaintiff on the one hand and the three contesting defendants - Shri Ashok Kumar and Smt. Shobha Kumar and their partnership business Messrs Ashok Anil and Company on the other hand. 12. That in terms of the said compromise between the parties aforesaid each of the eight plaintiffs legal representatives of Shri Fateh Chand Kumar, original plaintiff since deceased, shall receive a sum of Rs. 15,000. 00 (Rupees fifteen thousand only) by bank draft as detailed hereunder, being compensation for goodwill and surrendering their right, title and interest in block assets of the firm M/s Ashok Anil and Company in respect of 4% share. By the receipt of the said sum of Rupees fifteen thousand each aggregating to Rs. 1,20,000. 00 (Rupees one lakh and twenty thousand only) in all the 4% right, title and interest of the said eight plaintiffs in the assets of Messrs. Ashok Anil and Co. shall stand transferred in favour of Shri Ashok Kumar and Smt. Shobha Kumar, to the exclusion of all other persons, it is also agreed between the plaintiff and defendants 2,3 and 4 that all liability of M/s Ashok Anil and Co is to be discharged by defendants Nos 2 to 4, except the individual liability of any plaintiff for the payment of any individual income tax by any plaintiff. The defendants 2,3 and 4 have also agree and undertake to keep all the eight plaintiffs harmless and indemnified against all claims pertaining to the firm "ashok Anil and Co. " 13. That the defendants Nos. 1 (B) and 1 (C) to this suit, the two daughters of Shri Harivansh Lal Kumar, the brother of Shri Harivansh Lal Kumar namely Dr. B. ). Kumar, the three sons of Dr. B. D. Kumar and Shri Vijay Sheel Kumar, the son of Shri Manohar Lal Kumar, deceased are not parties to this compromise. However, to plaintiffs being dominus lites state that they do not wish to prosecute this suit ay longer in consideration of the receipt before this Hon'ble court of the said eight bank drafts of Rs. 15,000. 00 each as detailed hereunder, the details of the bank drafts aforesaid are as follows:- 1166. htm 14. That as already stated herein, the proforma defendant Dr. Vijay Sheel Kumar has filed Suit No. 219 of 1973, for the redress of his claims in respect of firm Ashok Anil and Co. That suit is still pending, and it is expressly agreed and declared by and between the eight plaintiffs herein and the defendants Nos 2, 3 and 4 herein, that this compromise shall never be deemed to affect in any manner, any claims and demands of Dr. Vijay Sheel Kumar, nor will the same affect any submissions of defendants 2,3 and 4 in that suit. 15. That Dr. B. D. Kumar has also filed suit No. 609 of 1985 regarding the two plots of land on which the flour Mill business Kumar Roller Flour Mills of Ashok Anil and Company is operating, under the name and style of Kumar Roller Flour Mills, Kirti Nagar, New Delhi. The three sons of Dr. B. D. Kumar are also impleaded as parties in the above suit. The last mentioned suit is still pending and the eight plaintiffs and defendants Nos 2,3 and 4 herein expressly agree, declare and record, that this compromise shall not affect in any manner, any claims and demands of either Dr. B. D. Kumar, defendant No. 5 herein, or the submissions of defendants 2,3 and 4 herein in that suit. 15 (a ). The defendants 2,3 and 4 will bear and pay the Court fee if any payable on this compromise/decree/suit. 16. B. D. Kumar, defendant No. 5 herein, or the submissions of defendants 2,3 and 4 herein in that suit. 15 (a ). The defendants 2,3 and 4 will bear and pay the Court fee if any payable on this compromise/decree/suit. 16. That the accompanying compromise petition has been signed by plaintiffs Nos 1,2,3,4,6 and 8 personally, and the same is also executed on behalf of plaintiffs Nos 5 and 7 by their brother Shri Ishwar Chand Kumar, advocate, plaintiff No. 3 herein, who has been appointed as the General Attorney of the said plaintiffs Nos 5 and 7 by General Powers of Attorney dated 19. 7. 1977 and 11. 8. 1977 respectively. The photostat copies of both the said General Powers of Attornye are also filed alongwith this compromise petition. The plaintiffs 1,2,4, 6 and 8 have also affirmed separate affidavits in support of the said compromise petition, the plaintiff No 3 has also affirmed a similar affidavit on his own behalf, and on behalf of plaintiffs Nos 5 and 7 as their General Power of Attorney. The affidavit by Smt. Kaushalya Devi has been executed by her thumb mark, as she is not literate. The contents of this compromise petition, and her accompanying affidavit have been explained to her by her son Shri I. C. Kumar, Advocate, plaintiff No. 3 herein, and she admits the correctness of the said application and the said affidavit after fully understanding the same. This compromise application and three separate affidavits of defendants 2,3 and 4 in support thereof have been executed and affirmed by the said defendants 2,3 and 4 in the presence of their said counsel. The application for compromise has also been signed by Shri I. C. Kumar, and Shri G. C. Kumar as advocates of plaintiffs, 1,4,5,6,7 and 8 as also on their personal behalf by the said two advocates ofthe said plaintiffs as well as by the advocates of defendant 2, 3, and 4 namely Shri S. R. Bhagat and Shri Avtar Singh. Shri I. C. Kumar and Shri G. C. Kumar, Advocates certify that the plaintiffs have executed this compromise petition in their presence, after fully understandingthe contents of the same, and admitting it to be correct and binding on them. Shri I. C. Kumar and Shri G. C. Kumar, Advocates certify that the plaintiffs have executed this compromise petition in their presence, after fully understandingthe contents of the same, and admitting it to be correct and binding on them. (THUMB IMPRESSION) DEPONENT VERIFICATION I, Smt. Kaushalya Devi, above named deponent do hereby verify on solemn affirmation that the contents of paras 1 to 16 of the above, my affidavit, are true to my knowledge. Nothing is false and nothing is concealed therefrom. Verified at New Delhi, this 14th day of December 1986. (THUMB IMPRESSION) DEPONENT A perusal ofthe affidavit shows that she had fully understood the matter having been explained by her son and advocate Mr. I. C. kumar, Mr. Gian Chand Kumar has also filed an affidavit. This is also attested before the Oath Commissioner on 14. 12. 1986. ( 31 ) MR. I. C. Kumar advocate also filed an affidavit to the same effect representing his brother Rattan Chand Kumar by virtue of the power of attorney dated 20. 07 1977 duly registered. This affidavit is also dated 14. 12. 1986 attested before the Oath Commissioner Mr. Nangia. Similarly Mr. Ramesh Chand Kumar had sworn to an affidavit dated 14. 12. 1986. ( 32 ) SMT. Susheela Sikri who is plaintiff no. 6 filed similar affidavit which was attested before the same Oath Commissioner Smt. Savita Grover plaintiff no. 8 also filed an affidavit dated 14. 12. 1986 attested before the same Oath Commissioner. ( 33 ) MR. Ashok Kumar, second defendant, had filed an affidavit dated 14. 12. 1986 attested before the same Oath Commissioner Mr. G. D. Nangia. Smt Shobha Kumar wife of Sh. Ashok Kumar also filed an affidavit dated 14. 12. 1986 attested before the same Oath Commissioner. ( 34 ) THEREFORE, on 14. 12. 1986, the parties after due deliberations had agreed to the terms of the compromise and solemnly affirmed the same by filing affidavits in this court and they had entered into an agreement and the plaintiffs had agreed to receive the amount mentioned in the compromise at the time of recording the same by this Court. ( 35 ) THE parties were taking adjournments from time to time without any justification whatsoever on some pretext or the other. ( 36 ) ON 3. 4. 1989 this court noted the death of Dr. B D. kumar the 5th defendant. On 5. ( 35 ) THE parties were taking adjournments from time to time without any justification whatsoever on some pretext or the other. ( 36 ) ON 3. 4. 1989 this court noted the death of Dr. B D. kumar the 5th defendant. On 5. 9. 1989, IA No. 3952/89 for bringing on record the LRs of Dr. B. D. Kumar was ordered by this Court. ( 37 ) DEFENDANTS 5 to8 filed IA No. 125 of 1987 under Order 6 Rule 17 for amendment to the written statement filed. ( 38 ) THEY also filed IA No. 413 of 1987 seeking permission to transpose themselves as plaintiffs. ( 40 ) THE petition was signed by Mr. I. C. Kumar advocate and Mr. G. C. Kumar advocate, on behalf of other plaintiffs and on their own behalf. ( 41 ) TO appreciate the question which has arisen for consideration it is necessary to extract the averments made in the petition which are as under: 1. That the present application by the Legal Representatives of the original plaintiff for repudiating thecompromise arrived at between the applicants LRs of the original plaintiff and defendant Nos 2 and 3 has been necessitated by the fact that it has subsequently been revealed that it was the result of fraudulent misrepresentation by Defendants 2 and 3. The applicants had thought that the present suit, if compromised by all the parties, who are kith and kin of the same family would close the sad chapter of family litigation but it has led to further escalation of litigation. The defendants 2 and 3 suppressed the true and material facts of the affairs of the partnership firm from the applicants inasmuch as they had leased out the partnership assets viz Kumar Roller Flour Mills to Delhi Flour Mills Co. ltd. as early as 5th December 1986 by taking rupees ten lakhs (Rupees ten lakhs) as advance rent. This fact came to light only when the defendants 5 to 8 filed IA no. 3142/87 on or about 8th May 1987 with which they filed copy of the said Lease Deed dated 31. 1. 1987. Had this fact of leasing out been known to the applicants they would not have signed the compromise application. 2. That the notice of the aforesaid IA No. 7074/86 was issued to the other defendants. The said defendants Viz Nos. 1. 1987. Had this fact of leasing out been known to the applicants they would not have signed the compromise application. 2. That the notice of the aforesaid IA No. 7074/86 was issued to the other defendants. The said defendants Viz Nos. 5 to 8 and 9 showed still opposition by filing their detailed reply taking serious objections to the proposed compromise on various grounds. 3. It is pertinent to state herein that the defendants Nos 5 to 8 also filed various applications specifically for transposition in place of the applicants and amendment of their written statement and appointment of Receiver and issuance of injunction. 4. That on finding stiff opposition and that there was merit in their objections to the proposed compromise, one of the LRs/ Applicants herein, viz. Shri I. C. Kumar suggested to Defendant Nos 2 and 3 again and again that there was no possibility of compromise in view of the law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Courtand our own High Court and other High Courts, it was suggested to the said defendants that all the parties should sit together and sort out the issues and run the business smoothly forgetting the past Defendants No. 5 to 8 agreed for favourable and amicable settlement and they expressed their desire that there should be reunion of the family and the business of Kumar Roller Flour Mills. Any how the compromise could not be arrived at amongst all as Shri Ashok Kumar, defendant no. 2 and his wife Smt. Shobha Kumar, Defendant No. 3 did not cooperate. 5. That on the said demise of defendant No. 5, Dr. B. D. Kumar on 4th March, 1989, it was hoped that the defendants Nos 2 and 3 would realise the futility of litigation and all settlements would take place amicably, for this all efforts were made by the Applicants-plaintiffs and Defendants Nos 6 to 8 who are the sons of Defendant No. 5 through common friends and relations the applicants and the other partners of the firm no such transaction could have been entered into and particularly when the entire compromise with the applicants stands vitiated and the suit concerning the determination of the rights and interests of the parties is pending determination in this Hon'ble court. The property of the partnership has been taken out from the partnership during the pendency of the suit without there being any mention of M/s Ashok Anil and Co. in the said lease deed. Defendants 2 and 3 have intentionally concealed the firm name from the lease deed with the sole object to deprive the other partners of their rightful share. The act amounts to criminal breach of Trust and thereby the said compromise stands vitiated. 8. That the applicants have further learnt for the first time from a perusal of the said lease deed that the property of the partnership has been mortgaged by defendants 2 and 3 in favour of Punjab and Sind Bank. which mortgage, it is submitted, is contrary to the orders of the Division bench dated 8th January 1975. 9. That the applicants-plaintiffs state and submit that although the said arrangement purports to be a lease agreement, in reality it seems to be a shame transaction and is a sale in the garb of a lease deed. This would be evident from a reading of Clause 42 of the lease deed which is to the following effect:- "42 The annual rent of the demised premises shall not exceed Rs. 22,00,000. 00 - in any year. As such the stamp duty on this lease deed for ten years is the stamp duty leviable at a consideration of Rs. 22,00,000. 00 on the footing that the duty payable is as on a conveyance for Rs. 22,00,000. 00. As such this lease has been executed on stamp papers of Rs. 66,000. 00 plus stamp of Rs. 207- for advance rent and ancillary arrangements. As such the total stamp duty paid here is Rs. 66020. 00. " 10. That the applicants-plaintiffs further state and submit that the fraudulent nature of the transaction is more so apparent from the fact that even the disclosed lease amount is not payable on a regular basis and in entirety as would be seen from a reading of Clauses 8,9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the lease deed. To illustrate this, kind attention of this Hon'ble court is invited to clause No. 8 of the said lease deed which is to the following effect:- " 8. For the first twelve months of the lease, if the lessee pays a sum of Rs. 40000. To illustrate this, kind attention of this Hon'ble court is invited to clause No. 8 of the said lease deed which is to the following effect:- " 8. For the first twelve months of the lease, if the lessee pays a sum of Rs. 40000. 00 - (Rupees forty thousand only) in advance as mentioned in clause 6, then the balance amount of Rs. 1,35,000. 00 (Rupees one lac thirty five thousand only) relating to the month for which a sum of Rs. 40,0007. 00 has been paid in time shall not be chargeable by the owners as provided in clause 4 and the lessee shall not also similarly be liable to pay such sum of Rs. 1,35,000. 00 i. e. no sum is payable in addition to the sum of Rs. 40,000. 00 if so paid by the lessee in advance to the owners. " The said clause, it is submitted, suggests unmistakably that some undisclosed consideration has passed in favour of defendants 2 and 3 who have acted for their own interest and to the detriment of the remaining partners of the partnership firm and have illegally made secret profits and gains for themselves. 11. Without prejudice to what is stated hereinabove, the applicants further submit that in view of the peculier nature of the suit viz. rendition of accounts of a dissolved partnership, the compromise cannot go through since all the parties to the suit are not signatory to the compromise. The defendants 5 to 8 who are admittedly the partners, have specifically pointed out in their reply to the IA No. 7074786 by way of preliminary objections as well as on merits and the applicants believe that their objections are legal ones and even otherwise the proposed compromise cannot go through. In a suit for rendition of accounts if all the plaintiffs and defendants are not parties to the compromise, it does not decide the suit and it may prejudice the rights of the other parties to the suit and thus it would not be a lawful compromise. In a suit for rendition of accounts where a preliminary decree for accounts is passed, the accounts are generally gone into between all the partners before a Local Commissioner. In a suit for rendition of accounts where a preliminary decree for accounts is passed, the accounts are generally gone into between all the partners before a Local Commissioner. He has to determine what amount is due to one partner from the other, in this way amount may be found due to defendant against the plaintiff and amount may be found due to the plaintiff against the defendant, in such a suit for accounts. Thus in a suit for rendition of accounts every plaintiff is a defendant and every defendant is a plaintiff. Therefore unless there is settlement regarding accounts of the partnership firm in the suit amongst all the partners including the heirs of the deceased partner, there would be no lawful agreement. This compromise thus implies injury to the rights of the defendants 5 to 8 and LRs 2 and 3 of defendant No. 1 since all of them are not parties to the compromise. the agreement or compromise cannot affect a third party. If this compromise is accepted and decree is passed, the decree cannot be challenged subsequently on the ground that the compromise was not lawful. As such a suit is barred by rule 3-A of Order 23 Civil Procedure Code. 12. Section 23 of the Contract Act states that the contract or object of an agreement is lawful unless it involves or implies injury to the person or property of another. In the present case the object of the agreement/compromise is to deprive defendants 5 to 8 and 9 and LRs. 2 and 3 of defendant no. 1. the compromise is thus hit by Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act. 13. With great respect it is submitted that the prayers (a) and (b) in the aforesaid IA no. 7074/86 cannot even otherwise find sentence in the eye of law. 14. That this application has been made bonafide and in the interest of justice. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances and the legal submissions/ position in law, the applicants went to repudiate the compromise application being IA. No. 7074/86. It is, therefore prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to dismiss the said application and proceed with the suit in accordance with law". ( 42 ) TO put it shortly the grounds are that defendants 2 and 3 leased out the premises to a third party. No. 7074/86. It is, therefore prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to dismiss the said application and proceed with the suit in accordance with law". ( 42 ) TO put it shortly the grounds are that defendants 2 and 3 leased out the premises to a third party. Defendants 2 and 3 entered into a lease with third party leasing out the partnership assets on 5. 12. 1986 by taking Rs. 10 lakhs as an advance. If this fact had been known to the plaintiffs they would not have signed the compromise application. Defendants 5 to 8 and 9 opposed the petition for recording compromise. Defendants 5 to 8 filed applications for transposition and appointment of a Receiver and injunction. Mr. I. C. Kumar submitted that there was no possibility of compromise in view of law declared by the Supreme Court and Delhi High Court and other High Courts, that the defendants 2 and 3 failed to disclose to the plaintiffs the partnership assets and dealt with it as their own, that the arrangement was contrary to the orders passed by the Division Bench of this Court on 8. 1. 1975, that the terms of the lease deed would disclose that defendants 2 and 3 had received large amounts, that the defendants 5 to 8 had specifically pointed out in their reply to IA 7074/86 that their objections are legal ones and proposed compromise cannot go through, that the compromise caused injury to the rights of defendants 5 to 8 and LRs 2 and 3 of defendants No 1 since all of them are not parties to the compromise, that the compromise is hit by Section 23 of the Contract Act, 1872 as it affects the rights of defendants 5 to 8 and 9 and LRs 2 and 3 of defendant no. 1. ( 43 ) THEREFORE, it is clear that the averments made in the petition for the purpose of avoiding the compromise already filed in this court do not satisfy the requirements under Order 6 Rule 4 Civil Procedure Code. Already the learned Judge Hon'ble Mr. Justice P. S. Safeer, had pointed out in his order that the plaintiff had no right to ask for appointment of a Receiver and this Court on 31. 10. Already the learned Judge Hon'ble Mr. Justice P. S. Safeer, had pointed out in his order that the plaintiff had no right to ask for appointment of a Receiver and this Court on 31. 10. 1984 again had pointed out that the plaintiffs were not concerned with the business of defendants 2,3 and 4 which order was confirmed by the Division Bench on 11. 7. 1985. It is not open to the plaintiffs to say that defendants 2 and 3 are using partnership assets and at once the compromise is against their interest. ( 44 ) THE plaintiffs also filed IA No. 8833/89 for the appointment of a Receiver. ( 45 ) IN the absence of the defendants this Court passed the order on 8. 12 1989 " Present: Mr I. C. Kumar for the plaintiff. IA No. 7074/86 This is an application under Order 23 Rule 3 C. P. C. for compromising the matter. Mr. Kumar has moved an application IA 8832 of 1989 for repudiating that compromise. Instead of issuing notice of IA 8832 of 1989, I think the proper course of action to adopt is to direct that the compromise application IA 7074 of 1986 be put up before the Court for directions to the parties who are signatories thereto to appear in Court, and record their statement whether they still abide by the terms of the compromise or not. If they do not abide by the terms of the compromise, the Court can dismiss that application. Renotify on 17. 1. 1990. IA No. 8833/89 Notice to the non-applicants through counsel for 17. 1. 1990. Mr. Kumar to file process-fee within three days. ( 46 ) LEARNED counsel did not bring to the notice of this Court the true scope and the effect of the petition in IA 7074/86. On 9. 2. 1990, this court passed the following order: All parties agree that pleadings in the suit are complete but admission and denial of documents has yet to be done. Further directions in the suit, in my opinion, can be given only after disposal of I. As 7074/86 and 8832/89 with regard to alleged compromise between the plaintiffs and defendants 2 and 3. Therefore, further orders on the suit are being deferred. Further directions in the suit, in my opinion, can be given only after disposal of I. As 7074/86 and 8832/89 with regard to alleged compromise between the plaintiffs and defendants 2 and 3. Therefore, further orders on the suit are being deferred. IA 7074/86 (U/s 23 R. 3 Civil Procedure Code filed by L. Rs of plaintiff and defendants 2 and 3) IA 8832/89 (filed by L. Rs of plaintiff for repudiating the alleged compromise ). IA 413/87 (U/0 1r. 10 read with O. 23 R. 1 (5) and sub-rule (1a) Civil Procedure Code filed by defendants 5 to 8 seeking transposition in place of the plaintiffs.) In view of the order made on 8th of December 1989, these applications have to be considered first. List the applications for hearing before Court in the category of 'others' on 24th of April 1990 at item No. 1. In view of the order made on 8th December 1989, the parties who are signatories to the above mentioned applications shall be present in person in Court on that day. IA 3142/87 (u/o 40 Civil Procedure Code for appointment of Receiver filed by defendants 5 to 8) IA 4210/88 (u/o 26 r. 9 filed by defendants 5 to 8 for appointment of Local Commissioner) IA 8833/89 (filed by plaintiffs for appointment of a Receiver and for injunction) These applications shall be taken up for hearing immediately on disposal of the applications mentioned in the earlier group. Therefore, list these applications also on 24th of April 1990 in the category of 'others'. In the meanwhile, the defendants may file replies to IA 8833/89 within four weeks with advance copies to the applicant who may file rejoinders within two weeks thereafter. IA 3123/86 (filed by defendants 2 and 3 seeking answer to interrogatories from defendant No. 5) This application shall also be taken up for consideration after completion of hearing on the applications mentioned in the first Group. ( 47 ) ON 22. 10. 1990 this court passed the following order: "ias 7074/86 and 8832/89 By my order dated 8. 12. 1989 I had directed that parties to the compromise should appear in Court for making a statement whether they still abide by the terms of the compromise or not, this compromise is in IA 7074/86 under Order 23 Rule 3 Civil Procedure Code: Today, Mr. 12. 1989 I had directed that parties to the compromise should appear in Court for making a statement whether they still abide by the terms of the compromise or not, this compromise is in IA 7074/86 under Order 23 Rule 3 Civil Procedure Code: Today, Mr. Kumar says that he has signed the compromise on behalf of R. C. Kumar and on behalf of Smt. Swaran Mehta. He has taken me through a photocopy of the Power of Attorney which is allegedly executed by R. C. Kumar. In this power of attorney the donor has not given power to withdraw any compromise to the receipant of the power of attorney, namely, IC Kumar. In this view of the matter I direct that R. C. Kumar himself should appear in Court as power of withdrawal not have specifically been conferred by the power of attorney. Smt. Swaran Mehta should appear in Court also. Renotify on 21. 1. 1991. Both Mr. R. C. Kumar and Mrs. Swaran Mehta should appear in Court for recording their statements on 21. 1. 1991. Directions regarding the statements of other signatories to the compromise shall be given on that date. Case to be listed as 'short Cause' on the date fixed. "this court recorded that Kaushlya Devi widow of Fateh Chand Kumar died on 29th of July 1991. On 8. 8. 1991 Smt. Swaran Mehta gave the following statement: "statement of Smt. Swaran Mehta, aged 46 years, one of the plaintiffs on S. A. The application under Order 23 Rule 3, read with Section 151, Civil Procedure Code bearing No. 7074/86 bears the signatures of my duly constituted attorney Sh. I. C. Kumar, Advocate. The affidavit in support of this application was also sworn and filed by Shri I. C. Kumar as my duly constituted attorney. The power of attorney executed by me in favour of Shr. I. C. Kumar, advocate is still operative and its photocopy is marked X. My attorney Shri. I. C. Kumar, advocate was authorised to move the application under Order 23 Rule 3, read with Section 151 Civil Procedure Code. , which has been marked as IA 7074/86, on my behalf. I do not want to abide by the terms of the compromise any more. My application to that effect bears No. IA 8832/89. It was moved on my instructions by my duly constituted attorney Shri I. C. Kumar, advocate. , which has been marked as IA 7074/86, on my behalf. I do not want to abide by the terms of the compromise any more. My application to that effect bears No. IA 8832/89. It was moved on my instructions by my duly constituted attorney Shri I. C. Kumar, advocate. The reasons for my not abiding by the terms of the compromise are given in the said application. " ( 48 ) SHRI R. C. Kumar gave the following statement on 8. 8. 1991: "statement of Mr. R. C. Kumar aged 54 years, one of the plaintiffs on S. A. The application under order 23 Rule 3, read with Section 151, Civil Procedure Code, bearing No. 7074/86 bears the signatures of my duly constituted attorney Shri I. C. Kumar, advocate. The affidavit in support of this application was also sworn and filed by Shri I. C. Kumar as my duly constituted attorney. The power of attorney executed by me in favour of Shri I. C. Kumar, advocate is still operative and its photocopy is marked X. My attorney Shri I. C. Kumar advocate was authorised to move the application under Order 23 Rule 3, read with Section 151 Civil Procedure Code, which has been marked as IA 7074/86, on my behalf. I do not want to abide by the terms of the compromise any more. My application to that effect bears No. IA 8832/89. It was moved on my instructions by my duly constituted attorney Shri I. C. Kumar, advocate. The reasons for my not abiding by the terms of the compromise are given in the said application. " ( 49 ) ON 7. 10. 1991 Mr. I. C. Kumar gave the following statement: " I am a party to the suit. I am also duly appointed counsel of the other plaintiffs. The application IA bearing No. 7074/86 bears my signatures as a party as well as a counsel for the other plaintiffs. I have also filed my own affidavit, I do not want to abide by the terms of the compromise any more. Application bearing IA No. 8832/89 bears my signatures as a party to the suit as well as a counsel for the other plaintiffs. It was moved by me on my own behalf and as a counsel of the other plaintiffs. The reason for not abiding by the terms of the compromise are mentioned in the application. Application bearing IA No. 8832/89 bears my signatures as a party to the suit as well as a counsel for the other plaintiffs. It was moved by me on my own behalf and as a counsel of the other plaintiffs. The reason for not abiding by the terms of the compromise are mentioned in the application. " ( 50 ) ON 7. 10. 1991 Mr. Ramesh Kumar, Smt. Savita Grover, Smt. Susheela Sikri and G. C. Kumar on S. A. "the application under Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure bearing No. 7074/86 bears our signatures and the signatures of our Advocates. We have filed our duly sworn affidavits in support of the application. Shri I. C. Kumar was authorised to move this application on our behalf. Shri G. C. Kumar is also appearing as a duly appointed counsel. We do not want to abide by the terms of the compromise any more. The application bearing IA No. 8832/89 was moved by our advocate Shri I. C. Kumar on our instructions. The reasons for not abiding by the terms of the compromise are mentioned in the application". . ( 51 ) IN 1992, defendants 2 to 4 filed IA No. 2735 of 1992 for condoning the delay in filing a few documents and that was ordered by this court on 27. 3. 1992 Thus the IA is being adjourned from time to time. On 6. 2. 1995 this Court passed the following order: IA No. 6536/93 This is an application under Section 24 read with section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it appears that in all three suits are pending inter se the parties. They relate to the same cause of action. The plaintiff wants that all the suits should be retained by this court and should be tried together. The learned counsel for the defendants have no objection to this suit being retained and tried by this court and not by the District Court as in the connected Suit No. 2319/93 issues have already been framed. In view of the facts stated and as there is no opposition, the application is allowed. Let this suit be also tried by this court alongwith other connected suits. IA stands disposed of. IA 8832/89 Mr. Kumar seeks adjournment. Renotify on 14th August 1995. "52. By an order dated 06. 11. In view of the facts stated and as there is no opposition, the application is allowed. Let this suit be also tried by this court alongwith other connected suits. IA stands disposed of. IA 8832/89 Mr. Kumar seeks adjournment. Renotify on 14th August 1995. "52. By an order dated 06. 11. 1995 a correction was made with reference to the suit No. 2319/73 mentioned in the order dated 06. 02. 1995 by correcting it to Suit No. 219 of 1973. On 9. 1. 1996 My Lord Mr. Justice Arun Kumar directed the matter to be posted before another bench. On 22. 1. 1996 the matter came before me. On 25. 1. 1996 the matter was heard. ( 53 ) AS I had pointed out in the beginning the question is whether the compromise is to be recorded in IA No. 7074/86 or whether the relief claimed by the plaintiffs in IA 8832/89 for withdrawing the earlier petition is to be allowed. ( 54 ) THE fact that parties had reduced the terms of agreement to writing and signed the same cannot be disputed. In otherwords, on 14. 12. 1986, the parties had come to a definite concluded contract. That contract is lawful and nothing has been said on behalf of the plaintiffs as to how the plaintiffs could avoid the same in the way in which they seek to do it now. The plaint was presented as I have noticed above on 30. 5. 1975. As On 1975 the application No. 7074/86 could be considered only under Order 23 Rule 3 Civil Procedure Code as it stood down on 30. 5. 1975. The provision of Order 23 Rule 3 Civil Procedure Code read as follows:"order 23 Rule 3 Civil Procedure Code Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise (in writing and signed by parties), or where the defendant satisfied the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith (so far as it relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject-matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject-matter of the suit ). ( 55 ) THE effect of which that it was incumbent on the court to inquire into and to record the compromise which was disputed. ( 56 ) DURING the pendency of the proceedings the Code of Civil Procedure was amended by the Parliament by Act 104/76. ( 57 ) THE amendment Act came into force with reference to certain provisions on 1. 2. 1977. By Section 74 of the Amendment Act Order 23 was substituted. After the amendment order 23 Rule 3 is as follows: Section 97 of the Amendment Act, 1976 made provisions for the pending proceedings in the light of the amendment made to the Code of Civil Procedure, Section 97 (2) Clauses) apply to the amendment as well as substitution made in order 23 of the First Schedule of Section 74 of this Act shall not apply to any suit or proceedings pending before the commencement of the said Section 74". Therefore, the amended provision of Order 23 Rule 3 Civil Procedure Code would not apply to the present suit. This legal position is clear as noticed by the Supreme Court in Rachakonda Venkat Rao and Ors Vs. Late R. Satya Bai Rep. by her LR Smt. Raj Kumari and Ors JT 1996 (1) SC 105. ( 58 ) HOWEVER, with reference to the consideration of the question whether the compromise entered into between the parties on 14. 2. 1986 can be recorded or not, the legal position appears to me to be that the amendment ofthe provisions, in my view, is only clarificatory ofthe law. In particular prior to 1. 2. 1977 the court could consider the compromise arrived at between the parties orally but the mandate now is it should be in writing. To put it in a more specific terms after the amendment that is with effect from 1. 2. 1977. no party can be heard to say without a document in writing that he had compromised the matter with the other party and therefore, the proceedings before the court should be terminated. ( 59 ) NOW the question I have to address myself is whether the compromise signed by the parties on 14. 12. 1986 is valid or not. I had already extracted the terms of compromise in 1973 when there was a compromise between Dr. B. D. Kumar's family and the first defendant's family, money was paid to Dr. ( 59 ) NOW the question I have to address myself is whether the compromise signed by the parties on 14. 12. 1986 is valid or not. I had already extracted the terms of compromise in 1973 when there was a compromise between Dr. B. D. Kumar's family and the first defendant's family, money was paid to Dr. B. D. Kumar in consideration ofthe first defendant family paying money to that family. It may be recalled that B. D. Kumar's family owned 37% of shares in the partnership. In the year 1986 the defendants 2 and 3 had agreed to pay each of the plaintiffs Rs. 15,000. 00. All of them together had 4% share in the partnership. It is not their case that they agreed to this amount without proper consideration of all aspects. They were aware that defendants 2 and 3 were running business under different partnership firm and the plaintiffs attempted to get a receiver appointed and they did not succeed and they had to be content with receiving some money. The plaintiffs have not stated on what basis they had agreed for Rs. 15,000. 00 each. They had also agreed that the defendants 2 and 3 were to give the draft before this court when the compromise is recorded. Therefore, when they filed their affidavits in support ofthe compromise application, they were fully conscious of what they were doing. All of them were and are sui juris. ( 60 ) LEARNED counsel for defendants 2 and 3 showed me the drafts taken by defendants 2 and 3 in 1986 and because the matter of recording compromise was not taken up by this court, the draft could not be handed over to the plaintiffs. It is a basic principle of law that act of court cannot prejudice the rights ofthe parties. The compromise application filed on 14. 8. 1986 was valid and it was in accordance with law. . ( 61 ) THE next question is whether the plaintiffs can go back on what they had agreed and seek to withdraw IA 7074/86 on the grounds mentioned in IA 8832/89. ( 62 ) I had extracted the averments in the application bearing IA No 8832/89. ( 63 ) IT is admitted that there was a contract in the year 1986, if that is so, then the parties are obliged to perform their part ofthe contract. ( 62 ) I had extracted the averments in the application bearing IA No 8832/89. ( 63 ) IT is admitted that there was a contract in the year 1986, if that is so, then the parties are obliged to perform their part ofthe contract. Section 37 ofthe Indian Contract Act, 1872 provides;"section 37 - Obligation of parties to contracts - The parties to a contract must either perform, or offer to perform their respective promises, unless such performance is dispensed with or excused under the provisions of this Act, or of any other law. Promises bind the representative of the promisors in case of the death of such promisors before performance, unless a contrary intention appears from the contract. "it is not disputed that defendants 2 and 3 had taken eight drafts each for Rs. 15,000. 00 to be given to the plaintiffs at the time of recording compromise and they had performed their part of the contract. If the plaintiffs refused to perform their contract defendants 2 and 3 can compel the plaintiffs to perform their obligations under the Contract Act, 1872, by virtue of the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. If a person who had entered into a contract, can withdraw from it with imp unity there will be complete chaos confusion and disorder in society and the relevant laws would be rendered nugatory. That is the reason why Order 23 Rule 3 Civil Procedure Code provides that the court should see whether there is a contract, whether that is lawful, whether the party who had committed to a course of action can avoid it on the ground mentioned in the Contract Act, 1872 and then record the same and if it is not lawful the court can refuse to record it. Section 13 of the Contract Act, 1872, defines consent, to mean, two or more partners are said to consent when they agree upon the same thing in the same sense. In the instant case this is satisfied. Section 13 of the Contract Act, 1872, defines consent, to mean, two or more partners are said to consent when they agree upon the same thing in the same sense. In the instant case this is satisfied. Section 14 of the Contract Act, 1872 defines free consent in the following terms: "section 14" "free consent" defined - Consent is said to be free when it is not caused by - 1) coercion, as defined in Section 15, or 2) undue influence, as defined in Section 16, or 3) fraud, as defined in Section 17, or 4) misrepresentation, as defined in Section 18, or 5) mistake, subject to the provisions of Sections 20, 21 and 22 Consent is said to be so caused when it would not have been given but for the existence of such coercion, undue influence, fraud, misrepresentation or mistake. ( 64 ) IN IA 8832 of 1989 it is not stated that defendants 2 and 3 exercised coercion undue influence or fraud as defined in Section 17 or made any misrepresentation as defined in Section 18 or there was any mistake subject to a provisions of Sections 20, 21 and 22 of the Contract Act, 1872. ( 65 ) IT is not for the plaintiffs to say that defendants 5 to 8 and defendant 9 would be affected by the compromise. The invocation of the provisions of Section 23 of the Contract Act, 1872, is very inexplicable and that shows that the plaintiffs are not serious about what they are going about. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs Mr. I. C. Kumar who himself is a party contended that the plaintiffs are entitled to go back on the compromise when they came to know that defendants 2 and 3 had entered into a transaction of lease with a third party. That can hardly be a reason for resiling from the contract. The parties had been deliberating since 1980 and the plaintiffs knew what are the items held by the partnership and what was the nature of business carried on by defendants 2 and 3. The plaintiffs could not succeed in getting a receiver appointed and, therefore, the best way they thought was to receive money for 4% and settle the matter. The parties had been deliberating since 1980 and the plaintiffs knew what are the items held by the partnership and what was the nature of business carried on by defendants 2 and 3. The plaintiffs could not succeed in getting a receiver appointed and, therefore, the best way they thought was to receive money for 4% and settle the matter. Therefore, the reason given by the Applicant in IA 8832/89 is not only false but this is a deliberate attempt on the part of the plaintiffs to resort to falsehood to get over what they had agreed to in 1986. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs argued that defendants 5 to 8 are not parties to the compromise and when the partners are not made parties to the compromise, it cannot be said that there was any valid compromise. ( 66 ) LEARNED counsel for the plaintiffs represent that the 9th defendant had filed a suit about which reference is made already and, therefore, there can be no compromise. I have already indicated that the 9th defendant is claiming some right and his suit is pending. I cannot not adjudicate on the rights of the 9th defendant in this suit. Therefore, that cannot be a ground for refusing to record the compromise if it is lawful. ( 67 ) ORDER 23 Rule 3 Civil Procedure Code after the amendment with effect from 01. 02. 1977 reads as follows: Order 23 Rule 3 Civil Procedure Code Whether it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise (in writing and signed by parties) or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith (so far as it relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject-matter of the agreement. compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject-matter of the suit ). compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject-matter of the suit ). Provided that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the Court shall decide the question; but no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding the question, unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, thinks, fit to grant such adjournment ). (Explanation: An agreement or compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this rule ). ( 68 ) IN the main part of the Sub Rule underlined portion is added. The proviso states that the question should be decided by the Court before the compromise is recorded. Therefore, it has to be decided whether the compromise is lawful or not, and after the filing of the compromise before it is recorded that it is open to the parties to deny the same. 'denying' means repudiation of the compromise. That means, disclaiming by the parties of the compromise on the ground available in law. The sub rule provides that compromise can be repudiated on the ground it is void or it is voidable. The party relying on the compromise should show that it has been arrived at after full deliberations and it is lawful. In the present case. I have set out the facts in full and it is clear therefrom that defendants 2 and 3 have established that the compromise is lawful. It is for the plaintiffs to show as to how it is not lawful and it should not be recorded The averments in the application do not satisfy the requirement of law. It can be said that it is voidable at the instance of the plaintiffs. But then they must give necessary particulars in the application itself to prove that it is vitiated on the ground of fraud, coercion and undue influence and misrepresentation and, therefore, the compromise should not be recorded. The explanation is added to clarify the legal position in view of the divergence of the opinion among the various High Courts before the amendment on the question whether lawful agreement of compromise in the main part of the rule could take in, agreement which is voidable. The explanation is added to clarify the legal position in view of the divergence of the opinion among the various High Courts before the amendment on the question whether lawful agreement of compromise in the main part of the rule could take in, agreement which is voidable. For the purpose of the present discussion we can take it that the explanation states that on agreement or compromise that is voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this rule. Therefore, under the rule when a party subscribes to a compromise and files it into the court it is open to him to allege and prove that it comes within the mischief of the provision of Indian Contract Act, 1872 and he is entitled to avoid it. The scope of the explanation is well-known. It is not a substantial provision by itself. It is intended to explain the meaning of the word contained in the section or clarify certain ambiguities or clear them up. It becomes a part and parcel of the enactment. Itmeaning must depend upon its term. Sometimes it would be added to include something within it or to exclude from the ambit of main provision or some conditions or words accruing on it. The explanation normally should be so read as to be harmonious with or to clear up any ambiguities in the same section. (Vide Salochna Amba Vs. Narain Neir 1994 (2) SCC 14 .) Therefore, it has to be seen whether the plaintiffs have made out a case to avoid the compromise. I have set out the facts and considered all facts. I am very clear in my mind that the plaintiffs have failed to establish that the compromise is hit by the provisions of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Therefore, the compromise signed by the parties has to be recorded and a decree to be passed in terms thereof. ( 70 ) THE learned counsel for the plaintiffs brought to my notice a few decisions to substantiate his submissions that it is for the plaintiffs to accept or simply withdraw from the compromise and if they do so, no further enquiries are necessary and the suit has to be posted by the court for trial when the pleadings are complete. He referred to Panna Lal and ors Vs. He referred to Panna Lal and ors Vs. Kishan Lal and ors AIR 1952 Nagpur 84. In that case, two plaintiffs filed a suit for declaration that the first defendant was not the validly adopted son of the 2nd defendant and for possession. The first plaintiff claimed to be the adopted son of the 2nd plaintiff. The defendants contested the claim of the first plaintiff. During the pendency of the appeal against the order refusing to appoint a receiver at the instances of the plaintiff, the High Court had stayed all further proceedings in the suit. The first plaintiff and the first defendant presented an application on the 24th of November 1944 praying to record the memorandum of compromise signed by them. The trial court did not take up the application on the ground that there was an order of stay of all proceedings in the suit. The High Court directed the trial court to consider the application. By an order dated 24. 07. 1946, the trial court held that there had been a valid compromise. The plaintiffs filed an appeal against that order. The High Court noticed the facts in the following words:" It is admitted that the 1st plaintiff and the 1st defendant signed the application for compromise. It is also admitted that on the 24th November 1944 the petition was presented by counsel both on behalf of the 1st plaintiff and the 1st defendant. The 2nd plaintiff alone opposed it on the 28th December 1944. There were several further hearings in the first Court between the 28th December 1944 and the 12th February 1946, namely four. At each of these hearing, the 1st plaintiff was represented by the counsel who had signed the compromise petition on his behalf and who had presented the petition also on his behalf. It was not till the 12th February 1946 that the 1st plaintiff also repudiated the compromise. It was contended that if there is any lawful compromise it has to be recorded even though it may have been brought about by fraud. The remedy of the party defrauded is not to oppose the application for recording the compromise but to have the decree which is eventually passed set aside in a separate suit. A large number of authorities were relied on for that position, namely 'kuppuswami Reddi Vs. Pavanambal' 1950- 1 Mad L J 534: 'suraparaju Vs. The remedy of the party defrauded is not to oppose the application for recording the compromise but to have the decree which is eventually passed set aside in a separate suit. A large number of authorities were relied on for that position, namely 'kuppuswami Reddi Vs. Pavanambal' 1950- 1 Mad L J 534: 'suraparaju Vs. Venkatarathnam' AIR (23) 1936 Mad 347; 'western Electric Co. , Ltd Vs. Kailash Chand', ILR ( 1940) Bom 13: 'narayanaswami Vs. President, Hindu Religious Endowments Board' 53 Mad 398 at P. 402; 'husain Yar Beg Vs. Radha Kishan' 57 All 426 and 'laraiti Vs. Ch. Shivam Sunder' AIR (19) 1932 All 478. I have not read all these authorities. Some of them do not go as far as that, but if they do then with the utmost respect I am unable to agree. In my opinion the word "lawful" has a wider meaning as used there than is contended for in the argument. Under Section 23 of the Contract Act it is explained that the consideration or object of an agreement is lawful unless, and then a number of instances are set out. One of them is if the object or consideration is fraudulent. But that does not refer to the contract itself being brought about by fraud. Section 23 is confined to the object or consideration. Now a contract with a fraudulent object may be brought about with the full consent and agreement of the parties. It is not fraudulent as between the parties, that is to say neither of the parties is being defrauded, but the object is to defraud somebody else. That is the type of agreement which is held to be unlawful. All other agreements are lawful even though one of the parties may be defrauded by the other, but it is open to the defrauded party in that even to have the agreement set aside. So also a void agreement is not necessarily unlawful unless its object or consideration falls within the purview of Section 23. It is just non-existent in the eye of thel aw. Viewing the matter in that light, a compromise which is said to be fraudulent can be investigated by the Court under Order XXIII Rule 3. So also a void agreement is not necessarily unlawful unless its object or consideration falls within the purview of Section 23. It is just non-existent in the eye of thel aw. Viewing the matter in that light, a compromise which is said to be fraudulent can be investigated by the Court under Order XXIII Rule 3. As regards the powers of the Court to look into questions of this kind, it does not matter whether the right to do so arises under Section 151 of the Civil P. C. or under Order XXIII Rule 3 where the words are "where it is 'proved' to the satisfaction of the Court". The fact in my opinion remains that the Court has power and must enquire into allegations of this nature. If a compromise is induced by fraud or if its object or consideration is to defraud somebody else then naturally the Court would not record it. I need not decide how these powers arise. "mr. I. C. Kumar learned counsel for the plaintiffs relied upon para 8 which reads as follows:" It was contended on behalf of the defendants/respondents that the 1st plaintiff is now shut out or estopped from contesting the compromise because he had presented it to the Court. I am not prepared to accept that position. In my opinion the 1st plaintiff is at liberty to challenge the fact". ( 71 ) NOBODY can quarrel with the proposition that the plaintiffs are at liberty to challenge the compromise. But the question is whether the plaintiffs can at their own sweet will and pleasure seek to withdraw from the compromise. ( 72 ) THE Nagpur High Court further noticed the arguments that the only ground on which the compromise can be attacked are undue influence or fraud. These grounds do not invalidate a contract inks inception and it is lawful and valid until it is set aside. The court observed that a compromise which is said to be fraud can be investigated by the Court under Order XXIII Rule 3 Civil Procedure Code. ( 73 ) THE Court had also noticed that the parties and their respective counsel had signed the compromise and it was the bounden duty of the first plaintiff who seek to have that compromise disregarded to establish the reasons for doing so. ( 73 ) THE Court had also noticed that the parties and their respective counsel had signed the compromise and it was the bounden duty of the first plaintiff who seek to have that compromise disregarded to establish the reasons for doing so. Noting the long interval between signing of the application, namely, 24th November 1944 and 12th November 1946 on which date it was repudiated the Court observed that the repudiation was not made in good faith. Vibian Bose J as he then was, held that the lower court was right in upholding the compromise and dismissed the appeal. This case does not help the plaintiffs. ( 74 ) LEARNED counsel for the plaintiffs Mr. I. C. Kumar relied upon the decision of this Court in Smt. Kiran Arora and ors Vs. Ram Prakash Arora and ors in AIR 1980 Delhi 99 wherein Sufltan Singh J held that the court must be satisfied that there has been a lawful agreement or compromise. The court has to be very cautious and should determine whether compromise arrived at is lawful or not. Unless there is a settlement regarding rendition accounts amongst all the partners there could be no lawful agreement. This view was taken on the facts of that case. There is no proposition laid down by the learned judge which could help the plaintiffs. ( 75 ) THE learned counsel for the plaintiffs then referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Gurpreet Singh Vs. Chatur Bhuj Goel AIR 1988 SC page 400. The facts could be stated very shortly in the following terms:"there was a contract between the appellant's father and the respondent before the Supreme Court for the sale of the appellant's property of 1577, Sector D, Chandigarh. There were criminal proceedings between the parties which went up to the Supreme Court which held that the process of criminal law cannot be implied for making the appellant's father to specifically performed the contract. Thereupon the respondents instituted a suit f specific performance. That was decreed. There was a Letters Patent Appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court. At the time of arguments in the appeal it appears that there was some proposal for compromise which was not reduced the writing. Ultimately the respondent said that there was no compromise and the appeal may be heard on merits. That was decreed. There was a Letters Patent Appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court. At the time of arguments in the appeal it appears that there was some proposal for compromise which was not reduced the writing. Ultimately the respondent said that there was no compromise and the appeal may be heard on merits. The appellant persisted that the respondent had agreed to receive a particular amount in full and final settlement of his claim and that should be recorded. The Division Bench said in para 6 that on the adjourned date i. e March 17, 1987, the learned Judges directed that in view of the fact that the respondent was not prepared to abide by the proposed compromise, the appeal would now be heard and decided on merits, with a further direction that it be placed before another Bench. Hence, this appeal by special leave. "the Supreme Court concurred with the view taken by the Division Bench, therefore this case also does not help the plaintiffs. ( 76 ) LEARNED counsel for the defendants 2 and 3 cited the decision in Mohd Narandas Chhaganlal Vs. Shah Jamnadas Maneklal and another AIR 1969 Gujarat 76. The facts can be stated very briefly in the following terms: ( 77 ) PENDING the suit for recovery of money the parties referred their disputes to an Arbitrator privately without any reference to the court. The Arbitrator gave the award. The parties had accepted the award but it was not brought to the notice of the court until the issues were framed in the suit. Thereafter the defendants filed an application stating that the parties had entered into a compromise as is evidenced by the award passed by the arbitrator and the same may be recorded under Order XXIII Rule 3 Civil Procedure Code. The plaintiffs objected to the same. The trial court held that the parties had accepted the award and, therefore, they had compromised the matter lawfully and passed a decree in terms thereof. That was upheld by the Appellate court. On second appeal the High Court affirmed the view taken by the lower appellate court. ( 78 ) THE High Court observed in the following terms:"in the instant case the parties have accepted the award after it was given. That was upheld by the Appellate court. On second appeal the High Court affirmed the view taken by the lower appellate court. ( 78 ) THE High Court observed in the following terms:"in the instant case the parties have accepted the award after it was given. It is necessary to consider as to what is the effect of the acceptance of such an award by all the parties to the suit. Does it remain an award even after all the parties to the suit accepted it? In my opinion, it does not remain an award as such, that is, it does not remain a decision of an arbitrator. By reason of the fact that all the parties to the suit have accepted it, the award becomes, as it were, an agreement between the parties or an adjustment of the suit arrived at by all the parties, order 23 Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code gives unlimited latitude to the parties to a suit to settle the disputes between them in any manner they like and they can always put that settlement of dispute before the Court and request the Court to make a decree in terms of that settlement. All that the Court has to do in such a case is to see whether the settlement or the compromise is lawful one or not. It it is a lawful compromise or settlement the Court is bound to pass a decree in terms of the settlement to the extent that it settles the dispute between the parties. The court is not required to enter upon any enquiry as to what were the means adopted by the parties to arrive at such an agreement or compromise; or who persuaded the parties to enter into such a compromise or adjustment or what were the matters considered by the parties in arriving at such a settlement or compromise. The parties may arrive at a settlement or compromise by the instrumentality of a third person; or they may arrive at such a settlement or compromise on accepting the advice of some persons. When an award is accepted by the parties to a suit all that they do is to make the award an instrument to enable them to come to an agreement or adjustment of the suit. When an award is accepted by the parties to a suit all that they do is to make the award an instrument to enable them to come to an agreement or adjustment of the suit. Once the parties have accepted the award, the award ceases to be a decision of a third person and it assumes the character of an agreement arrived at by the parties to the suit. When, therefore, after accepting the award any party goes to the Court and states to it that the parties have accepted the award and therefore it should be accepted as a compromise or adjustment of the suit, what is put before the Court is that there has been an agreement between the parties to the suit and it should be acted upon. When the other side appears in the Court and says that there has been no such agreement, the Court is entitled to enter into an inquiry as to whether there was an agreement in fact or not and if the Court is satisfied, despite the objection raised by the other side that there was in fact an agreement or settlement of the dispute between the parties, the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3 authorise the Court to arrive at such a decision and to pass a decree on the basis of that decision. In the instant case when the defendants fold the Court that the parties include in the plaintiff have accepted the award, what the defendants intimated in fact to the Court was that the suit is settled or adjusted in a particular manner as expressed in the award made by the arbitrator, and the defendants asked the Court to record that agreement or settlement of the dispute and to pass a decree in accordance with the said award. The Court, therefore, when it recorded a finding that the plaintiff had accepted the award, did in fact record a finding that the agreement alleged by the defendants is proved. "the Gujarat High Court noticed the view of the Patna High Court in Rameshwar Lat Vs. The Court, therefore, when it recorded a finding that the plaintiff had accepted the award, did in fact record a finding that the agreement alleged by the defendants is proved. "the Gujarat High Court noticed the view of the Patna High Court in Rameshwar Lat Vs. Mangi Lal AIR 1964 Patna 374 where the Patna High Court held " where the parties to a suit agree out of court to get dispute referred to arbitration and the consent to the award given by the Arbitrator, the award can be treated as compromise between them and a decree can be passed on the basis of such compromise even though one of the parties backs out from the compromise before the Court". ( 79 ) THE Gujarat High Court also has considered the judgement of the Andra Pradesh High Court in Salima Bibi Vs. Md. Ibrahim Saheb 1962 AP 123 wherein the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that "before the filing of the award, all parties signed on it, the court is entitled to take it into consideration as a compromise or adjustment of a suit within the meaning of Order 23 Rule 3 Civil Procedure Code. It is not necessary that the party should consent to the award at the time when the compromise petition is taken up for consideration by the Court. It does not matter whether the consent is signified outside the court or before the Court. The Gujarat High Court had also referred to the judgement of the Madras High Court in Abdul Rahman Vs. Muhammand Siddiq AIR 1953 Madras 781 wherein it is laid down that if the award which is not obtained in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act is executed by the parties after it is made the rule of the court is entitled to accept such a award as a compromise or adjustment of the disputes between the parties for the purposes of order 23 Rule 3 Civil Procedure Code. ( 80 ) THE Gujarat High court has also referred to the judgement of the Orissa High Court in Indramoni Mohapatra Vs. ( 80 ) THE Gujarat High court has also referred to the judgement of the Orissa High Court in Indramoni Mohapatra Vs. Nilamoni Moharana AIR 1950 Orissa page 169 wherein it was held " if the award is agreed after it's given it operate as an adjustment and a decree in termswill have to be followed under Order 23 Rule 3 Civil Procedure Code under the facts relevant to a situation are disputed they will have to be enquired into as any dispute adjustment".