ORAL JUDGMENT F.I. Rebello, J.-The appellant herein the Regional Director, Sub-Regional Office Employees' State Insurance Corporation has preferred this appeal on behalf of the Corporation against the order dated 25th February, 1994 passed by the Employees Insurance Court in Reference No. EIC/90. 2. A short narration of facts is necessary for the purpose of disposing of this appeal. The respondent is a proprietary concern which is covered by the provisions of the Employees' State Insurance Act. 1948, which hereinafter shall be referred to as the E.S.I. Act. On 24th and 28th January, 1984 Officers of the appellant carried out inspection in the premises of the respondent, Pursuant to the said inspection a notice was issued to the respondent for payment of contributions for the period July, 1982 to September, 1983. On receipt of the said notice, respondent sought time and thereafter filed his reply on 15th September, 1984. On 4th September, 1986 one more notice was issued by the appellant based on the inspection report claiming contributions for the period July 1983 to March 1984. Thereafter there has been an exchange of correspondence between the appellant and the respondent. However, the respondent failed to satisfy the claim as claimed in notices dated 6th July, 1984 and 4th September, 1986. 3. On 2nd January, 1990 the appellant issued a show-cause notice as to why action should not be taken under Section 45-A of the E.S.I. Act. The respondent sought time to file his reply. In fact on 23rd January, 1990 a date was fixed for personal hearing. However, on the said date respondent failed to turn up. Pursuant to which one more notice dated 1st March, 1990 was served on the respondent again calling upon the respondent to show cause and to appear for personal hearing on 20th March. 1990. Thereafter there are subsequent notices giving further opportunity to the respondent and b also calling upon the respondent to appear for personal hearing. However the respondent neither showed cause nor appeared for personal hearing. On 8th May, 1990 an order was passed determining the contributions for the period July 1982 to March 1984. On 24th May, 1990 the respondent moved an application under Section 75(1)(g) of the E.S.I. Act. The said application was heard and disposed of by order dated 25th February, 1994 by the Employees Insurance Court. On 8th May, 1990 an order was passed determining the contributions for the period July 1982 to March 1984. On 24th May, 1990 the respondent moved an application under Section 75(1)(g) of the E.S.I. Act. The said application was heard and disposed of by order dated 25th February, 1994 by the Employees Insurance Court. The Insurance Court upheld the contentions raised on behalf of the respondent herein that the demand for the period 1982-1983, that is, July 1982 to September 1983 is barred by limitation and consequently could not be recovered. Insofar as the second period for October 1983 to March 1984, the objection raised by the respondent had been rejected insofar as it pertains to the said claim being barred by limitation. Hence issue No.8 which was heard as a preliminary issue had been decided accordingly. 4. It is against this finding on preliminary issue No. 8 that the Corporation has preferred this appeal. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that the Employees Insurance Court erred in law in applying the provisions of Section 77 of an order made under Section 45-A of the E.S.I. Act. It is the contention of the counsel for the appellant that an order under Section 45-A stands on a different footing and is not subject to the limitation set out under Section 77 of the E.S.I. Act. In support of the said contention Shri Sonak relies on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Employees' State Insurance Corporation v. Asian Paints India Ltd. and another, reported in 1982 Mh LJ 315. It is further contended that explanation (b) to Section 77(1-A) was substituted by Act 29 of 1989 and came into force on 20th October, 1989 and hence will not apply to claims made before 20th October, 1989 but will only apply subsequent to 20th October, 1989. It is also urged that even if the amended provisions of the Act are made applicable insofar as the claim for the period 1982-83 is concerned, it is not barred and hence the order of the trial Court to that extent also is without jurisdiction. 5. It is also urged that even if the amended provisions of the Act are made applicable insofar as the claim for the period 1982-83 is concerned, it is not barred and hence the order of the trial Court to that extent also is without jurisdiction. 5. Shri Nitin Sardessai, arguing on behalf of the respondent, contended that the claim under Section 77(1-A) also includes a claim under Section 45-A of the E.S.I. Act and hence the Employees Insurance Court was right in its finding that the claim for the first period was barred by limitation. It is his further contention that Explanation (b) to Section 77(1-A) bars the right of the Corporation to make the claim and consequently also the order of the Insurance Court is justified and has to be upheld. 6. In my opinion, considering the relevant arguments, the following issues will arise for determination :- (1) Whether the period of limitation set out under Section 77(1-A) will also apply to an order made under Section 45-A; and (2) What is the meaning to be assigned to proviso to Explanation (b) of Section 77(1-A). 7. Shri Sonak developing the argument on the first issue has contended that Section 45-A falls under Chapter IV of Contributions whereas Section 77 alongwith Sections 74 and 75 fall under Chapter VI of the E.S.I. Act. It is his further contention that the previsions of Section 45-A became applicable on the happening of certain events, namely, the failure by the employer to maintain records or in the case where no returns have been filed as contemplated under Section 45-A of the E.S.I. Act. It is then contended that Section 45-A requires the authority to give a hearing to the person likely to be affected and on giving such hearing by order determine the amount of contributions. In other words it is his contention that a decision is taken under Section 45-A. It is then pointed out that an order passed under Section 45-A. if not challenged by a person affected by moving an application under Section 75, becomes final and the amount can be recovered under Section 45-B as arrears of land revenue. In other words it is his contention that a decision is taken under Section 45-A. It is then pointed out that an order passed under Section 45-A. if not challenged by a person affected by moving an application under Section 75, becomes final and the amount can be recovered under Section 45-B as arrears of land revenue. It is his contention therefore that the provisions of Section 77 do not apply to an order made under Section 45-A. In fact he argues that the provision of Section 77 will only apply if any claim is made to the Insurance Court under Section 75 of the E.S.I. Act. It is further argued by Shri Sonak that before the substitution of Explanation (b) to Section 77(1-A) the Legislature had introduced Section 77(1-A) by Act 44 of 1966, with effect from 28th January, 1968. A Division Bench of this Court had in E.S.I. Corp. v. Asian Paints (supra) occasion to consider the scope and effect of the said amendment and has held that the provision of Section 77 will only apply if any dispute or claim arises in a claim to the Court under Section 75. It is further his contention that the Division Bench has also considered a Full Bench judgment of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Regional Director, E.S.I. Corporation v. M/s. Fibre Bangalore (P) Ltd., reported in 1980 Lab IC 583. In the said Full Bench judgment the Karnataka High Court has also taken the same view, namely, that the provisions of Section 45-A re distinct and the provisions of Section 77 would not apply to a decision under Section 45-A. It is his contention that the subsequent amendment does not in any manner have the effect that the provision of Section 77 subsequent to the amendment will also apply to Section 45-A. He also relied on the judgment of a Division Bench of the High Court of a Kerala in E.S.I.C. v. Ramadas Reddiar, reported in 1981 (1) LW 166. 8. Shri Nitin Sardessai, counsel for the respondent, on the other hand contends that whatever may have been the interpretation given to Section 77(1-A), Explanations (a) and (b) before the amendment. 8. Shri Nitin Sardessai, counsel for the respondent, on the other hand contends that whatever may have been the interpretation given to Section 77(1-A), Explanations (a) and (b) before the amendment. the subsequent amendment which has substituted Explanation (b) and added the proviso make it clear that any claim made by the Corporation after 5 years period is barred and that such a claim will also include a claim made under Section 45-A. That therefore the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court and for that matter the judgment of the Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court being on the interpretation of the section before its amendment, will not apply subsequent to the amendment. It is his contention that the stress is to be laid on the words 'based on which such claim is made by the Corporation for the first time' and that if one looks at these words and the language Section 45-A it can be seen that also under Section 45-A a claim is made and, therefore, the provisions of Section 45-A will be attracted. 9. I have considered the arguments of both the counsel. In my opinion, though we are dealing with an amendment which was introduced by Act 29 of 1989 which came into force with effect from 20th October, 1989, the interpretation as given by the Division Bench of this Court in respect of Section 45-A will have to be adopted. The Division Bench as considering Section 45-A and the limitation as set out in Section 77(1-A). It may be noted that Section 45-A as well as Section 77(1-A) were brought about by the same amendment, namely, Act 44 of 1966. The Division Bench considered the law existing before the said amendment and the law subsequent to the said amendment. After considering in detail the law as existing and the subsequent amendment, the Division Bench held that Section 45-A stands on a different footing altogether from Section 77(1-A). The Division Bench noted that under Section 45-A (1) a decision is made subsequent to giving a hearing. That this decision is capable of being enforced as arrears of land revenue under Section 45-B. The argument advanced on behalf of the employer in the said case that the Corporation even after an order has been passed under Section 45-A(1) has to approach the Insurance Court under Section 75 has been rejected. That this decision is capable of being enforced as arrears of land revenue under Section 45-B. The argument advanced on behalf of the employer in the said case that the Corporation even after an order has been passed under Section 45-A(1) has to approach the Insurance Court under Section 75 has been rejected. After the interpretation given to Section 45-A qua Section 77(1-A) is considered, there is no reason to depart from applying the same ratio to the amended section. Ultimately what both the Explanations to Section 77(1-A) indicate are as to when the casue of action arises and qua the cause of action when the period of three years will commence. If the argument of Shri Sardessai is to be accepted that Section 45-A is also a claim then it would have to be considered that the decision under Section 45-A is merely a claim. If it is merely a claim, surely the question of enforcing the claim would not arise unless it parties of an order or decision. Section 45-A(2) lays down that insofar as the employer is concerned the Legislature has thought it fit that the decision being of a summary nature that the employer has still a right open to him to dispute the decision by moving an application under Section 75. The language of Section 45-A(2) reads as under :- "An order made by the Corporation under sub-section (1) shall be sufficient proof of the claim of the Corporation under Section 75 for recovery of the amount determined by such order as an arrear of land revenue under Section 45- B or recovery under Section 45-C to Section 451." Therefore what the sub-section speaks about is an order for the purpose of either a proof of the claim under Section 75 or for recovery of the amount. If one considers Section 75 it can be seen that the said section comes into force if any question or dispute arises. Therefore after a decision is taken there cannot be a dispute by the Corporation itself whereas there could be a dispute on the part of the employer. If one looks at the sub-section in this manner, it is clear that it is only the employer who can move under Section 75. Therefore after a decision is taken there cannot be a dispute by the Corporation itself whereas there could be a dispute on the part of the employer. If one looks at the sub-section in this manner, it is clear that it is only the employer who can move under Section 75. If the employer is to move under Section 75 then insofar as he is concerned the provisions of limitation would be from the date of decision or order as communication to him. A reading in this manner would be harmonious so as to give effect to the summary nature of the decision and the remedy to the employer in case he does not agree with the said decision. No order can attain finality unless a party aggrieved by that order has a remedy at law. In this case insofar as the employer is concerned the summary determination is subject to his raising a dispute under Section 75. 10. As I have no hesitation in adopting the reasoning given by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Employees' State Insurance d Corporation v. Asian Paints India Ltd. and another. I need not go into the two other judgments referred to by the counsel for the appellant. In fact both the judgments were considered by the Division Bench while pronouncing on the issue of applicability of the provision of Section 77 to Section 45-A(1). I respectfully adopt the same reasoning insofar as the interpretation of Explanation to Section 77(1-A) (b) is concerned. 11. Does the proviso to Explanation (b) brought about by the amendment of 1989 make any difference? Explanation (b) to Section 77(1-A) was substituted in 1989 and it reads as under :- "(b) The cause of action in respect of a claim by the Corporation for recovering contributions (including interest & damages) from the principal employer shall be deemed to have arisen on the date on which such claim is made by the Corporation for the first time : Provided that no claim shall be made by the Corporation after five years of the period to which the claim relates." A perusal of Explanation (a) to Section 77(1-A) would show that the said Explanation refers to the commencement of the cause of action other than the Corporation. Insofar as the Corporation is concerned, a the cause of action before the amendment was Explanation (b). Insofar as the Corporation is concerned, a the cause of action before the amendment was Explanation (b). The said Explanation has been substituted by the new Explanation (b) to which a proviso has been added. The said proviso is, therefore, to Explanation (b) of Section 77(1-A). As already held earlier the Explanation is for the purpose of the commencement of the cause of action. Explanation (a) applies to claimants other than the Corporation and Explanation (b) after amendment applies to the Corporation only. The bar of limitation as set out in Section 77(1-A) is referable to the cause of action in Explanations (a) and (b). The proviso to Explanation (b) is, therefore, for the purpose of the cause of action for commencement of proceedings and the limitation spelt out in Section 77(1-A). The proceedings to be commenced are under Section 75. The addition of the proviso, therefore, makes no difference whatsoever to the interpretation given to Section 45-A and Section 77 of the Act. My attention has been invited to a judgment of a Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in the case of Henry Wolsey and Company (for Proprietors S. Murugesan Family Trust by Trustee Executor) v. Regional Director. Employees' State Insurance Corporation, c reported in 1995 (1) LLN 165. The learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court was considering a case arising from an order passed under Section 45-A of the Act. After considering various arguments and more so the effect of the proviso, the learned Single Judge had come to the conclusion that the claim in that case was barred by limitation. I am unable to subscribe to the said view taken by the learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court. As already held by me the provisions of Section 77(1-A) will not apply in a case where an order is passed under Section 45-A of the Act. Further by the amended Act of 1989 Explanation (b) has been substituted to which a proviso has been added. Explanation (b) before the amendment was both in respect of the cause of action by the Corporation and also by the principal employer. Subsequent to the amendment, Explanation (b) is restricted to a cause of action only in respect of a claim by the Corporation. Explanation (b) before the amendment was both in respect of the cause of action by the Corporation and also by the principal employer. Subsequent to the amendment, Explanation (b) is restricted to a cause of action only in respect of a claim by the Corporation. Pursuant to the proviso a limitation is put whereby the Corporation cannot make a claim after five years of the period to which the claim relates. The Explanation, as already set out, is for the purpose of holding as to when the casue of action arose. If that be the case, even Explanation as amended in 1989 would only be referable to Section 77(1-A). Section 77(1-A) as already held does not apply to proceedings under Section 45-A and, consequently, the proviso will make no difference. In my opinion, therefore, proceedings under Section 45-A being of an entirely different nature insofar as the Corporation is concerned, the provisions of Section 77 including the proviso to Explanation (b) will not apply to proceedings under Section 45-A. 12. Though at the stage of admission the substantial question of law that arose in the appeal was not formulated, nonetheless the very interpretation of Section 77(1-A) Explanation (b) by itself would be a substantial question of law. 13. For the reasons aforesaid the order dated 25th February 1994 of the Employees Insurance Court on preliminary issue No. 8 is quashed and set aside. It is specifically held that the provisions' of Section 77(1-A), Explanations (a) and (b) with proviso will not apply to an order made under Section 45-A insofar as the Corporation is concerned. The matter is remanded to the Employees Insurance Court for deciding the matter on merits. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Case remitted back.