Judgment Gitesh Ranjan Bhattacharjee, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree' passed by the learned Assistant District Judge, 6th Court, Alipore in T.S. No. 42 of 1983. That was a suit for specific performance of contract regarding sale of immovable property. By the impugned judgment and decree the learned trial court granted decree for specific performance. The appellant was the defendant in the said suit. The present appeal has been preferred challenging the said judgment and decree. 2. In the suit it was the contention of the plaintiffs-respondents that there was an agreement between the defendant company and one Phani Bhusan Khasnabis, the predecessor in interest of the plaintiffs for sale of land and the said Phani Bhusan also paid earnest money as well as a part of the consideration money to the defendant company and in part performance of the agreement possession of the concerned property was also delivered to said Phani Bhusan Khasnabis but the defendant company did not execute deed of conveyance. It may be mentioned here that the plaintiff no. 1 Arun Kr. Khasnabis is the son of said Phani Bhusan Khasnabis, since des eased and the plaintiff no. 2 Sudha Rani Khasnabis is the widow of late Phani Bhusan Khasnabis. Originally the suit was filed on 14.5.83 by the plaintiff no.1 alone. Subsequently an application was filed for addition of his mother as plaintiff no. 2 in the suit and the said application was allowed by the learned trial court on 6.2.86. Under Art. 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963 a suit for specific performance of contract is required to be filed within three years from the date fixed for the performance or if no such date is fixed, then such suit is required to be filed within three years from the date when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused. It is not in dispute that in the present case, in view of the facts and circumstances, the period of limitation under the said Art. 54 started running with effect from 14th July, 1980. Therefore in view of the said Art. 54 the suit for specific performance was required to be instituted within three years from the said date, that is, within 14th July, 1983. As a matter of fact the suit was filed by the plaintiff no.1 alone within the period of limitation. Therefore in view of the said Art. 54 the suit for specific performance was required to be instituted within three years from the said date, that is, within 14th July, 1983. As a matter of fact the suit was filed by the plaintiff no.1 alone within the period of limitation. The only point urged on behalf of the appellant before us in this appeal is that the suit is barred by limitation as there was no properly constituted suit till the expiry of the period of limitation and the learned trial court should have dismissed the suit on that ground. Since the only point urged before us in this appeal is the ground of limitation and no other point has been urged, it is not necessary for us to advert our attention to the other aspects of the case. If we find that the suit is barred by limitation then the appeal will be allowed and the suit will be dismissed. On the other hand if we hold that the suit is not barred by limitation in that event the appeal will stand dismissed. 3. As we have seen, the suit was initially instituted within the period of limitation by the plaintiff no.1 alone as the son and heir of the deceased Phani Bhusan Khasnabis. Subsequently however he applied before the trial court on 6.2.86 for addition of his mother Smt. Sudha Rani Khasnabis as plaintiff no. 2 and the said application for addition of party was also allowed by the trial court by order dated 6.2.86. What is contended on behalf of the appellant before us in this appeal is that since Phani Bhusan died leaving behind the plaintiffs as his heirs (son and widow) the suit for specific performance should have been instituted jointly by both the plaintiffs within the prescribed period of limitation, but as a matter of fact initially the suit was instituted by the plaintiff no.1 alone and it was only after the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation the plaintiff no.2 was also added as a co-plaintiff in the suit. In this connection the learned Advocate for the appellant attracts our attention to s. 21(1) of the Limitation Act which runs thus. :- "21. In this connection the learned Advocate for the appellant attracts our attention to s. 21(1) of the Limitation Act which runs thus. :- "21. Effect of substitution or adding new plaintiff or defendant :- (1) Where after the institution of a suit a new plaintiff or defendant is substituted or added the suit shall as regards him be deemed to have been instituted when he was so made a party: Provided that where the court is satisfied that the omission to include a plaintiff or defendant was due to a mistake made in good faith it may direct that the suit as regards such plaintiff or defendant shall be deemed to have been instituted on any earlier date. (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to a case where a party is added or substituted owing to assignment or devolution of any interest during the pendency of a suit or where a plaintiff is made a defendant or a defendant is made a plaintiff." 4. It is argued on behalf of the appellant that the suit as initially instituted was not maintainable at the instance of the plaintiff no.1 alone and therefore no relief could be granted on the basis of the suit which •was initially instituted by the plaintiff no.!. It is further argued that in view of s. 21(1) of the Limitation Act the suit shall be deemed to have been instituted as regards the plaintiff no. 2 on the date on which she was subsequently made a party. It is also argued that since the plaintiff no.2 was added as a party in the suit on 6.2.86 when the period of limitation for such suit had already expired, it will have to be treated that the suit as a whole is barred by limitation and the mere fact that the suit was initially instituted by the plaintiff no. l alone within the period of limitation is of no avail. We cannot say that the proposition is apparently without merit. But then the learned Advocate for the respondents attracts our attention to the proviso to sub-so (1) of s. 21 of the Limitation Act as well as to the application for addition of plaintiff no.2 as a party to the suit in the trial court and the order passed thereon by the trial court. As we have seen, the proviso to subs. As we have seen, the proviso to subs. (1) of s. 21 of the Limitation Act expressly says that if the court is satisfied that the omission to include a plaintiff or defendant was due to a mistake made in good faith it may direct that the suit as regards such plaintiff or defendant shall be deemed to have been instituted on any earlier date. It is true that the learned court below while allowing the petition for addition of plaintiff no.2 as a party to the suit does not expressly say that the suit as regards such added plaintiff shall be deemed to have been instituted on any earlier date, but it has to be noticed that in the application for adding the plaintiff no.2 as a party to the suit it has been stated inter alia that the plaintiff (meaning the plaintiff no.l) as the legal heir of Phani Bhusan Khasnabis had instituted the suit, but through oversight his mother, that is, the widow of said Phani Bhusan had not been impleaded although she was a necessary party and accordingly prayer was made to add her as a plaintiff in the suit. The said application was purportingly made under Or. 6 rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Code which says that the court may at any stage of the proceeding allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. The said application for amendment was allowed by the learned court below on 6.2.86 by expressly recording that the application was allowed as no objection was raised upon it. It is therefore evident in view of the averments made in the application for amendment and also of the purport of the concerned order that the learned court below was satisfied that the widow of the deceased Phani Bhusan was not made a plaintiff originally through oversight and that she was a necessary party to the suit as averred in the application itself to which no objection was raised on behalf of the other side. It is therefore further evident that the learned court below allowed the amendment as the court was satisfied that the omission to include the plaintiff no. It is therefore further evident that the learned court below allowed the amendment as the court was satisfied that the omission to include the plaintiff no. 2 in the suit as originally framed was due to a bona fide mistake, that is, a mistake made in good faith and that she was a necessary party to the suit. Evidently the trial court in granting the prayer for adding the plaintiff no.2 as a party to the suit did not intend to pass a meaningless order which would serve no purpose. Unless the context or the circumstance otherwise requires, it would be presumed that the court while passing an order intended the order to attain a meaningful effect or purpose, rather than reducing itself to a HN-2/2 58 Deepchand Co. Ltd. us. A. Khesnabis 1997 (I) CRN wholly abortive exercise. The order should be understood accordingly, if the language used does not repel such import. It is not that while passing the concerned order in this case the trial court recorded that the amendment is allowed subject to contention regarding limitation or without prejudice to the rights or contentions regarding limitation. The other side also, as we have seen, did not raise any objection whatsoever regarding the amendment. Therefore it is evident that the court passed the order allowing amendment so that all the necessary parties might be brought in the picture for an effective adjudication in the suit after the suit is cured of its constitutional defect. In view of the amendment order passed by the learned court below in the facts and circumstances, the said court therefore ought to have also expressly recorded in the order itself instead of leaving it to be read therein by necessary implication that the suit as regards such added plaintiff would be deemed to have been instituted on the date on which the suit was originally filed by the plaintiff no.1 as required to have been done by the learned court below under the proviso to sub-so (1) of s. 21 of the Limitation Act so that the order of amendment could purportingly have the intended meaning and effect. We feel that when the learned court below granted the application for amendment of the plaint by adding the plaintiff no.2 as a party to the suit on the ground that she was left out inadvertantly through oversight although she was a necessary party and when no objection to such amendment was also raised by the other side when such amendment was allowed, it would be unjust thereafter to non-suit the plaintiffs on the ground of limitation quite contrary to the tenor and purpose of the order of amendment passed• by the learned court below. 5. The question now is whether the nominal deficiency in the phraseology of the amendment order passed by the learned court below should defeat the ends of justice when the purpose of granting such amendment is clear and patent. The further question is whether this court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction in the matter has any power to rectify any nominal or formal defect in the concerned order of the learned court below. In this connection we would refer to Or. 41 Rule 33 C.P.C which runs thus : "33. The further question is whether this court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction in the matter has any power to rectify any nominal or formal defect in the concerned order of the learned court below. In this connection we would refer to Or. 41 Rule 33 C.P.C which runs thus : "33. Power of Court of appeal-The appellate court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require, and this power may be exercised by the Court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection and may, where there have been decrees in cross-suits or where two or more decrees are, passed in one suit, be exercised in respect of all or any of the decrees, although an appeal may not have been filed against such decrees : Provided that the Appellant Court shall not make any order under s. 35A, in pursuance of any objection on which the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has omitted or refused to make such order." The said Rule 33 of Order 41 gives a wide power to the appellate court to pass such order in the matter as is consistent with law and is necessary for the ends of justice where it is satisfied that such order ought to have been passed. 1n our opinion, as we have already recorded, the learned trial court while allowing the amendment for reasons stated in the application for amendment ought to have also passed an order expressly recording hat the amendment by way of addition of party as plaintiff no. 2 would have effect from the date of institution of the suit, particularly when no objection in the matter of amendment was forthcoming from the other side. The power granted to the Appellate Court by the said Rule 33 of Or. 41 is wide enough to authorise the appellate court to pass an order in respect of any matter dealt with even at a stage anterior to the passing of the judgement, decree or order appealed against. 6. The power granted to the Appellate Court by the said Rule 33 of Or. 41 is wide enough to authorise the appellate court to pass an order in respect of any matter dealt with even at a stage anterior to the passing of the judgement, decree or order appealed against. 6. Accordingly for the ends of justice we direct that the order of amendment by which the plaintiffno.2 was added as a party in the suit shall, in view of the proviso to sub-so (1) of S. 21 of the Limitation Act, relate back to the date of filing of the suit and the suit so far as plaintiffno.2 is concerned shall also be deemed to have been instituted on the date on which it was originally instituted by the plaintiff no.1 alone. That being so we also hold that the suit is not barred by limitation and accordingly the appeal stands dismissed. No cost is however ordered. Devendra Kumar Jain, J.: I agree. Appeal dismissed