UTTAM CHAND (DECEASED) THROUGH PHOOL KUMARI v. CANARA BANK PAHARGANJ, NEW DELHI
1996-05-08
R.C.LAHOTI, S.N.KAPUR
body1996
DigiLaw.ai
R. C. Lahoti, J. ( 1 ) THIS is an appeal preferred by Smt. Phool Kumari, widow of one late Uttam Chand Jain, who was sole defendant in a civil suit. ( 2 ) ON the death of defendant, the counsel appearing for him informed the Court of factum of death as contemplated by Order 22 Rule 10-A CPC. On 18. 10. 95 it was brought to the notice of the Court by the counsel for the plaintiff that Mr. J. K. Jain, counsel appearing for the deceased defendant was also related to him. On a prayer made by the counsel for the plaintiff, the counsel for the defendant Mr. J. K. Jain was directed to disclose the names of the LRs of the deceased-defendant, so as to enable the plaintiff filing an appropriate application bringing the LRs on record. ( 3 ) AS Mr. J. K. Jain, counsel for the defendant did not comply with the order, on 17. 9. 96, the learned Single Judge has once again directed him to comply with the previous order within four weeks. ( 4 ) AGGRIEVED by the abovesaid orders, this appeal has been filed. ( 5 ) IT is submitted by the appellant that duly of the counsel contemplated by Rule 10-A of Order 22 of the Civil Procedure Code is over by bringing the factum of death of the party to the notice of the court and the counsel cannot be directed also to disclose the names of the LRs. It is further submitted that with the death of the party, the relationship between the counsel and the client stands snapped, the counsel no more remains a counsel for the party who is dead and therefore direction to counsel is totally unwarranted and illegal. It is further submitted that the direction cannot be justified merely because the counsel happens to be a relation of the deceased party. ( 6 ) THOUGH there may be some substance in the contention raised on behalf of the appellant we do not think that the present appeal deserves to be entertained. ( 7 ) DEATH of the sole defendant Uttam Chand took place on 11. 11. 1994. Affidavit.
( 6 ) THOUGH there may be some substance in the contention raised on behalf of the appellant we do not think that the present appeal deserves to be entertained. ( 7 ) DEATH of the sole defendant Uttam Chand took place on 11. 11. 1994. Affidavit. moved alongwith thepplication dated 11th January, 1995 was sworn in by Shri J. K. Jain, Advocate for the defendant and disclosed only so much : "that Shri Uttam Chand, sole defendant died at Delhi on 11th November,1994. "the affidavit docs not contain any other para. Shri J. K. Jain, advocate is admittedly a relation of the deceased. It appears that the deceased and the counsel both were living in Delhi. As such, we have reason to presume under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act that in ordinary course, he would have come to know about the death of the defendant immediately. Besides, his duty was over after moving the application along with the affidavit. But Shri J. K, Jain, the counsel continued to pursue the matter to defend the estate of the deceased and the appeal has been filed by the widow of the deceased through the same counsel. ( 8 ) IF the widow could be apprised by the counsel of the proceedings in the court and having been apprised of the Court proceedings, the widow could prefer an appeal, we fail to understand why the widow and the counsel could not have assisted the court by carrying out its order. ( 9 ) THE court having been apprised of the relationship existing between the counsel and his erstwhile client, was justified in proceeding upon an assumption that the counsel would be aware of the names and particulars of the LRs. It cannot be lost sight of that every counsel is an officer of the Court and apart from his duty towards client he also owes duty towards the Court in aiding the administration of justice which duty too is paramount. ( 10 ) IN a situation like the present one, the Court has several options under Order 22 Code of Civil Procedure.
( 10 ) IN a situation like the present one, the Court has several options under Order 22 Code of Civil Procedure. The court may : A) declare that the suit has abated, under sub-rule (3) of Rule 4; or b) exempt the plaintiff from the necessity of substituting the legal representatives of any such defendant who had failed to file written statement or who has failed to appear and contest the suit at the hearing, and may pronounce the judgment notwithstanding the death of such a defendant under sub-rule (4) of Rule 4; or c) set aside abatement in circumstances enumerated in sub-section (5) of Rule 4; or d) proceed in the absence of a person representing the estate of the deceased person; or e) appoint the Administrator-General or an officer of the court or such other person as it thinks fit to represent the deceased person and may deliver judgment binding the estate of the deceased under newly added rule 4-A. ( 11 ) FOR the aforesaid purpose, court may make enquiry from any person who is supposed to have and can give necessary information. Since now various options arc available to court to meet the situation like the present one, it can no more be argued that the learned single Judge was duly-bound to declare that the suit had abated under sub-rule (3) of Rule 4 of Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the amended Order 22. the word "shall" as used In the sub-rule (3) of Rule 4, has to be interpreted as "may". Holding the suit as abated is no more mandatory, since 1976 Amendment. ( 12 ) THE facts of the case indicate, a justice oriented approach, shorn of technicalities, on the part of the learned single Judge protecting the interest of a nationalised bank, hard earned savings of the citizens of the country behind. Bank officials have neither sufficient personal interest - like a private litigant - nor means to know the existence and particulars of legal representatives of the defendant. Merits of the lis should not be allowed to be lost in technicalities and lack of personal interest on the part of institutions and public bodies as litigants cannot come in the way of the Court in discharging its duty to administer justice even by devising procedure to reach the goal.
Merits of the lis should not be allowed to be lost in technicalities and lack of personal interest on the part of institutions and public bodies as litigants cannot come in the way of the Court in discharging its duty to administer justice even by devising procedure to reach the goal. There is nothing wrong in the Court eliciting such necessary information. Reference to Section 165 of the Evidence Act 1872 is apposite, for it empowers the Court to ask any question, - not barred by Section 121 to 131 (both inclusive) and which are not improper under Section 148 or 149 of the Indian Evidence Act - in any form, at any lime, to anyone, if relevant for the purpose of just decision of the suit. A similar power is vested in the court under Rule 2 of Order X Civil Procedure Code to question and examine any person, parly or pleader appearing or present in Court, though the applicability of the said provisions is not strictly attracted to the present case. ( 13 ) ALL the rules of procedure are handmaids of justice and the courts are duty- bound to adopt a justice-oriented approach. (See M/s Nabha Investment Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Harkishan Das Laxman Das 1995 (1) Delhi Lawyer 227 ). Supreme Court observed in Collector Land Aquisition Anantnag Vs. Mst. Katigi AIR 1987 SC 1353 : ". . . IT must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable oi removing injustice and it is expected to do so. " ( 14 ) WE cannot ignore the fact that it is only as a result of the view taken by the learned single Judge that the widow of the deceased has now appeared on the surface and is before this court in appeal. ( 15 ) EVEN otherwise the impugned order does not decide rights of any parly and hence does not amount to judgment within the meaning of Section 10 of Delhi High Court Act. An appeal against an order of the nature as is the impugned one, does notlie. ( 16 ) FOR all the foregoing reasons, we find the appeal devoid of any merit and liable to be dismissed. It is dismissed accordingly.