Judgment :- ABDUL HADI, J. A short question on the income-tax law is involved in this writ petition by the assessee, which is a Hindu undivided family. Since the matter arises from an order of the Commissioner of Income-tax in revision under section 264 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), it has come by way of a writ petition The prayer in the writ petition is to quash the said order of the Commissioner dated October 14, 1995, and consequently, to direct the said Commissioner (1st respondent) to grant the relief to the petitioner-assessee for the assessment year 1980-81. The said "relief" sought for is depreciation allowance under section 32(1)(ii) of the Act in respect of buses plied by the assessee during the first three months of the previous year in relation to the abovesaid assessment year, that is, from April 1, 1979, to June 30, 1979. The assessee-Hindu undivided family was a bus operator during the said assessment year 1980-81 and was running the buses up to the above said date June 30, 1979. The karta of the Hindu undivided family gave the buses owned by the Hindu undivided family to a firm by name, Barathi Travels, in which he became a partner, representing the said family. From July 1, 1979, the Hindu undivided family ceased to continue as a bus transport operator. The buses were given to the firm towards the capital contribution by the karta. As per section 34(2)(ii) of the Act, inter alia, the abovesaid allowance under section 32(1)(ii) of the Act cannot be granted for any previous year in respect of any plant (which would include buses) "sold, discarded, demolished or destroyed, in that year". However, it must be noted that in such a case what is popularly known as "terminal allowance" will be granted under section 32(1)(iii) of the Act in the assessment year in relation to the previous year, in which the asset in question is sold, discarded, demolished or destroyed. "The contention of the writ petitioner (assessee) is that, when the assessee gave the abovesaid buses to the firm as capital contribution, the said buses cannot be said to have been "sold, discarded, demolished or destroyed" and that, therefore, section 34(2)(ii) will not apply and depreciation allowance under section 32(1)(ii) should have been given to the assessee. "The contention of the writ petitioner (assessee) is that, when the assessee gave the abovesaid buses to the firm as capital contribution, the said buses cannot be said to have been "sold, discarded, demolished or destroyed" and that, therefore, section 34(2)(ii) will not apply and depreciation allowance under section 32(1)(ii) should have been given to the assessee. Further, according to learned counsel for the petitioner, the buses became the property of the firm on and from July 1, 1979, only by operation of law, as per section 14 of the Partnership Act and there is actually no "sale" to the firm by the Hindu undivided family. In this connection he drew my attention to the following passage in Sunil Siddharthbhai v. CIT 1986 AIR(SC) 368, 1985 (156) ITR 509, 1985 (2) Scale 755 , 1985 (4) SCC 519 , 1985 (S3) SCR 102, 1985 (2) SCALE 755 , 1985 (23) Taxman 1400, 1985 CTR(SC) 172, 1986 SCC(Tax) 50, 1985 (49) CTR(C) 172. Our attention has been invited to CIT v. Hind Construction Ltd. In that case, the assessee entered into a partnership and as its share of the capital, it transferred its stock of machinery to the partnership firm. This court held that when the assessee made over its machinery to the partnership firm, there was no sale and the assessee did not derive any income. In CIT v. Janab N. Hyath Batcha Sahib the Madras High Court held that when a partner introduces his property into a partnership firm as his contribution to its capital, the transaction does not involve a sale of the property. The High Court, referred to section 14 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, and observed 'When a partnership is formed for the first time and one of the members of the partnership brings into the firm assets, they become the property of the firm, not by any transfer, but by the very intention of the parties evinced in the agreement between them to treat such property belonging to one or more of the members of the partnership as that of the firm.... ' "We find no difficulty in accepting that proposition The first respondent-Commissioner has negatived the contention of the assessee-petitioner on the footing that the assessee has at any rate "transferred" the said buses to the firm within the meaning of section 2(47) of the Act. ' "We find no difficulty in accepting that proposition The first respondent-Commissioner has negatived the contention of the assessee-petitioner on the footing that the assessee has at any rate "transferred" the said buses to the firm within the meaning of section 2(47) of the Act. This reasoning of the first respondent, obviously is not correct since the term "transferred" is not used in section 34(2)(ii) of the Act and it has used only the words "sold, discarded, demolished, destroyed". It has not even used the expression "or otherwise transferred" or disposed "as for example, found in certain other provisions of the Act. Further, the definition in section 2(47) of the term "transfer" is only in relation to a "capital asset" as defined under section 2(14). In other words, the said term "transfer" is in relation to the computation of "capital gains" coming under Chapter IV-E of the Act In view of the abovesaid features, learned counsel for the respondent also fairly submits that the abovesaid reasoning of the respondent-Commissioner, is not correct. He could also not controvert the above referred to legal position explained in Sunil Siddharthbhai v. CIT based on section 14 of the Partnership Act. However, what he points out is that as per section 32, in order to claim depreciation allowance, the assessee must have been owner of the abovesaid buses, since section 32(1) begins thus: In respect of depreciation of buildings, machinery, plant or furniture owned by the assessee and used for the purposes of the business or profession...."(emphasis supplied) On the other hand, learned counsel for the assessee submits that the assessee was admittedly the owner of the above said buses during the previous year, that is, for the period from April 1, 1979, to June 30, 1979. Therefore, he submits that there is no bar to granting the assessee the depreciation allowance claimed, the assessee having admittedly used the said buses for the said entire three-month period for the purposes of its abovesaid business. Therefore, he submits that there is no bar to granting the assessee the depreciation allowance claimed, the assessee having admittedly used the said buses for the said entire three-month period for the purposes of its abovesaid business. In this connection, he also points out that as per rule 5 of the Income-tax Rules, 1962, as it existed at the relevant point of time, even when the assessee has used the asset in question for the purpose of its business "at any time" during the previous year, that is even for any single day in the previous year, it is entitled to the above depreciation allowance in fullI have considered the rival submissions in this regard. There is no difficulty in accepting the contention of learned counsel for the assessee. Though the term "owned by the assessee" is used in section 32(1) it does not mean that the assessee should have remained the owner of the asset in question for the entire previous year in question. Admittedly, the assessee, in this case was the owner of the abovesaid buses during the previous year, that is, from April 1, 1979, to June 30, 1979, though not for 365 days of a year. In fact, since the business itself was closed on June 30, 1979, the assessee had been fully using the asset for the business during the entire accounting year of the abovesaid three months ending with June 30, 1979. The object of the Legislature in granting depreciation allowance under section 32 of the Act is to give due allowance to the assessee for wear and tear suffered by the asset used by him in his business so that the net income (total income) is duly arrived at. Further, the enactment read with the abovesaid rule 5, as it existed at the relevant point of time, goes to the extent of granting such allowance even where the asset in question is used for the purpose of the business at any time "during the previous year". In other words, at the relevant point of time, even if the asset has been used for a single day, in the business of the assessee, depreciation allowance, in full, was given under section 32(1) of the Act. In other words, at the relevant point of time, even if the asset has been used for a single day, in the business of the assessee, depreciation allowance, in full, was given under section 32(1) of the Act. When such is the case, it cannot be said that the assessee cannot be granted the said depreciation allowance if he is not the owner for the entire period of the previous year or if he is not the owner on the last day of the previous year in question. There is no such stipulation in the Act. In CIT v. S. K. Sahana and Sons also, full depreciation was allowed even though the assessee was the owner during the previous year only for 5 1/2 months. In the said decision Fazl Ali C. J. and Manohar Lall J. made the following significant observation. It is not disputed that the assessee was the owner of the building, machinery, etc., during the accounting year. I do not see any provision in the Act which authorises an apportionment of depreciation on the assessee having sold the machinery or plant during the accounting period ..... I am of opinion that there is no such provision in the Act as would justify the view that if the machinery is not the property of the assessee throughout the year then the period for which it was the property of the assessee should be calculated and depreciation should be allowed in proportion to such period... It was contended by the learned standing counsel that the acceptance of this view is most inequitable as it would enable both the transferor and the transferee to claim full deduction for the depreciation although the machinery, etc., have been used by either of them only for a broken period in the same year. But it has been rightly pointed out that equity and taxation are as poles as under and the court cannot invoke an equitable rule in the construction of a taxing statute. But it has been rightly pointed out that equity and taxation are as poles as under and the court cannot invoke an equitable rule in the construction of a taxing statute. The net result is, that the impugned order is quashed and the respondents are directed not to refuse the depreciation allowance claimed by the assessee either on the ground that the assessee was not the owner of the abovesaid buses for the full previous year in relation to the assessment year in question or on the ground that the abovesaid section 34(2)(ii) would apply to the case of the assessee.