Judgment Indu Prabna Singh, J. 1. These two applications have been heard together as they arise out of the same judgment of the learned Lower Appellate Court. This judgment will govern both of them. Criminal Revision No.1361 of 1986 2. So far as Criminal Revision No.1361 of 1986 is concerned it has been filed under Sections 397 and 401 of the code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the code), The accused persons numbering 14 were the petitioners. However, this criminal revision application was admitted only with respect to applicant No.1 Bhuwal Prasad. With respect to the rest it was dismissed as will appear from the order sheet dated 25-11-1986. All. the 14 petitioners figured as accused in G. R. Case No.1575 of 1979/tr. Case No.39 of 1984 disposed of by" Shri Rajendra Narayan singh, Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, siwan by which the learned Magistrate convicted the aforesaid petitioners under Sec.380 of the Penal Code and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year each. The petitioners were further convicted under Sections 323 and 147 of the Penal Code and were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months each under each count. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently. On appeal Shri P. (sic), the learned Ist Additional Judge, siwan acquitted the appellants under section 380 of the Penal Code while maintaining their conviction under Sections 147 and 323 of the Penal code. He, however, reduced their sentences under each count from six months rigorous imprisonment to a fine of Rs.25/- each under each count and in default to undergo rigours imprisonment for one month each. With this modification in sentence he upheld the conviction of the petitioners under Sections 147 and 323 of the Penal Code while acquitting them of the charge under Sec.380 of the Penal Code. 3. Briefly stated the facts of this case are as follows : One Fakre Alam the informant (P. W.9) had lodged the f. I. R. at Basantpur P. S. making out various allegations against the petitioners. According to him at 8 AM. on 1.11.1979 while he was sitting at his darbaja the petitioners came there and charged him that he had got a false case instituted against them by Harijans of bhaparpur and for doing this illegal act he should be finished. According to him at 8 AM. on 1.11.1979 while he was sitting at his darbaja the petitioners came there and charged him that he had got a false case instituted against them by Harijans of bhaparpur and for doing this illegal act he should be finished. The informant denied his hand in any such case and asked them to come after he offered the nawaj prayers. The petitioners went back but again returned to the informant after his Nawaj prayer, abused him, assaulted him, his uncle and cousin and removed certain articles from their house. The F. I. R. was lodged and the police after completing the investigations submitted charge-sheet under Sections 147, 323,448 and 380 of the Penal code. The cognizance of the offence was taken and the case was transferred to the Judicial Magistrate named above for trial. The learned Magistrate after the conclusion of the trial sentenced the petitioners in the manner indicated above and in appeal, as stated above, the sentences were modified. 4. In this revision-application it has been contended that since the learned lower appellate court disbelieved the prosecution case with respect to the allegation under Sec.380 of the Penal code it should not have believed the prosecution case with respect to the allegation made under Sections 147 and 323 of the Penal Code. As a matter of fact no occurrence as alleged by the prosecution did ever take place and the petitioners have been falsely implicated in this case since petitioner No.1 had got the cattle of the informant impounded in the cattle pound. The learned courts below did not attach proper importance to the evidence of the D. Ws. The courts below have also not followed the mandatory provision of sections 360 and 361 of the Code. Petitioner No 1 is in Government service posted as headmaster at a place in the district of Siwan and if his conviction and sentence are not set aside he will suffer great loss. On these grounds it has been contended that the judgment of conviction passed against the petitioners be set aside. As stated above this application on was admitted only with respect to petitioner No.1 and dismissed with respect to the rest. 5. In this revision-application various points have been raised on behalf of the petitioners. As stated above the revision-application of only petitioner No.1 Bhuwal Prasad has been admitted. As stated above this application on was admitted only with respect to petitioner No.1 and dismissed with respect to the rest. 5. In this revision-application various points have been raised on behalf of the petitioners. As stated above the revision-application of only petitioner No.1 Bhuwal Prasad has been admitted. However, since the points raised in this revision-application are common to all the petitioners I would like to deal with them in detail. 6. It has been stated in this application that the prosecution has failed to examine the Investigating Officer. This statement appears to be wrong as from the record it appears that the Investigating Officer, Gopal Prasad, has been examined as P. W.11. So far as the evidence on record is concerned it appears to be consistent. I have perused the judgments of two courts below. I find that both the learned courts have properly appraised the evidence on record and have based their findings on the same as also on the facts and circumstances of this case. No particular inconsistency could be pointed out to me in the evidence of the witnesses or in the conclusions arrived at by the learned courts below, therefore, at this stage in this revision-application I do not feel inclined to interfere with the same. 7. On behalf of the petitioner No.1 a question of law has been raised to the effect that the mandatory provision as contained in Sections 360 and 361 of the Code have not been complied with and, therefore, the judgment of conviction is liable to be set aside. According to Sec.360 (1) of the Code when any person not under 21 years of age is convicted of an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term of 7 years or lessjthe Trial Court instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment; may release him on his entering into a bond with or without sureties to appear and receive the sentences. Under Section 360 (3) of the Code in a case in which a person is convicted of theft in a building or any offence punishable with not more than two years imprisonment the trial court may instead of sentencing him to any imprisonment release him after due admonition. Under Section 360 (3) of the Code in a case in which a person is convicted of theft in a building or any offence punishable with not more than two years imprisonment the trial court may instead of sentencing him to any imprisonment release him after due admonition. On the strength of these provisions of law it has been submitted before me that their benefits were given to the petitioner No.1 and he may be either released after admonition or on his executing a bond with or without sureties. It has been submitted that in present case this has not been done. It has further been pointed out that the provisions of Sec.361 of the Code which are mandatory in character have also not been complied with inasmuch as "special reasons" have not been recorded for not dealing with the petitioner No.1 under the provision of section 360 of the Code or provision of probation of Offenders Act. On these grounds it has been submitted that the judgments of the courts below suffered from fatal defects. 8. In view of these submissions made on behalf of the petitioner No.1,i have carefully examined the two judgements of the courts below. In paragraph ii of the judgment the learned trial court before whom the present petitioner No.1 figured as accused No.1 observed that taking into account the gravity of the offence committed by the accused persons he does not feel that they should be given the benefit of the probation of Offenders Act. Accordingly he has not chosen to deal with the accused persons under the provision of this Act. It may be stated here that the alleged occurrence had taken place during day time. The accused persons are said to have entered into the courtyard of the informant and they not only assaulted him, his brother and his uncle, but also removed their house hold articles including case and ornaments. It appears that under the aforesaid circumstances the learned Trial Court did not deem it fit to extend the benefits of the Probation of Offenders Act to the accused persons before him. On this point the law appears to be well settled, according to which the exercise of powers under this section is discretionary. The mere fact the person involved is the first offender will not mean that he could not be punished with imprisonment. On this point the law appears to be well settled, according to which the exercise of powers under this section is discretionary. The mere fact the person involved is the first offender will not mean that he could not be punished with imprisonment. In order to attract the provisions of Sec.3 or 4 of this Act, there must be some material available on record to convince a court that it would be justifiable to apply these provisions. In the present case where it was found that the accused persons, some of whom variously armed came in a body, surrounded the informant and assaulted him and others and also committed theft it can safely be held that it was not a fit case for releasing them on probation. In the present case the offence of the accused persons was further compounded since they went back but again returned in a body variously armed. They did so after premeditation and committed the offences as alleged. It does not appear to be a case where the occurrence had taken place on the spur of the moment without premeditation or under grave and sudden provocation. Under the aforesaid circumstances the learned Counsel for the petitioner No. l does not appear to have made out a case for the application of provisions of Sections 360 and 361 of the Code. The learned Trial Court has recorded "special reasons" for not extending the benefit of Probation of Offenders Act to the accused persons. In this connection a reference may be made to Sec.361 of the Code according to which were in any case the court could have dealt with and accused under Sec.360 or under the provisions of Probation of Offenders act but has not done so, it shall record in its judgment the "special reasons" for not having done so. In the present case the Trial Court after taking into consideration the provision of Probation of offenders Act came to the conclusion that its benefit should not be extended to the accused persons. Therefore, it is not one of those cases in which no "special reason"has been assigned by the trial Court for not extending the benefit of this Act to the accused persons. The learned Lower Appellate Court has also not thought it fit to interfere with this finding of the Trial Court. 9. Therefore, it is not one of those cases in which no "special reason"has been assigned by the trial Court for not extending the benefit of this Act to the accused persons. The learned Lower Appellate Court has also not thought it fit to interfere with this finding of the Trial Court. 9. In this connection on behalf of the petitioner reliance has been placed on the case of Rajbir V/s. State of Haryana, 1985 AIR SC 1278. In this case the conviction was under Sec.323 of the penal Code and the accused happened to be a Government servant. The parties to the assault were close relatives. It was accordingly held that it was a fit case in which the accused be released under section 4 of the Probation of Offenders act. Paragraph 4 of this judgment shows that the appellant was sentenced to six months imprisonment though he and the co-accused had already suffered over one years imprisonment in course of the trial. It was further observed by the Hon ble Supreme Court as follows : "ordinarily, in a situation as here, there would be no need to interfere. Learned Counsel for the appellant has, however, pressed the appeal as the appellant is in Government service and if the conviction and sentence are maintained, he would lose his service both the parties to the assault were close relations. " 10. Under the aforesaid circumstances the appellant was held to be entitled to be admitted to the benefits of section 3 of the Probation of Offenders act, 1958. The Hon ble Supreme Court, accordingly, while maintaining his conviction directed that he should be released on probition of good conduct under Sec.4 of the Act. The appellant was accordingly directed to appear before the Chief Judicial Magistrate within four weeks to be released after due admonition. 11. In the present case, however, the facts are entirely different. Here the parties are not close relations. While fakrey Alam is the informant, the present petitioner and others who are hindus were accused persons. Hence they cannot be said to be relations. Moreover on the examination of the record of this case before the Trial court it is clear that the petitioner or for that matter of fact the present petitioner was not put in jail custody even for a single day. Hence they cannot be said to be relations. Moreover on the examination of the record of this case before the Trial court it is clear that the petitioner or for that matter of fact the present petitioner was not put in jail custody even for a single day. The present petitioner along with others had surrendered before the court of the Chief judicial Magistrate on 14-11-1979 and on the same day all of them were released on bail. Since then all the accused persons of this case remained on bail till the judgments was pronounded. Hence it is not one of those cases in which the accused persons were in custody for over one years whereas the sentence imposed on the petitioner was only six months. Here there is no sentence of imprisonment against the petitioner. No doubt in the present case the petitioner, Bhuwal Prasad, has claimed to be a Government servant. This will, however, not entitle him to take the law in his own hands. The offences are alleged to have committed in a cool and calculated manner with complete determination. This will become clear from the fact that the accused persons again returned back to the informant after some time and committed the offences at the place of his residence. There is no mitigating circumstance in the present case. Under the aforesaid circumstance, in my view, decision in the case of Rajir (supra) of the Hon ble supreme Court will not apply and this petitioner cannot get any benefit out of the same. 12. From the discussions made above it becomes clear that this applica tion is not fit to be allowed. It is, accordingly, dismissed. Cr. Revision No.1523 of 1986 13. So far as Cr. Revision No.1523 of 1986;filed under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code; is concerned the informant fakrey Alam is the petitioner whereas two of the accused persons namely, bhuwal Prasad and Jado Lal who figured as accused No.1 and 9 before the learned trial court are the opposite parties. In this application the petitioner has made grievance that members of the opposite party should not have been acquitted of the charge under Sec.380 of the Penal Code and their sentences under Sections 147 and 323 of the Penal Code should not have been reduced to a fine of Rs.25/-each under each count. In this application the petitioner has made grievance that members of the opposite party should not have been acquitted of the charge under Sec.380 of the Penal Code and their sentences under Sections 147 and 323 of the Penal Code should not have been reduced to a fine of Rs.25/-each under each count. In this case before the learned Trial Court large number of prosecution witnesses were examined as eye-witnesses. Some D. Ws. had also been examined. After taking into consideration the entire evidence on record the learned Trial Court convicted the opposite party under Sections 147 and 323 of the Penal Code and sentenced them to undergoing rigorous imprisonment for six months each under each count. It further convicted them under Sec.380 of the Penal Code and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year each. The sentence were ordered to run concurrently. Even the learned Lower appellate Court held that P. W.1 had stated that the ornaments were removed by one of accused, namely, Ekwal Ram. Though P. W.5 has stated that the removal was made by the opposite party, Yadu Lal. However, the learned lower Appellate Court had acquitted the opposite party of the charge under section 380 of the Penal Code and has reduced there sentences under Sections 323 and 147 of the Penal Code to a fine of Rs.257 each under each count. The judgment of the learned Lower appellate Court is bad in law and wrong on facts. The learned court below should not have taken into account the minor contradictions in the evidence, specially when it up-held the conviction under sections 147 and 323 of the Penal Code. The learned Lower Appellate Court should have upheld the judgment of conviction of the learned Trial Court. Under these circumstances it was prayed that the judgment of the learned lower Appellate Court to the extent of the acquittal the opposite parties of the charge under Sec.380 of the Penal code and the reduction of sentence of the charge* under Sections 147 and 323 of the Penal Code may be set aside and the judgment of the learned Trial Court may be restored. 14. 14. In view of this prayer made in criminal Revision No.1523 of 1986 the important question that may arise for consideration would be, whether the informant has got any locus standi in the matter and whether he can file a criminal revision for setting aside the judgment of acquittal of the charge under Sec.380 of the Penal Code as also the reduction of the sentence under sections 323 and 147 of the Penal Code. Since they are important questions of law I propose to examine them in detail. 15. I will firstly refer to the prayer made in this revision-application for enhancement of the sentence passed under sections 323 and 147 of the Penal Code. As stated above the learned Trial Court and sentenced the members of the opposite party to six months rigorous imprisonment each under each count. On appeal this sentence was reduced by the learned Lower Appellate Court to a fine of Rs.25/- Each under each count and in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month each. In the present application a prayer has been made to enhance the sentence awarded by the learned Lower Appellate Court and to restore the sentences to the members of the opposite party awarded by the learned Trial Court. Apart from this prayer this revision-application is also directed against setting a side of the acquittal of the opposite party of the charge under Sec.380 of the Penal code by the learned Trial Court. Since these two prayers are required to be considered independently I propose to deal with them separately. 16. I will firstly refer to the prayer for enhancement of sentence. In this connection a reference may be made to section 377 (1) of the Code. It provides the procedure for filing the appeal by the State Government against the sentence awarded in 9 case. It lays down that in any case of conviction on a trial held by any Court other than the High court the State Government may direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court against the sentence on the ground of its inadequacy. It lays down that in any case of conviction on a trial held by any Court other than the High court the State Government may direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court against the sentence on the ground of its inadequacy. Sec.377 (3) of the Code provides that when an appeal has been filed against the sentence on the ground of its inadequacy the High Court shall not enhance the sentence except after giving to the accused reasonable opportunity of showing cause against such enhancement and while showing cause the accused may plead for his acquittal or for the reduction of the sentence. There is no other provision in the Code for filing an appeal for enhancement of sentence on the ground of its inadequacy. As stated above this Criminal revision has been filed by the informant. If the provision of Sec.377 of the Code are taken into consideration it appears that the informant has got no locus standi in the matter. Even otherwise the perusal of the judgment of the learned appellate court shows that the learned court has taken into consideration the evidence on record and also the relevant facts and circumstances of this case. No specific infirmity in the aforesaid judgment could be pointed out to me. So far as the revisional power of this Court under sections 397 and 401 of the Code is concerned recourse to the same cannot be taken to set at naught, other provisions of this Code. As pointed out above there is no provision for filing of an appeal by the informant on the ground of inadequacy of the sentence. It is only the State Government which can file any such appeal. So far as revisional powers are concerned the same may be most sparingly exercised when there is already a provision for appeal in the code on the ground of inadequacy of the sentence. Under this circumstance, I do not think that this revision application No.1523 of 1986 is maintainable. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner is also not able to show anything otherwise. It is, accordingly, dismissed. 17. So far as the acquittal of the opposite party of the charge under Sec.380 of the Penal Code is concerned this will not come under Sec.377 of the Code. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner is also not able to show anything otherwise. It is, accordingly, dismissed. 17. So far as the acquittal of the opposite party of the charge under Sec.380 of the Penal Code is concerned this will not come under Sec.377 of the Code. The procedure for appeal in the case of acquittal is governed by section 378 of the. Code. In this revision-application the informant has prayed that the acquittal of the members of the opposite party under Sec.380 of the penal Code by the learned Lower Appellate court be set aside and the judgment of conviction under this section by the learned trial court be restored. In other words it appears to be an application filed by the informant for setting aside the judgment of acquittal of the charge under Sec.380 of the Penal code passed by the learned Lower Appellate Court. 18. First important question that may arise for consideration under the facts and circumstances of this case is whether this criminal revision application filed under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code would be maintainable or not. 19. In this connection a reference may be made to section 378 of the Code which provides in its sub-section (i) the procedure for filing of appeal in the case of acquittal. A perusal of this subsection will show that an appeal in the case of acquittal may be presented by the public Prosecutor before the High court at the direction of the State government from the original or appellate order of acquittal passed by any court other than the High Court. From this it would appear that the informant has got no locus standi to file an appeal in a case of acquittal. In such a situation the appeal can only be filed by the public Prosecutor and that also at the direction of the State Government. 20. In the present case no appeal has been filed. It is only a revision application by the informant under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code that has been filed before this Court. The important question that may arise in this connection is whether under the facts and circumstances of this case the revision application in maintainable. 21. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has invited my attention to various cases decided in this connection. The important question that may arise in this connection is whether under the facts and circumstances of this case the revision application in maintainable. 21. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has invited my attention to various cases decided in this connection. Firstly my attention has been invited to the case of K. Chinnaswamy reddy V/s. State of Andhra Pradesh air 1962 S. C.1788. In this case it was held that no doubt it is open to a High court in revision to set aside an order of acquittal even at the instance of a private parties; though the State may not have thought fit to appeal;but this jurisdiction should be exercised by the high Court only in exceptional cases, when there is some glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law and consequently there has been flagrant miscarriage of justice. Sub-section (4) of Sec.439 of the Code, 1898 (old Code) forbids a high Court from converting a finding of acquittal into one of conviction and that makes all the more incumbent on the high Court to see that it does not convert the finding of the acquittal into one of conviction by the indirect method of ordering retrial. This places limitation on the power of the High Court to set aside a finding of acquittal in revision and it is only in exceptional cases that this power should be exercised. The Hon ble Supreme Court has further held that it is not possible to lay down the criteria for determining such exceptional cases which would cover all contingencies. It, however, proceeded to give by way of illustrations some of those cases which justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision. After enumerating those cases by way of illustrations it was held that these and other cases of similar nature, can properly be held to be cases of exceptional nature where the High court can justifiably interfere with an order of acquittal and in such a case it is obvious that it cannot be said that High court was doing indirectly what it could not be directly in view of the provisions of Sec.439 (4) of the Old Code. It may be mentioned here that section 439 (4) (old) corresponds to Sec.401 (3) of the present Code. 22. It may be mentioned here that section 439 (4) (old) corresponds to Sec.401 (3) of the present Code. 22. The extent of the jurisdiction of the High Court in the matter of interfering in revision against an order of acquittal has been considered by the Hon ble Supreme Court from time to time. In the case of D. Stephens V/s. Nosibolla, AIR 1951 SC 196 , it was observed as follows: "the revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under Sec.439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not to be lightly exercised when it is invoked by a Private complainant against an order of acquittal against which the Government has a right of appeal under Sec.417. It could be exercised only in exceptional cases where the interests of public justice require interference for the correction of a manifest illegality or the prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice. This jurisdiction is not ordinarily invoked or used merely because the lower court has taken a wrong view of the law or misappreciated the evidence on the record. " 23. Again in the case of logendranath Jha V/s. Shri Polailal Biswas (1951) SCR 676 : AIR 1951 SC 316 , supreme Court observed: "though sub-section (1) of Section 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code authorises the High Court to exercise in its discretion any of the powers conferred on a court of appeal by Sec.423, yet subsection (4) specifically excludes the power to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. This does not mean that dealing with a revision-petition by a private party against an order of acquittal, the high Court can in the absence of any error on a point of law reappraise the evidence and reverse the findings of facts on which the acquittal was based, provided only it stops short of finding the accused guilty and passing sentence on him by ordering retrial. " 24. " 24. In the case of K. Chinnaswamy reddy (supra) after taking a note of these two decisions of was further observed as follows: "these two cases clearly lay down the limits of the High Courts jurisdiction to interfere with an order of acquittal in revision in particular, Logendranath Jhas case 1951 S. C. R.676 : A. I. R.1951 S. C.316, stresses that it is not open to a High court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction in view of the provisions of Sec.439 (4) and that the High Court cannot do this even indirectly by ordering retrial. What had happened in that case was that the High Court reversed pure findings of facts based on the Trial Courts appreciation of evidence but formally complied with sub-section (4) by directing only a retrial of the appellants without convicting them, and warned that the Court retiring the case should not be influenced by any expression of opinion contained in the judgment of the High Court. In that connection this Court observed that there could be little doubt that the dice was loaded against the appellants of that case and it might prove difficult for any subordinate judicial officer dealing with the case to put aside altogether the strong views expressed in the judgment as to credibility of the prosecution witnesses and the circumstances of the case in general. " 25. As stated above in the case of k. Chinnaswamy Reddy (supra) certain cases have been given by way of illustration of as the case of exceptional nature in which High Court can justifiably interfere with the order of acquittal. It is clear that those cases are only illustrative and not exhaustive, as becomes clear from the judgment of Hon ble Supreme Court in the case of mahendra Pratap Singh V/s. Sarju Singh , 1968 AIR S. C.707. In this case all the three cases mentioned above were taken into consideration. Referring to the case of K. Chinnaswamy Reddy (supra), it was observed that "although the list given by this Court in the said case is not exhaustive, it is obvious that the defects in the judgment under revision must be analogous to those actually indicated by this Court. Referring to the case of K. Chinnaswamy Reddy (supra), it was observed that "although the list given by this Court in the said case is not exhaustive, it is obvious that the defects in the judgment under revision must be analogous to those actually indicated by this Court. " From this it would appear that the exceptional circumstances should either be those enumerated in the judgment in the case of K. Chinnaswamy Reddy (supra) or those others which are analogous to those exceptional circumstances. 26. In the case of Ayodhya Dube V/s. Ram sumer Singh AIR 1981 S. C.1415, the scope of the revisional power of the high Court under Sec.401 of the code against the judgment of acquittal has been explained. Further the decision of the case of A". Chinnaswamy Reddy (supra) also came up for consideration in this case before the Hon ble Supreme court. In the said case the Sessions judge had acquitted the accused by ignoring the probative value of F. I. R. and reliable testimony of eye-witnesses and his judgment was full of inconsistencies and consisted of faulty reasoning. The high Court in revision directed retrial by setting aside the acquittal. The Hon ble Supreme Court held that this order of the High Court was justified. After making a mention of the decision in K. Chinnaswamy Reddy (supra) it has been observed as follows: ". . . . . . . . . . We only wish to say that the criminal Justice System does not admit of pigeonholing! Life and the Law do not all neatly into slots. When a Court starts laying down rules enumerated (1), (2), (3), (4) or (a), (b) (c), (d), it is arranging for itself traps and pitfall. Categories, classifications and compartments, which statute does not mention, all tend to make law less flexible, less sensible and less just. " 27. Also my attention has been invited to the case of State of Orissa V/s. Nakula Sahu and others AIR 1979, SC 663. This was also a case under Section 439 read with section 435 of the Old code. " 27. Also my attention has been invited to the case of State of Orissa V/s. Nakula Sahu and others AIR 1979, SC 663. This was also a case under Section 439 read with section 435 of the Old code. It was observed as follows: "it is now well settled that normally the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 439 is to be exercised only in exceptional cases when there is a glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law which has consequently resulted in flagrant miscarriage of justice. The High Court is expected to act under Sec.435 or section 439 if it is hearing an appeal. The power being discretionary, it has to be exercised judiciously and arbitrarily or lightly. " 28. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties in detail with respect to the judgment under revision. I have also perused and closely scrutinised this judgment. I find: that there has been proper discussion of the evidence on record and various facts and circumstances of this case. From perusal of the judgment of the learned appellate court it appears that there were cogent reasons for disbelieving the prosecution evidence so far as the offence under Sec.380 of the Penal Code is concerned. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner at this stage, prima facie, has not been able to show such infirmity in the judgment of the learned lower Appellate Court which would warrant interference in exercise of the revisional power of this Court as sum-merised in the various reported decisions noted above. As such I do not find it to be a fit case for interference in exercise of the revisional powers. 29. In view of the discussions made above this application is also dismissed and the judgment of the learned Lower appellate Court is confirmed. Application Dismissed