R. DAYAL, J. ( 1 ) MAIN point that calls for consideration in this petition is whether this petition brought under Art. 226 of the Constitution deserves to be entertained as public interest litigation. ( 2 ) SWAROOP Rani Nehru Hospital (hereinafter referred as the hospital) is affiliated to Moti Lal Nehru Medical College, Allahabad (hereinafter referred as the medical college ). A lease document (Annexure 4) was executed on 13-2-1996 by the Principal of the medical College, respondent No. 4, on behalf of the Government of U. P. in favour of Rajendra Pratap Singh, respondent No. 7, in respect of a piece of land to establish a medical store inside the campus of the hospital on the terms and conditions specified therein. The petitioners have challenged this lease deed. They have pleaded in para 32 of the petition that the lease was granted under a letter of Director of Medical Education and Training dated 3-11-1995 for allowing the opening of a medical store in the hospital campus. One of the reliefs claimed in the petition is a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to produce letter No. M. E. /medical Store/95/57 dated 3-11-1995 issued by the Director General, Medical Education and Training, U. P. Lucknow and also for quashing the same. The other relief claimed is a writ in the nature of certiorari to quash the lease deed dated 13-2-1996 (Annexure 4 ). The petitioners have also claimed a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents, particularly respondent No. 7, to remove the disputed structure raised/erected/fixed inside the campus of the hospital on the basis of the lease deed dated 13-2-1996. ( 3 ) WE have heard Sri A. K. Yog, Advocate, on behalf of the petitioners, Sri L. P. Nathani, Senior Advocate, on behalf of respondent No. 7 and Sri A. N. Sinha, Advocate, on behalf of respondent No. 4. ( 3 ) WE have heard Sri A. K. Yog, Advocate, on behalf of the petitioners, Sri L. P. Nathani, Senior Advocate, on behalf of respondent No. 7 and Sri A. N. Sinha, Advocate, on behalf of respondent No. 4. ( 4 ) SRI Yog has submitted that the lease has been granted by the Principal of the medical college even when he had no authority under the rules to do so, in order to give undue benefit to respondent No. 7 in contravention of the relevant rules and also the circular letter dated 19-10-1995 which interdicts the opening of shops in the precincts of the hospital and also in violation of article 299 of the Constitution, since the lease was neither executed in the name of the Governor of Uttar Pradesh nor was it executed on behalf of the Governor by a person duly authorised by him to execute the same. According to the learned counsel, the lease was granted surreptitiously without inviting tenders and this has resulted in violation of the constitutional guarantee enshrined in Art. 14 of the Constitution. Further, the learned counsel has submitted that if tenders had been invited, every interested person would have got the opportunity to make an application for the lease and the lease amount must have been much higher than what it has been and the present case is a fit one to be entertained as public interest litigation. On the other hand, Sri Nathani has submitted that this petition has been brought with mala fide intention to maintain monopoly of the medical shops situated outside the hospital in order that the owners of these shops could exploit the persons who have no alternative than to purchase medicines from them at exorbitant prices especially when life saving medicines are needed late in the night and it was with a view to provide facility of having medicines at reasonable rates all the 24 hours every day within the hospital premixes that a decision was taken to have a medical shop inside the hospital campus and the petition instead of having been brought to serve any public purpose, has been filed to further private interest. Sri Nathani has further submitted that petitioners 3 and 4 who have claimed in the petition to be the employees working on the medical shops situated outside the hospital are in fact, the owners of the shops and have described themselves to be the employees in order to camouflage their private interest which is to exploit the people in distress. According to the learned counsel, circular letter dated 19-10-1995 is not applicable to the hospital in question. Further, the learned counsel has submitted that the lease amount has been fixed not on the basis of negotiation, but as per the relevant rules, and all the relevant rules have been complied with. The other submission is that writ is not an appropriate remedy to frustrate a contractual right in favour of a respondent. Sri A. N. Sinha has adopted the arguments advanced by Sri Nathani. ( 5 ) IN order to appreciate the rival contentions of the learned counsel, it is necessary to refer to the main allegations in the petition and counter affidavits filed on behalf of respondents 4 and 7 and also to the rejoinder affidavit filed by the petitioners. The first petitioner is Prayag Vyapar Mandal, Civil Lines, Allahabad. Second petitioner is Allahabad Chemist and Druggist Association, Allahabad and the third and fourth petitioners are Atual Luthra and Alok Yadav respectively. As per the allegations in the petition, the first petitioner is the association of traders of the civil lines market area in the city of Allahabad: Main objective of vyapar Mandal is "to watch larger interest of its members vis-a-vis consumers and in that context keep track and watch the larger interest of development of the city including adherence by the administration to the plan development of the city, particularly Civil Lines area at Allahabad. In the vyapar Mandal each member of this association has vital interest in the subject matter of the present petition including ecology, environment and plan development of the city, so as to ensure that the city of ancient historical importance does not lose its charm and continues to remain better place, if not model town, for its inhabitants. " The second petitioner Allahabad Chemist and Druggist Association is said to be an association of Chemist and Druggist Dealers/ Traders of Allahabad city affiliated to the Patron Registered Society called Uttar Pradesh Chemist and Druggist Federation. " The second petitioner Allahabad Chemist and Druggist Association is said to be an association of Chemist and Druggist Dealers/ Traders of Allahabad city affiliated to the Patron Registered Society called Uttar Pradesh Chemist and Druggist Federation. Para 4 of the writ petition says that "petitioners Nos. 3 and 4 are presently employed on the shops dealing with the sale and supply of medicines, drugs etc. and the said shops are situate just opposite the pampus of Swaroop Rani Hospital, Allahabad. The petitioners state that both the college and hospital are under the direct control and supervision of the State Government and the principal of the college is the head of the medical institution and he has nothing to do with the maintenance and management and running of the hospital but is concerned only with the academic aspect of the medical college for medical education and the hospital provides the avenue to be used by the medical students as their lab for practicals. Further, it is averred that inside the campus of the hospital there is a part which vests in, and is being maintained by, the Allahabad Development Authority and an attempt is being made by respondent No. 7 to raise constructions on the said park on the basis of the lease deed executed by respondent No. 4 on 13-2- 1996, even when the principal of the college who executed the lease was not competent to do so. Further, it is averred that on the stamp papers of the agreement excuse for the grant of the lease has been shown as the letter of Director of Medical Education and Training dated 3-11-1995 for allowing the opening of medical store in the hospital campus which the petitioners have not been able to procure and, therefore, the respondents may be directed to produce the same. Another plea taken in the petition is that the lease has been executed in violation of Art. 299 of the Constitution which requires a lease to be expressed to be made by the Governor and to the best of the knowledge of the petitioner there is no authorisation or delegation of powers of the Governor nor there is any rule which authorises the Director of Medical Education and Training or the principal of the medical college to exercise power by or on behalf of the Governor. Para 37 of the petition states that "no shop, or for that matter any other commercial activity. should be permitted to be commenced inside hospital premises. " Para 38 of the petition states that even if it assumed that the shop can be opened, equal opportunity ought to have been offered to all the interested persons for opening of the shop of chemist and druggist inside the campus of hospital, and respondents Nos. 3 and 4 cannot be permitted to confer benefit upon their own favourite in the manner in which it is sought to be done in the instant case. According to the petitioners, the contract should have been given after inviting tenders and not by private negotiation and the execution of the lease deed in favour of respondent No. 7 is arbitrary and illegal and without jurisdiction apart from being done by the principal of the College who is not at all competent to execute the same. Further, it is alleged that respondent No. 7 has suddenly placed a steel structures inside the campus of the hospital within the parking area marked as cycle Stand without any permission from the competent authority. Para 47 states that the petition is being filed in "representative capacity" inasmuch as the subject matter involved in the present case is concerned with each and every citizen. Further, it is said that it goes without saying that in case tenders had been invited, the government could fetch higher price for getting similar lease deed executed in ones favour and that the petitioners shall suffer irreparable loss in cure respondent No. 7 is not restrained from using or carrying on any commercial activity from the structure raised/erected/ fixed on the basis of the lease deed dated 13-21996 (Annexure 4 ). ( 6 ) TWO counter affidavits have been filed, one by respondent No. 4 and the other by respondent No. 7. The stand taken by both the respondents is almost identical. ( 6 ) TWO counter affidavits have been filed, one by respondent No. 4 and the other by respondent No. 7. The stand taken by both the respondents is almost identical. Their case is that the hospital is a government hospital and is being run under the administrative and financial control of the principal of the medical college and the entire affairs of the hospital are controlled by respondent No. 4 According to the respondents, it was complained from every corner that during the emergency period, particularly in night, the medical shops established outside the campus of the hospital are closed With the result that the emergencies of it hospital were not being performed properly and further the owners of the medical shops situated outside the campus of the hospital are extracting illicit money from the relatives of the patients and are charging exorbitant prices for the medicines and some time three times of the prices fixed therefore and it was on looking at the extreme need of the general public that it was considered necessary to instal a medical booth inside the campus of the hospital which might be run under the control of the medical college so as to enable the patients to purchase medicines all the 24 hours and with, that end in view respondent No. 4 decided to open a medical booth inside the campus of the hospital so as to facilitate the patients and their relatives. In pursuance of that decision, respondent No. 4 issued a public notice on 22-9l995 which, was posted on the notice board whereby respondent No. 4 invited applications from desirous persons for letting out a piece of land for constructing a medical booth inside the campus of the hospital. A copy of that public notice has been filed as Annexure C. A. 1 to the counter affidavit filed by respondent No. 7 and as Annexure 2 to the counter filed by the respondent No. 2. Annexure 2 also bears an endorsement dated 22-9-1995 to the effect that a copy of the notice was affixed on the main gate near the cycle stand. Annexure 2 also bears an endorsement dated 22-9-1995 to the effect that a copy of the notice was affixed on the main gate near the cycle stand. Further, it is alleged that in pursuance of the notice other persons besides respondent No. 7 made applications for allotment of the land on lease inside the medical college and alter scrutiny of the same respondent No. 7 was found to be the most suitable and as such the land was allotted to him and the lease dead was also executed in his favour in accordance with the rules alter a sum of Rs. 22,000. 00 was deposited by him as Nazarana. Further it is stated that the petition is not maintainable, firstly, because the remedy of the petitioners lay before the civil Court and, secondly, because the petitioners have no locus standi to bring the petition. According to these respondents, petitioner No. 1 has nothing to do with the activities within the campus of the hospital and so far as petitioner No. 2 is concerned it is at present not in existence and the entire body was stood dissolved. Respondent No. 7 has alleged in para No. 21 of his counter affidavit that petitioner No. 3, Atul Luthra is the owner of the medical shop which is being run in the name of M/s. M. Lal and Brothers just opposite the gate of the hospital and petitioner No. 4 is the owner of medical shop being run in the naive of uma Chemists just beside the gate of the hospital, and is also the owner of Prakash X-Ray Plant and P. C. O. which are adjacent to the medical store being run in the name of Uma Chemists. According to respondent No. 7, petitioners 3 and 4 have a desire to monopolise the sale and distribution of medicine so that they may extract exorbitant prices from the patients and their relative. According to him it is a common factor that at the gate of the hospital every day quarrel takes place between the relatives of the patients and the shop keeper as they used to charge 3 times prices than the prescribed rate. According to him it is a common factor that at the gate of the hospital every day quarrel takes place between the relatives of the patients and the shop keeper as they used to charge 3 times prices than the prescribed rate. " Further it is stated in para 22 of the counter affidavit of respondent No. 7 that petitioners 3 and 4 who have claimed to have been motivated to bring the petition in the interest of the charm and beauty of the city of Allahabad as well as the hospital have themselves destroyed the charm and beauty of the city of Allahabad by encroaching upon the public road with the result that 40 feet wide road has been reduced to 10 feet in front of the hospital. Further, according to the respondents, circular letter dated 19-10-1995 was issued by S. 2 of the Medical Department of Government of Uttar Pradesh which deals with District Hospitals and not by S. 1 which deals, with the hospital in question and the piece of land allotted to respondent No. 7 is adjacent to cycle stand and is not a part of the park and no structure has been put up on any part of the park. They have also said that the principal of the medical college has full power and competence to execute the sale deed. They have denied that the petition has been brought in representatives capacity and have alleged that it has been brought by them to maintain their monopoly against the public interest. Subsequently, on 11-4-996 another affidavit has been filed by respondent No. 7 to the effect that unsuccessful candidate, Manoj Agrahari, has filed civil suit No. 293 of 1996 (Manoj Agrahari v. Dr. K. N. Singh) which is pending before the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Allahabad. ( 7 ) IN the rejoinder affidavit the petitioners have denied the allegations about charging of the exorbitant prices or of any quarrel having taken place. They have also denied that any public notice inviting applications was ever pasted on the notice board or on the gate of the hospital or that the Principal of the college is whole sole incharge of the hospital. According to them, the procedure adopted in the case is arbitrary, illegal and in contravention of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution. According to them, the procedure adopted in the case is arbitrary, illegal and in contravention of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution. It is averred in para 16 of the rejoinder affidavit that the construction was initially sought to be raised inside the park. They did not deny specifically the allegations made in the counter affidavits that petitioners 3 and 4 are the owners of the medical shops as stated in the counter affidavits. ( 8 ) FROM perusal of the petition, counter affidavits and the rejoinder affidavit, it is demonstrably clear that the petitioners have not been able to make out a case that they were denied or were deprived of their any legal right. Though they have alleged that public notice was not pasted either on the notice board or on the main gate of the hospital or near the site in question and that tenders should have been invited, yet they have not unambiguously pleaded that they were not aware of the public notice inviting applications when the lease was going to be granted of a site inside the campus of the hospital or that had they been aware of the notice inviting applications they would have submitted applications for allotment of the site in their favour. They have also not denied that they are the owners of two shops situate outside the hospital and that they have encroached upon the public road. In fact, on record there is an affidavit dated 2-4-96 sworn by petitioner No. 3, Atul Luthra, annexed with the rejoinder affidavit, where he admitted himself to be the owner of the shop adjoining the main gate of the hospital. Para 1 of the affidavit is reproduced as under :"that the deponent abovenamed has got his shop and is carrying on his business just adjoining main gate of Swaroop Rani Nehru Medical Hospital, Allahabad towards adjoining Cycle Stand of Swaroop Rani Nehru Hospital, Allahabad. "the allegation in the petition that petitioners 3 and 4 are employees of the shops dealing with the sale and supply of medicines situate just opposite the campus of the hospital is a blatant lie. "the allegation in the petition that petitioners 3 and 4 are employees of the shops dealing with the sale and supply of medicines situate just opposite the campus of the hospital is a blatant lie. The fact that they resorted to this falsehood leaves no reason to doubt the veracity of the case of the respondents that the petition has been brought by them not in public interest as professed by them but on account of their motivation to further their personal interest at the cost of public interest. Apparently, public interest lies in having a medical store inside the campus under the control authorities in order that genuine medicines at prescribed rates are available when needed patients even at the dead of night. Their main inside the campus of the hospital. This is t further their private interest. An objection by shop keepers across the road close to the hospital that opening of a medical store in the campus will jeopardise their interest and they will not be able to sustain themselves does not constitute any legally tenable right in favour of the shop keepers. For this we find support from State of Orissa v. Radheyshyam Meher, AIR 1995 SC 855 . As regards the fitness of the petitioner No. 1 Prayag Vyapar Mandal to bring the petition as public interest litigation, the main objective of the vyapar Mandal as alleged in the petition itself is "to watch larger interest of its members vis-a-vis consumers. " Thus, admittedly, if there is a conflict between the interest of the members of Vyapar Mandal and the consumers, the Mandal will as per its objectives act in the interest of its members and against the interest of the consumers. Therefore, petitioner No. 1 is not qualified to bring the petition as public interest litigation. There is no reason, therefore, for not accepting the submission advanced by Sri Nathani that the petition has been brought with mala fide intention to serve the personal interest of petitioners 3 and 4 and not in public interest. Therefore, petitioner No. 1 is not qualified to bring the petition as public interest litigation. There is no reason, therefore, for not accepting the submission advanced by Sri Nathani that the petition has been brought with mala fide intention to serve the personal interest of petitioners 3 and 4 and not in public interest. ( 9 ) SINCE the petitioners have not shown that they were not aware of the public notice before the lease was granted in favour of respondent No. 7 and that had they known about it, they would have applied for the grant of lease in their favour, no fundamental right of theirs under Art, 14 of the Constitution has been violated and they have not sustained injury to any legally protected interest. As reiterated, in the Janata Dal v. H. S. Chowhary, AIR 1993 SC 892 "the requirement of locus standi of a party to a litigation is mandatory; because the legal capacity of the party to any litigation whether in private or public action in relation to any specific remedy sought for has to be primarily ascertained at the threshold. " But as regards the public interest, "the strict rule of locus standi applicable to private litigation is relaxed and a broad rule is evolved which gives the fight of locus standi to any member of the public acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in instituting an action for redressal of public wrong or public injury, but who is not a mere busy body or a meddlesome interloper, since the dominant object is to ensure the observance of the provisions of the Constitution or the law which can be best achieved to advance the cause of community or disadvantaged groups and individuals or public interest by permitting any person, having no personal gain or private motivation or any other oblique consideration but acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in maintaining an action for judicial redress for public injury to put the judicial machinery in motion. " In Mithilesh Garg v. Union of India, AIR 1992 SC 443 a reference was made to Jashbhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar in the following words :"this Court in Jashbhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, (1976) 3 SCR 58 : ( AIR 1976 SC 578 ) posed the following questions for its determination. " In Mithilesh Garg v. Union of India, AIR 1992 SC 443 a reference was made to Jashbhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar in the following words :"this Court in Jashbhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, (1976) 3 SCR 58 : ( AIR 1976 SC 578 ) posed the following questions for its determination. "whether the proprietor of a cinema theatre holding a licence for exhibiting cinematograph films, is entitled to invoke the certiorari jurisdiction ex debito justitiae to get a no-Objection Certificate, granted under Rule 6 of the Bombay Cinema Rules, 1954 (for short, the Rules) by the District Magistrate in favour of a rival in the trade, brought, up and quashed on the ground that it suffers from a defect of jurisdiction, is the principal question that falls to be determined in this appeal by special leave. "9a. Sarkaria, J. speaking for the Court answered the question in the following words :"in the light of the above discussion, it is demonstrably clear that the appellant his not been denied or deprived of a legal right. He has not sustained injury to any legally protected interest, In fact, the impugned order does not operate as a decision against him, much less does it wrongfully affect his title to something. He has not been subjected to a legal wrong. He has suffered no legal grievance. He has no legal peg for a justifiable claim to hang on. While a procrustean approach should be avoided, as a rule the Court should not interfere at the instance of a stranger unless there are exceptional circumstances involving a grave miscarriage of justice having an adverse impact on public interests. Assuming that the appellant is a stranger; and not a busybody, then also, there are no exceptional circumstances in the present case which would justify the issue of a writ of certiorari at his instance. On the contrary, the result of the exercise of these discretionary powers, in his favour, will on balance, be against public policy. Assuming that the appellant is a stranger; and not a busybody, then also, there are no exceptional circumstances in the present case which would justify the issue of a writ of certiorari at his instance. On the contrary, the result of the exercise of these discretionary powers, in his favour, will on balance, be against public policy. It will eliminate healthy competition in this business which is so essential to raise commercial morality; it will tend to perpetuate- the appellants monopoly of cinema business in the town; and above all, it will, in effect, seriously injure the fundamental rights of respondents 1 and 2, which they have under Art. 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution, to carry on trade or business subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by law. The instant case falls well-nigh within the ratio of this Courts decision in Rice and Flour Mills v. N. T. Gowda, ( AIR 1971 SC 246 ), wherein it was held that a rice mill-owner has no locus standi to challenge under Art. 226, the setting up of a new rice-mill by another even if such setting up be in contravention of S. 8 (3) (c) of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958 - because no right vested in such an applicant is infringed. For all the foregoing reasons, we are of opinion that the appellant had no locus standi to invoke this special jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Accordingly, we answer the question posed at the commencement of this judgment in the negative. " ( 10 ) THUS, a person who professes to bring a litigation as public interest litigation should do so to achieve some public purpose and should not be motivated by some personal private interest. Further, such person should act bona fide. If on the other hand, a petition is brought with mala fide intention in the name of public interest to achieve some private purpose, it does not deserve to be entertained as public interest litigation. Where a petitioner bringing such petition resorts to falsehood to hide the private motivation, a clear case of abusing the judicial process is made out. Such a petitioner is not to be left lightly. Where a petitioner bringing such petition resorts to falsehood to hide the private motivation, a clear case of abusing the judicial process is made out. Such a petitioner is not to be left lightly. Since we have found that the petitioners have acted with mala fide intention not to achieve a public purpose but on account of motivation of personal and private interest, we do not consider it proper to examine whether lease has been granted consistent with the relevant provisions of the relevant rules and whether the lease deed has been executed in favour of respondent No. 7 by a person competent to do so compliance with the provisions of Article 299 of the Constitution, particularly when a civil suit is pending in the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division) at Allahabad in respect of the lease in question. Therefore, the petition must fail. ( 11 ) DURING the course of arguments the learned counsel for the petitioners in an attempt to show that the petition cannot be thrown out merely on the ground of arbitrariness in relation to contract entered into between the State and the petitioners, has referred to Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India, AIR 1979 SC 1628 , Smt. Nivedita Singh v. Vice Chairman, Allahabad Development Authority, Allahabad, 1988 ALJ 1082 and Bangalore Medical Trust v. B. S. Muddappa, JT 1991 (3) SC 172 : ( AIR 1991 SC 1902 ). He has also referred to Chint Ram Ram Chand v. State of Punjab, JT 1996 (2) SC 243 in support of the submission that one of the fairest means, which a State can adopt without showing any favour in disposing of the property, is to dispose of it by auction. However, we are not discussing the authorities for the reason that we are not entering into the merits of the case, as we have found that the petition is liable to fail since the petitioners have no locus standi to maintain the petition. ( 12 ) IT is necessary to discourage people from bringing petitions which are motivated by merely personal interests in the name of public interest, for which they have no locus standi. Abuse of the process of the Court in the garb of public interest adds to the Courts already heavy docket. ( 12 ) IT is necessary to discourage people from bringing petitions which are motivated by merely personal interests in the name of public interest, for which they have no locus standi. Abuse of the process of the Court in the garb of public interest adds to the Courts already heavy docket. This at times also results in manifest injustice to a public cause, because of interim orders. The instant petition was filed on 7-3-1996. On 8-3-1996 a Division Bench of this Court passed an interim order directing that : (I) The respondents shall not take any action in pursuance of the lease-deed. (ii) No construction shall be made in pursuance of the lease-deed on the site allotted through the said lease-deed. (iii) If any construction has been made, it shall stay there until further orders of this Court. (iv) No further collection of materials etc. shall be done within the premises of the hospital precincts. (v) The parties shall maintain status quo as it stands today. "this order was to operate till 31-3-1996. However, the same was extended from time to time and has been in operation till today. It is true that the interim order has been in operation for a little more than one month only yet it has been so at the instance of those who have no locus standi to file the petition and who have resorted to falsehood to hide the private interest of same individuals against public interest. Their Lordships of Supreme Court have from time to time emphasised the need to discourage such litigation. In the present case, we are of the view that cause of justice will be amply served if cost of Rs. 10,000. 00 (Rupees ten thousand) is imposed on the petitioners. Half of the said amount should be payable to respondent No. 7 and the remaining half to respondent No. 4. ( 13 ) IT is made clear that whatever observations have been made in this judgment have to be treated as made only for this case and not for any other case or cases, which are pending or may be brought in future by the affected people. ( 14 ) IN the result, the petition is dismissed with costs which we quantify as Rs. 10,000. 00 (Rupees ten thousand only ). Out of this amount a sum of Rs. 5000. ( 14 ) IN the result, the petition is dismissed with costs which we quantify as Rs. 10,000. 00 (Rupees ten thousand only ). Out of this amount a sum of Rs. 5000. 00 (Rupees five thousand only) shall be paid to respondent No. 7, Rajendra Pratap Singh and the remaining half to respondent No. 4 Moti Lal Nehru Medical College, Allahabad. Petition dismissed. .