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1996 DIGILAW 451 (PAT)

Vidyatma Sah v. State Of Bihar

1996-07-24

N.K.SINHA

body1996
Judgment N. K. Sinha, J. 1. Five accused persons including the two appellants were put on trial before the learned Additional sessions Judge. While Vidyatma sah (A-1) was charged under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as ipc) for the murder of Lal Muni Devi (deceased), a-1 and Hira Lal Sah (A-2) were charged under Sec.323, I. P. C. for assaulting gopal Sah, the husband of the deceased a-2 along with three others (since acquitted)were charged under Section 302,i. P. C. for being members of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of which the deceased was murdered by A-l. By judgment and order dated 24th August, 1987, A-l was not found guilty of the charge under section 302 I. P. C. and instead convicted under Sec.326, I. P. C. and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years. A-2 along with other were acquitted of the charge under Section 302/149, I. P. C. However, both A-l and a-2 were convicted under Sec.323, i. P. C. and each of them sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months. The sentence against A-l were ordered to run concurrently. Hence the appeal by A-l and A-2. 2. The case arose out of an incident that took place on the night of 13.3.1979 in village Gajadhar Tola under manjhagarh P. S. of Gopalganj district. The prosecution case as unfolded in course of trial was that about 8 p. m. the informal Gopal Shah (P. W.3) was sitting on a cot and his wife Lal Muni Devi (deceased) was cooking food on the osara of their house. A-l armed with farsa, his brother A-2 with lathi and a-1s mother Phuljharia Devi, wife phulmatiya Devi and son Krishna Sah came there. The deceased was assaulted and dragged to the Sahan of Khublal Sah (P. W.7) where A-l gave a farsa blow on her head and A-2 assaulted her with lathi. A-l armed with farsa, his brother A-2 with lathi and a-1s mother Phuljharia Devi, wife phulmatiya Devi and son Krishna Sah came there. The deceased was assaulted and dragged to the Sahan of Khublal Sah (P. W.7) where A-l gave a farsa blow on her head and A-2 assaulted her with lathi. The informant was also assaulted by A-l by the lathi- portion of farsa and by A-2 by means of lathi both the injured, that is, the deceased and P. W.3 were brought to Gopalganj Hospital on a Thela by Nandji Prasad (P. W.4) where the fardbeyan (Ext.2) of P. W.3 was recorded at 11.25 P. M. and on the basis of which a formal first information report (Ext.3) was drawn up and a case under Sections 147, 148, 149, 324, 307 and 448, I. P. C. was registered which was subsequently converted into one under section 302, I. P. C. on the death of the injured Lal Muni Devi in the hospital on that very night. The motive for the occurrence is alleged to be a quarrel that took place between the minor sons of the informant and A-l a day prior to the occurrence and in respect of which the son of A-l had complalned to his father that Lal Muni Devi (deceased)had assaulted him. After completion of investigation in course of which the doctor held the post-mortem examination on the body of the deceased and also examined the injured (P. W.3), the police charge-sheeted five accused per sons under Sections 147, 148, 149, 448, 323 and 302, I. P. C, including the two appellants. As many as 11 witnesses were examined for the prosecution in cluding three eye-witnesses, namely, gyanti Devi (P. W.1), Suraj Sah (P. W.2)and the informant Gopal Sah (P. W.3 ). The medical officer and the Investigating officer were not examined. The injury reports (Exts.4 and 4/1) and the post Mortem Report (Ext.5) and the inquest Report (Ext.8) were produced and marked Exhibits. The defence case was a denial of the occurrence as alleged by the prosecution. It was suggested to the informant that he had himself assaulted his wife suspecting an illicit relationship between her and is brother (P. W.2 ). The learned Additional Sessions Judge did not accept the defence plea and con victed and sentenced the appellants in the manner indicated above and acquitted the other three accused. 3. Mr. It was suggested to the informant that he had himself assaulted his wife suspecting an illicit relationship between her and is brother (P. W.2 ). The learned Additional Sessions Judge did not accept the defence plea and con victed and sentenced the appellants in the manner indicated above and acquitted the other three accused. 3. Mr. Y. V. Giri, senior counsel appearing for the appellants argued that p. Ws 1, 2 and 3 could not be eye witnesses to the alleged occurrence and in view of the large number of infirmities and inconsistencies in the prosecution evidence including the non-examination of the independent witnesses, the learned Additional Sessions Judge was clearly in error in convicting the appellants. Another contention put forward on his behalf is that the appellants have, been seriously prejudiced by the non-examination of the Investigating Officer and by the Trial Court using the contents of the case diary (Ext.7) which had been illegally admitted in evidence while appreciating the evidence of the eye witnesses. He also referred to a number of circumstances which supported the defence case that the informant who had come home after 2 to 3 months from Patna where he was working, had himself assaulted his wife (deceased) suspecting illicit relationship between his young and unmarried brother (P. W.2) and his wife and to have falsely implicated the appellants in this case. Mr. P. K. Sahi, learned counsel appearing for the informant argued that it was a clear case of murder under Section 302, I. P. C. and the Trial Court was in error in not relying upon the Post mortem Report (Ext.5) as its contents were admissible in evidence under section 294 of the Code. He described the prosecution case as having the ring of truth and defence case not worthy of even serious discussion on account of different suggestion regarding the defence case given to the prosecution witnesses. Mrs. Indu Bala Jha, learned counsel appearing for the State, however, supported the conviction of the appellants as based on legal and satisfactory evidence on the record. 4. I have perused the evidence on the record in the light of the submissions made both on behalf of the appellants and the prosecution. All the three eye witnesses, namely, P. Ws 1, 2 and 3 have substantially supported the prosecution case. 4. I have perused the evidence on the record in the light of the submissions made both on behalf of the appellants and the prosecution. All the three eye witnesses, namely, P. Ws 1, 2 and 3 have substantially supported the prosecution case. Their testimony is more or less consistent with one another except for certain minor discrepancies and inconsistencies which do not have any bearing or their credibility. It is true that all the three eye witnesses are closely related. P. Ws 2 and 3 are full brothers and P. W.1 is the wife Of one of the brothers. P. W.1 also happened to be the sister of the diseased as their husbands were full brothers. The testimony of P. W.1 has been attacked on the ground that her house was far from the p. O. house being intervened by 3-4 houses. There is nothing surprising if p. W.1 being the brothers wife of the informant and own sister of the informants wife, was at the place of the informant at 8 p. m. when the alleged occurrence took place. It is her own clalm that she was at the P. O.2 hour from before the alleged incident and her daughter was cooking food in the house. P. W.1 is aged about 45 years and there is nothing surprising if the cooking at her house was being done by her daughter and she had the time to visit her sister living in a nearby house. She gave her evidence that both A-l and A-2 came on the Osara and took the deceased to the door of P. W.7 where A-l assaulted her by means of farsa. If P. W.1 is to be believed, the deceased fell down and become unconscious. According to her, it was only thereafter that A-l, by the lathi portion of the farsa and A-2, by lathi, assaulted P. W.3. In course of cross-examination, P. W.1 disclosed that the night of the occurrence was a moon-lit night and the house of Khublal Sah was west the P. O. house and that she had gone to the door of Khublal Sah (P. W.7 ). The manner in which P. W.1 gave further details about the assault in her cross-examination further strengthened her credibility. The manner in which P. W.1 gave further details about the assault in her cross-examination further strengthened her credibility. She stated that the deceased was dragged to the door of p. W.7 where she fell down and she had been assaulted by farsa and lathi while she was lying on the ground. P. W.2 was on the door of P. W.7 along with Chhedi sah (P. W.6) when he witnessed the occurrence. According to his testimony, the deceased fell down after receiving the farsa blow given by A-l and A-2 assaulted her by lathi after she had fallen down. His evidence is consistent with that of P. W.1 that thereafter P. W.3 was assaulted by A-l and A-2 by the lathi portion of farsa and lathi respectively. He also clalms to have witness the occurrence in the moon-lit night as also in the light of the lamp. 5. The evidence of. P. W.3 is also consistent with that of P. Ws 1 and 2 that after his wife was assaulted by A-l by means of farsa and by A-2 by means of lathi, both A-l and A-2 had assaulted him by the lathi portion of the farsa and lathi respectively. Since P. W.3 clalms to have been assaulted at the Osara, it was argued that he could not have witness the assault on his wife on the darwaza of p. W.7 as it was not visible from there. In this connection, the testimony of P. W.7 who was tendered for cross examination, is relied upon. P. W.7 stated in his cross-examination that the Osara of p. W.7 was not visible from his Sahan. This aspect of the criticism of the evidence of P. W.3 has been considered by the Trial Court and in my opinion, rejected for good reasons. The typographical features of the P. O. as disclosed in the evidence of the witnesses, do not indicate that the Sahan of P. W.7 was not visible from the Osara of P. W.3. P. W.3 had stated that the house of P. W.7 was towards west and in between is the sahan of P. W.7 in some 8-9 Haths. No suggestion was given to the witness in cross-examination that the Sahan was not visible from, his house. P. W.3 had stated that the house of P. W.7 was towards west and in between is the sahan of P. W.7 in some 8-9 Haths. No suggestion was given to the witness in cross-examination that the Sahan was not visible from, his house. Thus the testimony of P. W.3 could not be discredited on the statement made by P. W.7 who had simply been tendered by the prosecution for cross-examination by the defence. 6. The three eye witnesses, namely, p. Ws.1, 2 and 3 are closely related, is no ground for rejecting their testimony. What is required is that their evidence should be strictly scrutinised before being relied upon. As already observed by the Trial Court, there was no enmity between the parties from before except the quarrel that took place in between their children a day before the alleged occurrence which is said to be the motive for the incident. The Trial Court had referred to the arguments advanced on behalf of the defence that the three eye-witnesses, in their statements before the police, did not make any statement that the deceased was dragged to the sahan of Khublal Sah and was assaulted with lathi and farsa and that their statements were that the deceased had been assaulted at her Osara alone. The above contention was denied by the learned additional Public Prosecutor who referred to paragraph Nos.6, 9 and 10 of the case diary which had been formally proved and marked Ext.7. learned addl. P. P. had also referred to paragraph-7 of the case diary which described the place of the occurrence where blood had also been found. The trial Court had therefore rejected the defence contention on that score. The trial Court had clearly fallen in error indoing so. The contents of the case diary could not be looked into for being used as evidence. 7. A number of documents, such as, pages 1 to 61 of the case diary (Ext.7), inquest Report (Ext.8), Seizure list (Ext.9), Sketch map of. P. O. (Ext.10)and the forwarding report to Forensic science laboratory (Ext.11), were admitted in evidence under Sec.294 of the Code. The order was passed on 24.06.1987 on an application filed by the a. P. P. and only after the learned defence counsel raised no objection. P. O. (Ext.10)and the forwarding report to Forensic science laboratory (Ext.11), were admitted in evidence under Sec.294 of the Code. The order was passed on 24.06.1987 on an application filed by the a. P. P. and only after the learned defence counsel raised no objection. From the evidence of Ambika Ram (P. W.11), it appears that he had gone to execute warrant against the retired A. S. I. of police Shri Vidya Sagar Rai but he was suffering from arthritis. His execution report has been brought on record as ext.6. Even assuming that Vidya Sagar rai happens to be the Investigating officer and was unable to depose in the case, that could be no good ground to mark any portion of the case diary as an exhibit. The case diary was not admissible in evidence even under Sec.294 of the Code even if the defence made no objection. learned Counsel for the appellant referred to a decision of the Allahabad High court in Mahavir V/s. State of U. P. (1990-Cri. L. J.1605) where it was held that the Court cannot rely on the contents of the case diary unless its extracts are proved after confronting the same to the witness concerned under section 162, Cr. P. C. and that "the conduct of the trial court in relying on the case diary, cannot be justified even if counsel for the accused-appellant had no objection or had given his consent for perusing the case diary. " In other words, since the use of the contents of the case diary was not permissible inlaw, save and except, for certain limited purposes as provided in law, the consent of the parties would not clothe the Trial court with the jurisdiction to use its contents. Since the Investigating Officer had not been examined, the contents of the case diary could not have been used by the learned Addl. P. P. for rebutting the defence contention. It was the consistent evidence of P. Ws.1,2 and 3 that the deceased was assaulted by farsa in the Sahan of P. W.3. That place was very close to the Osara of the informant. P. W.4, an independent witness, who has no concern whatsoever, with the family of the informant, categorically stated that he had seen the deceased lying unconscious in the Sahan of Khublal Sah (P. W.7)with her head bleeding. That place was very close to the Osara of the informant. P. W.4, an independent witness, who has no concern whatsoever, with the family of the informant, categorically stated that he had seen the deceased lying unconscious in the Sahan of Khublal Sah (P. W.7)with her head bleeding. P. W.4 further stated that the darwaza of P. W.3 was also at the same place and he had seen p. W.3 at his darwaza with injury. It was p. W.4 who carried both P. W.3 and his injured wife to Gopalganj Hospital. Thus, there was no legal evidence on the record to suggest that P. Ws 1, 2 and 3 admitted in their statement before the investigating Officer that the assault on the deceased took place at the Osara and not the Sahan of P. W.7. Even assuming that there was any such contradiction in the statement of the eye witnesses, before the police, the Osara and the Sahan appeared to be so closed to each other that not much could be read therein. In view of the consistent testimony of P. Ws.1, 2 and 3 that the deceased was assaulted in the sahan of p. W.7 where she fell down unconscious, any contradiction in their statement before the police, even if formally proved, could not have impeached their credibility. 8. It was argued on behalf of the appellants that a large number of witnesses of the locality were present at the time of the alleged occurrence as disclosed by P. W.1. An independent witness Cheedi sah (P. W.6) who, according to P. W.2, was present along with him at the time of the alleged occurrence, did not support the prosecution case and was declared hostile. P. W.1 did say that at the time of the assault, people of the houses in the neighbourhood were on their darwaza. She did not specifically name any one of them anywhere. She, however, categorically stated that khublal Sah (P. W.7) on whose darwaza, alleged occurrence took place, was not present near the darwaza. There is a general reluctance these days for independent witnesses to come forward to support a criminal case on account of fear of retaliation or just because of general apathy. She, however, categorically stated that khublal Sah (P. W.7) on whose darwaza, alleged occurrence took place, was not present near the darwaza. There is a general reluctance these days for independent witnesses to come forward to support a criminal case on account of fear of retaliation or just because of general apathy. However, each case has to be decided on the facts of its own and mere non-examination of any independent witness, is no ground in itself to discard the other evidence on record. P. Ws.1, 2 and 3 cannot be described as interested witnesses only because they were related with the deceased. Their presence at or near the P. O. appeared to be quite natural for the reasons already mentioned earlier. 9. The question is whether the Injury report (Ext.4) of the informant (P. W.3) and the Post Mortem Report (Ext.5) can be looked into for corroboration of the testimony of the eye witnesses. The Injury Report and the post Mortem Report were issued by Dr. K. N. Saran who was not produced as a prosecution witness and Ext.4 was proved by a formal witness Md. Suleman (P. W.9), an employee of a Post office and Ext.5 by Baban Prasad (P. W.10) an advocates clerk. The trial court referred to certain decisions of this court relied upon by the learned defence counsel and held that "the Post Mortem report (Ext.5) was not a legally proved document and cannot be looked into. " the Trial Court observed that "ext.5 is of no avail to the prosecution to prove the cause of death of the deceased lal muni in the instant case. " Mr. Shahi, learned counsel appearing for the informant, however, contended that the post Mortem Report was admissible in evidence under Sec.294, Cr. P. C. and its contents should have been relied upon by the trial court as substantive evidence. It was contended on behalf of the appellants that Ext.5 was not admitted in evidence and marked as an exhibit after complying with the provisions of Sec.294, Cr. P. C. and this was clearly evident from the order sheet dated 24.6.1987 of the Trial Court already referred to in detail earlier. It is all the more significant that while the prosecution filed an application for getting certain documents admitted in evidence and marked as exhibits under section 294, Cr. P. C. and this was clearly evident from the order sheet dated 24.6.1987 of the Trial Court already referred to in detail earlier. It is all the more significant that while the prosecution filed an application for getting certain documents admitted in evidence and marked as exhibits under section 294, Cr. P. C. , it made no such application for marking the Injury reports Exts.4 and 4/1 and the Post mortem Report (Ext.5) Shri Shahi, argued that the Post Mortem Report (Ext.5)was produced and proved by a prosecution witness (P. W.10) entering the witness box and the defence not having put any question in cross-examination challenging the genuineness of the document, must be presumed to have admitted its genuineness. Thus, there was a substantial compliance of the provisions of Sec.294, Cr. P. C. and Ext.5 was a legally admissible document and the Trial Court was clearly in error in taking the opposite view. 10. In view of the controversy raised as to the correct interpretation of the provisions of Sec.294, Cr. P. C. , the Section which reads as follows needs a closer look:- "294. No formal proof of certain documents- (1) Where any document is filed before any court by the prosecution or the accused, the particulars of every such document shall be included in a list and the prosecution or the accused, as the case may be, or the pleader for the prosecution or the accused, if any, shall be called upon to admit or deny the genuineness of each such document. (2) The list of documents shall be in such form as may be prescribed by the state Government. (3) Where the genuineness of any document is not disputed such document may be read in evidence in any Inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code without proof of the signature of the person to whom it purports to be signed : provided that the court may, in its direction, require such signature to be proved. " Before considering the rival contention whether or not the post-mortem report (Ext.5) was legally admissible under Sec.294, Cr. P. C, it is necessary to dispose of another argument advanced by Mr. Giri that even if Ext.5 was admitted in evidence under the aforesaid provisions of the Code its contents cannot be looked into as substantive evidence. In support of his contention mr. P. C, it is necessary to dispose of another argument advanced by Mr. Giri that even if Ext.5 was admitted in evidence under the aforesaid provisions of the Code its contents cannot be looked into as substantive evidence. In support of his contention mr. Giri relied on a decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in ramdeo Yadav V/s. State of Bihar (1987-BBCJ 775 : 1988 BLJ 164 ) in which it was observed in course of the judgment as follows: "6. . . . . . . . . . . . Sec.294 of the Code of criminal Procedure has been provided in the Code for obtaining the difficulty of formal proof of certain document and not for providing a substitute for direct evidence of witnesses like the doctor. This section simply says that where the genuineness of a document is not disputed, it may be read in evidence in any inquiry or trial. It is significant that Sec.294, Cr. P. C. , does not refer to a document which even if exhibited, cannot be read as a piece of evidence. The injury report by itself does not prove anything, as it is not a substantive piece of evidence. It is the evidence of the doctor on oath in regard to the injuries which alone is substantive evidence. The injury report can only be used to corroborate or contradict the doctor and it cannot be a substitute for the evidence of the doctor. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " Mr. Giri pointed out that the aforesaid decision was a binding precedent and if this Court was inclined to take a different view, it may consider referring the matter in a Division bench. Mr. Shahi submitted that the decision in Ramdeo Yadav V/s. State (supra) does not hold good and in a number of decisions of this Court as also of other High Courts, law has been lald down that the contents of the Post mortem Report admitted under Section 294 of the Code could be used as substantive evidence. He referred to a Full bench decision of the Allahabad High court in Sadque V/s. State of U. P. , (1981 cri. He referred to a Full bench decision of the Allahabad High court in Sadque V/s. State of U. P. , (1981 cri. L. J.379) which held that "under sub-section (3) of section 294 of the code, an injury report filed by the prosecution under sub-section (1) of the section 294 may be read as substantive evidence in place of the deposition of the doctor who prepared it, if its genuineness is not disputed by the accused. " The Full Bench had overruled a division Bench decision of the Court in jagdeo Singh V/s. State (1979 Cri. L. J.236)which had held that "it was not permissible to exhibit the Post Mortem Report under Sec.294, Cr. P. C. Even if it was done, the report could not be used as substantive piece of evidence until and unless the doctor concerned was examined in Court. " The true interpretation of Sec.294 of the Code was the subject-matter of a reference before a full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Sheikh Farid Hussainsab V/s. State of maharashtra (1983 Cri. L. J.487 ). The full Bench held that "sub-section (3) of section 294 of the Code covers Post mortem notes and every other document of which genuineness is not disputed" and that "such document can be read in evidence as genuine without the formal proof. " In taking such a view, the full Bench over-ruled the decision of the Court in Ganpat Raojis case (1980 cri-L. J.853), taking a contrary view. A similar view was taken by a Division bench of the Andhra Pradesh High court in Kudumula Pratap Ready V/s. State of A. P. (1985 Cri. L. J.1446 ). It was held therein that "post Mortem Report is admitted as evidence as no exception is taken for reception of the same. " It was further observed that "section 294 of the Cr. P. C. empowers the Court to admit the documents as evidence in the situation embodied in section 294, namely, when no objection is taken as to the admission of the document by other side and when it is not possible to examine the person connected with the document. " 11 Mr. P. C. empowers the Court to admit the documents as evidence in the situation embodied in section 294, namely, when no objection is taken as to the admission of the document by other side and when it is not possible to examine the person connected with the document. " 11 Mr. Shahi also referred to a division Bench decision of this Court in sohrai Manjhi V/s. State of Bihar, 1992 (2)BLJ-158, in which it was held that a Post mortem Report can be read in evidence under Sec.294 of the Code unless objected to about its correctness. He argued that the Division Bench decision of this court ought to be followed and that there was no necessity as argued by mr. Giri for referring the matter of a division Bench. In my opinion, there is a catena of decisions including the Full bench decisions of the Allahabad High court and Bombay Highcourt which have given reasons in detail while interpreting considering the ambit and scope of the provisions of Sec.294 of the code. It has to be held as has been done in the decisions that once a Post Mortem report is admitted under Section 294 after complying with the provisions contained therein, its contents would be read as evidence in the case. To take the opposite view, would defeat the object behind introduction of a new provision such as Sec.294 of the Code of criminal Procedure, 1973. 12. Mr. Shahi was very fair to State that the Full Bench decisions of the allahabad High Court and Bombay High court the Division Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court already cited are in respect of the cases in which the Post Mortem Report had been admitted in evidence under Sec.294 of the Code. Mr. Giri argued that those decisions have no relevance in the present case for the Post Mortem report was not admitted by the Trial court under Sec.294 of the Code and no such prayer was even made by the prosecution party. Moreover, when the Trial Court had riot considered the post Mortem Report as legally admissible, this Court, in its appellate jurisdiction, ought not to take a different view of the matter. It contended that the post Mortem Report was also not admissible under Sec.294 of the Code as the provisions contained therein, had not been complied with. Moreover, when the Trial Court had riot considered the post Mortem Report as legally admissible, this Court, in its appellate jurisdiction, ought not to take a different view of the matter. It contended that the post Mortem Report was also not admissible under Sec.294 of the Code as the provisions contained therein, had not been complied with. The contention put forward on behalf of the informant is that there was substantial compliance of the provisions and the Trial Court was, therefore, in error in not admitting the Post Mortem Report under Section 294 of the Code which was an illegality and nothing prevented the Appellate court from correction the mistake and admitting the document under Section 294 and reading its contents as evidence in the case. 13. There is no two opinion that section 294, Cr. P. C, provides the manner in which a document can be admitted in evidence. There is no dispute between the parties that in the instant case, the prosecution made no effort to get the Post Mortem Report admitted in evidence under the aforesaid provisions of the Code. As already mentioned earlier, the Additional Public Prosecutor, who filed an application for getting certain other documents exhibited under section 294 of the Code, filed no such application in respect of the Post Mortem report. It was, therefore, argued on behalf of the appellants that the prosecution cannot be allowed to turn its back at the stage of appeal and seek admission of the documents under section 294 of the Code. Mr. Shahi while conceding that the provisions of section 294 of the Code had not been literally complied with argued,that there was substantial compliance of the same because the Post Mortem Report was produced by the prosecution and marked exhibit in the evidence of a formal witness and the defence did not put any question in the cross-examination challenging its genuineness. 14. Mr. Shahi referred to the division Bench decisions of this Court in Sohrai Manjhi (supra) where the doctor performing the autopsy, was not produced and the Post Mortem Report was brought on the record and proved by P. W.7 an advocates clerk in the office of the Public Prosecutor and the contents of the Post Mortem Report were relied upon. Mr. Shahi referred to the division Bench decisions of this Court in Sohrai Manjhi (supra) where the doctor performing the autopsy, was not produced and the Post Mortem Report was brought on the record and proved by P. W.7 an advocates clerk in the office of the Public Prosecutor and the contents of the Post Mortem Report were relied upon. Para-15 of the judgment in the aforesaid case clearly mentions that "the post Mortem Report has been brought on the record and it had been accepted in evidence. " It thus follows that in the said case the Trial court had accepted the Post Mortem report in evidence unlike the instant case in which the trial court did not treat Post Mortem Report as evidence in the case. In other words, Sohrai manjis case (supra) cannot be relied upon as an authority for the proposition that even if the Post Mortem Report has not been read in evidence by the Trial court under Sec.294, Cr. P. C. , it can still be treated as evidence of the contents mentioned therein only because it was produced and marked as an exhibit in the evidence of a formal witness for the prosecution. It is for consideration in the instant case whether the defence admitted ihe genuineness of the Post mortem Report while cross-examining the formal witnesses within the meaning of sub-section (3) of Sec.294, Cr. P. C. The only question put to P. W.10, who proved Ext.5 in the cross-examination, had nothing to do with the genuineness or otherwise of the Post mortem Report. This is suggested by the answer given by the witness in the cross- examination that he did not make pairwy in the case on behalf of any party. It may be argued that the defence did not put any question disputing the genuineness of the document. The argument though attractive, has no substance and has got to be rejected. 15. The prosecution had only produced the Post Mortem Report through a formal witness and got it exhibited. It did not file the report by including it in a list calling upon the defence to either admit or deny its genuineness as required under sub- section (1) of Sec.294. Sub-section (3)must be read along with sub-section (1)for giving harmonious construction to the provisions of Sec.294 as a whole. It did not file the report by including it in a list calling upon the defence to either admit or deny its genuineness as required under sub- section (1) of Sec.294. Sub-section (3)must be read along with sub-section (1)for giving harmonious construction to the provisions of Sec.294 as a whole. The words of sub-section (3) "where the genuineness of any document is not disputed" must necessarily referred to the document produced by the prosecution or the accused, as the case may be, the particulars of which were included in a list and the other side or their pleader called upon to admit or deny its genuineness. The provisions of sub- section (3) cannot be read in isolation. If it was so fead and treated as self-contained and independent of the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2), the whole scheme of section 294 would collapse. In any view of the matter, since the defence did not put any question to p. W.10 in the cross-examination suggesting that it was hot disputing the genuineness of the Post Mortem report, even the provision of section (3) cannot be invoked by Mr. Shahi to substantiate his contention that on the evidence on the record, the defence had not disputed the genuineness of the Post mortem Report. In the circumstances, there is no basis for advancing any argument that there was a substantial compliance with the provisions of Section 294 of the Code and Ext.5 was admissible in evidence to prove the nature of injury caused to the deceased. Mr. Giri referred to the case of PC. Poulose V/s. State of Kerala (1996 Cr. L. J.203) of the kerala High Court in which under similar circumstances, the High Court had ruled that the Post Mortem Report was not admissible. In that case also, p. W.10 as in the present case, produced post Mortem Certificate of the deceased which he had obtained from the doctor and it was marked as Ext.7. The learned single Judge observed that "there is nothing in the evidence to show that before the marking of the document, the accused was called upon to admit or deny the genuineness of the document," and "as the prosecution did not strictly comply with the provisions of Section 294, Cr. The learned single Judge observed that "there is nothing in the evidence to show that before the marking of the document, the accused was called upon to admit or deny the genuineness of the document," and "as the prosecution did not strictly comply with the provisions of Section 294, Cr. P. C. , I am of the view that Ext.7 ought not to have been marked and proved as a document evidencing the cause of death of the deceased. " For the reasons mentioned above, there is no merit in the contention put forward by mr. Shahi that the Post Mortem Report (Ext.5) was admissible under Section 294 of the Code and its contents should be relied upon as evidence. The Trial court, in my opinion, was thus right in not looking to its contents to find out the nature of the injuries sustained by the deceased. For identical reasons, the injury report (Ext.4) in respect of the informant was also not legally admissible and the Trial Court had rightly not referred to its contents while appreciating the evidence of the witnesses on the record. 16. It was argued that the motive for the occurrence as alleged by the prosecution was wholly inadequate. P. W.1 gave a graphic account of an incident that took place a day prior to the occurrence. That day, P. W.1 had accompanied the deceased to the jungle along with mohan, the younger son of the deceased nandu and Munna, the two sons of A-l had also gone to the jungle. And both of them had assaulted Mohan and the deceased had intervened to separate them. Nandu and Munna had returned home and complalned to their mother as also father, A. I. That day when the deceased had returned to the village, a-1 and A-2 had come to the darwaza to assault her and the deceased had filed in side her house. It is the definite case of the prosecution that the alleged occurrence took place on account of the aforesaid incident. There, is no reason whatsoever to disbelieve the prosecution evidence with regard to the alleged motive. In a criminal case, where the evidence is found satisfactory to prove it, motive or lack of it has no significance. However, in the instant case the prosecution alleged a motive and also adduced evidence to prove it. There, is no reason whatsoever to disbelieve the prosecution evidence with regard to the alleged motive. In a criminal case, where the evidence is found satisfactory to prove it, motive or lack of it has no significance. However, in the instant case the prosecution alleged a motive and also adduced evidence to prove it. This explalns as to why the target of the attack of the appellant was the deceased and no one else. Since only one farsa blow was given to the deceased, it is possible for the appellant to argue that considering the nature of the mild provocation given by the deceased as per the case of the prosecution, the appellant, could have no intention whatsoever to cause murder of the deceased. In any view of the matter, there is no substance in the argument that the motive alleged by the prosecution was wholly inadequate to prove the occurrence. 17. Mr. Giri argued at length in support of the defence case that the informant had himself assaulted his wife-deceased suspecting illicit relationship between her and his young and unmarried brother (P. W.2) such a defence case was actually suggested to the informant (P. W.3) in the cross-examination which he denied. It was pointed out that the admitted case of the prosecution was that the informant had returned home a short while before the alleged incident after 2-3 months. It was, therefore, extremely probable that on hearing about the illicit relationship, he lost his balance and in a fit of rage he assaulted and killed his wife. It has come in evidence that the deceased was a white complexioned and P. W.2 was unmarried brother of the informant. However, on that basis alone, and inference of illicit relationship between the two, could not be drawn. Moreover, no such suggestion was given to P. W.2 that he was having illicit relationship with his Bhabhi. Instead, the defence suggested to P. W.2 in course of cross-examination that upon the return of the informant to his house, his wife (deceased) poisoned his ears where upon the informant exchanged words with A-l and ran to assault him and in the process, the deceased sustained injury from the weapon carried by her husband. It appears that the defence has suggested one version of the occurrence to P. W.2 and another to P. W.3. It appears that the defence has suggested one version of the occurrence to P. W.2 and another to P. W.3. In such circumstances, the only possible conclusion is that the defence case is an after thought. Moreover, the presence of the injury on P. W.3 testified to by the witnesses was wholly inconsistent with any such defence version of the occurrence. 18. Thus, on a careful consideration of all the facts and circumstances, I see no reason to differ with the findings of the Trial Court that the P. Ws.1,2 and 3 are reliable and had proved the prosecution case in the manner alleged. The non-examination of the I. O. , in the facts and circumstances of the case, had caused no serious prejudice to the defence and the prosecution case, could not have been thrown out on the ground of non-examination of the Investigating officer alone. The testimony of the eye witnesses were also worthy of belief notwithstanding that no medical evidence could be brought on the record to corroborate the testimony. On the evidence adduced, A-l had given one farsa blow on the head of the deceased whereupon she had fallen down and become unconscious. A-l who was charged under Sec.302, i. P. C. was convicted by the trial Court for an offence under Section 326,i. P. C after relying oh a decision of this court in Sheo Govind Bind V/s. State of Bihar (1985 PLJR-1019 ). In the said case, a Division Bench of this Court, while hearing an appeal of the appellant sheo Govind who had been convicted under Sec.302,i. P. C. , had altered his conviction to one under Sec.326 i. P. C. , as the post Mortem Report was not legally admissible. The facts of the case are not similar, to those in the present case. Appellant Sheo Govind bind was found to have inflicted repeated garasa blows on the deceased causing his death at the spot. In the present case, only one blow was given to the deceased and no attempt was made to repeat the blow. There is also no evidence that A-l could not repeat the blow on account of intervention by others. Appellant Sheo Govind bind was found to have inflicted repeated garasa blows on the deceased causing his death at the spot. In the present case, only one blow was given to the deceased and no attempt was made to repeat the blow. There is also no evidence that A-l could not repeat the blow on account of intervention by others. Under such circumstances, specially in the absence of any medical evidence regarding the nature of the injuries caused, it would not be safe to presume that A-l had caused grievous injury by a sharp-cutting weapon so as to make him liable for an offence under section 326, I. P. C. In such circumstances, it would be fair just and proper to find the appellant guilty under Section 324,i. P. C. alone. The conviction of A-l under Sec.326,i. P. C. , is therefore altered to one under Sec.324, I. P. C. , and he is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and fine of rs.5000/- and in default, rigorous imprisonment for one year. His conviction under section 326,i. P. C. and sentence of rigorous imprisonment for ten years passed against him, thus stand, set aside. The conviction of A-l and A-2 for the offence under Sec.323, I. P. C. and sentence of rigorous imprisonment for six months are also upheld. Both the sentences against A-l shall, however, run concurrently. 19. In the result, the criminal appeal has no merit and is dismissed subject to the modifications mentioned above. Both the appellants must surrender within two weeks from today to serve out their sentences failing which immediate steps should be taken for their arrest. Appeal Dismissed.