JUDGMENT S.K. Mookherjee, J. This is an appeal assigned to us for being heard out. In connection with the appeal, an application for interlocutory order has been presented. The appeal is directed against two orders passed by learned single Judge of this Court, one dated 21st May, 1996, and the other dated 30th May, 1996. In substance, by the first order, the learned single Judge laid down the manner in which the investigation, in accordance with law, was to be carried out, by directing, inter alia, that the time for such investigation, on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, would be between 11-00 A.M. and 4-00 P.M. and that the petitioners would be at liberty to take assistance of an Advocate of their own choice, who would be present to over-see the interrogation going on without interfering with the same. The other direction, relevant for the present purpose, was that the petitioners would be supplied with a copy of the seizure list of the documents within a period of 10-days from the date of the order and that they would be entitled to have copies or extracts of the documents seized from their custody; petitioners were also granted leave to have the order modified upon notice. By the order, dated 30th May, 1996, while dealing with the petitioners' application for clarification/modification of the order dated 21st of May, 1996, the learned Judge appears to have clarified by recording that during the period of seven weeks the petitioners should not be arrested without leave of the Court and the respondents were directed to give copies of the statements recorded by the interrogating authorities in course of interrogation on a day to day basis. The learned Judge, while doing so, refused the prayer of the respondents for filing affidavit-in-opposition to the application for clarification, but recorded that the allegations be deemed not to have been admitted. 2. In course of hearing, before us, the learned Counsel for the contesting parties had taken great pains in making very detailed submissions, which can be said to have great relevance, particularly for the disposal of the main writ application, which was pending consideration before the single Bench. 2. In course of hearing, before us, the learned Counsel for the contesting parties had taken great pains in making very detailed submissions, which can be said to have great relevance, particularly for the disposal of the main writ application, which was pending consideration before the single Bench. Indeed, the validity of the proceedings, initiated by the Custom Authorities, had been sought to be assailed, on behalf of the respondents to the appeal, and countered on behalf of the appellants, in addition to the specific contention having been raised with regard to the scope of the present appeal and the propriety of the adjudication of other points. 3. At the very outset, we would like to point out that the scope of appeal before us, is very limited, in the absence of a cross appeal, coupled with the admitted fact that in compliance with the initial order, passed by the learned Trial Judge, dated 21st of May, 1996, interrogation had already commenced. We feel it necessary, at this juncture, to record that we are not unmindful of the contention, raised on behalf of the respondents to the present appeal, very emphatically, that after having conformed to the order, dated 21st of May, 1996, it was not open to the appellants to assail the same through the present appeal and ask the Court to set the same aside. For avoiding any misunderstanding, we do not feel hesitant to record that only on that ground the right of the respondents/appellants to challenge the order, dated 21st of May, 1996, cannot be deemed to have been waived. For an authority on the above proposition, reference may be made to the case of Bhau Ram vs. Baij Nath Singh & Ors., reported in AIR 1961 SC 1327 . On the same principle we feel to be well within our jurisdiction also to consider the propriety of the clarifying/modifying order passed by the learned single .Judge, dated 30th May, 1996. 4. In this connection, on behalf of the respondents, the English case of Lissenden vs. CAV Bosch. Ltd., reported in 1940 LR, page 412 : (1940) 1 AER 425, had been relied upon and referred to, by the petitioners/ respondents to emphasise the application. 4. In this connection, on behalf of the respondents, the English case of Lissenden vs. CAV Bosch. Ltd., reported in 1940 LR, page 412 : (1940) 1 AER 425, had been relied upon and referred to, by the petitioners/ respondents to emphasise the application. In this case of the principle of 'approbate and reprobate', in our view, as has been held by our Apex Court, while considering the said case, in the case of Bhau Ram, the same does not make any distinction. To quote the observation of the Apex Court in paragraph-II "the Lissenden case, 1940 AC 412 has thus, in clear terms, indicated what the limitation of the scots doctrine are. If, therefore, what was laid down in this case is the common law of England according to its highest judicial tribunal, it is only that law, which the Courts in this country may apply on the principles of natural justice and not what was supposed to be the common law in certain earlier decisions". Even assuming the applicability of the English principle, the facts in the instant case rendered the same totally inapplicable as here the appellants did not take advantage, by election, of anything which could not accrue to them de hors the claim of merit but what the appellants had implemented was part of what they would have been entitled to ordinarily. We, therefore, hold that the appeal is maintainable against the two orders. 5. Before proceeding to deal with the submissions made by the rival parties, relevant for deciding the questions before us, we would propose to ascertain the effect of Pool Pandi's case which has been referred to by both the parties either by way of reliance or for the purpose of distinguishing-, as in our view, the same has a bearing on the questions involved in the present case. In the said case of Pool Pandi etc. vs. Superintendent, Central Excise & Ors. etc., reported in AIR 1992 SC 1795 : (1992) 3 SCC 259 , the Supreme Court broadly laid down two principles, one, to the effect that the guarantee under Art. 20 (3) of the Constitution of India may be claimed by a person while making a statement, if, by that time, he has been accused of an offence. etc., reported in AIR 1992 SC 1795 : (1992) 3 SCC 259 , the Supreme Court broadly laid down two principles, one, to the effect that the guarantee under Art. 20 (3) of the Constitution of India may be claimed by a person while making a statement, if, by that time, he has been accused of an offence. On the hypothesis that a person in future be discovered to be guilty of some offence, he cannot claim that exemption or guarantee and avoid making a statement, secondly, a person called for questioning during investigation by authorities under the provisions of the Customs Act or the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) is not an accused. He, therefore cannot claim that in view of possibility, of his being made an accused in future, he is entitled to the presence of his lawyer when he is questioned, The facts in the present case, prima facie, are similar to those before the Supreme Court, though minor distinctions have been sought to be raised, on behalf of the respondents, to avoid the effects of the said decision in Pool Pandi's case. Therefore, on the principle of Pool Pandi's case the contention of the appellant has to be sustained that the order permitting assistance of a lawyer during investigation or imposing certain restridions on the free right of investigation of the statutory authorities is not warranted in law. 6. At this point, it is necessary to deal with the question of applicability of the principle laid down by a five judges' Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Shobharam and Ors., reported in AIR 1965 SC 1910. While dealing with Art. 22(1) of the Constitution of India, Their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down that an accused had a right to be represented or assisted by his lawyer (emphasis is ours). It is noticeable that in the said case the Court's approach was that the arrested person must have been arrested on the accusation of commission of crime and his right to be defended or assisted by a lawyer of his choice did not extend to a proceeding or action for recovery of money against him with regard to which the offence might have been committed. The language used by the court leaves no room for doubt that the principle laid down in the said case does not in any way come in conflict with the principle laid down in Pool Pandi's case. Before parting with this point, it is pertinent to note that the factual allegations, such as, suppression of the fact of acting upon the order or non-denial of alleged threats by the appellant, do not appear to us to be relevant, at this stage, since before the Trial Court which passed the orders or which may ultimately hear the matter having determination for the same, no affidavit-in-opposition could be filed when the orders impugned had been issued. More so, because the Trial Court treated the same as deemed to have not been admitted. 7. We have already indicated that very detailed submissions have been made before us even on points which should appropriately be left to be decided at the final hearing by the Trial Court. Such submissions were sought to be made on the plea of showing existence of a strong prima facie case for issuance of the restricted orders, which are under appeal before us. The submissions included detailed analysis of the provisions of the Customs Act and of factual aspects to justify the non-applicability of the said provisions so as to make out that there was no case for investigation under the Act. In short, the utter hollowness of the contents of the notice under challenge in the writ petition by the respondents was sought to be established by way of a prima facie case. With regard to this point, we are of the view that the present stage is too early to foresee existence or absence of an offence under the Act in question. Only on completion of the investigation, it is to be decided as to whether, if at all, any step or proceeding under the Customs Act to be initiated. In an appeal against interlocutory orders, we feel, it is not open to us to adjudicate threadbare such submissions of the respondents, even for the purpose of maintaining or upsetting the orders under challenge. In an appeal against interlocutory orders, we feel, it is not open to us to adjudicate threadbare such submissions of the respondents, even for the purpose of maintaining or upsetting the orders under challenge. The statutory right of investigation conferred on the authorities should not be allowed to be curtailed, at least, before disposal of the writ petition finally but if circumstances so warrant the use of materials, collected during such process of investigation, .could, by appropriate orders, have been prevented from causing any prejudice to the respondents. We, therefore, refrain from dealing with such submissions of the respondents and in doing so we feel justified by the principles laid down in the case of I.J. Roy, Assistant Collector of Customs & Ors. vs. Bibhuti Bhusan Bagh and Anr., reported in (1989) 3 SCC 202 . In this connection, in the case of Union of India vs. W. N. Chadha, reported in AIR 1993 SC 1082, while approving a decision of the Allahabad High Court, the Apex Court quoted with approval the following : "Thus, it has been recognised by Judges of undoubted eminence that a decision on substantive rights of parties is one thing and a mere decision that another body investigate and decide on those substantive rights is quite another, and the principles of hearing is not applicable to the latter class of cases" and stated even when the person affected was an accused that the investigation officer was not deciding any matter except collecting the materials for ascertaining whether a prima facie case was made out or not, it could not be said that at that stage the rule of audi alteram partem super-imposes an obligation to hear the accused. 8. For the reasons aforesaid, it will be pre-mature for this Court to hold that the petitioner's prayer in the writ for quashing may be ultimately granted and in aid of that relief to grant ad interim order permitting a-conditional investigation, thus depriving the statutory authority or its right to carryon a free investigation. We, therefore, stay the operation of that order and permit the respondents to proceed with investigation in accordance with law. The order passed on 30th May 1996, purporting to clarity the earlier order also would remain stayed in view of the stay of operation of the substantive order granted by us as above. We, therefore, stay the operation of that order and permit the respondents to proceed with investigation in accordance with law. The order passed on 30th May 1996, purporting to clarity the earlier order also would remain stayed in view of the stay of operation of the substantive order granted by us as above. We would, however, direct that the use of materials, collected during such investigation, at subsequent stages, would abide by the results of the appeal pending before us. It is for the interest of justice that the process of investigation be expedited as far as practicable. We keep on record that excepting the points specifically decided by us, all other points have been kept open and even the points decided having been decided at an interlocutory stage will have effect according to law. 9. A prayer is made on behalf of the appellant and respondent that, since the interim order has been disposed of in connection with an appeal, till appeal really spends its forces and may be disposed of by the some order, and, we do accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the impugned orders subsequent to direction as regards user of materials collected during investigation. A prayer for stay of the operation of the order is made, but we decline to allow the same, in view of the reasons given in our order and particularly because we have followed the precedents set up by the Apex Court of the country. We further direct, on the prayers made, that if an urgent certified copy of the present judgment and order is applied for by any of the parties, the Department shall deliver the same within ten days of deposit of the requisite stamps and folios. 10. All parties are to act on a signed copy of the operative part of this judgment on the usual undertaking. 11. H. Bhattacharyya, J.: I agree. Appeal allowed.