Honble DALELAJ, J. – All these aforesaid special appeals are directed against the common judgment and order dated 3.7.1992 of the learned single Judge and hence, they are decided by this common judgment and order as they raise common points of law and facts. However, two other appeals, i.e., D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 654/93, State & Ors. vs. Moti Bhawan Nirman & D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 692/93, State & Ors. vs. Anand Bhawan Nirman Samiti, arising out of S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3344/91 and S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3491/91, respectively, have been separated by our order dated 17.4.96. We have done so because in these matters certain questions of distinct facts have been averred and there was no reply filed by either J.D.A. or by the State Government. Therefore, these two matters have been taken out of this group of above mentioned 116 appeals as indicated in our aforesaid order i.e. two matters will be heard and decided separately. Therefore, this judgment covers all 116 appeals only and not the aforesaid two appeals. (2). A notification dated 6.1.1988 was published by the Government of Rajasthan in Urban Development & Housing Department in Rajasthan Gazette, dated July 7, 1988, stating therein that it appeared to the State Government that the buildings and land situated within the area specified in the notification were needed or were likely to be needed for public purpose, i.e., for discharge of its functions and execution of its development programme by the Jaipur Development Authority. This notification was published in pursuance of S. 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, hereinafter, `the Acquisition Act). By declaration dated July 28, 1989, published in Rajasthan Gazette, dated July 31, 1989, State Government dec-lared under Section 6 of the Acquisition Act that the lands described in the declaration were needed for public purpose, i.e., the discharge of functions and development programmes by the Jaipur Development Authority (for short `J.D.A). This declaration was made after considering the report of the Land Acquisition Officer made u/s. 5-A of the Acquisition Act. (3). This declaration was made after considering the report of the Land Acquisition Officer made u/s. 5-A of the Acquisition Act. (3). The lands sought to be acquired are situated in Villages Jhotwara, Govindpura, Gokulpura, Chak Peethawas, Panchiawalla, Lawas alias Meenawala, Vishnawala, Beer Khatipura, Girdharipura, Heerapura, Lalpura, Dhanwas and Gajsingh- pura of Tehsil Jaipur (District) and in village Nandkishorepura alias Maniawas, Chak Ganpatpura No.1, Chak Ganpatpura No.2, Asarpura, Mangiawas Badarwas, Manpu, Dewari alias Galiwas, Balrampura alias Kejraon-ka Bas and Kalyanpura of Tehsil Sanganer (District Jaipur). The total area of land of these villages sought to be acquired was notified to be 10,721 bighas 17 bishwas. (4). The respondent-petitioners filed the writ petitions challenging the legality and validity of the acquisition proceedings. The learned single Judge by his judgment and order dated 3.7.1992, allowed all 117 writ petitions. Against this judgment and order of the learned single Judge, these appeals have been preferred. (5). We have heard the arguments of both the sides. (6). The learned single Judge held as follows :– (i) In the absence of the scheme being sanctioned no acquisition pro- ceedings of the land can legally be initiated. (ii) In the master plan the lands sought to be acquired have been included in the greenbelt area. The greenbelt area shown in the master plan cannot be made the subject matter of acquisition because the purpose of acquisition of land is not in conformity with the use specified in the master plan. (iii) The substance of notification issued u/s. 4(1) of the Acquisition Act was not pasted at convenient places in the localities and as such the notification u/s. 4(1) of the Acquisition Act is ineffective. (iv) The purpose for which the lands have been sought to be acquired is quite vague and cannot be said to be a public purpose. (v) The declaration u/s. 6(1) of the Acquisition Act was made after the expiry of year from the date of publication of the notification u/s. 4(1) of the Acquisition Act; and (vi) The publication of the declaration u/s. of the Acquisition Act by the State Government has been made without application of mind. (7). After holding as aforesaid, the learned single Judge, allowed the writ petitions and quashed the notification dated 6.1.1988 issued u/s. 4(1), and the declaration dated 28.7.1989 issued u/s. 6(1) and all the proceedings of the acquisition taken thereunder qua the petitioners-respondents. (8). (7). After holding as aforesaid, the learned single Judge, allowed the writ petitions and quashed the notification dated 6.1.1988 issued u/s. 4(1), and the declaration dated 28.7.1989 issued u/s. 6(1) and all the proceedings of the acquisition taken thereunder qua the petitioners-respondents. (8). We have not been able to persuade ourselves to agree with the learned single Judge that in the absence of the scheme having been sanctioned, no acquisition proceedings of the land can legally be initiated. The Full Bench of this court in the D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 255/95, Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur vs. State of Raj. & Ors. and other connected matters in its judgment dated 1.11.1995, has held that in absence of any scheme, the acquisition can be made under the Acquisition Act. The Apex Court in a recent case of Pratap & Anr. vs. State of Raj. & Ors. (1), has held that the decision of the Full Bench is correct. The Apex Court has also held therein that even if there is no scheme prepared or finalised, the acquisition could be validly made under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act for public purpose, or under the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act for the purpose of improvement or for any other purpose under the Act. (9). The learned counsel for the respondents-original-petitioners submitted that the definition of `public purpose occurring section 3(f) of the Acquisition Act has been amended by Act No. 68 of 1984. It is contended that this amended defi- nition of `public purpose has not been taken into consideration by the Full Bench of this Court while deciding the case of Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur (supra). It is further submitted that when the Apex Court decided the case of Pratap & Anr. (supra), the Apex Court also has not taken into consideration the amended definition of `public purpose. In short, it is submitted that we should reconsider the deci- sion taken by the Full Bench, and distinguish the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Pratap & Anr. (supra). The submission is extra-ordinary in nature. (supra), the Apex Court also has not taken into consideration the amended definition of `public purpose. In short, it is submitted that we should reconsider the deci- sion taken by the Full Bench, and distinguish the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Pratap & Anr. (supra). The submission is extra-ordinary in nature. Despite our request not to pursue this point further, each counsel persisted in hammering the point that the decision of Full Bench and that of the Supreme Court laying down the principle that existence of sanctioned or approved scheme was not a condition precedent of initiating acquisition proceedings was not good law inasmuch as the Full Bench as well as the Honble Supreme Court had not taken into consideration the amended definition of `public purpose. Counsel arguing the cases were free to make any and every submission. But we are bound by the law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court and also by the judicial discipline. Here we would like to refer to the observations made by the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar, West Bengal vs. Dunlop India Ltd. & Ors. (2). In para 6 of the reported decision, the Honble Supreme Court has, inter alia, observed as follows : ``We desire to add, and as was said in Cassell & Co. Ltd. vs. Broome, we hope it will never be necessary for us to say so again that `in the hierarchical system of courts which exists in our country, `it is necessary for each lower tier, including the High Court, `to accept loyally the decisions of the higher tiers. `It is inevitable in hierarchical system of courts that there are decisions of the Supreme Court appellate tribunal which do not attract the unanimous approval of all members of the judiciary. . . . . But the judicial system only works if someone is allowed to have the last word and that last word, once spoken, is loyally accepted. The better wisdom of the court below must yield to the higher wisdom of the court above. That is the strength of the hierarchical judicial system. In Cassell & Co. . . . . But the judicial system only works if someone is allowed to have the last word and that last word, once spoken, is loyally accepted. The better wisdom of the court below must yield to the higher wisdom of the court above. That is the strength of the hierarchical judicial system. In Cassell & Co. Ltd. vs. Broom, commenting on the Court of Appeals comment that Rookes vs. Barnard was rendered per incuriam, Lord Diplock observed: ``The Court of Appeal found themselves able to disregard the decision of this House is Rookes vs. Barnard by applying to it the lable per incuriam. That lable is relevant only to the right of an appellate court to decline to follow one of its own previous decisions, not to its right to disregard a decision of a higher appellate court or to the right of a Judge of the High Court to disregard a decision of the Court of Appeal. It is needless to add that in India under Article 141 of the Constitution the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India and under Article 144 all authorities, civil and judicial in the territory of India shall act in aid of the Supreme Court. In view of the aforesaid settled legal position, it would suffice for us to make a short shrift of the various contentions raised by the learned counsel for the respondents by saying that the question with regard to the existence of sanctioned scheme before initiating the acquisition proceedings is concluded by the decisions of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Pratap & Anr. (supra). For this reason, it would not be necessary at all to make elaborate discussion. However, only in order to illustrate certain factual aspects and make clear the position of law pertaining to the Jaipur Development Authority Act, 1982, we make the following discussion. (10). A perusal of the preamble of the Jaipur Development Authority Act, 1982, would show that the Jaipur Development Authority has been established by the Act for the purposes of planning, co- ordinating, and supervising the proper, orderly and rapid development of Jaipur Region for executing plans, projects and schemes for such development. (10). A perusal of the preamble of the Jaipur Development Authority Act, 1982, would show that the Jaipur Development Authority has been established by the Act for the purposes of planning, co- ordinating, and supervising the proper, orderly and rapid development of Jaipur Region for executing plans, projects and schemes for such development. Section 3 of the Jaipur Development Authority Act, 1982, pro- vides that the State Government shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, establish for the purposes of this Act, an Authority to be called ``the Jaipur Development Authority. (11). Thus, the Jaipur Development Authority as established under the Jaipur Development Authority Act, 1982, is an authority established by the State Govern- ment for carrying out the planning, co-ordinating and supervising the proper, orderly and rapid development of the Jaipur Region and to execute the plans, projects and schemes for such development. The amended definition of `public purpose contained in section 3(f) of the Acquisition Act is obviously an illustrative one and not exhaustive. Prior to the amendment of 1984 definition of public purpose read as follows: ``the expression `public purpose includes the provision of village-sites in districts in which the (appropriate Government) shall have declared by notification in the Official Gazette that it is customary for the Government to make such provision. By amendment of the definition of public purpose in 1984 as many as 8 illustrative instances have been included in the definition of public purpose. Thereby the power of the Government to initiate acquisition proceedings u/s. 4 of the Act is not in any way truncated. All that has been done by amendment of the definition of `public purpose occurring in section 3(f) of the Acquisition Act is that formerly there was only one illustrative instance in the definition of the public purpose, after the amendment of the definition, there are as many as 8 illustrative instances in the definition of public purpose. This amendment, in no way affects the power of the Government to initiate acquisition proceedings without there be- ing any sanctioned or approved scheme of development in existence prior to the initiation of the acquisition proceedings. In this view of the matter, there is no need to reconsider the Full Bench decision. (12). The case H.M.T. House Building Co-operative Society vs. Syed Khader and Others (3), cited on behalf of the respondents is not attracted to the matters in hand. In this view of the matter, there is no need to reconsider the Full Bench decision. (12). The case H.M.T. House Building Co-operative Society vs. Syed Khader and Others (3), cited on behalf of the respondents is not attracted to the matters in hand. In that case the housing scheme was sponsored, by the House Building Co-operative Society of the employees of H.M.T. Limited, and that society moved that State Government for the acquisition of lands. In that case, the development scheme was not sponsored by the authority established by the Government and the notification for the acquisition was issued to acquire the lands for the society for its scheme. In the matters in hand, the acquisition proceedings have been initiated by the State Government in order to enable the Jaipur Development Authority to discharge its functions for the planned and orderly development of Jaipur Region. In the cases on hand, the acquisition of land is not for the purposes of any scheme or development project of any Housing Co-operative Society or of any local authority. Be it noted that the public purpose mentioned in section 4 of the notification is discharge of its functions and execution of its development programme by the Jaipur Development Authority. Thus, the public purpose mentioned is to enable a statutorily constituted authority to discharge its statutory functions and duties. The amended definition does not truncate the powers of the appropriate Government to acquire the land for any `public purpose. For initiating acquisition proceedings, all that is required is that there should be genuine intention of the Government to acquire the land for `public purpose. To read into this definition, a requirement of existence of sanctioned scheme before initiation of acquisition proceedings would amount to reading something more in the definition clause, than the purpose for which the definition is enacted. The object of the definition is to illustrate certain instances of the `public purpose. The object of amendment of definition of public purpose is not to truncate or in any way condition the power of the appropriate Government to initiate the land acquisition proceedings. Therefore, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of H. M. T. House Building Co-operative Society (supra) is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case in hand. (13). Therefore, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of H. M. T. House Building Co-operative Society (supra) is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case in hand. (13). Section 45 of the J.D.A. Act, 1982, provides that where, it appears to the State Government that, in order to enable the Authority to perform any of its functions, or to discharge any of its duties or to exercise any of its powers, or to carry out any of its projects or schemes or development programmes, it is necessary that any land in any part of the Jaipur Region should be acquired, the State Government may acquire the land in accordance with the provisions of the Acquisition Act. It may be mentioned here that S. 92 of the J.D.A. Act, 1982, provides that the provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith in any other law for the time being in force. The J.D.A. Act, 1982, has received the assent of the President of India. Therefore, under Article 254 of the Constitution, the provisions of J.D.A. Act, 1982 would prevail in the State of Rajasthan notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith in any other law including the Central law. (14). The expression ``where it appears to the State Government occurring in Section 45 of the J.D.A. Act, shows that it is not necessary for the State Government to frame a detailed scheme or development plan before exercising the powers of acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act. It is sufficient, if a decision in that respect is taken and the detailed scheme is left to be worked out at the stage of the execution of the plan. Government, having taken the policy decision for the public purpose or the purpose mentioned in Section 45 of the J.D.A. Act, was justified in issuing the notification for acquisition of the land. Thus, in the context of the J.D.A. Act, 1982, the proceedings for acquiring the land under the Acquisition Act can be initiated and completed in the absence of the sanctioned notified scheme for which the land is required. Therefore, the decision of the learned single Judge that in the absence of the sanctioned as approved scheme no acquisition proceedings of the land could legally be initiated, cannot be upheld. (15). In the case of S.S. Darshan vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. Therefore, the decision of the learned single Judge that in the absence of the sanctioned as approved scheme no acquisition proceedings of the land could legally be initiated, cannot be upheld. (15). In the case of S.S. Darshan vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. (4), the Apex Court has held that the challenge to the acquisition on the ground that the purpose of acquisition is different than permitted land use under the master plan is not tenable. The Supreme Court has observed in this regard as under :– ``The last submission of learned counsel for the appellant is that the user of the acquired land shown in the master plan being different, there cannot be a conversion of the user except in accordance with the provisions for making the change in the land use. It is not a case of change of user by the owner of the land but one of acquisition by the State under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984. This argument also has no merit. (16). Again in the case of Jainarain and Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. (5), the second contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners, before the Supreme Court was that the land in dispute shown in the Master Plan and Zonal Development Plan as agricultural green belt, whereas it is being acquired for the public purposes of setting up the STP, the acquisition is contrary to the Master Plan and the Zonal Development Plan. Repelling this contention, the Supreme Court has held that : ``So far as the second contention raised by Mr. Vashisht, the same is mentioned to be rejected. Whatever may be the user of the land under the Master Plan and the Zonal Development Plan the State can always acquire the same for the public purpose in accordance with the law of the land. (17). In view of the above decisions of the Apex Court, the decision of the learned Single Judge that the green belt area shown in the master plan cannot legally be made subject matter of the acquisition under the Acquisition Act is not sustainable. (18). As per the notification and declaration issued, the public purpose has been specified as for the discharge of functions and for implementation of the development programme by the Jaipur Development Authority. (18). As per the notification and declaration issued, the public purpose has been specified as for the discharge of functions and for implementation of the development programme by the Jaipur Development Authority. Obviously, the public purpose specified in the notification and the declaration is for the discharge of its function and for the implementation of the development programmes of J.D.A. which is obviously for the planned, proper and orderly development of Jaipur Region and of its executing plans, projects and schemes. For such development for which the Jaipur Development Authority has been established under the Jaipur Development Authority Act, 1982, a vast area of land measuring 10, 721 bighas and 17 bishwas are sought to be acquired. Obviously, when a huge area of land is sought to be acquired, it would not be proper to insist upon the Government to specify particular use to which each and every bit of land notified would be used. In the State of Tamilnadu & Ors. vs. L. Krishnan & Ors. (6), it has been held by the Apex Court that where the large extents are sought to be acquired for development and similar purposes, it would not be possible to specify how each owners bit would be utilised and for what purpose. Therefore, non-mention of specific use to which each and every bit of land notified would be put to does not invalidate the notification for the acquisition of the land. (19). Section 45 of the J.D.A. Act, 1982, provides that where it appears to the State Government that in order to enable the Jaipur Development Authority to perform any of its functions or to discharge any of its duty or to exercise any of its powers or to carry out any of its projects or schemes or development programmes, it is necessary that any land in any part of the Jaipur Region should be acquired, the State Government may acquire the land in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Obviously, u/s. 45, the land can be acquired for public purpose of the J.D.A. for the discharge of its function and its development programme. Obviously, u/s. 45, the land can be acquired for public purpose of the J.D.A. for the discharge of its function and its development programme. Therefore, in our opinion, the public purpose specified in the notification and the declaration that the land is needed for the discharge of its function and for implementation of the development programmes by J.D.A. is consistent with the provisions of section 45 of the J.D.A. Act, 1982. (20). In our opinion, the public purpose specified in the notification u/s. 4(1) and the declaration u/s. 6 of the Acquisition Act are not vague. The purpose mentioned in the notification is public purpose in accordance with law. In Aflatun vs. Lieut. Governor of Delhi (7), the acquisition of large extent of land made for `planned development of Delhi was under challenge. The Supreme Court held in that case that the land was needed for the public purpose and the public purpose mentioned in the notification cannot be said to be vague. Therefore, in the present case in hand also the public purpose specified in the notification u/s. 4(1) and dec- laration u/s. 6 that the land is required by the J.D.A. for the discharge of its function and for implementation of development programmes cannot be said to be vague and it is a public purpose within the meaning of Acquisition Act. (21). Sub-section (3) of section 6 of the Acquisition Act, provides that a declaration made u/s. 6 shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for the public purpose. In the cases on hand the State Government has made a declaration u/s. 6 of the Acquisition Act. This is conclusive evidence of the fact that the land is required for the public purpose. (22). In view of the above discussion, conclusion of the learned single Judge that the public purpose mentioned in the notification and declaration are vague and are not public purpose, cannot be accepted. (23). Section 4 of the Acquisition Act requires that the notification must be published in the Official Gazette and two daily news-papers circulating in the locality and the Collector shall cause the public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the said locality. The learned single Judge has found that the substance of the notification has been affixed on the notice boards of two Tehsils. The learned single Judge has found that the substance of the notification has been affixed on the notice boards of two Tehsils. The learned Single Judge held that this cannot be said to be the notice given at the convenient places in the locality. It is difficult to agree with the learned single Judge. In the present matters in hand, the lands sought to be acquired fall within two Tehsils of Jaipur and Sanganer. In our opinion, Tehsil is a very convenient place. In the localities comprising a tehsil affixing of the substance of notification on the notice boards of both the tehsils can be held to be notice given at the convenient places in the locality. With utmost respect, we do not agree with the learned Single Judge that affixing the substance of notification on notice board of Sanganer and Jaipur Tehsils for information of general public is not sufficient compliance with the requirement of giving notice at the convenient place in the locality within the meaning of section 4 of the Acquisition Act. (24). From the affidavits which have been labelled as belated affidavits by the learned single Judge, it is evident that the substance of notification was pasted on the notice board at Panchayat Bhawans. All official acts are presumed to be done in accordance with law. Even so, the view taken by the learned Single Judge is that the substance of notification was not pasted on the notice boards of the Panchayat or that the mere lists were affixed on the notice board of tehsils. We are of the view that the substance of notice has been affixed on the notice boards of both the tehsils along with the lists and was also pasted on the notice board, at the Panchayat Bhawans. We, therefore, hold that the pasting of the public notice of the substance of notification has been done at the convenient places of the locality. Thus, the second part of the mandatory requirement of the Section 4(1) of the Acquisition Act has been duly complied with. It has been admitted by both the sides and also observed by the learned Single Judge that the substance of the notification was affixed on the notice boards of tehsils on 5.8.1988. Thus, the second part of the mandatory requirement of the Section 4(1) of the Acquisition Act has been duly complied with. It has been admitted by both the sides and also observed by the learned Single Judge that the substance of the notification was affixed on the notice boards of tehsils on 5.8.1988. Therefore, the conclusion of the learned single Judge that no public notice or the substance of notification u/s. 4 of the Act was given at the convenient places in the locality cannot be maintained. (25). Even for arguments sake, if it is taken that there have been some irregu- larities in the publishing of the public notice or the substance of the notification at convenient places in the locality, no prejudice has been caused to the respondents- petitioners. This is evident from the fact that the detailed objections have been filed u/s. 5A by them before the Land Acquisition Officer. Therefore, on the concept of want of prejudice the notification u/s. 4(1) of the Acquisition Act cannot be held invalid merely because some irregularities in the publishing of the public notice or the substance of notification at convenient places in the locality has taken place. (26). Section 4 of the Acquisition Act provides that the notification that the land is needed for the public purpose shall be published in the Official Gazette and in two daily newspapers and the public notice or the substance of such notification shall be caused to be given at the convenient places in the locality and the last of the dates of such publication and of giving of public notice shall be referred to as the date of publication of notification. The public notice or the substance of the notification was given at the convenient places on the notice boards of both the tehsils on 5.8.88. This date is obviously the last of the dates of the publication and of giving of public notice. Therefore, it is the date of publication of notice u/s. 6 of the Acquisition Act. There is no dispute that the declaration u/s. 6 is dated 28.7.89, and published in the Rajasthan Gazette dated July 31, 1989. Counting from 5.8.1988 the declaration u/s. 6 of the Acquisition Act was published in the Official Gazette within one year from the date of the publication of the notification u/s. 4. of the Acquisition Act. There is no dispute that the declaration u/s. 6 is dated 28.7.89, and published in the Rajasthan Gazette dated July 31, 1989. Counting from 5.8.1988 the declaration u/s. 6 of the Acquisition Act was published in the Official Gazette within one year from the date of the publication of the notification u/s. 4. of the Acquisition Act. In Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti & Anr. vs. Makrand Singh & Ors. (8), the Supreme Court has held that the period has to be calculated from the last date of the publication of the notification u/s. 4(1) to the date of publication of declaration u/s. 6 in the Official Gazette. Obviously, from 5.8.88, last of the dates of the publication of the notification u/s. 4(1) of the Acquisition Act the declaration u/s. 6 has been published in the Gazette on July 31, 1989 which is clearly within one year from the date of publication of the notification u/s. 4(1) of the Acquisition Act. Therefore the view taken by the learned single Judge that the declaration u/s. 6 was published after the expiry of the period of one year from the date of publication of the notification u/s. 4(1) of the Acquisition Act, cannot be upheld. (27). It has been urged before us that the objectors were not given opportunity of hearing and as such the mandate of section 5A of the Acquisition Act has not been complied with. The learned Single Judge after going through the material available on record, concluded that before making his recommendations, the Land Acquisition Officer, had given the opportunity to the objectors of hearing and had thus complied with the mandate of section 5A of the Acquisition Act. We are broadly in agreement with the conclusion arrive at by the learned Single Judge that due opportunity of hearing was given to the objectors and the mandate of section 5A of the Acquisition Act has been duly complied with. (28). The acquisition of vast land has been made for the public purpose of planned and orderly development of Jaipur Region and if there is nursery in any small area and it is acquired, there is obviously no discrimination. The interest of betterment of the society and the planned development of the Region shall have to be given precedence over the interest of the individuals. The interest of betterment of the society and the planned development of the Region shall have to be given precedence over the interest of the individuals. Therefore, there is no- thing wrong and there is no infirmity in the acquisition of the nursery. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the learned single Judge that the nursery land cannot be acquired. (29). Some land of the housing societies and the land and building of some schools and hostels have also been acquired. There is nothing on record to suggest that the construction of the houses or the school and hostel buildings have been made with the permission obtained from the appropriate authority in accordance with law. Therefore, if the acquisition for public purpose has been made, then the individual interest of the persons/bodies, who have constructed the buildings without the requisite permission, deserve no sympathy. Therefore, there is no irre- gularity or infirmity in the acquisition of such land and buildings. Larger interest of betterment of the society and the development of the Region would prevail over the interest of the individual or a group of individuals who have taken law in their hands and have made construction in violation of law. If some land of some other housing societies have been left out by the Govt. from acquisition that by itself is not indicative of any discrimination. Only those lands that are needed for the development programmes of J.D.A. have been acquired. In the case of Yadu Nandan Garg vs. State of Raj. & Ors. (9), the Apex Court has observed that wrong action taken by the authorities cannot be pressed into service on the ground of invidious discrimination under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. (30). The contention that the notification u/s. 4(1) does not contain the details of the lands and their Khatedars and consequently, it is bad in law is not tenable. The Supreme Court in the case of Yadunandan (supra) has ruled that it is enough that the main survey number of the land is mentioned in the notification issued u/s. 4(1) of the Acquisition Act and non-mention of sub-division or other details would not render the notification invalid. The observation of the Supreme Court are as under : ``It is true, for reasons best known to the authorities, that Anand Nursery had the benefit of the exemption. The observation of the Supreme Court are as under : ``It is true, for reasons best known to the authorities, that Anand Nursery had the benefit of the exemption. The wrong exemption under wrong action taken by the authorities will not clothe others to get the same benefit nor can Article 14 be pressed into service on the ground of invidious discrimination. The wrong mention of survey number in notice under section 9 cannot cast a cloud on valid notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act. It is enough that main survey number is mentioned in the notification under section 4 and the details thereof would be supplemented at the appropriate stage. Mention of the sub-division of the main survey number does not render the notification under section 4(1) illegal. In view of the above, the notification u/s. 4(1) cannot be said to be bad in law. (31). The learned counsel for the J.D.A. has stated at Bar that the development work in relation to lands so acquired will be done and executed by the J.D.A. alone and the development shall not be carried out through or by any private agency including Suneja Tower. The J.D.A. has cancelled all the agreements in this behalf. This statement at Bar has not been disputed before us. Therefore, it is accepted that the development work and scheme is to be executed by the Jaipur Development Authority. (32). No other point has been argued and pressed before us. (33). The next result of above entire discussion is that all 116 appeals above mentioned are allowed and the judgment and order of the learned single Judge is set aside in relation to the appeals and it is held that the acquisition proceedings initiated by notification u/s. 4(1) and declaration u/s. 6(1) of the Acquisition Act are valid and legal in respect of the lands etc. which are mentioned in the notification u/s. 4(1) and the declaration u/s. 6(1) both. There shall be no order as to costs.