Vummidi Ramaiah Chetty Gurusamy Chetty and Sons, by Proprietor v. Ramaiah represented by power agent V. Sudhakar VS V. V. Narasa Reddy
1996-03-28
S.S.SUBRAMANI, SRINIVASAN
body1996
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- SRINIVASAN, J. 1. I.P. No. 69 of 1988 was filed by certain creditors for adjudicating Vummidi Ramaiah Chetty Guruswamy Chetty & Sons as insolvents. The petitioners were substituted later by two other creditors. On 15.3.1995 the petition was dismissed as not pressed in view of the endorsement made by the petitioning creditors. On 15.4.1995, the present first respondent filed applications for rescinding the order made on 15.3.1995, for substituting himself as petitioning creditor and for appointing a receiver to take charge of the properties. The applications have been allowed by the learned single judge by his order dated 18.3.1996. These appeals have been filed against the said order. 2. The first contention of the learned senior counsel for the appellants is that the question of substituting creditors in the place of petitioning creditors under Section 92 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) could be entertained only if the petition is pending. Section 92 of the Act is in the following terms: “Power to Change carriage of petition: “Where the petitioner does not proceed with due diligence on his petition, the Court may substitute as petitioner any other creditor to whom the debtor is indebted in the amount required by this Act in the case of a petitioning creditor”. 3. It is submitted that in this case on 15.3.1995 an order has been passed dismissing the Insolvency Petition and no proceeding is pending thereafter. Hence, the other creditors could not have filed an application for substituting them in the place of petitioning creditors and if at all, they may file only fresh petition for adjudication. We are unable to agree with this contention. The application has been filed only under Section 8 of the Act. Under sub-section (1) of section 8 of the Act, the Court may review, rescind or vary any order made by it under its insolvency jurisdiction. It is that provision, which has been invoked by the first respondent In this case, the order which was passed on 15.3.1995 was made on the endorsement made by the petitioning creditor that the petition was not pressed.
It is that provision, which has been invoked by the first respondent In this case, the order which was passed on 15.3.1995 was made on the endorsement made by the petitioning creditor that the petition was not pressed. The Court did not keep in mind that the Insolvency Petition was on behalf of the general body of creditors and that the interest of the general body would be affected if the petitioning creditor, who had filed the petition was permitted to withdraw the same or allowed the same to be dismissed as not pressed. The Court should have directed advertisement of the proposal of the petitioning creditor to withdraw the petition and informed the other creditors that the petition will not be proceeded with. But, that has not been done. If that had been done, the other creditors would have had an opportunity to get themselves substituted in the place of petitioning creditors and proceed further with the application. In as much as such an opportunity had not been given, it was certainly open to them to come with an application under Section 8 of the Act for rescinding the order passed on 15.3.1995 dismissing the petition for adjudication. We do not find any error in the order passed by the learned single judge. 4. The learned judge has considered in detail the various contentions raised on behalf of the appellants herein and found that there was sufficient justification for rescinding the order dated 15.3.1995. It is contended before us that the persons who now seek to entertain the proceedings are depositors, whose claims were barred by limitation. There are two limbs to the argument. One is that the depositors are entitled to get interest only for five years and thereafter interest was not payable. It is submitted that the creditors who want to conduct the proceedings have to restrict the claim for interest upto the period of five years from the date of deposit. This is not a question which can be decided at this stage. What is the amount due should be decided only at a later stage when claim petitions are considered. 5. The other limb of the argument is on the basis that the claim of depositors is barred by limitation, as the deposits were made long prior to three years from the date of application.
What is the amount due should be decided only at a later stage when claim petitions are considered. 5. The other limb of the argument is on the basis that the claim of depositors is barred by limitation, as the deposits were made long prior to three years from the date of application. Here again the learned single judge has rightly pointed out that the question of limitation can be gone into when the proceedings for adjudication are considered and it is not a matter which can be decided at this stage. We are entirely in agreement with the view taken by the learned single judge. Apart from that, we hasten to point out that in the case of deposits, the period of limitation should start only from the date of demand and not from the date of deposit. 6. The learned senior counsel placed reliance on the judgment of the Rangoon High Court in Maung Gye v. A.L.K.P. Chettyar Firm (AIR 1933 Rangoon, 251). The Court had to consider the language of Section 16 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, which corresponds to Section 92 of the Act. The language in both the sections is identical. While considering the language of Section 16, the Court held that it contemplated a petition that is alive and not dead and therefore, when a proceeding had been dismissed, and it was not pending, the section could not be invoked by any person who wanted to come on record. We find from the report that the only application made before the Court was to substitute the applicant in the place of original petitioning creditor. The Court had no occasion to consider the applicability of the provision similar to Section 8 of the Act. 7. Our attention is also drawn to Order III, Rule 18 of the Insolvency Rules. In that Rule, before a petition by a creditor is allowed to be withdrawn, the petitioner shall file an affidavit stating the terms under which his debt has been settled and the debtor shall similarly file an affidavit stating the terms under which the debt of the petitioning creditor is settled and also a complete list of his assets and liabilities. Under Rule 19, the Court may direct the Official Assignee to advertise the fact that the petition is liable to be dismissed for non-prosecution.
Under Rule 19, the Court may direct the Official Assignee to advertise the fact that the petition is liable to be dismissed for non-prosecution. As pointed out earlier, in this case, the Court did not keep in mind the fact that the petition for adjudication was on behalf of the general body of creditors and the interest of the said general body should have been considered before the petition was dismissed as not pressed. We have gone through the records and we find that the order passed by the learned single judge is fully justified on the facts and circumstances of the case. We do not find any merit in these appeals and they are dismissed.