JUDGMENT A.K. Ganguly, J. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. In this writ application some interesting questions arise for decision. The bare facts of the case are noted below: The writ petitioner was charge-sheeted on 15.12.1994 issued by the General Manager of Bihar State Sugar Corporation Limited (hereinafter to be referred to as the 'Corporation') stating therein that the petitioner in a domestic enquiry as well as in Misc. Case No. 110/M/85 supported the case of the Corporation whereas in B.S.E. Case No. 9/86 the petitioner did not support the case of the Corporation. Further allegation is that the petitioner had stated before the Labour Court that one Kedar Nath Prasad did not try to assault Lalit Mohan Prasad with the chair. On the contrary he said that he was standing clutching the chair. It is further alleged that the petitioner has changed his statements before the Labour Court in connivance with the delinquent workman. 3. Reading the charge-sheet it appears that the totality of the misconduct alleged against the petitioner is that he has changed his version of an incident and before the Labour Court his evidence has not supported the allegation which has been levelled against one Kedar Nath Prasad. 4. In the writ petition the petitioner has stated that when domestic enquiry was held, he was made to say something falsely against Kedar Nath Prasad under the pressure of the Management. Similarly, before the Executive Magistrate the petitioner also had to say something against Kedar Nath Prasad. 5. Be that as it may, the allegation against the petitioner is one of giving incorrect version of an incident or of adducing evidence which does not support the case of the Management. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has produced before this Court the relevant standing orders showing different categories of misconduct as framed by the respondent-Corporation. The said items of misconduct are stated below: (a) Wilful insubordination or disobedience whether alone or in combination with others of any lawful and reasonable order of a superior. (b) Inciting, instigating or organising an illegal strike including a set-down or stay-in strike or indulging in acts of violence, sabotage or illegal acts in pursuance of an illegal strike. (c) Theft, fraud, dishonesty or misappropriation with criminal intent in connection with Mill's business or property. (b) Inciting, instigating or organising an illegal strike including a set-down or stay-in strike or indulging in acts of violence, sabotage or illegal acts in pursuance of an illegal strike. (c) Theft, fraud, dishonesty or misappropriation with criminal intent in connection with Mill's business or property. (d) Taking or giving bribes or any illegal gratifications connected directly or indirectly with the affairs of the mill. (e) Habitual absence without leave. (f) Habitual late attendance. (g) Riotous or disorderly behaviour or any act subversive of discipline within the Mill's establishment. (h) Gross or habitual negligence of work. (i) Frequent repetition of any act or omission for which a fine may be imposed under the Payment of Wages Act. (j) Damage to work in process or to any property of the mills caused wilfully or by gross negligence. (k) Unauthorised removal or interference or damage to machinery guards, fencing and other safety devices installed in the mills. (l) Refusal to work on another job normally undertaken by the same category of workmen not affecting his wages. (m) Holding meetings, taking out processions and shouting slogans inside the factory premises without the previous sanction of the manager. (n) Disclosing to any unauthorised person or persons or making unauthorised use of any information adversely affecting the interest of the company which comes into the possession of the workman during the course of his work. (o) Sleeping whilst on watch and ward duty. (p) Deliberate delaying of production or instigating others to do so. (q) Assaulting, threatening or intimidating any workman or other employee of the mills within the mill's premises. (r) Commission of any minor misconduct after three' previous punishment under Clause-49 of these orders, in the course of twelve months. This Court does not find that allegations levelled against the petitioner come within anyone of them. 7. Even if it is admitted that the petitioner has made incorrect statements or has given an incorrect version before the Labour Court even that does not amount to misconduct. It was open to the Management to cross-examine the petitioner and elicit the truth of the matter. This Court is not aware whether the petitioner was subjected to cross-examination before the Labour Court in connection with his evidence. Be that as it may, giving of evidence which does not suit the Management case does not amount to misconduct in law. It was open to the Management to cross-examine the petitioner and elicit the truth of the matter. This Court is not aware whether the petitioner was subjected to cross-examination before the Labour Court in connection with his evidence. Be that as it may, giving of evidence which does not suit the Management case does not amount to misconduct in law. This Court is definitely of the view that by deposing before the quasi judicial tribunal no person can be alleged to have committed any misconduct. In this connection, the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon two judgments of the Supreme Court. One is in the case of M/s Glaxo Laboratories Limited Vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Meerut and others reported in A.I.R., 1984. S.C., 505. The other case is that of A.L. Kalra vs. Project and Equipment Corporation of India Limited reported in A.I.R. 1984, S.C., 1361. In the subsequent judgment of A.L. Kalra (supra), the learned Judge of the Supreme Court has been pleased to hold a consideration of the previous judgment in the case of M/s. Glaxo Laboratories (supra), that acts of misconduct must be specific and precisely defined. For commission of an act of misconduct a person may lose his job. Therefore, it is incumbent on the part of the Management to precisely lay down the acts of misconduct. The learned Judge of the Supreme Court in Paragraph-22 at page-1368 in the Case of A.L. Kalra (supra), has clarified the position with the following words: "Failure to keep such high standard of moral ethical or decorous behaviour befitting an Officer of the company by itself can not constitute misconduct unless the specific conduct falls in any of the enumerated misconducts in Rule-5." 8. The learned counsel for the respondent nos.2 and 3 have placed their reliance on the decision in the case of Pradip Kumar Das vs. State of West Bengal and others reported in 1995 Labour and Industrial Cases, 2522. In that judgment the learned Judge of the Calcutta High Court came to the conclusion that n a disciplinary proceeding where there has been delay in submitting the charge-sheet, the affected person may raise the question of delay before the Enquiry Officer and/or the Disciplinary Authority. With this observation that application was disposed of. But here the question is totally different. Nobody has complained delay in the submission of the charge-sheet. With this observation that application was disposed of. But here the question is totally different. Nobody has complained delay in the submission of the charge-sheet. Therefore, the decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Pradip Kumar Das (supra) is not applicable in this case. Reliance has been placed on another judgment of Calcutta High Court in Gulam Mohiuddin vs. State of West Bengal and others reported in A.I.R. 1964, Calcutta, 503. Referring to a particular Paragraph-55 of the said judgment in the case of Gulam Mohiuddin (supra), the learned counsel for the respondents submits that in that judgment the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court has held as follows : "The word 'misconduct' is a sufficiently wide expression and covers any conduct which in any way renders a man unfit for his office or is likely to tamper or embarass the administration." This Court, with great respect to the learned Judge of the Calcutta High Court, is unable to accept the said ratio in view of the clear enunciation of the law in the two judgments of the Supreme Court referred to above. 9. Similar is the case reported in A.I.R. 1960, Bombay, 285, in Madho Singh Daulat Singh vs. State of Bombay. The broad definition of misconduct given in Paragraph-5 of the said judgment is not in consonance with the legal position explained by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid two cases. The learned counsel for the respondents has also placed reliance in the case of one S. Govinda Menon vs. Union of India and another reported in A.I.R. 1967, SC, 1274. References has been made to certain observations made in Para-6 of the said Judgment at page 1278, whereby it is said that it is open to the Government to take disciplinary proceedings against an employee in respect of his acts or omissions which cast a reflection upon his reputation for integrity or good faith or devotion to duty as a member of the Service. Such general observation made in the case of S. Govinda Menon (supra), cannot dilute the law laid down in two successive and later judgments of the Supreme Court of three Judge Benches. 10. This Court is of the view that the law on this question has been conclusively decided in the aforesaid two judgments of the Supreme Court. Such general observation made in the case of S. Govinda Menon (supra), cannot dilute the law laid down in two successive and later judgments of the Supreme Court of three Judge Benches. 10. This Court is of the view that the law on this question has been conclusively decided in the aforesaid two judgments of the Supreme Court. In this view of the matter, the Charge-sheet (Annexure-1) is quashed. Automatically, the suspension order passed against the petitioner in connection with the pendency of the said disciplinary proceeding (Annexure-4) and all the proceedings taken in connection with the Charge-sheet (Annexure-1) are also quashed. The writ petition is allowed to the extent mentioned as above. The respondents must pay to the petitioner his full salary during the period he was on suspension after deducting the amount of subsistence allowance paid to him during suspension. Such payment must be made within three months from the date of production /receipt of a copy of this order.