Judgment : Dr. B. S. Chauhan, J. 1. The instant petition has been filed by the petitioner for issuing a mandamus to the respondent No. 5, the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Ghaziabad to dispose of the applications filed by the petitioners under Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter called the Act). 2. The petitioners' land was acquired along with the land of the others by issuing a notification under Section 4 of the Act on 16.7.60 (Annexure 2 to the writ petition). Declaration under Section 6 of the Act was issued in respect of the land in question on 20.5.62 (Annexure 3 to the writ petition) and the petitioners had been dispossessed from the land on 16.4.65 though the award under Section 11 of the Act was made on 18.9.77. The petitioners case is that they did nob file the references under Section 18 of the Act. The L.A.R. No. 304/77 "Hemchand and others v. State of U. P. and others" was decided by the reference court vide award dated 31.3.87 Annexure 4 to the writ petition. The petitioners preferred their applications under Section 28A of the Act promptly for re-determination of compensation in respect of their respective plots of land which had been acquired by the same notification under which the land which had been the subject-matter of L. A. R. No. 304 of 1977 was acquired. The grievance of the petitioners is that the applications are pending for such a long time and the respondent No. 5 is not proceeding with the hearing of the said applications in spite of the fact that the award under Section 18 of the Act in the case of Hemchand (supra) had become final. 3. Heard Shri B. B. Paul, learned counsel for the petitioners and learned Standing Counsel on behalf of the respondents and perused the documents filed along with the writ petition. 4. In spite of the fact that time was granted on 4.8.95 for filing counter- affidavit to the learned standing counsel, but the same has not been filed till date. 3. Heard Shri B. B. Paul, learned counsel for the petitioners and learned Standing Counsel on behalf of the respondents and perused the documents filed along with the writ petition. 4. In spite of the fact that time was granted on 4.8.95 for filing counter- affidavit to the learned standing counsel, but the same has not been filed till date. Section 28A was inserted in the Act by amendment Act No. 68 of 1984 and it provides for re-determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the court in respect of a land which has also been acquired in the same land acquisition proceedings, if the applications are filed within a period of three months from the date of the award of the court. 5. The scope of provisions of Section 28A was considered by the Supreme Court in Mewa Ram v. State of Haryana, (1986) 4 SCC 151 and the court placed particular emphasis on Para 2 (ix) of the objects and reasons which provided for a special and particular discriminatory advantage for inarticulate and poor people to apply for re-determination of the compensation amount on the basis of the court award in a land acquisition reference filed by the comparatively affluent land owner. The Apex Court observed as under : "Section 28A in terms does not apply to the case of the petitioners ...............................they do not belong to that class of society for whose benefit the provision is intended and meant, i.e., inarticulate and poor people who by reason of their poverty and ignorance have failed to take advantage of the right of reference to the civil court under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. On the contrary, the petitioners belong to an affluent class" 6. The Apex Court approved the law laid down in Mewa Ram (supra) again in Scheduled Caste Co-operative Owning Society Ltd., Batinda v. Union of India and others, AIR 1991 SC 730 . On the contrary, the petitioners belong to an affluent class" 6. The Apex Court approved the law laid down in Mewa Ram (supra) again in Scheduled Caste Co-operative Owning Society Ltd., Batinda v. Union of India and others, AIR 1991 SC 730 . In Babua Ram v. State of U. P., 1995 (2) SCC 689 , the Apex Court again approved and reiterated the law laid down in Mewa Ram (supra) and observed as under : "Legislature made a discriminatory policy between the poor and inarticulate as one class of persons to whom the benefit of Section 28A was to be extended and comparatively affluent who had taken advantage of the reference under Section 18 and the latter as a class to which the benefit of Section 28A was not extended. Otherwise, the phraseology of the language of the non-obstante clause would have been differently worded.......................It is true that the Legislature intended to relieve hardship to the poor, indigent and inarticulate interested persons who generally failed to avail the reference under Section 18 which is an existing bar and to remedy it, Section 28A was enacted giving a right and remedy for re-determination........................ The Legislature appears to have presumed that the same state of affairs continue to subsist among the poor and inarticulate persons and they generally fail to avail the right under sub-section (1) of Section 18 due to poverty or ignorance or avoidance of expropriation.....................Parliament made conscious discrimination between the poor and inarticulate as a class and comparatively affluent as another class and conferred the rights under Section 28A in favour of the former.......................Section 28A is just and fair and does not violate Article 14. The procedure, therefore, is just and fair and does not violate Article 21." 7. However, the Court further held that Section 28A has no application where the court's award is in respect of the land which is of different nature, quality or situation when compared with the land of the applicant. It also further held that the applications under Section 28A must not be decided by the Collector till the court's award does not become final meaning thereby in appeal, special leave petition, etc., either before the High Court or Supreme Court should not be pending against the said court's award. 8. It also further held that the applications under Section 28A must not be decided by the Collector till the court's award does not become final meaning thereby in appeal, special leave petition, etc., either before the High Court or Supreme Court should not be pending against the said court's award. 8. The same view had been reiterated by the Supreme Court in a large number of cases, e.g., Union of India and others v. Karnail Singh and others, (1995) 2 SCC 728 ; D. Krishna Vani and another v. State of Orissa and others, (1995) 2 SCC 734 ; Union of India and others v. Pradeep Kumari and others, AIR 1995 SC 2259 and U. P. State Industrial Development Corporation v. State of U. P. and others, (1995) 2 SCC 766 . Thus, it is clear from the above, that the provision of Section 28A is applicable only in a case of 'Little Indians' who because of their poverty and ignorance cannot afford to file the reference under Section 18 of the Act and if an application under the said provision is filed by a person of that class, the same cannot be decided unless the Court's award on the basis of which the said application has been filed does not attain the Pinalty. However, the provisions of Section 28A are not intended to be windfall for every landholder whose land had been acquired under the same land acquisition proceedings. 9. In Nand Kishore v. State of Punjab, 1995 (7) JT 69 , the Supreme Court explained the scope of Article 141 of the Constitution of India by observing that the law declared by the Apex Court is binding and commandful as the law made by a legislative body or an authorised delegatee of such body. 10. In the instant case, there is no averment in the petition that the petitioners belong to the Class for the benefit of which Section 28A had been enacted. The petitioners have mentioned that they are poor persons and could not file references because of their poverty and ignorance. However, it has not been contended that the land in question was the only holdings of the petitioners. There are 18 applications filed as Annexures 5 to 22 to this writ petition and Annexures 8, 9, 11, 12, 15, 18 and 21 do not bear the dates on which the said applications were filed. However, it has not been contended that the land in question was the only holdings of the petitioners. There are 18 applications filed as Annexures 5 to 22 to this writ petition and Annexures 8, 9, 11, 12, 15, 18 and 21 do not bear the dates on which the said applications were filed. However, it has been mentioned in Paragraph 12 of the writ petition that the applications had been filed promptly. It does not say that applications had been filed within limitation. In the applications filed by the petitioners before respondent No. 5 under Section 28A (Annexures 5 to 22 to the writ petition), the petitioners have not disclosed any ground on the basis of which they can seek relief under the said provisions of the Act except that the petitioners did not file the references under Section 18 of the Act. It is still doubtful whether the petitioners can amend their applications and establish their case to get the benefit under Section 28A as it is difficult for the concerned authority to proceed and examine, the said applications as the petitioners have not taken sufficient pleadings in their applications. 11. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that their applications are not being decided because in Civil Appeal No. 8112-14/94, U. P. State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. v. State of U. P. and others, the Hon'ble Supreme Court directed not to decide the applications under Section 28A filed by some persons on the basis of the Court's award which was subject-matter of the said appeal (Annexure 23 to the writ petition). IT is clear from the said order that in the said case of U. P. State Industrial Development Corporation (supra), notification under Section 4 of the Act had been issued on 9.2.62. In the case of the present petitioners, Section 4 notification was issued on 16.6.60, therefore the applications of the petitioners cannot be withheld on the basis of the said order of the Supreme Court as IT relates to the land acquisition proceedings emanating from entirely different Section 4 notification. 12. Thus, in view of the above, we are constrained to direct the respondent No. 5, to issue notices to respondent No. 6, Ghaziabad Development Authority, the other contesting party and after hearing all the parties concerned, to determine whether : (i) The applications were filed by the petitioners within limitation. 12. Thus, in view of the above, we are constrained to direct the respondent No. 5, to issue notices to respondent No. 6, Ghaziabad Development Authority, the other contesting party and after hearing all the parties concerned, to determine whether : (i) The applications were filed by the petitioners within limitation. (ii) Petitioners belong to the indigent class of the society for whose benefit, provisions of Section 28A were enacted particularly in the light of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Mewa Ram, Scheduled Caste Co-operative Society and Babua Ram (supra). (iii) The Court's award in L.A.R. No. 304/77, Hemchand (supra) has become final or whether any appeal arising out of the same or any other award in respect of any land covered by the same Section 4 notification dated 16.7.60 is pending before this Court or Supreme Court. (iv) The nature, location and quality of the land of the petitioners are identical to the land which had been subject-matter of the Court's award in Hemchand (supra). If all the aforesaid conditions are fulfilled in the cases of the petitioners, the Special Land Acquisition Officer, respondent No. 5 is directed to decide the applications under Section 28A of the Act and dispose them of finally within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment strictly in accordance with law as explained above. With these observations, this petition is finally disposed of. There will be no order as to costs.