M. F. SALDANHA, J. ( 1 ) THESE two civil revision petitions are directed against a common order dated 8th october, 1993 in r. a. nos. 85 and 86 of 1992. The petitioner before me was the appellant in both these appeals which were preferred against the two decrees passed by the trial court against the appellant. The dispute relates to a rather involved property transaction and it is alleged that the respondents 2 and 3 sold the property in question under a registered sale deed to the petitioner and respondent 4 in the year 1985 and that the purchasers were put in possession of the property. In the same year, two suits came to be filed one by the respondents 2 and 3 who contended that the sale should be set aside on the ground that it is vitiated by fraud and the second suit was filed by the first respondent to this proceeding who contended that there is a registered agreement to sell the property in his favour as far back as in the year 1983 and that consequently he is entitled to specific performance. The trial court heard the two suits together and decreed both of them. The sale in question was set aside and the court also passed a decree for specific performance in favour of respondent 1. It is against these two decrees which were passed on 11-12-1991 that the two appeals were filed. These two appeals were filed on 9-6-1992. In the meanwhile, the petitioner had applied for certified copies on 30-12-1991 and the certified copies were ready on 25-1-1992. These were collected only on 19-2-1992 and the appeal court therefore computed the limitation for filing the appeal as 30 days plus 26 days which the appellant was entitled to being the copying time. The entire controversy before me is confined to the question as to whether the delay in filing the appeals ought to have been condoned or not. The appellant's contention was that he was unwell, that he was suffering from typhoid and that this was a prolonged ailment which prevented him from contacting his Advocate and attending to the filing of the appeals and in support thereof he has not only given evidence but he has examined his doctor who is P. W. 2. The appellant's contention was that he was unwell, that he was suffering from typhoid and that this was a prolonged ailment which prevented him from contacting his Advocate and attending to the filing of the appeals and in support thereof he has not only given evidence but he has examined his doctor who is P. W. 2. The respondents seriously contested the correctness of the ground that had been pleaded as a result of which the appeal court was required to assess as to whether just and sufficient cause had been shown for the delay and the learned judge after a detailed evaluation of the evidence before him held that the appellant had failed to discharge this legal obligation and therefore dismissed both the appeals. The present civil revision petitions are directed against that order. ( 2 ) I need to record here that as a necessary consequence of the dismissal of the applications for condonation of delay by the appeal court that a consequential order was passed whereunder the appeals themselves stood dismissed. The respondents' learned Advocate has pointed this fact out to the court because he has contended that the present civil revision petitions can only be confined to the question as to whether the delay condonation applications were rightly rejected or not and he submits that irrespective of whether the petitioner succeeds in the civil revision petitions that it can have no bearing on the dismissal of the appeals. His contention is that even if that was a consequential Order, that it has the effect of virtually disposing of the appeals and that therefore, in the absence of a separate proceeding for setting aside the dismissal order and restoration of those appeals, which according to him can only be through a regular second appeal, that the appeals cannot be restored. Learned Advocate submits that this argument is not academic because he sought to contend that there have been several other developments in this litigation and he also submitted that on merits the petitioner has no case and if this being the position, that the question of going into the aspect of the correctness or otherwise of the delay condonation applications is rendered academic. What was sought to be contended was that even if the petitioner succeeds in the civil revision petitions, that the appeals having been dismissed and that order having become final not having been challenged, that nothing would survive in the litigation. As far as this aspect of the matter is concerned, petitioner's learned Advocate submitted that the appeals have not been dismissed on merits neither have they been dismissed by the court on the ground that they are devoid of substance and consequentially, that since the dismissal was automatic as a consequence of the dismissal of the delay condonation applications that if this court were to allow the civil revision petitions, that the order being one and the same, the appeals would also as of necessity have to be revived. To my mind, there is considerable substance in this argument because it is well-settled law that a second appeal could only be directed against a decision on merits and in the present instance where the court has dismissed the appeal only because it has been filed beyond the period of limitation, the setting aside of that order would automatically revive the appeals. I am unable to uphold the technical objection that in the peculiar circumstances of this case, separate appeal proceedings were necessary with regard to the dismissal of the appeals. It is true that some times the law prescribes technical requirements but upholding this argument would be carrying the issue too far and that to my mind, is not the spirit of the law. ( 3 ) PETITIONER's learned Advocate sought to submit that there was nothing more that his client could do beyond giving evidence in support of his plea that he was laid up with typhoid and that this was the ground on which the delay had occurred. He also contends that the utmost that the petitioner could do was to summon his doctor to give evidence in order to substantiate the ground on which he had prayed for condonation of delay. Learned Advocate submits that the learned trial judge has come down heavily on the doctor who was unable to produce any record whatsoever of the so-called treatment of the petitioner on 7-2-1992 and he submits that the petitioner cannot be held responsible for this State of affairs. Learned Advocate submits that the learned trial judge has come down heavily on the doctor who was unable to produce any record whatsoever of the so-called treatment of the petitioner on 7-2-1992 and he submits that the petitioner cannot be held responsible for this State of affairs. Furthermore, he submits that in a situation where the petitioner was down with typhoid and was advised medication and bed rest that he was not in a position to produce any other documentary evidence in support of his illness and that the learned judge having disbelieved his plea only on this ground is manifestly harsh. On the other hand, the respondents' learned Advocate has submitted that this is one of the cases in which the court has very correctly questioned the plea put forward by the petitioner and that on a careful and meticulous examination of the evidence, the learned judge has very correctly come to the conclusion that the entire story of illness was a fabrication. Respondents' learned Advocate submitted that if this be the conduct of the petitioner, that he is totally disqualified from any indulgence from this court. Basically what was contended was that this is not a case in which default or poverty or helplessness was pleaded in which case the court could bestow liberality or sympathetic consideration but that this was an instance where specific justification was pleaded on the ground of serious illness and where it can be concluded that the entire plea was false that virtually no mercy should be bestowed on the petitioner. He submits that the courts normally take a charitable view in applications for condonation of delay but this is one of the cases in which the circumstance have been aggravated and where the appeal court has very rightly refused to exercise any discretion in favour of the appellant. ( 4 ) I have gone through the material placed before the court doubly carefully. It is true that the petitioner has given evidence wherein he has stated that he fell ill in the beginning of February of that year and that he went to the doctor on 7-2-1992. ( 4 ) I have gone through the material placed before the court doubly carefully. It is true that the petitioner has given evidence wherein he has stated that he fell ill in the beginning of February of that year and that he went to the doctor on 7-2-1992. According to him, for the next several months he was down with the illness and was recourparating and that it was only on 5-6-1992 that he was able to go to the court and swear the necessary affidavit after which the appeals were filed on 9-6-1992. The petitioner who is a businessman has not produced any supportive evidence. The ailment pleaded by him was of typhoid and if this were to be true, he would have most certainly had various documents even if he was not hospitalised such as doctor's prescriptions, bills from the chemist and the like, none of which have been produced by him. It is for this reason that the learned trial court has seriously doubted his evidence. As far as the doctor's evidence is concerned, the less said the better. The doctor has sought to cover up the fact that he has absolutely no record of any type of this patient by giving the specious plea that this was not a medico legal case and that he did not maintain any record, as the doctor was a private doctor to whom no medico legal cases are referred but the learned trial judge is perfectly right when he comes to the conclusion that it is impossible to accept this version because even the most ordinary practitioner does maintain some minor record or the other of the patients and their visits. It is true that the hospitals maintain regular records but even private doctors who undoubtedly treat a large number of persons everyday do for their own safety and in order to facilitate the future course of treatment make some noting in the diary or in a book of the dates when the patients come to them and the ailment and the treatment. It is very clear from the totality of the doctor as evidence that he has come forward at the request of the petitioner only in order to substantiate the plea that the petitioner was suffering from typhoid. It is very clear from the totality of the doctor as evidence that he has come forward at the request of the petitioner only in order to substantiate the plea that the petitioner was suffering from typhoid. To my mind therefore, the evidence of the petitioner and the doctor with regard to the so-called illness has rightly been rejected. ( 5 ) NORMALLY, that would have been virtually the end of the matter but a careful scrutiny of the record which also requires some degree of reading between the lines indicates that the appellant was not negligent with regard to taking the requisite steps for purposes of filing the appeal. This is a factor in his favour because the record indicates that an application for certified copies was in fact filed in the month of December itself and this was obviously done either by the appellant or at his instance. The further step of providing the copying sheets was also complied with and the certified copies were also collected on 19-2-1992. These facts indicate that there was no negligence with regard to the preparatory steps for filing the appeal. There is one circumstance of immense significance which the learned appellate judge has completely overlooked namely the fact that the appellant has deposed on oath that on 30-12-1991 itself he had instructed his Advocate about the filing of the appeals and had also deposited the requisite funds with him for this purpose. Having regard to this aspect of the case, I have no hesitation whatsoever in holding that the delay that thereafter took place was not occasioned by the appellant because he had already given necessary instructions to his Advocate to file the appeals and as often happens, the matter was obviously not attended to or overlooked at that level. This being the position, the court has virtually got to go back to the traditional view that a litigant cannot be punished or made to bear the consequences for the default of the persons who are conducting the cases on his behalf. If this be the position, it is equally clear that when the delay was noticed that the usual ploy was suggested to the client to plead illness in the hope that the court would have mechanically accepted this plea and condoned the delay. If this be the position, it is equally clear that when the delay was noticed that the usual ploy was suggested to the client to plead illness in the hope that the court would have mechanically accepted this plea and condoned the delay. Unfortunately, for the appellant, the respondent seriously contested the matter which required the appellant having to substantiate the plea of illness. It is that which virtually started the entire problem which culminated in asking the doctor to come and give evidence and putting the appellant into a virtually impossible situation. To my mind therefore, the respondents' learned Advocate may not be very correct when he submits that the court will have to take an extremely rigorous and severe view of the conduct of the appellant in putting forward a false plea because the record more than fully substantiates my view that this entire ploy did not originate from the appellant. On the facts of this case, it is quite inconceivable to me that the appellant who had purchased the property in question and who was involved in a litigation concerning that very property which litigation he had lost, was either not bothered about the litigation or would be negligent about it. These are aspects and circumstances of the case which this court needs to take serious note of. It is in this background therefore, that irrespective of the plea that was taken up and which had failed, that the delay in this case would have to be condoned. ( 6 ) I need to however record that merely because a distinction has to be made between the conduct of the appellant and the consequences to him, the performance of the doctor and the manner in which the filing of the appeal was handled, that as far as the second aspect of the matter is concerned, that this court should allow the incident to pass. It has become customary to trade in the sympathy of every court by pleading illness at the drop of a hat. It is true that on many occasions the courts take the word of the person who pleads the illness as being true but instances are legion where this sympathy is being capitalised upon and is being grossly misused and exploited. It is true that on many occasions the courts take the word of the person who pleads the illness as being true but instances are legion where this sympathy is being capitalised upon and is being grossly misused and exploited. Responsible statements have virtually begun to lose their value and the plea of illness which is being put forward with impunity particularly in cases relating to condonation of delay, has almost been reduced to the level of a joke. The effect of this on the working of the courts is disastrous and it is therefore very necessary that appropriate action be taken in order to remedy this State of affairs. While I do concede that illnesses do occur and that in many instances the plea put forward is genuine and also that one cannot blame or discredit the whole of the legal profession for such lapses, that it will still be necessary to weed-out and put a stop to the indiscriminate issuance of false medical certificates and in this case where the action has been compounded by the doctor having stepped into witness box to substantiate a rather untenable plea. To my mind, if the instance is allowed to pass, it would send out the wrong signals if the doctor were to get away with what has happened. An example will therefore have to be made particularly since the facts of this case are sufficiently gross and it is therefore directed that the learned appellate judge shall issue a show-cause notice to the doctor concerned to appear before him and show cause as to why the court should not direct a prosecution against him for having given false evidence. In fairness to the doctor, the learned judge shall give him a chance to point out whatever he so desires and only if the learned judge is thereafter satisfied that it is a case which warrants a prosecution, shall be resort to such a course of action. ( 7 ) THE last question that arises is as to whether in the facts and circumstances of this case because of the fact that it has been demonstrated that the appellant did take the initial steps towards the filing of the appeal, whether it is at all necessary to penalise the appellant for what has happened in this regard. ( 7 ) THE last question that arises is as to whether in the facts and circumstances of this case because of the fact that it has been demonstrated that the appellant did take the initial steps towards the filing of the appeal, whether it is at all necessary to penalise the appellant for what has happened in this regard. The court cannot be oblivious of the fact that on the expiry of the period of limitation certain corresponding rights have accrued to the respondents and furthermore, that they have been dragged through a litigation through the appellate court on this ground and thereafter the two present proceedings. The appellant cannot be completely exonerated for what has happened even though in the overwhelming interest of justice, I have held that the delay will have to be condoned. One of the main reasons for this is because the courts have always taken the view that decisions on cases must be decisions on merits and that no litigant should be either debarred or shut out of the proceedings merely on technical considerations. I have carefully taken stock of the equities involved in the case and that is one of the additional reasons why having regard to the overriding considerations of justice, I have held that the delay is liable to be condoned but this does not mean that it will be done unconditionally. It is therefore directed that excluding the period of limitation and the 26 days allowed for copying, that the appellant will be liable to pay costs to the respondents quantified at the rate of Rs. 100/- per day for the entire period exceeding those allowed on the aforesaid computation. The payment of these costs shall be condition precedent for the appellants being allowed to prosecute the further proceedings in the appeal. ( 8 ) LEARNED advocates on both sides have pointed out to me that there have been several other developments in the case which I have not referred to. This decision is confined only to the impugned orders and it is therefore left to the absolute discretion of the learned appellate judge to hear the parties with regard to all the other relevant aspects of the case and to decide the future course of the appeal filed before him. ( 9 ) THE civil revision petitions therefore succeed. This decision is confined only to the impugned orders and it is therefore left to the absolute discretion of the learned appellate judge to hear the parties with regard to all the other relevant aspects of the case and to decide the future course of the appeal filed before him. ( 9 ) THE civil revision petitions therefore succeed. The impugned orders are set aside but this is however made conditional on the petitioner depositing the costs that have been quantified by me in the trial court on or before 13-9-1996. The parties are directed to appear before the trial court on 18-9-1996 for further orders. If there is any default in the payment of the costs, the impugned orders shall stand confirmed. If however the costs are deposited in the trial court by that date, the delay shall be treated as having been condoned. The appeals shall be restored and the learned judge shall thereafter take up the same for consideration. ( 10 ) THE civil revision petitions are accordingly allowed. The interim order shall continue until 18-9-1996. --- *** --- .