R. A. SHARMA, J. Sri Salig Ram Misra, Principal of Sri Sadhu Bela Sanskrit Mahavidyalaya Varanasi (hereinafter referred to as the College) was suspended by the Committee of Management of the College on 25-12-1990. The above order of suspension was, however, revoked by the Vice-Chancel lor of Sampurnanand Sanskrit Vishwa Vidyalaya, Varanasi (hereinafter referred to as the University ). On 23-1-1 91 the Vice-Chancellor passed further order mentioning therein that in spite of the revocation of the suspen sion order of Sri Salig Ram Misra he will not exercise the administrative and financial powers of the Principal although he will continue to be the Principal of the college. It was further directed that the financial and administrative powers of the Principal will be dis charged by the senior most lecturer. Petitioner, being the senior most lecturer, started disharging those functions in pursuance of the above order of the Vice- Chancellor. The Management terminated the service of Sri Salig Ram Misra, but this order was disapproved by the Vice-Chancellor on 9-11-1994. The Vice-Chancellors order was challenged before the Chancellor by means of a representation, which was allowed and the matter was remanded back to the Vice-Chancellor to decide the matter afresh. The Chancellors order was challenged by means of writ petition No. 36741 of 1994 before this Court, but the petition was dismissed. 2. On 5-6-1995 the Management placed the petitioner under suspen sion. On 1-7-1995 the petitioner was charge-sheered. The inquiry commit tee after holding inquiry submitted its report to the Management, on the basis of which on 4-12-1995 the Management resolved to terminate the services of the petitioner subject to the approval of the Vice-chancellor. It has been stated that the Vice- Chancellor has not passed any order so far. On 1-7-1995 the petitioner was charge-sheered. The inquiry commit tee after holding inquiry submitted its report to the Management, on the basis of which on 4-12-1995 the Management resolved to terminate the services of the petitioner subject to the approval of the Vice-chancellor. It has been stated that the Vice- Chancellor has not passed any order so far. Petitioner has filed the writ petition No. 36841 of 1995 for the following reliefs : (i) to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents not to interfere in the functioning of the petitioner as Head of Department/officiating Principal of the institution, (ii) to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondent No. 1 Vice-Chancellor to decide the matter regarding the proposal of the committee of manage ment dated 4- 12-1994 after giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, (iii) to issue any other writ, order or direction as this Honble Court deems fit and proper under the circumstances of the case. " 3. On 2-1-1996 an order was passed by their Deputy Registrar autho rising Sri Narbadeshwar Tiwari, Held of the Vyacaran Department of the College to perform two functions, namely, (i) to forward the examination forms of students for the year 1996 ; and (ii) to disperse the salary of teachers and other employees of the College till further orders. Petitioner has challenged this order also by means of writ petition No. 3186 of 1996 in which he claimed the following reliefs : " (a) to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 2-1- 1996 (Annexure 7 to the writ petition) ; (b) to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents not to interfere in functioning of the petitioner as Head of Department (Vedant)/officiating Principal of the institution ; (c) o issue any other writ, order or direction as this Honble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case ; (d) to award the costs of the petitioner to the petitioner. " 4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. 5. " 4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. 5. In view of sub-section (2) of Section 35 of the State Universities Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) a teacher of a college cannot be dismissed or removed, reduced in rank or punished in any other manner without, approval of the Vice-ChancellChancellor of the University to which the college is affiliated. However, the order of suspension pending inquiry passed by the management is not required to be approved by the Vice-Chancellor, because sub-section (4) of Section 35 has laid down that its sub section (2) shall not apply to an order of suspension pending inquiry. Peti tioner was suspended vide order dated 5-6-1995. He has not challenged this order either before the Vice-Chancellor or before this Court. 6. Even in these two writ petitions he has not made any prayer for getting the said order of suspension quashed. As long as the petitioner remains under suspension, he is not entitled to work as a teacher/head of the Department/officiating Principal. Therefore, the first relief claimed by the petitioner in writ petition No. 36841 of 1995 cannot be granted. How ever, second relief for direction to the Vice-Chancellor to take a decision on the proposal of the Committee of Management dated 4-12- 1995 is liable to be granted, because such matters should be decided expeditiously. 7. As regards the second writ petition No. 3186 of 1996 is concerned, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. So far as the order dated 2-1-1996 (Annexure VII to the writ petition) is concerned, it is consequential order, because after the suspension of the petitioner somebody eke has to be appointed to perform the obligatory functions of submitting the exami nation forms for the examination of 1966 and of payment of salary to the teachers and other employees of the college. The second relief in the later writ petition is the same as relief No. 1 in the former writ petition. Petitioner being under suspension cannot work in the college in any capacity. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has, in this connection, sub mitted that order of suspension dated 5-6-1995 passed by the management has not been communicated to the petitioner and, therefore, it is inopera tive and cannot be enforced against him. This contention is devoid of merit. Petitioner being under suspension cannot work in the college in any capacity. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has, in this connection, sub mitted that order of suspension dated 5-6-1995 passed by the management has not been communicated to the petitioner and, therefore, it is inopera tive and cannot be enforced against him. This contention is devoid of merit. It has been stated by the respondents in the counter-affidavit that order of suspension was communicated to the petitioner through a peon of the college. It has further been stated that the said order has also been served on the petitioner through the registered post and also by publication in a Hindi daily newspaper. Even the petitioner has filed the copy of the said order of suspension as Annexure IV to the first writ petition. The contention of the learned counsel that unless the order is actually received by the petitioner from the respondents, it cannot be enforced, is also devoid of merit. Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Khemi Ram, AIR 1970 SC 214 has laid down that it is the communication of the order, which is essen tial and not its actual receipt by the concerned officer. Relevant extract from the said judgment is reproduced below : "it will be seen that in all the decisions cited before us it was the communication of the impugned order which was held to be essential and not its actual receipt by the office? concerned and such communication was held to be necessary because till the order is issued and actually sent out to the person concerned the authority making such order would be in a position to change its mind and modify it if it thought fit. But once such an order is sent out, it goes out of the control of such an authority, and therefore, there would be no chance whatsoever of its changing its mind or modifying it. It our view, once an order is issued and it is sent out to tthe concerned Government servant, it must be held to have been communicated to him, no matter when he actually received it. We find it difficult to persuade ourselves to accept the view that it is only from the date of the actual receipt by him that the order becomes effective. We find it difficult to persuade ourselves to accept the view that it is only from the date of the actual receipt by him that the order becomes effective. If that be the true meaning of communication, it would be possible for a Government servant to effectively thwart an order by avoid ing receipt of it by one method or the other till after the date of his retirement even though such an order is passed and despatched to him before such date. An officer against whom action is sought to be taken, thus, may go away from the address given by him for service of such orders or may delibe rately give a wrong address and thus prevent or delay its receipt and be able to defeat its service on him. " Petitioner has been communicated the order of suspension. He also has its copy, which he has filed as Annexure IV to the first writ petition. Order of suspension, as such, stands communicated. The order of suspension is thus in operation and, therefore, no relief can be granted to the petitioner excepting the necessary direction to the Vice-Chancellor to decide the matter expeditiously. 9. These writ petitions are dismissed. The Vice-Chancellor of the University is however, directed to take a decision in accordance with law on the proposal dated 4-12-1995 of the Committee of Management of the college within a period of three months from the date of prosecution of certified copy of this order before him. It is desirable that the Vice-Chancellor should also decide, if not already decided, the matter relating to the termination of service of the regular Principal of the college, Sri Salig Ram Misra as expeditiously as possible. In view of the facts and circum stances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs, Petition dismissed. .