Judgment :- P.A. Mohammed, J. The petitioner was initially appointed as Food Inspector in Health Service of the State of Kerala. While he was working in Thiruvananthapuram Circle, he was placed in full additional charge of the District Food Inspector, Kollam as per Ext. P1 proceedings of 2nd respondent. However, by Ext. P2, he was put in full additional charge of Chief Food Inspector, Mobile Vigilance Squared, Thiruvananthapuram while he was working at Kottarakkara. Later, by Ext. P3 proceeding, the Director of Health Services cancelled the above order and the 3rd respondent was placed in full additional charge of Chief Food Inspector, Mobile Vigilance Squad, Thiruvananthapuram. The petitioner had been directed to hand over charge to 3rd respondent. This writ petition has been filed praying to quash Ext. P3 order issued by the 2nd respondent. 2. The counsel appearing for the petitioner and the 3rd respondent were heard. Heard also the counsel for the additional respondents 4 and 5 who have got themselves impleaded as per the order in CMP No. 26262 of 1996. I also heard the Government Pleader on he half of respondents 1 and 2. 3. The only question which required to be considered in this case is whether this Court can interfere in Ext. P3 order passed by the 2nd respondent. By Ext. P3 what has been done by the 2nd respondent is to place the 3rd respondent Food Inspector, Mobile Vigilance Squad, Thiruvananthapuram in full additional charge of the Chief Food Inspector, Mobile Vigilance Squad, Thiruvananthapuram after cancelling the charge earlier given to the petitioner who was working as Food Inspector, Kottarakkara Circle. It was argued by the counsel for the petitioner that no reasons are given for cancelling the full additional charge given to the petitioner and substituting the 3rd respondent in his place. In support of said contention the counsel relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Mohinder Singh Gillv. Chief Election Commissioner (MR 1978 SC 851) and a decision of this Court in State of Kerala v. Balakrishnan 1992(1) KLT 420). The counsel for the additional respondents 4 and 5 also placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (AIR 1974 SC 555). Before invoking the principles or rules laid down in the aforesaid decisions it is necessary to examine the ambit and scope of the impugned order. The counsel for the additional respondents 4 and 5 also placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (AIR 1974 SC 555). Before invoking the principles or rules laid down in the aforesaid decisions it is necessary to examine the ambit and scope of the impugned order. What has been done by Ext. P3 is to put the 3rd respondent in full additional charge of Chief Food Inspector. The 3rd respondent is the senior most Food Inspector in the Mobile Vigilance Squad Unit, Thiruvananthapuram. By Ext. P3, no service benefit has been conferred on the 3rd respondent. What has been directed is only to hold additional charge of the Chief Food Inspector. This appears to be an interim arrangement for administrative reasons. On this score, there is no question of any dispute as to seniority among the petitioner and the contesting respondents. By the reason of the present order, the service conditions of the petitioner or the contesting respondents have not been in any way affected. 4. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the 2nd respondent, where in it has been stated that as far as the Chief Food Inspectors are concerned, there is no Government decision or rule for entrusting the additional charge. In Paragraph 7 of the said counter affidavit, it is stated that the office of the Food Inspector, Kottarakkara Circle is far away from the office of the Mobile Vigilance Squad, Thiruvananthapuram. The Government will incur financial commitments to meet the travelling allowances and other allowances of the petitioner. In addition to that it would cause inconvenience in discharging his duties as Chief Food Inspector as well as the duties of Food Inspector at Kottarakkara Circle. Ext. P3 order was passed in taking the above aspects into consideration. Though, the reasons are not given in Ext. P3 the background of the cancellation of the said order has been detailed in the counter-affidavit. There is no absolute or unqualified rule that in cases of the like nature, the reasons available before the authority, should be revealed in the impugned orders. Sometimes such revelation may work against the public interest. It is for the authority concerned to decide whether such reasons should be disclosed or not. Whatever that be in this case sufficient reasons are explained by the 2nd respondent in the counter-affidavit. Sometimes such revelation may work against the public interest. It is for the authority concerned to decide whether such reasons should be disclosed or not. Whatever that be in this case sufficient reasons are explained by the 2nd respondent in the counter-affidavit. When an order is challenged before this court on the ground that no reasons are stated in support thereof, the authority concerned can disclose the reasons in the counter-affidavit and I find that the reasons stated in paragraph 7 of the counter-affidavit in this case is well founded. 5. It has to be observed that this is not a case involving an officer acting in an officiating capacity or an officer involved in a transfer. The guidelines or rules applicable to such situations cannot be applied in the case of an order involving charge arrangement. What has been argued before me is that the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Mohindar Singh Gill's case, supra, shall be applied here. There the Supreme Court was considering a situation where a statutory functionary made an order based on certain grounds. In such cases, it said the validity of such order must be judged by reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. "Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out". Here, this court is faced with totally a different situation. So also, a Division Bench of this Court in Balakrishnaii 's case, supra, was dealing with an order of transfer. There, the contention was that the ground of "public interest" was not stated in the order of transfer though it was sought to be sustained on that ground. In that context, the Division Bench said "public interest should not be a camouflage or a smokescreen". Though, it was a case where the order does not contain any ground, it was admittedly a case of transfer and not an order giving additional charge. The Supreme Court in E.P. Rovappa's case, supra, said that the ambit and reach of Arts.14 & 16 are not limited to cases where the public servants affected has a right to post. The Court was considering a case of a public servant who was in an officiating position. The Supreme Court in E.P. Rovappa's case, supra, said that the ambit and reach of Arts.14 & 16 are not limited to cases where the public servants affected has a right to post. The Court was considering a case of a public servant who was in an officiating position. In the present case, this court is not faced with similar situation. It is made clear in Paragraph 10 of the counter affidavit that the benefits legally available to the petitioner will not be affected in any manner by the reason of Ext. P3. So also his future prospects in the service will not be affected. Usually, when a post in an office is fell vacant, the senior most person in the office is given additional charge. There is no dispute that the 3rd respondent is the senior most Food Inspector in the office where additional charge was sought to be implemented. Nowhere it is said that the state wise seniority should be reckoned while selecting the officer for giving additional charge. 6. Counsel for the petitioner has pointed out that by virtue of Exts. P1 and P2, this charge arrangement can only be done according to seniority. I do not think such a position will merge from Exts. P1 and P2. Even then as far as the present case is concerned, we need not look into what is contained in Exts P1 & P2. What is relevant is only the giving of additional charge to the 3rd respondent. This is a function of the authority who passes the order for securing administrative convenience. The scope of interference of this court in such proceeding is very limited. In that view of the matter, I am not inclined to interfere with Ext. P3 order. 7. However, it can be definitely said that the Government have power always to alter or vary the order of charge arrangement in whatever manner it requires. In this premise, therefore, the Government can always consider the grievance of the parties, if any, by the impugned process and pass appropriate order in the circumstances of the case. The Original Petition is disposed of as above.