Judgment PATIL G.D., J.:—Rule made returnable forthwith and heard by consent. Intervention allowed. All these petitions pertain to the same subject matter viz. the notice dated 18-5-1996 issued by the Collector, Gadchiroli, convening a special meeting of the Zilla Parishad, Gadchiroli on 10-6-1996 to consider the motion of no-confidence against its President and three Chairman/Chairperson of three Subject Committee and, therefore, they were heard together by consent of parties and are being decided by this common judgment delivered in Writ Petition No. 1156 of 1996. 2. The Petitioner in Writ Petition No. 1156 of 1996, is an elected President of the Zilla Parishad, Gadchiroli, whereas respondent No. 3 A. G. Ganyarpawar is a Member of the Zilla Parishad and proposer of the motion of no-confidence. The petitioner in Writ Petition No. 1152 of 1996 is Chairman of Works and Health Committee of the Zilla Parishad, Gadchiroli. Inter alia, it is his grievance that the notice dated 18-5-1996 has not been issued to the Chairmen of the Panchayat Samitis numbering 8 in the District of Gadchiroli. The same contention is raised by the petitioner in W. P. 1156 of 1996, who is a Chairperson of Women and Child Welfare Committee of the Zilla Parishad, Gadchiroli, so also by the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 1154 of 1996, who is a Chairman of Agriculture, Animal Husbandary and Dairy Development Committee of the Zilla Parishad, Gadchiroli. The petitioner in Writ Petition No. 1155 of 1996 is a Chairman of the Panchayat Samiti, Gadchiroli and claims that he has a right to participate and vote in the meeting to be held for consideration of motion of no-confidence convened on 10-6-1996. 3. In all these petitions Mr. B.T. Patil and Mr. B.P. Dharmadhikari, learned Counsel appeared for the petitioners, Mr. Kukde, learned A. G. P. appeared for the State and the Collector, and the other parties were represented by their respective Counsel. One Shri G. K. Nikhare has filed applications in all these petitions except in W. P. No. 1155 of 1996 for intervention. He is one of signatories to the requisition to call special meeting of Zilla Parishad to consider the motion of no-confidence. Mr. Kaptan, learned Counsel appeared for him. 4. The elections to the Zilla Parishad, Gadchiroli were held some time in the year 1992 and the term being of 5 years, it will have an existence till the year 1997. He is one of signatories to the requisition to call special meeting of Zilla Parishad to consider the motion of no-confidence. Mr. Kaptan, learned Counsel appeared for him. 4. The elections to the Zilla Parishad, Gadchiroli were held some time in the year 1992 and the term being of 5 years, it will have an existence till the year 1997. It is an undisputed position that earlier a notice dated 5th October, 1995 was issued by the Collector, Gadchiroli convening a special meeting of the Zilla Parishad on 27-10-1995 for considering the motion of no-confidence against the President and the Chairmen of the Subject Committees against whom the present motion of no-confidence has been proposed. This notice was put to challenge in Writ Petition No. 3216 of 1995 by one Kisanrao Shetye, Chairman of Panchayat Samiti, Charmoshi. By an interim order the meeting scheduled to be held on 27th October, 1995 was stayed by this Court. From the judgment rendered in Writ Petition No. 3216 of 1995 dated 5th February, 1996 it appears that the members who were invited to attend the meeting, remained absent and the meeting commenced its proceedings and that the Sub-Divisional Officer observed that the no-confidence motion could not even be tabled and as 30 out of 32 members had left the place in view of the order of the stay granted by this Court, the motion of no-confidence could not be carried out. Consequently amendment was sought to be made in that petition, praying that the proceedings of the meeting held on 27th October, 1995 be quashed. Taking all these aspects into consideration and the proceedings of the said meeting held on 27th October, 1995, which was before the Court, this Court observed in the aforesaid order dated 5th February, 1996, that “one thing is clear that in the circumstances the meeting could not be proceeded with and as such the present petition to that extent becomes infructuous.” Considering the request for quashing of the proceedings of the meeting, this Court further held : “In view of the facts and circumstances, it is unnecessary to decide this issue as the meeting is not postponed, but the proceedings are concluded. The petitioner or any other member for that matter qualified in that behalf, can again bring the motion of no-confidence against the President or any other person in accordance with law and if the competent authority decides that in view of sub-section (7) of section 49 of the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act, 1961, such motion cannot be brought within a period stipulated therein, the petitioner or any such qualified person will be entitled to challenge the legality and validity of any such order. The issues whether the motion of no-confidence is not moved in the meeting held on 27th October, 1995, is kept open. In view of the aforesaid, we do not find it necessary to entertain this petition and the same is rejected.” In the aforesaid backdrop Mr. Patil, learned Counsel for the petitioners has urged before us that the notice dated 18-5-1996 issued by the Collector, Gadchiroli, convening the special meeting on 10-6-1996 for considering the no-confidence motion against the petitioner and Chairmen of the Subjects Committees is liable to be quashed and set aside on the grounds : (i) that the present motion of no-confidence cannot be brought within a period of one year from the date of the special meeting convened under sub-section (7) of section 49 and section 87 of the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act, 1961 (for short, 'the Zilla Parishads Act') on 27-10-1995; and that the Maharashtra Act No. XII of 1996 is unconstitutional and, therefore, inoperative. The Maharashtra Act No. XII of 1996 being unconstitutional, motion of no-confidence cannot be declared to have been passed unless it is passed by not less than three-fifth of the total number of Councillors who are for the time being entitled to sit and vote at any meeting of the Zilla Parishad; (ii) That the petitioners and other Councillors should have given a copy of the requisition submitted by the requisitionists. What has been supplied to the petitioners and other Councillors along with the notice dated 18-5-1996 is a motion of no-confidence only and nothing more. What has been supplied to the petitioners and other Councillors along with the notice dated 18-5-1996 is a motion of no-confidence only and nothing more. Since the requisition is not supplied to the petitioner and the Councillors, the impugned notice issued on its basis is bad in law; (iii) The motion of no-confidence proposed to be moved does not disclose any ground for moving the motion of no-confidence inasmuch as the alleged grounds referred to therein are too vague, without any details and amount in fact giving no grounds at all. In the submission of Mr. Patil, for the purposes of moving a no-confidence motion as provided by the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads Presiding Authorities (No-confidence Motion) Rules, 1962 (for short, 'No-confidence Motion Rules') it is necessary to mention the grounds on which the motion of no-confidence is sought to be moved and for want of grounds in the motion, the notice of the meeting dated 18-5-1996 convened for consideration of such motion of no-confidence has to be held as illegal and is, therefore, liable to be quashed and set aside. To substantiate his contention on this aspect, Mr. Patil placed reliance on the decisions of this Court reported in (Ganeshsinha Domansinha Hajari v. Commissioner, Nagpur Division)1, 1963 Mh.L.J. 569 and (Dhrubad Bhagwan Sawale v. Collector, District Buldana)2, 1987(1) Bom.C.R. 531 : 1986 Mh.L.J. 996; (iv) The proposed meeting scheduled to be held on 10-6-1996 would be illegal inasmuch as all the Chairmen/Chairpersons of the Panchayat Samitis within the area of Gadchiroli Zilla Parishad have not been issued notices of meeting, though they are members of the Zilla Parishad, Gadchiroli, and entitled to sit and vote in the meetings of the Zilla Parishad. In the submission of Shri Patil, even after the amendment brought to the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads Act by the Maharashtra Act No. 21 of 1994, which came into force w.e.f. 22-4-1994, the Chairmen of all the Panchayat Samitis in the District are entitled to sit and vote at the meeting of the Zilla Parishad existing as on date and as such they are entitled to sit and vote at the time of election of the President, Vice-President and Chairmen of the Subjects Committees as also to sit and vote in the meeting convened for considering the motion of no-confidence against them. 5. 5. Shri Kukde, learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for the respondent State and the Collector, raised contentions countering the submissions made by Shri Patil, learned Counsel for the petitioners, and urged that the Collector has committed no error in issuing the notice of the meeting of the Zilla Parishad for considering the motion of no-confidence, on receipt of the requisition from the Councillors of the Zilla Parishad in that regard. 6. In so far as the first contention raised by Shri Patil, that the present motion of no-confidence cannot be held to be valid as it is being brought within a period of one year from the date of the special meeting earlier convened on 27-10-1995 for considering the motion of no-confidence against the President and the Chairman/Chairperson, Zilla Parishad, is concerned, it would be pertinent to refer to the provisions of sections 49 and 87 of the Zilla Parishads Act. Section 49 speaks about the motion of no-confidence against President or Vice-President of the Zilla Parishad while section 87 deals with motion of no-confidence against Chairmen of Subjects Committee. Section 87 makes the provisions of section 49 applicable in relation to the motion against the Chairmen of Subjects Committees as they apply in relation to the President or the Vice President of the Parishad, after providing as to when the Collector has to call a special meeting on receipt of a requisition to consider the motion of no-confidence in the Chairman of the Subjects Committee. For considering the first submission of Mr. Patil, the provision of sub-section (7) of section 49 is material. Sub-section (7) of section 49, as it presently stands after the amendment-introduced by Maharashtra Act No. XII of 1996, is as under : “(7) If the motion of no-confidence is not moved, or, as the case may be is rejected, no fresh motion of no confidence shall be brought before the Zilla Parishad within a period of six months from the date of the special meeting convened under sub-section (3).” 7. The only change effected by Maharashtra Act No. XII of 1996 in sub-section (7) to the earlier provision is that, in place of 'one year' the words 'six months' have been substituted. The only change effected by Maharashtra Act No. XII of 1996 in sub-section (7) to the earlier provision is that, in place of 'one year' the words 'six months' have been substituted. Earlier, therefore, motion of no-confidence could not be brought before the Zilla Parishad within a period of one year from the date of the special meeting convened under sub-section (3) whereas now it cannot be so brought within a period of six months. Undisputedly earlier special meeting of the Zilla Parishad was convened under sub-section (3) of section 49 of the Zilla Parishads Act for considering the motion of no-confidence against the President and Chairmen of the Subjects Committees on 27-10-1995. Undisputedly the present requisition was submitted to the Collector on 15-5-1995 and the Collector had issued notice of the meeting on 18-5-1996, convening the special meeting of the Zilla Parishad on 10-6-1996. Having regard to the amendment-introduced by Maharashtra Act No. XII of 1996, which is deemed to have come into effect w.e.f. 30th October, 1995, the special meeting as convened on 10-6-1996 cannot be held to be barred by the provision of sub-section (7) of section 49. What is, however, urged by Shri Patil is that since the earlier meeting was convened on 27-10-1995, and according to him which was so held on 27-10-1995, and further in the said meeting the motion of no-confidence was defeated, no fresh motion of no-confidence could have been brought within a period of one year from 27-10-1995. In effect the submission is that in sofaras the present matter is concerned, bringing of fresh motion of no-confidence is barred for a period of one year and not six months. What is contended is that firstly the provision regarding not bringing fresh motion of no-confidence for a certain period, as was in existence on the date of the earlier meeting dated 27-10-1995 and not the one which has been introduced later on, bringing down the period of one year to six months as introduced by Maharashtra Act No. XII of 1996 would be applicable. The second submission is that the Maharashtra Act No. XII of 1996 itself is unconstitutional and, therefore, inoperative for the reasons stated in the petition and also canvassed before us. 8. What we feel is that while considering the first limb of the first contention raised by Mr. The second submission is that the Maharashtra Act No. XII of 1996 itself is unconstitutional and, therefore, inoperative for the reasons stated in the petition and also canvassed before us. 8. What we feel is that while considering the first limb of the first contention raised by Mr. Patil it is not necessary to go into the controversy of the validity of Maharashtra Act No. 12 of 1996, so also into the question as to whether it can be held to be not operative. This is because of our noticing as to what has exactly happened in the meeting which was scheduled to be held on 27th October, 1995. As already mentioned, the notice issued by the Collector convening the special meeting of the Zilla Parishad for considering the motion of no-confidence on 27th October, 1995 was the subject matter of the petition before this Court in Writ Petition No. 3216 of 1995. As already noted, from the judgment in Writ Petition No. 3216 of 1995 dated 5th February, 1996, this Court had come to the conclusion that the members who were invited to attend the meeting, remained absent and the meeting commenced its proceedings and that the Sub-Divisional Officer observed that the no-confidence motion could not even be tabled and as 30 out of 32 members had left the place in view of the order of stay granted by this Court, motion of no-confidence could not be carried out. This Court then in its judgment dated 5th February, 1996 in that petition specifically held that, “one thing is clear that in the circumstances, the meeting could not be proceeded with”. This conclusion was reached by this Court as is apparent from the said judgment, after perusal of the proceedings of the said meeting convened on 27-10-1995. No doubt, though this Court further held that the petitioner or any other member for that matter qualified in that behalf can again bring motion of no-confidence against the President or any other person in accordance with law, the Court also held that if the competent authority decides that in view of sub-section (7) of section 49 of the Zilla Parishads Act such motion cannot be brought within a period stipulated therein, the petitioner or any such qualified person will be entitled to challenge the legality and validity of any such order. Relying upon this part of the judgment, Mr. Relying upon this part of the judgment, Mr. Patil tried to urge that the meeting was held on 27-10-1995 and in the said meeting the motion of no-confidence was defeated, as is alleged in para 2 of the petition. In the context of this contention it is necessary to refer to the submissions filed by the Respondent No. 3. In para 4 of the submissions the respondent No. 3 has categorically averred : “At the commencement of the meeting, one of the Panchayat Samiti Chairman Shri Kisanrao Shetye made an application to the Presiding Officer staling therein that the meeting dated 27-10-1995 was stayed by this Hon'ble Court. At the same time fax copy of order was received. Since the order of the Hon'ble High Court had to be respected, the councillors who wanted to move a motion and some other councillors left the meeting by making their submissions in that behalf. In these circumstances, the motion could not be moved. In spite of the order of this Hon'ble Court the Presiding Officer preferred to write the proceedings to the effect that the motion was rejected.” The submissions then refer to the contempt petition filed against the Presiding Officer and to the reply filed by the Presiding Officer in that contempt-proceeding. It is then averred by the respondent No. 3 that, “Further, the Presiding Officer stated in his reply that no business could be transacted in the said meeting. The contempt petition was, therefore, disposed of by this Hon'ble Court granting liberty to move a fresh requisition and question of section 49(7) was kept open.” 9. In so far as the respondent No. 2 is concerned, submissions have been filed on his behalf also in this petition. In para 9 thereof it is stated on oath : “It is humbly submitted that even otherwise the earlier motion of no confidence scheduled to be held on 27-10-1995 was never tabled at all since out of the 32 members who were present then, 30 had left before the meeting commenced and consequently, there was no quorum enough to commence the meeting itself.” 10. In the above backdrop we thought it fit to peruse the proceeding of the said meeting scheduled to be held on 27-10-1995. In the above backdrop we thought it fit to peruse the proceeding of the said meeting scheduled to be held on 27-10-1995. On perusal of the proceedings we are in respectful agreement with the observations made by this Court in its judgment dated 5th February, 1996 in Writ Petition No. 3216 of 1995, which we quote below : “It appears that the members who were invited to attend the meeting remained absent and the meeting commenced its proceeding. However the petitioner brought it to the notice of the Presiding Officer of the meeting, namely Sub-Divisional Officer and before the Sub-Divisional Officer could render his decision as to whether the meeting should be proceeded further, it appears that out of 32 persons present, 30 left the meeting place. The Sub-Divisional Officer observed that in view of the fact that the No-Confidence Motion could not even be tabled and as 30 out of 32 members have left the place in view of the order of stay granted by the High Court, the Motion of No-Confidence could not be carried out.” 11. Perusal of the observation made by this Court in its judgment in Writ Petition No. 3216 of 1995, perusal of the proceedings of the meeting by ourselves, statement on oath made by the respondents Nos. 2 and 3 in their submissions as quoted hereinabove, coupled with the statement of the Presiding Officer in his reply to the contempt petition referred to hereinabove, do not leave any doubt in our mind that the motion of no-confidence was actually not moved in the meeting held on 27-10-1995. We are, therefore, not inclined to accept the contrary allegations made in this behalf in the petition and also canvassed before us, particularly when there is no other independent corroborative circumstance brought on record by the petitioner. In the wake of grant of stay by this Court to the meeting held on 27-10-1995 it appears to be but natural that the motion of no-confidence had not been moved. To us, this appears to be more probable in view of the established position that the Presiding Officer had been informed about the stay before the commencement of the meeting. To us, this appears to be more probable in view of the established position that the Presiding Officer had been informed about the stay before the commencement of the meeting. We may further point out here that as per section 49(6) of the Zilla Parishads Act, names of the Councillors voting for and against the motion have to be read in the meeting and recorded in the minute-book kept under sub-section (13) of section 111. On the perusal of the proceedings of the meeting held on 27-10-1995 we do not see any such recording. It is, therefore, difficult to accept the contention of the petitioner that in the meeting held on 27-10-1995 the motion of no-confidence was defeated. 12. Once we reach to the conclusion that in the meeting held on 27-10-1995 the motion of no-confidence was not actually moved, there is no question of its rejection. This is, therefore, a case where on 27-10-1995 the motion of no-confidence was not moved much less rejected. If this is so, there is no question of operating any bar under section 49(7) for bringing fresh motion of no-confidence and for convening a meeting for consideration thereof on 10-6-1996, whatever may be the period during which no-confidence motion cannot be brought afresh after moving of the earlier motion of no-confidence or its rejection. For the same reasons, it is therefore, also not necessary to go into the aspect as to whether the provision existing on the date of consideration of the earlier motion of no-confidence on 27-10-1995 or the provision as amended by Maharashtra Act No. XII of 1996 would be applicable to the present motion of no-confidence brought against the President and Vice-President of the Zilla Parishad. The present motion of no-confidence and the special meeting convened on 10-6-1996, therefore, cannot be said to be illegal on the ground of contravention of provision of sub-section (7) of section 49 and section 87 of the Zilla Parishads Act. 13. The Second limb of the first contention of Mr. Patil, that the motion of no-confidence cannot be declared to have been passed unless it is passed by not less than three-fifths of the total number of Councillors, who are for the time being entitled to sit and vote at any meeting of the Zilla Parishad, is based on Mr. 13. The Second limb of the first contention of Mr. Patil, that the motion of no-confidence cannot be declared to have been passed unless it is passed by not less than three-fifths of the total number of Councillors, who are for the time being entitled to sit and vote at any meeting of the Zilla Parishad, is based on Mr. Patil's another contention that the Maharashtra Act No. 12 of 1996 is not a validly passed law and, therefore, unconstitutional and inoperative. Maharashtra Act No. XII of 1996 is first published in the Maharashtra Government Gazette dated 14th February, 1996 and it has replaced Maharashtra Ordinance No. 15 of 1995. It would be suffice to say for the purpose of these petitions that by Maharashtra Ordinance No. 15 of 1995 as also Maharashtra Act No. 12 of 1996 amendments were brought to the provisions of section 49(1) and 49(7) of the Zilla Parishads Act, to the extent of substituting sub-section (1) of section 49 by a new sub-section, inter alia making a change in the earlier provision of requirement of passing of no-confidence motion “by a majority of not less than three-fifths” of the total number of Councillors, by providing the requirement of passing of no-confidence motion “by a majority” only, and substituting the words “six months” for the words “one year” in section 49(7). Thus, by virtue of the provision of Maharashtra Act No. XII of 1996, motion of no-confidence can be declared to have been passed even if it is passed by a majority only of the total number of elected Councillors and further if the motion of no-confidence is not moved or, as the case may be, is rejected, no fresh motion of no-confidence can be brought before the Zilla Parishad within a period of six months from the date of special meeting convened under sub-section (3). 14. Now it becomes necessary to consider the aspect of validity of Maharashtra Act No. 12 of 1996. The relevant history of this legislation starts from the promulgation of Ordinance No. 15 of 1995 on 30th October, 1995 by the Governor of Maharashtra. After the promulgation of this Ordinance, upon the reassembly of the State Legislature on 4th December, 1995. 14. Now it becomes necessary to consider the aspect of validity of Maharashtra Act No. 12 of 1996. The relevant history of this legislation starts from the promulgation of Ordinance No. 15 of 1995 on 30th October, 1995 by the Governor of Maharashtra. After the promulgation of this Ordinance, upon the reassembly of the State Legislature on 4th December, 1995. L. A. Bill No. 35 of 1995 - Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis (Amendment) Bill, 1995 for converting the said Ordinance into Act of the State Legislature, was introduced in the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly on 4th December, 1995. It was passed by the Legislative Assembly on 6th December, 1995. It was then transmitted to the Legislative Council for consideration and passing. On 14-12-1995, however, the said Bill was rejected by the Legislative Council. Therefore, as provided under Article 197(1)(a) of the Constitution of India, it was passed for the second time by the Legislative Assembly on 21st December, 1995 and it was again transmitted on 21st December, 1995 itself to the Legislative Council for consideration and passing the same. Such is the averment made on oath in the submissions filed on behalf of the respondents Nos. 1 and 2. Along with the submissions, copy of the list of business before the Council on 22nd December, 1995 is also annexed which includes the L.A. Bill No. 35 of 1995 as well. In the submissions it is also averred that this L. A. Bill No. 35 of 1995 along with three other Bills were laid before the Legislative Council on 22nd December, 1995. Both the Houses of the State Legislature were prorogued on 22nd December, 1995 without the L. A. Bill No. 35 of 1995 having been passed by the Maharashtra Legislative Council. 15. Both the Houses of the State Legislature were prorogued on 22nd December, 1995 without the L. A. Bill No. 35 of 1995 having been passed by the Maharashtra Legislative Council. 15. Having regard to the provisions contained in clause (2)(b) of Article 197 of the Constitution, that the said L. A. Bill No. 35 of 1995 shall be deemed to have been passed by both the Houses of the State Legislature in the form in which it was passed by the Legislative Assembly for the second time, after one month elapsed from the date on which the said Bill was laid before the Council without the Bill being passed by it and further having regard to the provisions contained in Article 213(2)(a) of the Constitution that the Maharashtra Ordinance No. 15 of 1995 would cease to operate at the expiration of six weeks from the reassembly on 4th December 1995 of the State Legislature, i.e. after 14th January, 1996, it was though necessary to take immediate action to continue the operation of the provisions of Ordinance No. 15 of 1995 till the publication of the L. A. Bill No. 35 of 1995 as an Act of the State Legislature and hence the Governor of Maharashtra issued Ordinance No. 4 of 1996 on 11th January, 1996 published in the Maharashtra Government Gazette on 12th January, 1996, to meet the contingency. This Ordinance had come in force on 15th January, 1996. Later on L.A. Bill No. 35 of 1995 was published as an Act of the State Legislature converting the Maharashtra Ordinance No. 15 of 1995 as an Act of the State Legislature which is Maharashtra Act No. 12 of 1996. After receiving the assent of the Governor it was first published in the Maharashtra Government Gazette on 14th February, 1996 and by virtue of the deeming provision in the Act it has come into effect from 30th October, 1995. On the very same day on which this Maharashtra Act No. 12 of 1996 was published in the Maharashtra Government Gazette i.e. on 14th February, 1996, the Governor of Maharashtra exercising the powers conferred upon him under Article 213(2)(b), withdrew the Maharashtra Ordinance No. 1 of 1995 with immediate effect. 16. On the very same day on which this Maharashtra Act No. 12 of 1996 was published in the Maharashtra Government Gazette i.e. on 14th February, 1996, the Governor of Maharashtra exercising the powers conferred upon him under Article 213(2)(b), withdrew the Maharashtra Ordinance No. 1 of 1995 with immediate effect. 16. Referring to the aforesaid history of this Legislature, it is contended that undisputedly the State Legislative Council did not have an occasion on the opportunity to consider the L. A. Bill No. 35 of 1995. It did not have occasion to consider, because, it is submitted, it was not moved for consideration before the Legislative Council. It did not have opportunity, it is submitted, because both the Houses of the State Legislature were prorogued on 22nd December, 1995, without the said Bill having been considered by the Maharashtra Legislative Council. It was also urged that L. A. Bill No. 35 of 1995 is not actually laid before the Legislative Council and if this is so, the said Bill cannot be said to be deemed to have been passed by the Houses of the Legislature of the State, as contemplated by Article 197(2) of the Constitution. It is, therefore, contended that enactment of the Maharashtra Act No. 12 of 1996 on the basis of Ordinance No. 15 of 1995 is unconstitutional and Maharashtra Act No. 12 of 1996 is, therefore, invalid and cannot be treated to be in operation. 17. As already indicated, we have before us the list of business before the Council on 22nd December, 1995 which includes L. A. Bill No. 35 of 1995. It is prepared by the Secretary of the Maharashtra Legislative Council. This indicates that L. A. Bill No. 35 of 1995 was received by the Council after being transmitted by the Legislative Assembly to it. Besides, the communication dated 21st December, 1995 from the Under Secretary to the Maharashtra Legislative Council addressed to all the Members of the Legislative Council reveals that the copies of certain Bills, including L. A. Bill No. 35 of 1995, which had been laid before the Council were forwarded to them for information. The foot-note thereto clearly again speaks of laying of those Bills before the Council (including L. A. Bill No. 35 of 1995) on 21st December, 1995. This communication is also signed by the Under Secretary in the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly Secretariat. The foot-note thereto clearly again speaks of laying of those Bills before the Council (including L. A. Bill No. 35 of 1995) on 21st December, 1995. This communication is also signed by the Under Secretary in the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly Secretariat. These two documents coupled with the statements on oath in the submissions filed on behalf of the Respondents 1 and 2, in our view, are sufficient enough to hold that L. A. Bill No. 35 of 1995 was transmitted by the Legislative Assembly to the Legislative Council on 21-12-1995 and on the same day it was received by the Legislative Council and it was further laid before the Council on 21st December, 1995 and the Bill was included in the list of business to be conducted by the Council on the next day viz. 22nd December, 1995. What was, however, urged before us is that laying before the Council as contemplated by the provisions of Article 197(2) of the Constitution cannot be restricted to merely laying the Bill on the table of the Council and something more is necessary to attract the deeming provision of the Bill becoming an Act as passed by the Houses of the Legislature of the State as envisaged by Article 197(2). Since admittedly the Bill was not actually moved by the Minister in the Council for discussion, it is contended, the deeming provision of converting the Bill into an Act cannot be invoked to justify the constitutional validity of the Maharashtra Act No. 12 of 1996. Our attention was drawn to Rule 142 of the Maharashtra Legislative Council Rules in this regard and it was urged that sub-rule (2) of Rule 142 is made to give effect to what is provided by Article 197(2) of the Constitution and that the tabling of the Bill for the second time cannot be treated to be a mere formality. In the submission of Mr. Patil, an opportunity to consider the Bill is a prerequisite for applying the deeming provision which permits to presume the Bill having been passed by both the Houses of the State Legislature. In the submission of Mr. Patil, an opportunity to consider the Bill is a prerequisite for applying the deeming provision which permits to presume the Bill having been passed by both the Houses of the State Legislature. It was also urged that the Bill on its transmission to the Council after having been passed by the Legislative Assembly for the second time does not become an Act before one month elapses from the date on which the Bill is laid before the Council without the Bill being passed by it and this period of one month has been given to the upper House for consideration the legislation passed by the lower House, viz. the Legislative Assembly. Reliance was placed on the speech of Dr. Ambedkar, Chairman of the Drafting Committee, delivered while drafting of the Constitution was being considered, as reproduced in para 25 of the judgment delivered by this Court in the case of (Ramprasad Wamanrao Kadam v. State of Maharashra)3, 1996(3) Bom.C.R. 658 : 1996(1) Mh.L.J. 983 . 18. For considering the submission, we may refer to the relevant Constitutional provisions in brief. Article 196 of the Constitution incorporates the provisions as to introduction and passing of Bills by both the Houses of the State Legislature. Article 196(2) provides : “Subject to the provisions of Articles 197 and 198, a Bill shall not be deemed to have been passed by the House of the Legislature of a State having a Legislative Council unless it has been agreed to both Houses, either without amendment or with such amendment only as are agreed to by both Houses.” Article 196(3) lays down that a Bill pending in the Legislature of a State shall not lapse by reason of the prorogation of the House or Houses thereof. Then Article 197 is as follows : “197. Then Article 197 is as follows : “197. Restriction on powers of Legislative Council as to Bills other than Money Bills.---(1) If after a Bill has been passed by the Legislative Assembly of a State having a Legislative Council and transmitted to Assembly or a State having a Legislative council and transmitted to the Legislative Council - (a) the Bill is rejected by the Council; or (b) more than three months elapse from the date on which the Bill is laid before the Council without the Bill being passed by it; or (c) the Bill is passed by the Council with amendments to which the Legislative Assembly does not agree; the Legislative Assembly may, subject to the rules regulating its procedure, pass the Bill again in the same or in any subsequent session with or without such amendments, if any, as have been made, suggested or agreed to by the Legislative Council and then transmit the Bill as so passed to the Legislative Council. (2) If after a Bill has been so passed for the second time by the Legislative Assembly and transmitted to the Legislative Council - (a) the Bill is rejected by the Council; or (b) more than one month elapse from the date on which the Bill is laid before the Council without the Bill being passed by it; or (c) the Bill is passed by the Council with amendments to which Legislative Assembly does not agree; the Bill shall be deemed to have been passed by the Houses of the Legislature of the State in the form in which it was passed by the Legislative Assembly for the second time with such amendments if any, as have been made or suggested by the Legislative Council and agreed to by the Legislative Assembly. (3) Nothing in this Article shall apply to a Money Bill.” Article 200 provides for presentation of the Bills to the Governor for his assent after it has been passed by the Legislature of the State and further provides that the Governor may return the case (if it is not a Money Bill) to Legislature for reconsideration. Article 208 permits the Houses of the Legislature to make rules for regulating, subject to the provisions of the Constitution, its procedure and the conduct of its business and then Article 212 prohibits the Courts from enquiring into the proceedings of the Legislature. Article 208 permits the Houses of the Legislature to make rules for regulating, subject to the provisions of the Constitution, its procedure and the conduct of its business and then Article 212 prohibits the Courts from enquiring into the proceedings of the Legislature. In exercise of the powers conferred upon it under Article 208 of the Constitution, the Maharashtra Legislative Council has framed Rules, called as the Maharashtra Legislative Council Rules. Rules 142(1) and 142(2) are reproduced below : “142(1) Copies of every Bill passed by the Assembly for the second time under Clause (1) of Article 197 of the Constitution and transmitted to the Council shall be laid on the table of the Council. The date on which the Bill is laid on the table of the Council shall be reported to the Secretary of the Assembly. (2) At any time after copies of the Bill have been laid on the table under sub-rule (1) of this Rule, any Minister in the case of a Government Bill, or in the case of any other Bill, move that the Bill as passed by the Assembly for the second time be taken into consideration.” 19. It is clear to us that if after the Bill is passed for the second time by the Legislative Assembly and transmitted to the Legislative Council, it is deemed to have been passed by the Houses of the Legislature of the State in the form in which it was passed by the Legislative Assembly for the second time with such amendments, if any, as have been made or suggested by the Legislative Council and agreed to by the Legislative Assembly, even if it is, after transmission to the Council - (a) rejected by the Council, or (b) is passed by the Council with amendments to which Legislative Assembly does not agree and also, (c) when more than one month elapses from the date on which the Bill is laid before the Council without the Bill being passed by it. Article 197(2) thus gives finality to the Bill passed for the second time by the Legislative Assembly, as provided in Article 197(1) of the Constitution. Article 197(2) thus gives finality to the Bill passed for the second time by the Legislative Assembly, as provided in Article 197(1) of the Constitution. Non-consideration of the Bill by the Council after it is laid before the Council on transmission by the Legislative Assembly either due to lack of an occasion or opportunity either because the Bill was not actually moved and/or because the Council was prorogued thereafter does not come in the way of the deeming fiction coming into operation and such Bill has to be treated deemed to have been passed by both the Houses of the Legislature of State. It is clear that deeming provision comes into operation immediately a result of either of the circumstances enumerated in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Article 197(2) of the Constitution. The contention raised on the strength of sub-rule (2) of Rule 142 of the Maharashtra Legislative Council Rules also cannot be accepted since Article 197(2)(b) does not require moving of the Bill for consideration of the Council. The requirement is only to lay the Bill before the Council. According to New Webster's Dictionary of English Language, Deluxe Encyclopedic Edition, in parliamentary use, 'lay on the table' means to table or postpone consideration of, as a proposal or resolution. According to this dictionary, 'lay' also means to put or place or position of rest or recumbency; as, to lay a book on a desk, to bring to a person's notice or consideration. The provisions of sub-rules (1) and (2) of Rule 142 themselves indicate that there is a difference in between 'laying the Bill on the table' and 'moving the same for consideration'. 20. The Apex Court in the case of (Koteswar v. K. R. B. Co.,)4, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 504 while interpreting the proviso to Article 304 of the Constitution has observed as follows : “There is further an indication in the Constitution itself that wherever a reference is made to a Bill, the only step envisaged is introduction of the Bill. There is no-reference to such a step as a Bill being moved. The Articles, of which notice may be taken in this connection, are Articles 109, 114, 117, 198 and 207. In all these Articles, whatever prohibition is laid down relates to the introduction of a Bill in the Legislature. There is no-reference to such a step as a Bill being moved. The Articles, of which notice may be taken in this connection, are Articles 109, 114, 117, 198 and 207. In all these Articles, whatever prohibition is laid down relates to the introduction of a Bill in the Legislature. There is no reference at any stage to a Bill being moved in a House.” 21. As already noted, the prorogation of the State Legislature does not cause the Bill to elapse. After a lapse of one month from the date on which the Bill is laid before the Council, the Bill has to be treated as deemed to have been passed by the Houses of the Legislature of the State in the form it had been passed by the Legislative Assembly for the second time. The deeming provision is plain and clear and admits of no other interpretation. Reference to the Maharashtra Legislative Council Rules and to the speech of Dr. Ambedkar, therefore, in our view, is not necessary. 22. As to what exactly happened in relation to L. A. Bill No. 35 of 1995 in converting the same as Act No. 12 of 1996, it has so happened with respect to L. A Bill No. 42 of 1995 amending the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Market (Regulation) (Temporary Amendment) Bill, 1995 which was introduced for converting the Ordinance No. 17 of 1995 into an Act and which later on became the Maharashtra Act No. 9 of 1996. As can be gathered from the decision in Ramprasad's case (cited supra) wherein Act No. 9 of 1996 was challenged on the ground that it was not validly passed law, raising contentions identical to the one which have been raised in the instant petition, the Division Bench of this Court repelled all these contentions after reproducing Dr. Ambedkar's speech while considering draft Constitutions, in para 25 and in para 26 held as under : “Plain reading of Article 197(2)(b) would show that one month's time lapses from the date on which Bill is laid on the table of the House without the Bill being passed by it and nothing more. Constitution does not provide that there should be 30 working days for the Legislature or even a single working day for that matter, when the Legislative Council is in session. Constitution does not provide that there should be 30 working days for the Legislature or even a single working day for that matter, when the Legislative Council is in session. The deeming provision which permits the Bill shall be deemed to have been passed by both the Houses of the Legislature of the State will come into operation immediately after either of the situations listed in Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Article 197(2) come into existence. It is true that because of prorogation of the Legislative Council on the very day when the Bill was tabled, Legislative Council had practically no opportunity to discuss it. But such an eventuality will not except the Bill from the operation of the deeming provision. It is for the Legislative Council whether to sit and whether to avail the opportunity to reconsider the Bill for second time or not. But merely because the Bill was not considered by Legislative Council, it cannot be argued that the deeming provision will not come into play.” It was further held in para 27, and we quote : “It is true that the Legislative Council did not consider the Bill. The normal rule in the Legislatures which are by the Central is that both the Houses should pass the legislative measure. But in cases of difference, in case of Parliament Institution, Constitution provides for a joint sitting. Whereas for the State Legislature, no such joint sitting has been provided. More importance has been given to the Lower House of the State Legislature and under the circumstances listed in sub-article (2) of Article 197 of the Constitution of India, a legal fiction is created that the Upper House has passed it though actually the measure might have been rejected by the Upper House or might have been passed with such amendment to which the Lower House had not agreed. When the legal fiction is created, thing is treated to be that, in fact, it is not. The effect of such a legal fiction is, however, that a position otherwise would not have been obtained is deemed to be obtained under those circumstances. One of the circumstances listed in Sub-article (2) is more than one month elapsed from the date on which the Bill is tabled in the Council without the Bill being passed by it. The effect of such a legal fiction is, however, that a position otherwise would not have been obtained is deemed to be obtained under those circumstances. One of the circumstances listed in Sub-article (2) is more than one month elapsed from the date on which the Bill is tabled in the Council without the Bill being passed by it. If it happens, the Bill shall be deemed to have been passed by the' Houses of the Legislature in the State in the form in which it was passed by the Legislative Assembly for the second time. If the deeming provision is there, the necessary consequences will have to follow. When the deeming provision is very clear, then just like other statutory provisions, which admit no different interpretation, external aids and any reference to the intention of the Constitution makers is totally unwarranted.” Referring to the provisions of the Maharashtra Legislative Council Rules, in para 29 the Court further held as follows : “Sub-rule (2) of Rule 142 of the Maharashtra Legislative Council Rules deal with how the Bill is to be taken into consideration and how the motion for the same is to be moved. As already pointed out Article 197(2)(b) does not require that the Bill should be moved for consideration. What it requires is that the Bill should be tabled. Whether the Minister or Member avails the opportunity to move it, whether the Council avails the opportunity to consider it, are considerations irrelevant for the operation of the deeming provision. It is true that in cases like the present one, because of the prorogation of the Legislative Council, the Council may not get the opportunity at all to discuss the measure for the second time. But since the Constitution does not say that such a consideration was must before the deeming provision should be operative, we do not think that this fact can be taken a note of while considering the validity of the impugned Act.” 23. After considering the factual aspect and the relevant provisions referred to hereinabove and on perusal of the Judgment delivered by the Court in Ramprasad's case (supra) we are in respectful agreement with the view taken by this Court in Ramprasad's case. In the view we have taken, we have to reject the contention of Mr. Patil that the Maharashtra Act No. 12 of 1996 is unconstitutional and invalid and, therefore, inoperative. In the view we have taken, we have to reject the contention of Mr. Patil that the Maharashtra Act No. 12 of 1996 is unconstitutional and invalid and, therefore, inoperative. Resultantly it would be a mere majority which will be required for passing of no-confidence motion and not “majority of not less than three-fifths” of the total number of elected Councillors of the Zilla Parishad for that purpose. 24. The second submission of Mr. Patil that the notice of meeting as issued is bad in law for the reason that the requisition is not supplied to the petitioners and the Councillors on the basis of which the notice of meeting is issued, we may say at this stage itself, is totally untenable and, therefore, has to be rejected. Section 49(2) as also section 87 of the Zilla Parishads Act provide that the requisition shall be signed by the requisitionists and shall be made in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed by the State Government. Sub-section (3) then provides that the Collector shall, within seven days from the date of receipt of the requisition, convene a special meeting of the Zilla Parishad and that the meeting shall be held on a date not later than thirty days from the date of issue of the notice of the meeting. In this regard it would be pertinent to refer to the Rules framed by the State Government in exercise of the powers under section 274(2), called as the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads Presiding Authorities (No-confidence Motion) Rules, 1962. Rule 2 read with the Rule 4 prescribe the form of requisition for calling a special meeting to consider the motion of no-confidence in the President and the Vice-President and Chairman of Subjects Committee. Rule 2 is as follows: “2. Form of requisition.---The requisition to call a special meeting to consider a motion of no-confidence in the President or Vice-President or both shall be in the form hereto appended. Rule 2 is as follows: “2. Form of requisition.---The requisition to call a special meeting to consider a motion of no-confidence in the President or Vice-President or both shall be in the form hereto appended. The requisition shall be accompanied by the text of the motion proposed to be moved specifying there in the grounds on which it is proposed to move the motion and the name of the Councillor who shall move the motion.” The form of requisition, appended to the Rules, to call special meeting to consider the motion of no-confidence inter alia provides for enclosing a copy of the motion proposed to be moved and mentioning of the name of the mover of the motion of no-confidence. Insofar as the requisition in the instant matter is concerned, it is not debated that it is not in consonance with the provisions of motion of no-confidence Rules. Even otherwise, perusal of the requisition, copy of which has been filed along with the submissions of Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 reveals that it is in the form as prescribed under the No-Confidence Motion Rules and signed by 18 Councillors of the Zilla Parishad. The name of the mover of the motion of no-confidence is also disclosed i.e. A. G. Ganyarpawar, Member, Zilla Parishad. Copy of motion of no-confidence proposed to be moved is also enclosed to this requisition. The question is whether this requisition, as submitted by the requisitionists, has to be supplied or forwarded to the persons against whom no-confidence motion is being proposed and to the Councillors as well as sought to be urged by Shri Patil. As to what is to be done after the receipt of the requisition by the Collector is provided under sub-section (3) of section 49 of the Zilla Parishads Act. Section 49 provides that the Collector shall, within seven days from the receipt of the requisition under sub-section (2), convene a special meeting of the Zilla Parishad. 25. Section 111 provides for meeting of Zilla Parishads. Sub-section (2) thereof empowers that State Government to make Rules with respect to the place, conduct and adjournment of the meetings of the Zilla Parishads and generally with respect to the transactions of business thereat. 25. Section 111 provides for meeting of Zilla Parishads. Sub-section (2) thereof empowers that State Government to make Rules with respect to the place, conduct and adjournment of the meetings of the Zilla Parishads and generally with respect to the transactions of business thereat. Sub-section (4) provides for 15 clear days' notice of an ordinary meeting and 10 clear days' notice of special meeting specifying the time and place at which such meeting is to be held and the business to be transacted thereat. It also provides that such notice shall, in the case of a special meeting, include a motion or proposition, if any, mentioned in the written request made for such meeting. Proviso to sub-section (3) also provides that where a special meeting is called, the notice of meeting shall state a date at which the meeting is to be held, being a date not later than thirty days from the date of the issue of the notice. Sub-section (7) of section 111 provides a quorum for the meeting to be of one-third of the total number of Councillors who are for the time being entitled to sit, vote or participate in any meeting of the Zilla Parishad. The State Government, in exercise of its powers under sub-section (2) of section 111 read with section 274(2) (xix-a) of the Zilla Parishads Act has framed Rules called as the Maharashtra Zilla Parishad (Conduct of Business) Rules, 1964. Rule 5 thereof speaks of a form of notice convening an ordinary or special meeting of the Zilla Parishad. According to this Rule, it is to be in Form A appended to the Rules. Perusal of Form A referred to in Rule 5 i.e. form of notice of meeting shows that it requires that a copy of motion/requisition proposed to be moved in the meeting is to be enclosed with the notice. It is not in dispute before us that the impugned notice issued by the Collector is in consonance with this Form A appended to the Conduct of Business Rules. We perused that as required, a copy of motion has been enclosed with the notice of motion issued by the Collector. It is not in dispute before us that the impugned notice issued by the Collector is in consonance with this Form A appended to the Conduct of Business Rules. We perused that as required, a copy of motion has been enclosed with the notice of motion issued by the Collector. Having seen the aforesaid provisions we see no requirement either in the Act or in the Conduct of Business Rules as regards forwarding of the requisition, as submitted by the requisitionists, to the persons against whom no-confidence motion is being proposed or to the Councillors, as sought to be urged by Shri Patil. The requisitionists have only to sign the requisition and not the motion proposed to be moved in the meeting of the Zilla Parishad. A notice of meeting as issued without enclosing therewith copy of the requisition, therefore, cannot be termed to be bad in law and the contrary submissions made in this behalf by Shri Patil, therefore, cannot be accepted. 26. Coming to the third contention raised by Shri Patil, that the notice of meeting has to be held as illegal as it is for consideration of the motion of no-confidence which is not disclosing any ground for moving the motion of no-confidence, in as much as the alleged grounds referred to therein are too vague or without any details and amount in fact giving no grounds at all, reference may now be made to the two decisions relied upon by Mr. Patil. In Ganeshsinha Hajari's decision (cited supra) it is no doubt true that this Court has held the requirement of Rule 2 of the No-confidence Motion Rules that the grounds must be mentioned in the motion proposed to be moved, as a mandatory requirement and that if the grounds do not appear in the motion accompanying the notice, the notice would be vitiated. In Dhrupad Sawale's decision (cited supra) reliance was placed on the decision in Ganeshsinha Hajari's case and further on the decision in Writ Petition No. 2476/81 decided on 15-12-1981, (Shaligram v. Collector)5, which has followed the decision in Ganeshsinha Hajari's case and it was held that the notice dated 25-9-1986 convening the meeting for considering the motion of no-confidence against the President and the Vice-President of the Zilla Parishad, Buldhana was bad for want of grounds in the motion. It may be pointed out here that in the case of Dhrupad Sawale no grounds at all were mentioned in the motion of no-confidence. The motion was, “since Shri Dhrupad Bhagwant Sawale has lost our confidence, we are proposing no-confidence motion against him”, and nothing more. In Ganeshsinha's case also it is apparent from the judgment, notice was not accompanied by 'any grounds on which it was proposed to move the motion. Para 6 of the judgment indicates that only the name of the Councillor was mentioned in the motion appended to the notice but not the grounds and the grounds nowhere appeared in the motion itself or in the notice. The Court found that they should have been found place in the motion. 27. These two decisions, therefore, dealt with a case where no ground was at all mentioned in the motion proposed to be moved. Such is not a case in the instant matter. Undisputedly the grounds are given in the motion of no-confidence proposed. The contention, however, is that the alleged grounds referred to in the motion of no-confidence are too vague, without any details and amount in fact giving no grounds at all. We are unable to accept this contention. The motion accompanied with the notice is in the following words: “Motion I Atul Gangadharrao Ganayarpawar, Member, Zilla Parishad, Gadchiroli, proposed to move following notice. Shri Bandopant Shankarrao Mallewar, President, Zilla Parishad, Gadchiroli, on account of his incompetency and by abusing his post as President. Wrote false proceedings to his liking in respect of General Body Meeting of Zilla Parishad and violated rights of majority of Zilla Parishad Members and insulted them in General Body. He by dictatorial attitude and forcibly got the Resolutions containing promises and assurances passed in disregard to Rules and Model Code of Conduct of Parliamentary elections though majority of Zilla Parishad. Members opposed and violated Election conduct code by immediately implementing them. He has encroached on rights of majority of Zilla Parishad Members and lost confidence of this House. Therefore, he is not fit for remaining on said post. Hence it is requested that all non-members of Zilla Parishad should support this no-confidence motion against him and passed this resolution by majority.” From the above motion it is apparent to us that several grounds for expressing no-confidence against the President have been given. Therefore, he is not fit for remaining on said post. Hence it is requested that all non-members of Zilla Parishad should support this no-confidence motion against him and passed this resolution by majority.” From the above motion it is apparent to us that several grounds for expressing no-confidence against the President have been given. What is contended, however, is details of the grounds have also to be incorporated in the motion of no-confidence, by giving specific instances on the basis of which allegations have been levelled forming grounds of motion of no-confidence. As an example, it was pointed out that one of the grounds was that the President wrote false proceedings to his liking in respect of General Body Meeting of the Zilla Parishad. It is contended that which specific false proceedings were written and as to when the General Body meeting of the Zilla Parishad was held also ought to have been narrated. It was contended that not giving such details deprives the petitioner to take suitable defence and opportunity of pointing out the falsity in the allegation and of convincing the Councillors about the falsity of the allegations. Firstly we see no vagueness in the grounds incorporated in the motion of no-confidence. The requirement is to incorporate the grounds of no-confidence in the motion of no-confidence and nothing more. The requirement of specifying the grounds on which the motion of no-confidence is proposed to be moved is by virtue of the provision of Rule 2 of No-confidence Motion Rules and not by any of the provisions of the Act as such. No doubt, as already observed, this requirement has been held to be mandatory by this Court in its decision in Ganeshsinha Hajari's decision followed in Dhrupad Sawale's case. The requirement appears to be with the object of giving a notice to the person against whom the no-confidence motion is being moved, as to what generally he has to face in the meeting convened for consideration of no-confidence motion against him. If he feels unable to refute the allegations made against him, which forms the ground of motion of no-confidence, he gets an opportunity in the meeting to say so and to convince and persuade the Councillors not to vote a vote of no-confidence against him. Ultimately it is for the Councillors to decide the fate of no-confidence motion. If he feels unable to refute the allegations made against him, which forms the ground of motion of no-confidence, he gets an opportunity in the meeting to say so and to convince and persuade the Councillors not to vote a vote of no-confidence against him. Ultimately it is for the Councillors to decide the fate of no-confidence motion. In absence of any legal bar to the passing of motion of no-confidence against the President or the Chairman of the Subjects Committee even without charging the authority with any impropriety or lapse on its part, it is difficult to accept the submission that giving of grounds without any details amount to giving of no-ground at all and, therefore, the notice of meeting convened for considering the motion of no-confidence without containing such grounds is illegal, as was urged by Mr. Patil. 28. The full text of the decision reported in the form of Note in (Surendra v. Commissioner, Nagpur Division, Nagpur)6, 1967 Mh.L.J. Note No. 23, reveals that this Court while considering the similar contentions has held as follows: “As to the rest, he contends that the allegations are vague. It seems to us that if he had really cared he could have made these matters known to the members. In any event he could have asked for particulars and there would have been no difficulty in pointing out from the records of the Panchayat the acts of commission and omission on which the members could have relied. After all, these are not criminal charges that are levelled in a Court, nor are they charges against any Government servant which have certain consequences. It is always the right of the house to choose who shall be its President and who shall not be its President. One cannot expect that grounds must be stated with such precision as are to be found in a charge under the Criminal Procedure Code or in a charge against a Government servant in a disciplinary action. All these rules must be construed reasonably, having due regard to the purpose for which they are framed.” 29. One cannot expect that grounds must be stated with such precision as are to be found in a charge under the Criminal Procedure Code or in a charge against a Government servant in a disciplinary action. All these rules must be construed reasonably, having due regard to the purpose for which they are framed.” 29. The Apex Court in its decision reported in (Babubhai Muljibhai Patel v. Nandlal and others)7, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 2105, dealing with identical provisions as contained in Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963, has observed as under: “It is pertinent in this context to observe that there is a difference between a motion of no confidence and a censure motion. While it is necessary in the case of a censure motion to set out the ground or charge on which it is based, a motion of no-confidence need not set out a ground of charge. A vote of censure presupposes that the persons censured have been guilty of some impropriety or lapse by act or omission and it is because of that lapse or impropriety that they are being censured. It may, therefore, become necessary to specify the impropriety or lapse while moving a vote of censure. No such consideration arises when a motion of no-confidence is moved. Although a ground may be mentioned when passing a motion of no-confidence, the existence of a ground is not a prerequisite of a motion of no confidence. There is no legal bar to the passing of a motion of no confidence against an authority in the absence of any charge or impropriety or lapse on the part of that authority. The essential connotation of a no confidence motion is that the party against whom such motion is passed has ceased to enjoy the confidence of the requisite majority of members.” Thus, if the existence of a ground is not a prerequisite of a motion of no-confidence and further if the essential connotation of a no-confidence motion is that the person concerned has ceased to enjoy the confidence of the requisite majority, non-specification of the grounds would not render the motion to be invalid. 30. The last contention of Mr. 30. The last contention of Mr. Patil relates to a common grievance made in all these petitions that the proposed meeting scheduled to be held on 10-6-1996 would be illegal, in as much as all the Chairman/Chairpersons of the Panchayat Samitis within the area of Gadchiroli Zilla Parishad have not been issued notices of meeting though they are members of the Zilla Parishad, Gadchiroli and are entitled to sit and vote in the meetings of the Zilla Parishad. Mr. Patil contended that despite the coming into force of the Maharashtra Act No. 21 of 1994. the Chairman of Panchayat Samitis in the District, whether they are Councillor or not of the Zilla Parishad, are entitled to sit and vote at the meeting of the Zilla Parishad existing as on date and as such they are entitled to sit and vote at the time of election of the President, Vice-President and Chairman of the Subject Committees as also to sit and vote in the meeting convened for considering the motion of no-confidence against them. It is contended that the provisions of Maharashtra Act No. 21 of 1994 amending the Zilla Parishads Act in this regard do not effect the constitution of the existing Zilla Parishads and they are applicable only to those Zilla Parishads which are constituted after they were dissolved by resolution passed to that effect by both the Houses of the State Legislature as contemplated by proviso to Article 243-N of the Constitution. It is contended that the tenure of the existing Zilla Parishads, including its composition is guaranteed subject to their dissolution by a resolution of the State Legislature by both the Houses of the State Legislature under the Proviso to Article 243-N and the State Legislature is, therefore, not competent to pass any law inconsistent with those provisions of Article 243-N of the Constitution, and the relevant provisions of the Amending Act No. 21 of 1994 shall have to be accordingly read, as else they will have to be declared as unconstitutional. 31. For considering the above submission it becomes necessary to refer to the Constitution (Seventy-third Amendment) Act, 1992, which has come into force on 24th April, 1993. By this Seventy-third Amendment, Part IX has been inserted in relation to the Panchayats. 31. For considering the above submission it becomes necessary to refer to the Constitution (Seventy-third Amendment) Act, 1992, which has come into force on 24th April, 1993. By this Seventy-third Amendment, Part IX has been inserted in relation to the Panchayats. 'Panchayat' has been defined by Article 243(d) and accordingly 'Panchayat' means, an institution (by whatever name called) of self government constituted under Article 243-B, for the rural areas. Article 243-B provides that there shall be constituted in every State, Panchayats at the village, intermediate and district levels in accordance with the provisions of this part. As defined under Article 243-C, 'Intermediate Level' means a level between the village and district levels specified by the Governor of a State by public notification to be the intermediate level for the purposes of this part. Article 243-C provides for composition of Panchayats and lays down that subject to the provisions of this part the Legislature of a State may, by law, make provisions with respect to the composition of Panchayats. Article 243-C(2) provides that all seats in a Panchayat shall be filled by persons chosen by direct election from territorial constituencies in the Panchayat area. Article 243-C(3) provides for the representation at the discretion of the Legislature of State, (a) of the Chairpersons of the Panchayats at the village level, in the Panchayats at the intermediate level or, in the case of a State not having Panchayats at the intermediate level, in the Panchayats at the district level, and then further also provides for the representation, (b) of the Chairpersons of the Panchayats at the intermediate level, in the Panchayats at the intermediate level, in the Panchayats at the district level. Article 243-C(3), however, does not provide for the representation of the Panchayats at the district level in the Panchayat at the intermediate level. Article 243-C(5) provides that the Chairpersons of a Panchayat at the intermediate level or district level shall be elected by, and from amongst, the elected members thereof. Article 243-E then provides for the tenure of the Panchayats, which is of five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer, unless sooner dissolved under any law for the time being in force. Article 243-E then provides for the tenure of the Panchayats, which is of five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer, unless sooner dissolved under any law for the time being in force. It also further provides that no amendment of any law for the time being in force shall have the effect of causing dissolution of a Panchayat at any level, which is functioning immediately before such amendment, till the expiration of its duration specified in clause (1) of Article 243-E. As these were the major changes contemplated for the composition of intermediate and district level Panchayats, some provisions had to be made about the existing Panchayats. Taking this into consideration, Article 243-N provides for the continuance of existing laws and Panchayats. We may quote Article 243-N: “243-N. Continuance of existing laws and Panchayats.--- Notwithstanding anything in this Part, any provision of any law relating to Panchayats in force in a State immediately before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventy-Third Amendment) Act, 1992, which is inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, shall continue to be in force until amended or repealed by a competent Legislature or other competent authority or until the expiration of one year from such commencement, whichever is earlier : Provided that all the Panchayats existing immediately before such commencement shall continue till the expiration of their duration, unless sooner dissolved by a resolution passed to that effect by the Legislative Assembly of that State or, in the case of a State having a Legislative Council, by each House of the Legislature of that State.” 32. With a view to give effect to the provisions made in the Constitution of India through the Constitution (Seventy-third Amendment) Act, the State Legislature introduced amendments to the Zilla Parishads Act by enacting Maharashtra Act No. 21 of 1994. We may only refer to only those provisions of this Maharashtra Act No. 21 of 1994, which are relevant for the purposes of the instant petitions. 33. Section 9 of the Zilla Parishads Act speaks of Constitution of Zilla Parishads. Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of section 9 earlier provided that the Zilla Parishad shall consist of the Chairman of all Panchayat Samitis in the District, ex officio. 33. Section 9 of the Zilla Parishads Act speaks of Constitution of Zilla Parishads. Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of section 9 earlier provided that the Zilla Parishad shall consist of the Chairman of all Panchayat Samitis in the District, ex officio. By Maharashtra Act No. 21 of 1994, clause (b) has been inserted and the new clause (b) is as under : “(b) the Chairman of all Panchayat Samitis in the district.” Clauses (c), (d), (dd) and (e) of sub-section (1) have been deleted. The only change effected is thus, the words “ex officio” from clause (c) as it earlier stood, have been deleted. The Chairman of all Panchayat Samitis in the district thus continue to be the Councillors, which is defined as a 'member of the Zilla Parishad constituted under the Zilla Parishads Act, as per section 2(9) of the said Act. Section 42 prior to the amendment brought by Maharashtra Act No. 21 of 1994, was as under : “Every Zilla Parishad shall be presided over by a President, who shall, subject to the provisions of sub-sections (2) (3) and (4), be elected by the Parishad from amongst its elected Councillors. The Zilla Parishad shall also likewise elect one of its elected Councillors to be the Vice- President : Provided...........” It has been amended by Maharashtra Act No. 21 of 1994 as follows : “Every Zilla Parishad shall be presided over by a President, who shall, subject to the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3), be elected by, and from amongst, the elected Councillors of the Zilla Parishad.” The change is that the President or the Vice-President now is to be elected by the elected Councillors only. 34. In section 49, the only change effected by the Maharashtra Act No. 21 of 1994 is of deletion of brackets and words, “(other than Associate Councillors)” in sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) thereof. 34. In section 49, the only change effected by the Maharashtra Act No. 21 of 1994 is of deletion of brackets and words, “(other than Associate Councillors)” in sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) thereof. As already pointed out, however, sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 49 now has been substituted by Maharashtra Act No. 12 of 1996 and after the enactment of Act No. 12 of 1996, a President or Vice-President thus ceases to be a President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, if a motion of no-confidence is passed at a special meeting of the Zilla Parishad, by a majority of total numbers of elected Councillors, who are for the time being entitled to sit and vote at any meeting of the Zilla Parishad. We have already negatived the challenge as raised, to the Maharashtra Act No. 12 of 1996. There is no challenge before us to the constitutional validity of Maharashtra Act No. 21 of 1994. What was contended, however, was that the Maharashtra Act No. 21 of 1994 would not affect the constitution of the existing Zilla Parishad. Even after the enactment of Maharashtra Act No. 21 of 1994, the Chairman of the Panchayat Samiti continues to be a Councillor of the Ziila Parishad. Composition or constitution of the Zilla Parishad, therefore, cannot be said to have been changed by the introduction of Maharashtra Act No. 21 of 1994. The change effected in section 42 by the Maharashtra Act No. 21 of 1994 provides for election of the President or the Vice-President of the Zilla Parishad by elected Councillors of the Zilla Parishad, from amongst them. We are not, however, concerned with the election of the President as such in the instant petitions. No change was brought to section 49 which deals with no-confidence motion against the President or Vice-President in relation to the rights of the members of the Panchayat Samitis. It is, therefore, not necessary for us to go into the aspect as regards the effect of the provisions of proviso to Article 243-N in the instant petitions with reference to the changes effected in the Zilla Parishads Act by Maharashtra Act No. 21 of 1994. 35. It is, therefore, not necessary for us to go into the aspect as regards the effect of the provisions of proviso to Article 243-N in the instant petitions with reference to the changes effected in the Zilla Parishads Act by Maharashtra Act No. 21 of 1994. 35. The provision of section 49(1) which takes away the right of the Chairman of the Panchayat Samitis to vote at the meeting of the Zilla Parishad convened for a motion of no-confidence against the President or the Vice-President for the first time has come into effect after coming into force of Maharashtra Act No. 12 of 1996. We may clarify here that in none of these petitions the provisions of section 49(1) and (2) as introduced by Maharashtra Act No. 12 of 1996 have been specifically challenged as unconstitutional on the ground of they being in contravention of or they being inconsistent with any of the provisions of Part IX of the Constitution as introduced by Constitution (Seventy-Third Amendment) Act, 1992 including the provision to Article 243-N; nor there is a specific contention in these petitions that on account of the proviso to Article 243-N the provisions as contained in section 49(1) and (2) are not made applicable or are not applicable to the Zilla Parishads existing immediately before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventy-Third Amendment) Act, 1992. No doubt there is a challenge to that validity of Maharashtra Act No. 12 of 1996 but it is on different grounds to which we have already referred to and did not accept. It is, therefore, not necessary to refer to the judgment of Division Bench of this Court at Aurangabad, in the case of (Pradip Gulabrao Pawar v. State of Maharashtra and others)8, 1996(3) Bom.C.R. 420 (Writ Petition No. 5886 of 1995 with two other petitions) decided on 30-1-1996 (since reported in 1996(2) Mh.LJ. It is, therefore, not necessary to refer to the judgment of Division Bench of this Court at Aurangabad, in the case of (Pradip Gulabrao Pawar v. State of Maharashtra and others)8, 1996(3) Bom.C.R. 420 (Writ Petition No. 5886 of 1995 with two other petitions) decided on 30-1-1996 (since reported in 1996(2) Mh.LJ. 221 ) and the judgment of Division Bench of this Court at Nagpur in (Shri Manohar Pariaji Gaidhana v. State of Maharashtra and others)9, (W.P. No. 3655/95 with connected petitions) decided on 15th March, 1996, particularly when in both these decisions, the question was as regards the composition of the Panchayat Samiti and not of the Zilla Parishad and of the right of the Councillors of the Zilla Parishad to sit and vote in the meeting convened for passing a no-confidence motion against a Chairman of the existing Panchayat Samiti on account of the change effected by Maharashtra Act No. 21 of 1994 to the provisions of section 57 of the Zilla Parishads Act and as in our view, they do not have any bearing on the aspect of entitlement of Chairman of the Panchayat Samitis to vote at a motion of no-confidence against the President, Vice-President and the Chairman of the Subjects Committee of the Zilla Parishad. Since we have rejected the challenge to the Maharashtra Act No. 12 of 1996, it is only the elected Councillors of the Zilla Parishad who are entitled to vote in the meeting convened for consideration of a motion of no-confidence against the President, Vice-President or Chairman of Subjects Committee and the Chairman of Panchayat Samitis cannot claim a right to vote on such a motion of no-confidence. 36. No doubt, Writ Petition No. 1155 of 1996 is filed by the Chairman of the Panchayat Samiti who is not elected Councillor of the Zilla Parishad but still claims to have a right to participate and vote in the meeting convened for considering the motion of no-confidence. 36. No doubt, Writ Petition No. 1155 of 1996 is filed by the Chairman of the Panchayat Samiti who is not elected Councillor of the Zilla Parishad but still claims to have a right to participate and vote in the meeting convened for considering the motion of no-confidence. What he substantially urges is contained in para 4 only of the petition which we reproduce : “The Collector, Gadchiroli, however, has failed to issue the notice of the said meeting being held on 10-6-1996 to the petitioner as well as the Chairman/Chairperson of the other Panchayat Samitis of Gadchiroli including the petitioner, perhaps under the misconception that provisions of the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act (as amended) put a rider on their right to participate in such meetings as also their right to participate in such meetings as also their right to vote. The petitioner submits that Collector, Gadchiroli without serving the notice dated 18-5-1996 on the petitioner is illegally seeking to deprive the petitioner of his right to participate and vote in the said meeting amounting to violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Petitioner is, therefore, entitled to a writ of mandamus or such other appropriate writ, Order and/or direction, directing the Collector, Gadchiroli to serve the notice dated 18-5-1996 of the meeting being held on 10-6-1996 and allow the petitioner to participate and vote in the said meeting.” Deprivation of the right to participate in the meeting and right to vote is being claimed to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and on no other ground. It is well settled that a right to vote, right to contest an election and right to challenge an election are all statutory rights. Right to vote is a special right created by statute and can only be exercised if permitted by the Statute. The fundamental right chapter has no bearing on a right like this created by Statute. In Ramprasad's case (cited supra) this Court has held, with which we respectfully agree, as follows : “A right to vote and contest at the election is not a fundamental right or a common law right. It is special right created by the statute and can only be exercised on the conditions laid down by the statute. In Ramprasad's case (cited supra) this Court has held, with which we respectfully agree, as follows : “A right to vote and contest at the election is not a fundamental right or a common law right. It is special right created by the statute and can only be exercised on the conditions laid down by the statute. Therefore, no right was vested in petitioners, independent of the statute, to vote or contest at the election of the Bombay Market Committee. This right is co-existent with the statute and if it deletes provision for the elective element, the petitioners have no right for which they could seek mandamus. Right from (N.P. Ponnaswami v. The Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency and others)10, A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 64, time and again Courts have explained the nature of the right to vote and contest at the election. There is only a statutory right and it does not exist apart from the statute. In case of fundamental rights, if the rights are taken away by the statutes, statutes will have to be held illegal. It is not the case with the statutes governing elections. There is no pre-existing right vested in any individual to vote and contest the elections. The contention as raised by the petitioner in W.P. No. 1155 of 1996, therefore, cannot be accepted. 37. The notice of meeting as issued by the Collector in the instant matter and the proposed meeting, therefore, cannot be held to be illegal only because the Chairman of the Panchayat Samitis are not being allowed to vote on the motion of no-confidence. 38. A question still remains to be decided is as to whether the Chairman of the Panchayat Samitis are entitled to attend and take part in the deliberations of a special meeting of the Zilla Parishad convened for considering the motion of no-confidence against the President, Vice-President and the Chairman of the Subjects Committee though they are not entitled to vote at a motion of no-confidence against these persons and as to whether the Collector has not acted in accordance with law in not issuing the notice of meeting which was scheduled to be held on 10-6-1996, to the Chairman of the Panchayat Samitis in the district who are not elected Councillors of the Zilla Parishad, like the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 1155 of 1996. Our answers to both these questions are in the affirmative having regard to the provisions of the Zilla Parishads Act as it presently stands. It may be pointed out that section 49(1) of the Zilla Parishads Act speaks of motion of “no-confidence to be passed at a special meeting of the Zilla Parishad (emphasis supplied) by a majority of the total number of elected councillors who are for the time being entitled to sit and vote at any meeting of the Zilla Parishad. Requisition for such special meeting, as contemplated by sub-section (2) of section 49, has to be for the special meeting of the Zilla Parishad. Sub-section (3) of section 49 then enjoins upon the Collector to convene a special meeting of the Zilla Parishad, sub-section (7) of section 49 then provides that if the motion of no confidence is not moved, or, as the case may be, is rejected, no fresh motion of no-confidence shall be brought before the Zilla Parishad within a period of one year form of the date of the special meeting convened under sub-section (3). As already pointed out, sub-section (3) of section 49 contemplates convening of a special meeting of the Zilla Parishad. No-confidence Motion Rules prescribe from the requisition to call a special meeting to consider a motion of no-confidence which has to be read only with reference to the special meeting envisaged by section 49 which, as already observed, postulates a special meeting of the Zilla Parishad. The Conduct of Business Rules also envisage a notice of a special meeting of the Zilla Parishad to be prepared in Form A. Section 111 also envisages an ordinary or a special meeting of the Zilla Parishad and section 112(3) also speaks that no act or proceeding of a Zilla Parishad shall be deemed to be invalid on account of any defect or irregularity specified therein. All these provisions, in our view, are clearly indicative of the fact that special meeting contemplated by section 49 to be convened for the purpose of considering the motion of no-confidence has to be of a Zilla Parishad. “Zilla Parishad”, as defined by section 2(35) means a Zilla Parishad constituted under section 9. As already noted, as per section 9 of the Zilla Parishads Act, the Zilla Parishad consists of Councillors chosen by direct election as also of the Chairmen of all Panchayat Samitis in the District. “Zilla Parishad”, as defined by section 2(35) means a Zilla Parishad constituted under section 9. As already noted, as per section 9 of the Zilla Parishads Act, the Zilla Parishad consists of Councillors chosen by direct election as also of the Chairmen of all Panchayat Samitis in the District. If a special meeting to be convened for consideration of no-confidence motion is of the Zilla Parishad as contemplated by the aforementioned various provisions of the Act and the Rules, it has to be a meeting of the elected Councillors and of the Chairmen of all the Panchayat Samitis in the District. It is a different thing whether a Chairman of a Panchayat Samiti is entitled to vote or not in such a special meeting as regards to which we have already held that they are not entitled. Entitlement to attend and to take part in the deliberations of the Zilla Parishad, including on motion of no-confidence, is one aspect of the matter and having a right to vote at a motion after such deliberations is a different aspect. Earlier Zilla Parishads consisted, besides the elected Councillors and Chairmen of Panchayat Samitis, of associate Councillors or associate members as well. These associate Councillors or associate members were entitled to attend and to take part in the deliberations of the Zilla Parishad, but unless expressly provided, had no right to vote. Having regard to the amendment effected to section 49 by the Maharashtra Act No. 12 of 1996, the position of Chairmen of Panchayat Samitis has been brought to a similar nature in so far as the motion of no-confidence is concerned, and nothing more than that as else, the Legislature would have used explicitly in section 49(1) the words “at a special meeting of the elected Councillors of the Zilla Parishad” in place of “at a special meeting of the Zilla Parishad” and further also would have used such words in sub-sections (3) and (7) of section 49. In our view, therefore, Chairmen of the Panchayat Samitis in the District are entitled to attend and to take part in the deliberations of a motion of no-confidence in a special meeting convened for that purpose by the Zilla Parishad. In our view, therefore, Chairmen of the Panchayat Samitis in the District are entitled to attend and to take part in the deliberations of a motion of no-confidence in a special meeting convened for that purpose by the Zilla Parishad. If the Collector has not issued notices to the Chairmen of the Panchayat Samitis of the special meeting convened on 10-6-1996 on the ground that they are not elected Councillors, he cannot be said to have acted in accordance with law. 39. The meeting scheduled to be held on 10-6-1996 admittedly could not be held. A contention was advanced that since the requisition remains operative for 7 days and since the Collector has to convene a special meeting within those 7 days, on a date not later than thirty days from the date of issue of the notice of the meeting, the special meeting on the basis of the requisition in the instant matter cannot now be called by the Collector, for the reason that if the meeting cannot take place in the statutory period indicated in section 49, then the requisition lapses. We are unable to accept this contention. The contention as raised is no more res integra. As already pointed out, the meeting scheduled to be held on 10-6-1996 could not be held in the instant matter because of the stay granted by this Court in these petitions. This Court in Pradeep Pawar's case (cited supra) has already held, with which we respectfully agree, as under : “The provision will have to be read to further its object. The purpose is to give an opportunity to the members to express their no-confidence on office bearers of the Zilla Parishad or Panchayat Samiti as the case may be and, therefore, if the Collector has failed in his duty or the meeting could not take place within the statutory outer limit because of the stay orders of any Court or for similar reason (for example, meeting stayed by the State Government), it does not follow that the requisition would lapse. Unless the members are given an opportunity to consider the motion, there is no propriety in holding that the requisition would lapse unless statute provides for that. Requisition calling Collector to convene a meeting will stand or fall on the sole fact whether statutory requirement of section 72(2) and the Rules made therefor are followed or not. Unless the members are given an opportunity to consider the motion, there is no propriety in holding that the requisition would lapse unless statute provides for that. Requisition calling Collector to convene a meeting will stand or fall on the sole fact whether statutory requirement of section 72(2) and the Rules made therefor are followed or not. It will cease to exist only after meeting takes place and not otherwise. There is no provision in the statute for the lapse of requisition. Right of the requisitionist member to ask for the meeting continues despite meeting not having taken place within 30 days either because of inaction of the Collector or for any other reason.” What is stated in relation to section 72 in the aforesaid judgment will be fully applicable to the provisions of section 49 of the Zilla Parishads Act and the Collector, therefore, will have to convene a special meeting for the purpose of considering the motion of no-confidence as per requisition received by him in the instant matter. 40. In the result all these petitions are hereby dismissed. The Collector, Gadchiroli is directed to issue notices at the earliest convening a special meeting of the Zilla Parishad, Gadchiroli as per requisitions received by him in all those matters. In the circumstances of the case, however, there will be no order as to costs. At this stage request was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioners for staying the operation of the instant judgment for a period of 15 days as the petitioners desire to file Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the position of law, we are not inclined to accept this request. The request as made is, therefore, rejected. Petitions dismissed. -----