JUDGMENT The Court: When this writ application was moved on 2nd August, 1996, an interim order had been passed restraining the respondents from giving effect to the communication dated 14th June, 1996, from the Additional Registrar, High Court, Appellate Side, informing the petitioner that he was to retire from service with immediate effect as he had attained the age of 58 years long ago and leave had been given to the High Court Administration to make an evaluation of the petitioner's continued potentiality to continue in service. An appeal was taken from the said order and the Hon'ble Appeal Court by its order of 10th October, 1996, set aside the said order and expressed a desire that the writ application itself be heard and disposed of expeditiously. 2. The writ application was, accordingly, taken up for final hearing on being mentioned by the parties. 3. The petitioner claims to have joined the cadre of the West Bengal Civil Service (Judicial) on 9th September, 1969 and served in different capacities, both in the State of West Bengal and in the State of Bihar. 4. Admittedly, the petitioner's date of birth is 10th January, 1938, and he attained the age of 58 years on 10th January, 1996. Even, thereafter, the petitioner was allowed to continue in service and on 8th March, 1996, while he was serving as the District and Sessions Judge, Uttar Dinajpur at Raigunge, his services were placed at the disposal of the State Government for appointment to the post of Arbitrator, Calcutta and 24-Parganas. By a subsequent notification dated 22nd March, 1996, issued by the Judicial Department, Government of West Bengal, the petitioner's services were placed at the disposal of the Land and Land Reforms Department, Government of West Bengal, for appointment to the said post. 5. Pursuant to another notification dated 26th March, 1996, issued by the Land and Land Reforms Department, Government of West Bengal, the petitioner assumed charge of the said post on and from 29th March, 1996. 6. 5. Pursuant to another notification dated 26th March, 1996, issued by the Land and Land Reforms Department, Government of West Bengal, the petitioner assumed charge of the said post on and from 29th March, 1996. 6. While the petitioner was functioning as Arbitrator, Calcutta and 24-Parganas (Land and Land Reforms Department, Government of West Bengal) the petitioner was served with a memo dated 17th June, 1996 issued by the Judicial Department enclosing a letter written by the Additional Registrar of this Court, Appellate Side, on 14th June, 1996, informing the petitioner that it had been decided by this Court that he should retire from service with immediate effect as he had attained the age of 58 years long ago. 7. The said directions contained in the aforesaid letter of 14th June, 1996, is the subject matter of challenge in the present writ application. 8. Appearing in support of the writ petition, Mr. S.K. Mitra, learned advocate, submitted that the aforesaid letter had been issued to him in complete contravention of the directions given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of All India Judges Association vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1993 SC at page 2493. Mr. Mitra urged that the said decision had been pronounced on the review petition in respect of an earlier decision reported in AIR 1992 SC at page 165, in which various directions had been given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in respect of the service condition of the members of the subordinate judiciary. One of the issues which fell for consideration in the said case concerned the age of superannuation of such officer. 9. Mr. Mitra urged that in its earlier decision, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had directed that the age of superannuation of members of the subordinate judiciary should be enhanced from 58 years to 60 years with effect from 1st December, 1992, but not as a matter of course. Certain conditions were laid down for deciding as to which of such officers were to be given such benefit. While deciding the review application, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that such benefit would not accrue automatically, but would be subject to scrutiny and assessment of the officer's past record of service and evidence of his continuing utility to the judicial system. Mr. While deciding the review application, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that such benefit would not accrue automatically, but would be subject to scrutiny and assessment of the officer's past record of service and evidence of his continuing utility to the judicial system. Mr. Mitra pointed out that the High Court had been directed to undertake and complete such exercise relating to evaluation of the officer's potentialities before he attained the age of 58 years by following the procedure for compulsory retirement as laid down in the respective Service Rules applicable to the Judicial officers concerned. 10. Mr. Mitra pointed out that it had also been observed that the officers who were not inclined to continue in service beyond 58 years would be entitled to exercise their option in that regard and if such option was not exercised, it would be deemed that the officers had opted to continue in service till the age of 60 years. 11. Mr. Mitra urged that since the petitioner had not exercised such option, and, inasmuch as, the petitioner had been allowed to continue in service beyond 58 years, there could be no justification for issuance of the impugned memo and the petitioner should be allowed to continue in service till he attained the age of 60 years. 12. Mr. Mitra then submitted that even if the rules relating to compulsory retirement under the West Bengal Service Rules, Part-I, were to be applied in the present case, even then the impugned order of 19th June, 1996, was bad and was liable to be quashed. Mr. Mitra urged that Rule 75 of the said Rules made it clear that a Government employee, other than a member of the Group "D" service, is to retire from service compulsorily with effect from the afternoon of the last date of the month in which he attained the age of 58 years. 13. Mr. Mitra urged that by indicating that the petitioner was to retire with immediate effect, the respondent concerned had acted contrary to the said Rule and the impugned communication was, therefore, liable to be quashed on such ground as well. 14. Mr. 13. Mr. Mitra urged that by indicating that the petitioner was to retire with immediate effect, the respondent concerned had acted contrary to the said Rule and the impugned communication was, therefore, liable to be quashed on such ground as well. 14. Mr. Mitra concluded his submissions by urging that since the High Court had not made any assessment as to the continued utility of the petitioner in service beyond 58 years, he should be given the benefit of the deeming provision indicated in the judgment delivered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the review application and he should be allowed to continue in service till he attained the age of 60 years. 15. Opposing the writ application on behalf of the High Court Administration, Mr. Aloke Ghosh submitted that the petitioner's case had not been taken up for evaluation prior to 10th January, 1996, that is, the date on which he attained the age of 58 years, because of an erroneous entry in the petitioner's service record maintained by the High Court Administration showing his date of birth as 1st October, 1938, instead of 10th January, 1938. 16. Mr. Ghosh urged that since the High Court Administration was under the impression that the petitioner was going to attain the age of 58 years on 1st October, 1996, it had not taken up the question of evaluation of the petitioner's potentiality to continue in service upto 60 years before he actually attained the age of 58 years on 10th January, 1996. 17. Mr. Ghosh urged that in view of the directions given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court to allow an officer to continue beyond the age of 58 years on the basis of an evaluation to be made of his continued potentiality, in the absence of such an evaluation in the petitioner's case, he could not be allowed to continue in service after having attained the age of 58 years. Mr. Ghosh submitted that while deciding the review petition, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had not intended that all officers belonging to the subordinate judiciary would automatically be allowed to continue in service upto the age of 60 years. Such continuance would be subject to and dependent on an evaluation to be made as indicated hereinbefore. 18. Mr. Mr. Ghosh submitted that while deciding the review petition, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had not intended that all officers belonging to the subordinate judiciary would automatically be allowed to continue in service upto the age of 60 years. Such continuance would be subject to and dependent on an evaluation to be made as indicated hereinbefore. 18. Mr. Ghosh urged that the Hon'ble Supreme Court had not contemplated a situation like this where owing to a bona fide error the High Court had failed to make an evaluation for the purpose of continuance of an officer in service beyond 58 years and upto the age of 60 years. Mr. Ghosh urged that it was, however, the intention of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that in all cases an assessment was required to be made before an officer could be allowed to continue in service beyond 58 years. 19. Mr. Ghosh submitted that despite the unfortunate circumstances in which the evaluation of the petitioner's continued utility in service could not be made, the petitioner could not automatically be allowed to continue in service after attaining the age of 58 years. Mr. Ghosh submitted that in the facts of the case and in the absence of an evaluation being made, the impugned decision resulting in the impugned communication of 14th June, 1996, had been correctly taken and no interference was called for therewith. 20. Replying to Mr. Ghosh's submissions, Mr. Mitra pointed out that, although, in the records of the High Court the petitioner's date of birth had been wrongly entered, the petitioner had by his letters dated 23rd December,1994 and 27th March, 1995, being Annexure "C" collectively to the writ petition, informed the Registrar, Appellate Side, that he would be completing 58 years on 10th January, 1996. 21. Mr. Mitra urged that inspite of being informed of the above fact, the petitioner was allowed to continue in service beyond 10th January, 1996, thereby attracting the deeming provisions indicated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its judgment while deciding the review application in the All India Judges' Association case. 22. Mr. 21. Mr. Mitra urged that inspite of being informed of the above fact, the petitioner was allowed to continue in service beyond 10th January, 1996, thereby attracting the deeming provisions indicated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its judgment while deciding the review application in the All India Judges' Association case. 22. Mr. Mitra urged that it was no longer open to the respondents to contend that because of the erroneous entries in the petitioner's services records maintained by the High Court, the assessment contemplated in the aforesaid judgment could not be undertaken and that, as a result, the petitioner could not be allowed to continue in service beyond 58 years. 23. There is no ambiguity in the directions given in the initial judgment delivered in the All India Judges' Association case ( AIR 1992 SC 165 ) that the retirement age of members of the subordinate judiciary be raised to 60 years with effect from 31st December, 1992. There is also no ambiguity that the said direction was subsequently modified in the judgment on the review application ( AIR 1993 SC 2493 ) and it was observed that the benefit of the increase of the retirement age to 60 years would not be available to all judicial officers irrespective of their past record of service and evidence of their continued utility to the judicial system, but that the same would be available to those who, in the opinion of the respective High Courts had a potential for continued useful service. 24. The procedure to be followed in making such assessment has been indicated in the latter judgment and it has, inter alia, been observed that such exercise in case of officers about to attain the age of 58 years should be completed by the High Court well within time. 25. The Hon'ble Supreme Court went on to observe further that there may be judicial officers who did not want to continue in service beyond 58 years. In such cases, the concerned officers should intimate in writing their desire to retire at the age of 58 years well in advance, and, in any case, before they attained the age of 57 years. In such cases, the concerned officers should intimate in writing their desire to retire at the age of 58 years well in advance, and, in any case, before they attained the age of 57 years. As far as those who had already crossed 57 years and those who were going to cross the age of 58 years soon after the date of the judgment, were concerned, they were required to exercise their option within a month from the date of the decision failing which they would be deemed to have opted for continuing in service till the age of 60 years. In that case, they too would be subjected to the review for compulsory retirement, even if there was not enough time to undertake such review before they attained the age of 58 years. In their case, the review was required to be undertaken within two months from the date of expiry of the period given to them for exercising their option and if found unfit, they were to be retired compulsorily according to the procedure for compulsory retirement under the Rules. 26. Some other directions were also given, which are not material to the facts at issue in this case. 27. From the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court it is quite clear that in order to be given the benefit of continuing in service till 60 years, an assessment would have to be made of the officer's continued potential for useful service and that such assessment would have to be undertaken by the concerned High Court well before the said officer reached the age of 58 years. The officer was required to exercise an option if he did not wish to continue in service beyond 58 years. Special provision was made for those officers who had crossed 57 years and were about to reach 58 years at the time of passing of the order. 28. In their case the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows :- "Those who have already crossed the age of 57 years and those who will cross the age of 58 years soon after the date of this decision, will exercise their option within one month from the date of this decision. If they do not do so, they will be deemed to have opted for continuing in service till the age of 60 years. If they do not do so, they will be deemed to have opted for continuing in service till the age of 60 years. In that case, they will also be subjected to the review for compulsory retirement, if any, notwithstanding the fact that there was not enough time to undertake such review before they attained the age of 58 years. However, in their case, the review should be undertaken within two months from the date of the expiry of the period given to them above for exercising their option and if found unfit, they should be retired compulsory according to the procedure for compulsory retirement under the Rules." 29. As is quite evident, while delivering its judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court did not quite envisage a situation like the present one, where for whatever reason, the assessment of the officer's continued potentiality to be useful was not undertaken before he attained the age of 58 years and he was allowed to continue in service even after he crossed the age of 58 years without his having exercised any option not to continue beyond 58 years. 30. A case like this is obviously an exception to the norms laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, but, in my view, the officer concerned should not be made to suffer the consequences of a default, which was not of his own making. In reply to Mr. Ghosh's submissions regarding the petitioner's duty to inform the High Court that his date of birth had been incorrectly recorded in the records maintained by the High Court, Mr. Mitra had pointed out that the petitioner had, in fact, by his letters dated 23rd December, 1994 and 24th March, 1995, being Annexure "C" collectively to the writ petition, informed the High Court that he would be attaining the age of 58 years on 10th January, 1996. In whatever context the said letters may have been written, the same should have alerted the High Court Administration to the fact that the petitioner would attain 58 years of age on 10th January, 1996, and that an evaluation was required to be undertaken as to whether he should be allowed to continue in service till 60 years. 31. In whatever context the said letters may have been written, the same should have alerted the High Court Administration to the fact that the petitioner would attain 58 years of age on 10th January, 1996, and that an evaluation was required to be undertaken as to whether he should be allowed to continue in service till 60 years. 31. Be that as it may, without attempting to apportion the blame for such default, in the circumstances prevailing in the petitioner's case, the proper course of action, in my view, would be to adopt the procedure indicated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of those officers where there was not enough time to undertake an evaluation before they attained the age of 58 years, as set out hereinbefore. 32. The High Court Administration is, therefore, directed to make a dispassionate assessment of the petitioner's potential to continue to render useful service till he attains the age of 60 years, within two months from date. The impugned communication dated 14th June, 1996, being Annexure "B" collectively to the writ petition, is hereby quashed. If upon the assessment being undertaken, the petitioner is found to be eligible to continue till 60 years, then he should be allowed to continue in service accordingly. In the event the petitioner is considered to be ineligible to enjoy the said benefit, fresh orders should be passed in that regard. 33. The writ application succeeds to the aforesaid extent. 34. There will be no order as to costs. 35. All parties to act on a signed copy of the operative portion of this judgment on the usual undertaking. Petition allowed in part.