Judgment N.Pandey, J. 1. This writ application under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution has been filed on behalf of different licensees under the meaning of Section 2(g) of Bihar Agricultural Produce Market Act, 1960 read with Rule 98 of the Bihar Agricultural Produce Market Rules, 1975. 2. The prayer of the petitioners is for quashing Annexure-1 series, dated 25th July, 1991, whereby, the Secretary, Market Committee, Gaya, demanded arrears of occupation charges with respect to the shops and godowns, allotted to the petitioners on rental. It was also communicated in case that fail to deposit, the amount shall be realised as public demand. A prayer has also been made to declare that the Market Committee has no jurisdiction to enhance occupation charges or rent for the premises in question. The next grievance is that even assuming the Market Committee can realise occupation charges but in any view of the matter the rule cannot be higher than what has been prescribed under Rule 98 of the Rules. 3. It appears different shops and godowns were allotted to the petitioners within the principal market yard of the Agricultural Produce Market, Gaya, on rental of Rs. 250/- per month. Pursuant to such allotment, different lease deeds were also executed. It further appears from the Demand Notices that in certain period petitioner have already paid occupation charges. But in spite of repeated request when the balance dues were not paid, the impugned notices were issued. 4. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondents 1 to 3. Their stand is that the petitioners having entered into agreement as also after executing lease deeds for payment of occupation charges etc. for the shops and godowns, can not be allowed at this stage to question the validity of such agreement and its terms and conditions. Their further stand is that the market fee as prescribed under Rule 98 of the Rules and the occupation charges and rental with respect to the godowns and shops in possession of the petitioners are quite different. Admittedly, occupation charges or rent are realised by way of rental of the shops or godowns. But the market fee has to be realised from all the traders, transacting business in the principal market yard irrespective of the fact whether a shop or godown has been allotted. 5. In my view, the stand, taken by the respondents, is completely justified. Admittedly, occupation charges or rent are realised by way of rental of the shops or godowns. But the market fee has to be realised from all the traders, transacting business in the principal market yard irrespective of the fact whether a shop or godown has been allotted. 5. In my view, the stand, taken by the respondents, is completely justified. The power of the Market Committee to levy fees from the licence traders as per the provisions of Section 27 of the Act on the rate prescribed under Rule 98 of the Rules, is altogether different from the provisions to realise occupation charges or rental by the Market Committee from the transfer, who are allotted godowns/shops in a principal market yard. There is no dispute that different agreement and lease deeds were executed for allotment of the shops and godowns at the rental of Rs. 250/- per month with the petitioners in the year, 1988 itself. 6. It would also be relevant to notice that identical question was considered by a Bench of this Court at Ranchi in the case of Khandelwal Trading Co. V/s. the State of Bihar & Ors. C.W.J.C. No. 730 of 1986 (R). In that ase also there was an agreement for payment of rental at the rate of Rs. 250/- per month. The Court while disposing of the writ petition, held that the Market Committee, being local authority under the Act, is fully entitled to realise rent or make enhancement in appropriate cases. 7. From the facts noticed above, there cannot be any dispute that the petitioners at the relevant time agreed to make payment of occupation charges etc. It is also established from the demand notices that part of the charges were already paid. Therefore, it is really ridiculous at this stage to question the authority of Market Committee to realise such dues. 8. Mr. Advocate General, however, appearing for the petitioners, contended that in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Valjibhai Muljibhai Soneji and another V/s. The State of Bombay and others ( AIR 1963 SC 1890 ) as well as in the case of Municipal Corporation, Jabalpur V/s. Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti and another AIR 1990 SC 601 ), the Market Committee cannot be called a local authority under the Therefore, any enhancement of rent, such committee, is illegal and without jurisdiction. It is next contended that the impugned demand notices to the extent that in failure of payment, the amount invoved would be recovered through a public demand, is also illegal and without jurisdiction because such dues of market committees cannot be realised through public demand. Apart from the aforesaid, he also contended that the impugned revision of rale is highly arbitrary and unjust. Therefore, on this ground also, it would be essential for the ends of justice to quash the impugned notices. 9. In my view, none of the authorities relied upon by the learned Advocate General are applicable to the facts of present case. Because, in the background of the facts of this case, it is not at all necessary to examine whether the Market Committee is a local authority or the dues in question are required to be realised through a public demand. 10. On behalf of the respondents, copies of different agreements/deed of lease for the shops-cum-godown etc. have been brought on the record. A bare reference to condition nos. 1 and 5 of the agreement would show that on the expiry of the term of licence, the licensee shall, if he has duly observed all the conditions, be entitled to its renewal on such terms and conditions as may be determined by the Board and such revised terms shall be binding and acceptable to the licensees. Therefore, if the petitioners have agreed to such terms and conditions, at the time of allotment of shops, they cannot be allowed to question the jurisdiction of the Board to enhance the rate of rent in appropriate cases. 11. Besides the aforesaid, the petitioners also cannot be allowed to question the validity of the impugned notices on a plea that such dues cannot be realised through a public demand. In fact, a bare reference to the impugned notices would reveal that no certificate proceeding was at all instituted at the time the impugned notices were issued. That apart, these notices have been issued under Form D, as per the provisions of Sub-section (10) of Section 27A of the Act. Therefore, any person aggrieved by a decision of the Market Committee under the aforesaid provision, can avail remedy of appeal under section 27B or even revision under section 27C of the Act. 12. That apart, these notices have been issued under Form D, as per the provisions of Sub-section (10) of Section 27A of the Act. Therefore, any person aggrieved by a decision of the Market Committee under the aforesaid provision, can avail remedy of appeal under section 27B or even revision under section 27C of the Act. 12. Apart from what has been noticed above, the reliefs sought for on behalf of the petitioners in this case, depends upon disputed facts. Whether adequate amenities were provided by the Market Committee to justify the demand of rental or occupation charges, depends upon verification of different materials, which is completely beyond the scope of a writ jurisdiction. 13. Therefore, having regard to the facts and circumstances noticed above, I find no merit in this writ application. The same is hereby dismissed. But the parties are left to bear their own costs. Ashish N.Trivedi, J. 14 I agree.