JUDGMENT Miss Kamlesh Sharma. J.—In these writ petitions, the petitioners are aggrieved and have prayed for quashing of the requisition dated 29-9-1995 (Annexure P~3)f whereby the Divisional Manager, Himachal Road Transport Corporation, Mandi Division Mandi has asked the Employment Exchanges to sponsor the names of candidates to fill up 35 posts of conductors on contract basis and also to prepare waiting panel for filling up 20 anticipated posts on contract and on one to one basis. They have further prayed that these vacancies be filled no out of the panel already prepared in pursuance to selection made out of the candidates sponsored in response to earlier requisition dated 7-5-1994 (Annexure R-l), 2. The case set up by the petitioners is that by earlier requisition dated 7-5-1994 the respondent-corporation had sent for the names of the candidates for preparing a waiting panel for appointment to 75 posts of Conductors as and when needed in future against resultant vacancies, in pursuance whereof their names were duly sponsored by their respective employment exchanges and after holding written test and interview they were selected. The panel was announced on 6 8 1994, out of which 1! posts of conductors belonging to the category of ex-servicemen were filled up on 28-2-1995 Thereafter, 9 more posts of the general category were filled up on 27-6-1995. Further vacancies arising from time to time were not filled up out of said panel ; instead the requisition dated 29-9-1995 was issued which gave cause of action to the petitioners to file these petitions. 3. Shri Chirag B. Singh, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, has raised two points to assail the action of respondent-Corporation The first point is that 35 vacancies were existing at the time requisition dated ?9-9-1995 was issued which were required to be filled up from the existing panel out of which 20 appointments were already made* The second point is that the change in policy to make appointments on contract basis instead of on regular basis is prospective which would apply to the vacancies arising in future The precise contention of Mr. Singh is that change of the policy midway was unreasonable, arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Singh is that change of the policy midway was unreasonable, arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. In support of his submissions he has relied upon N T. Devin Katti and others v. Karnataka Public Service Commission and others, (1990) 3 SCC 157 ; Union of India and others v. Ishwar Singh Khatri and others, 1992 Suppl (3) SCC 84 and State of Bihar and others Appellants v. The Secretariat Assistant Successful Examinees Union 1986 and others. Respondents, AIR 1994 SC 736, 4. On the other hand, Shri M. S Chandel, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents, has urged that by mere selection no right of appointment had accrued to the petitioners, more so against the anticipated vacancies for which the panel was prepared, as stated in the requisition dated 7-5-1994. He has pointed out that in fact when requisition dated 7-5-1994 was issued and panel was prepared, there was no existing vacancy and later appointments twenty in number were made out of the said panel as and when vacancies arose. He has not denied that at the time of sending requisition dated 29-9-1995, 35 vacancies were available and 20 vacancies were anticipated for which waiting list was to be prepared, Mr. Chandel has referred to the reply of respondents filed on the affidavit of Shri K, C Cbauhan, Manager (Legal and Labour), H. R, T. C, Shimla to point out that change in the policy to make appointments to the posts of conductors on contract basis instead of on regular basis has necessitated the issuance of fresh requisition and supersession of earlier panel. The change in the policy is purely on administrative and economic grounds. It is averred in the reply-affidavit that the conductors appointed on regular basis have been indulging in corrupt practices on large scale causing huge losses to the respondent-Corporation and for bringing them to book lengthy procedure prescribed under Rule 14 of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 is required to be followed. If the appointments are made on contract basis the Corporation will have ample opportunity to assess their work and conduct before they are appointed on regular basis after completion of contract period. 5. Shri Chandel has also urged that the case law cited by Shri Singh is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case. If the appointments are made on contract basis the Corporation will have ample opportunity to assess their work and conduct before they are appointed on regular basis after completion of contract period. 5. Shri Chandel has also urged that the case law cited by Shri Singh is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case. In support of the proposition that by mere selection no right accrues to the petitioners for appointment to the post of conductor, he has referred to judgments of Supreme Court, viz The State of Haryana, Appellant v. Subhash Chmder Marwaha and others. Respondents, (1974) 3 SCC 220 ; Jatinder Kumar and others. Appellants v. State Bank of Punjab and others, Respondents, (1985) 1 SCC 22 ; Shankarsan Dash, Appellants. Union of India, Respondent, (1991) 3 SCC 47 and Shyam Sunder Duita, Appellants Balkuntha Nath Banerjee (dead) by L. Rs. and others, Respondents, (1994) 6 SCC 545. 6. In the case of State of Haryana v. Subhash Chander Marwaha and others (supra), the learned Judges of Supreme Court were dealing with the appointment to the post of Subordinate Judges and the grievance of the petitioner in that case was that after making appointment from the select list from Serial No. 1 to 1, the Government stopped making further appointments out of the said list In the context of the rules applicable to the post, it was said that the only requirement of Rule 10 was that the State Government; (i) shall not make such appointments by travelling outside the list and (ii) shall make the selection for appointments strictly in the order the candidates have been placed in the list published in the Government Gazette But it was not there that after making some appointments in seriatim out of the select list the Government could not refuse to make further appointments out of the said list despite the vacancies avail-able with it The learned Judges further held that in order to issue Mandamus to the Government to make further appointments out of the select list, it must be shown that the statute imposes a legal duty on the appointing authority and the aggrieved party has a legal right under the statute to enforce its performance, which was not the position in the case before them. 7. 7. The law laid down in the case of State of Haryana v. Subhash Chander Marwaha and others (supra), has been consistently followed in later judgment of Supreme Court in Jatinder Kumar and others v. Srate of Punjab and others (supra), wherein it is held that : "......... . but it is open to the Government to decide how many appointments will be made. The process for selection and selection for the purpose of recruitment against anticipated vacancies does not create a right to be appointed to the post which can be enforced by a Mandamus.” Further in the case of Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India (supra), the observations are: "It is not correct to say that if a number of vacancies are notified for appointment and adequate number of candidates are found fit, the successful candidates acquire an indefeasible right to be appointed which cannot be legitimately denied Ordinarily the notification merely amounts to ao invitation to qualified candidates to apply for recruitment and on their selection they do not acquire any right to the post. Unless the relevant recruitment rules so indicate, the State is under no legal duty to fill up all or any of the vacancies. However, it does not mean that the State has the licence of acting in an arbitrary manner. The decision not to fill up the vacancies has to be taken bonafide for appropriate reasons. And if the vacancies or any of them are filled up, the State is bound to respect the comparative merit of the candidates, as reflected at the recruitment test, and no discrimination can be permitted This correct position has been consistently followed by this Court, and we do not find any discordant note in the decisions in State of Haryana v. Subhash Chander Marwaha ; Neelima Shangla v. State of Haryana or Jatendra Kumar v. State of Punjab." 8. Lastly in State of M. P. and others v. Raghuveer Singh Yadav and others, (1994) 6 SCC 151, the learned Judges of Supreme Court have gone to the extent that even after preparing the select list, the Government may bonafide amend the statutory rules and withdraw the earlier notification and thereafter proceed with fresh recruitment after cancelling the earlier selection made under the unamended rules. In the words of learned Judges : "Amended Rules have only prospective operation. In the words of learned Judges : "Amended Rules have only prospective operation. The Government is entitled to conduct selection in accordance with the changed rules and make final recruitment. Obviously no candidate acquired any vested right against the State. Therefore, the State is entitled to withdraw the notification by which it had previously notified recruitment and to issue fresh notification in that regard on the basis of the amended Rules." 9. Scrutinising the present case in the light of the ratio of above referred judgments of the Supreme Court, we find that by the requisition dated 7-5-1994, the respondents had called for the names of candidates to prepare a waiting panel for appointment to 73 posts of conductors as and when needed in future against resultant vacancies. These posts were to be filled in the pay scale of Rs. 950-1800. At the time of issuance of requisition, no vacancy was available with the respondents and they had made selection for the anticipated vacancies only. Having been selected for anticipated vacancies, the petitioners cannot claim that they have a right to be appointed atleast against the existing vacancies as on 29-9-1995 when second requisition dated 29-9-1995 was issued. Since in the meantime the respondents had changed their policy of recruitment and decided to make appointment on contract basis instead of on regular basis, they were very much within their right to supersede the earlier selection. To make the policy or the statutory rules for the recruitment and to amend them is within the domain of the Government or the authority and if by amending the policy or rules, the Government or the authority intends to make fresh selection by cancelling the earlier selection made under the earlier policy or unamended rules, there is nothing arbitrary which violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Neither there is any right accruing in the petitioners nor corresponding duty to the respondents to make further appointments out of the select list already prepared in pursuance to requisition dated 7-5-1994 (Annexure R-l). 10. Neither there is any right accruing in the petitioners nor corresponding duty to the respondents to make further appointments out of the select list already prepared in pursuance to requisition dated 7-5-1994 (Annexure R-l). 10. The judgment of Supreme Court in N. T Devin Katti and others v. Karnataka Public Service Commission and others (supra), is on the facts and circumstances of that case wherein the learned Judges have held that once the selection process is initiated by issuing advertisement, the candidates applying in response have a right of consideration in accordance with the existing rules and subsequent amendment thereof will not affect the pending selection process unless contrary intention is expressly or impliedly indicated. Similarly in Union of India and others v. Ishwar Singh Khatri and others, 1991 Suppl (3) SCC 84, though 654 vacancies were notified but panel of 1492 selected candidates was prepared and the Selection Board in its meeting decided that panel will be valid till all the candidates were appointed out of it. ft was in this context that the learned Judges of Supreme Court held that selected candidates ordinarily will have a right to appointment against the vacancies notified or available at the time the select list is prepared, but they have no right against future vacancies. These observations are definitely in the context of the case before the Supreme Court and cannot be taken as law that notwithstanding amendment in rules or change in policy in the meantime, the selected candidates will be given appointment against the vacancies existing at the time these were notified. So far the case in band is concerned, it may be reiterated that there was no vacancy available at the time the first requisition dated 7-5-1994 was sent and all the 75 vacancies were anticipated, and the supersession of the select list and issuance of the fresh requisition dated 29-9-1995 was necessitated because of change in policy of recruitment from appointment in regular scale to appointment on contract. 11. 11. Another judgment of Supreme Court in State of Bihar ana others v. The Secretariat Assistant Successful Examinees Union 1986 and others (supra), is also on its own facts and does not help the petitioners rather it supports the case of the respondents as held in para 10 : “It is now well settled that a person who is selected does not on account of being empanelled alone, acquire any indefeasible right of appointment. Empanelment is at the best a condition of eligibility for purposes of appointment, and by itself does not amount to selection or create a vested right to be appointed unless relevant service rule says to the contrary." The learned Judges have set aside the direction of the High Court to make appointments of empanelled candidates holding that this would not be fair to the candidates, who have become ineligible since the last selection was held The result of above discussion is that we do not find any merit in the writ petition and it is dismissed. But before parting with this case, we may observe that admittedly a few of the candidates who were selected in pursuance to the earlier requisition dated 7-5-1994 have become over age and their names may not be sponsored by their respective employment exchanges in reply to the later requisition dated 29-9-1995, therefore, it will be in the interest of justice and fair play to direct the respondent-Corporation to consider all those who were selected in pursuance to earlier requisition dated 7-5-1994, but have become over age without insisting upon their sponsorship from their respective employment exchanges provided they apply in pursuance to requisition dated 29-9-1995. Order accordingly. No costs. Order accordingly.