JUDGMENT Basudeva Panigrahi, J. The defendant No.1 in Title Suit No. 1162/87 pending in the Court of the learned 6th Judge, City Civil Court at Calcutta has called in question the legality, validity and the propriety of the order dated 30th September, 1994 whereby and whereunder the learned Court below has directed the petitioner for restoration of the possession to the opposite party-plaintiff. 2. The brief scenario of the facts leading to this revisional application are as follows : The opposite party No.3, namely, M/s. Babulal Lodha a partnership firm was inducted as a lessee by the petitioner herein for a period of 21 years with effect from 1st February, 1967. By and under a registered Deed of lease dated 19th March, 1968. It is alleged that the partnership firm was constituted between the partners and one Babulal Lodha was one of the partners' thereof. The said Babulal Lodha was the father of the opposite party No.1 and the husband of the opposite party No.2. The said lease was granted in respect of the room being No. 36 on the first floor of the premises No. 207 Maharshi Debendra Road, Calcutta since the partnership firm namely the opposite party No.3 committed default in paying monthly rent on and from 16th September, 1982 the said lease was forfeited and/or because of breach of the terms and covenants. Accordingly, the petitioner has said to have sent a notice dated 25th November, 1983 on the opposite party No.3 for determination of the said lease. Thereupon, the petitioner filed a suit against the opposite party No.3 herein in the learned City Civil Court at Calcutta. In the said suit TS 798/84, the petitioner obtained a decree for recovery of possession of the said premises. The opposite party Nos.1 and 2 seem to have filed an application in the said suit claiming to be the legal heirs of the said Babulal Lodha, under Or. 1 R. 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure for being added as the party defendants. In the said suit, the opposite party No.2 has taken a specific stand that the defendant No.2 of that suit was never a lessee in respect of the suit premises nor such firm was ever in existence. The said Babulal Lodha died on 23rd September, 1974 leaving behind the opposite party Nos. 1 and 2 as his heirs and legal representatives. The said Babulal Lodha died on 23rd September, 1974 leaving behind the opposite party Nos. 1 and 2 as his heirs and legal representatives. They are the only tenants under the defendant No.1 petitioner herein and the said tenancy is governed under the provision of West Bengal Act XII of 1956. 3. The learned Judge 6th Bench, City Civil Court at Calcutta had rejected their application on 3rd April, 1987. After the dismissal of the aforesaid application for being added as party, the' opposite party nos. 1 and 2 filed the present suit. In the said suit they have prayed there a decree for declaration that they are the tenants in respect of suit premises and the tenancy is governed under the provisions of the W.B.P.T. Act of 1956 and have further prayed for a decree of permanent injunction. In the aforementioned suit, the opposite party nos. 1 and 2 filed an application under Or.39 Rr. 1 and 2 of the CPC for ad-interim injunction against the petitioner as to why his men and agent be not restrained from proceeding with the Title Suit No. 798/84 pending in the City Civil Court at Calcutta. The learned 6th Bench, City Civil Court by the judgment and order dated 22nd September, 1993 was inclined to record an order of temporary injunction restraining the petitioner herein, his men and agent from interfering with peaceful possession of the plaintiffs over the said premises otherwise than in due process of law till the disposal of the suit. 4. In the meanwhile, after obtaining an ex parte decree against the opposite party no. 3 the petitioner is said to have lodged an execution case against the firm in Execution Case No. 90/93. In the title execution case the bailiff has handed pver peaceful possession of the room to the petitioner on 7th July, 1994. It is claimed by the petitioner that after having taken possession of the suit premises, he, by and under agreement dated 7th July, 1994, had inducted to one M/s. Followel Engineering Limited as tenant. 5. After the petitioner having taken possession of the suit premises; the opposite party nos. 1 and 2 made an application under s. 151 CPC against the defendants 1 and 2 stating, inter alia, that the petitioner has dispossessed the opposite party nos. 5. After the petitioner having taken possession of the suit premises; the opposite party nos. 1 and 2 made an application under s. 151 CPC against the defendants 1 and 2 stating, inter alia, that the petitioner has dispossessed the opposite party nos. 1 and 2 from the premises in question forcibly and unlawfully and without due recourse to law. The petitioner also while dispossessing the opposite party nos. 1 and 2 wrongfully had removed all their belongings and movables from the said premises. Thus, they claimed to restore the possession of the suit premises to the plaintiff forthwith, to return back to the plaintiffs the valuable assests and other article removed from the suit premises and not to alienate and/or part with the possession of the suit premises by handing over the same to any third person. 6. The learned 6th Bench, City Civil Court by an order/judgment dated 30th September, 1994 has directed the petitioner to hand over possession of the suit premises to the plaintiffs/opposite party nos. 1 and 2 who would be entitled to get back possession in accordance with the law. Therefore, the petitioner has approached this court assailing the said order of restoration. 7. Mr. Sudhis Dasgupta, senior advocate appearing for the petitioner, has argued in support of the application and has submitted that the registered firm i.e. M/s. Babulal Lodha had taken the suit premises by and under a registered lease deed dated 19.3.1968. In the said lease Babulal Lodha was described as the partner and one of the plaintiffs Shib Shankar Lodha who is the son of Babulal Lodha was figured as a witness. Although, in the year 1974 the rent receipts were granted in the name of Babulal Lodha which would be implicit that those are issued in the name of the firm notwithstanding the death of Babulal Lodha in 1974, therefore, the plaintiff was obliged to bring the suit against the firm. He had filed the suit taking recourse to the provisions of Or. 30 Rr. 1 and 4 of the CPC. The opposite party Nos.1 and 2 had never claimed to be the partners of the Babulal Lodha's firm but they claimed as heirs and legal representatives of Babulal Lodha. Therefore, the Court had rightly rejected their application since the suit was against the firm. 30 Rr. 1 and 4 of the CPC. The opposite party Nos.1 and 2 had never claimed to be the partners of the Babulal Lodha's firm but they claimed as heirs and legal representatives of Babulal Lodha. Therefore, the Court had rightly rejected their application since the suit was against the firm. In support of the application he has further advanced an argument that if the suit is against the firm and one of the partners dies before or during the pendency of the suit, the decree can be enforced against the share of the deceased in the partnership property. The petitioner obtained the decree against the firm and took possession from it. Therefore, according to Mr. Dasgupta, how such decree could be termed to have been obtained without due process of law. He, therefore, was very much critical about the order of the learned Court below that when there was no evidence of dissolution of partnership firm how could such finding be rendered by the court below. 8. The existence or non-existence of firm was within the special knowledge of the opposite party nos. 1 and 2. It seems strange as to how and why, although registered lease deed speaks about the existence of the firm; the opposite party nos. 1 and 2 has intentionally withheld the production of such partnership deed. Had the partnership deed been produced it would have assisted the court come to proper findings. Non-production of such deed will raise adverse inference against opposite party nos. 1 and 2. The opposite party nos. 1 and 2 have lost their interest over the demised premises after the expiry of the lease-period. Mr. S.P. Roy Chowdhury also supported the version of the petitioner by stating that the opposite party nos. 1 and 2/plaintiffs had ignored tenancy status of the partnership in the suit filed by the petitioner. Therefore, the court had to reject their application under Or. 1 R. 10 for which they were obliged to file the present suit claiming tenancy right. In the injunction application filed by the plaintiff/opposite party nos. 1 and 2 they sought prayers for ad-interim injunction against the petitioner from proceeding with the title suit filed by him. Therefore, the learned court below had rightly negatived their plea for injunction as it was hit under s. 41(a) of the Specific Relief Act. In the injunction application filed by the plaintiff/opposite party nos. 1 and 2 they sought prayers for ad-interim injunction against the petitioner from proceeding with the title suit filed by him. Therefore, the learned court below had rightly negatived their plea for injunction as it was hit under s. 41(a) of the Specific Relief Act. In respect of the second prayer the Court recorded and order that the petitioner is injuncted to take possession otherwise than in due course of law. Since the delivery of possession was made over to the petitioner in due process of law, the impugned order directing the petitioner for restoration of possession is prima facie illegal, unlawful and without jurisdiction. He further indicated that assuming the order passed by the trial court was ambiguous and capable of two interpretation and the party honestly pursued one such remedy cannot be held guilty. In support of his contention he has also relied on a decision reported in AIR 1961 SC page 221. The opposite party no. 1 has impleaded the tenant who had been let-out by the petitioner after taking possession. 9. Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee, the learned senior advocate, appearing for the opposite party nos. 1 and 2 while repelling the contentions of the petitioner has advanced his submission that the plaintiff in the suit in T.S. No. 798/84 should not have joined the opposite party no. 3. When such firm was not in existence, the provisions of Or. 30 R. 1 C.P.C. is not applicable. It is also indicated that the provisions of Or.30 R. 1 C.P.C. is only permissive but not mandatory. By the time of filing of the suit, undisputedly Babulal Lodha was dead, therefore, it was imperative for the plaintiff to make a discrete enquiry as to whether the firm was in fact in existence and if so who were its partners. Without causing any enquiry by discernible means, the plaintiff could not have joined the firm as the defendant. His main thrust of argument is that since Babulal Lodha being dead in the year 1974, the partnership firm is deemed to have been dissolved unless there is a contract to the contrary. The petitioner/defendant no. 1 has not established by clear, cogent and convincing evidence that there was a contract among the partners that the firm would continue notwithstanding the death of Babulal Lodha. 10. Opposite party nos. The petitioner/defendant no. 1 has not established by clear, cogent and convincing evidence that there was a contract among the partners that the firm would continue notwithstanding the death of Babulal Lodha. 10. Opposite party nos. 1 and 2 immediately after having come to know about the suit, filed an application to join as defendant under Or. 1 R. 10 C.P.C., inter alia, stating that there was no partnership firm but under the teeth of opposition the court had rejected their prayer. Thus, they had to file a separate suit for declaration of their tenancy and move for a temporary injunction. The court having been satisfied with the genuineness of the claim of the opposite party nos. 1 and 2, had granted temporary injunction against the petitioner from evicting the opposite party no. 1 otherwise than in due course of law. After having obtained a decree, in case of any ambiguity in the injunction order the petitioner should have sought a clarification or alteration from the court which passed the injunction order earlier. But without obtaining such clarification, the petitioner could' not have taken possession by causing flagrant disobedience of the court's order under a camouflage of ambiguity in the injunction order. The cause of action for the suit having arisen after the death of Babulal Lodha, the petitioner could not have taken recourse to the provisions under Or. 30 R. 4 C.P.C. In support of his submission, he placed strong reliance on the decision reported in AIR 1970 SC page 1147 and AIR 1965 SC page 1718 at 1721. 11. Since the petitioner in defiance of the injunction order passed by the court had dispossessed the opposite party nos. 1 and 2, it is obliged to put them into same position before taking such possession. In case of any doubt, with regard to the interpretation of the order, it is for the party to seek clarification from the court. Because the, petitioner has unlawfully dispossessed the opposite party nos. 1 and 2 in violation of the interim injunction. Inherent power could be invoked to remedy the party who has been unreasonably dispossessed. To buttress his stand, he strongly relied upon a decision reported in AIR 1986 Cal page 220. When the suit filed by the petitioner was not maintainable, the possession pursuant to such decree could not be said to be in accordance with law. Inherent power could be invoked to remedy the party who has been unreasonably dispossessed. To buttress his stand, he strongly relied upon a decision reported in AIR 1986 Cal page 220. When the suit filed by the petitioner was not maintainable, the possession pursuant to such decree could not be said to be in accordance with law. Thus, the trial court, in his opinion has rightly directed the petitioner for restoration of possession to the opposite party nos. 1 and 2. 12. Undisputedly, the lease deed was executed by and between the petitioner/defendant no. 1 and the defendant no. 3 M/s. Babulal Lodha from 1.11.1967 on the basis of a registered Indenture of Lease on 19.3.1968 at a monthly rent of Rs. 150.00 p. which had been enhanced to Rs. 183/subsequently. But the petitioner filed a suit in the learned 6th Bench of the City Civil Court at Calcutta in T.S. No. 798/84 for recovery of possession and for arrears of rent. The opposite party nos. 1 and 2 filed an application in T.S. No. 798/84 for being impleaded as legal representatives and legal heir of Babulal Lodha. Their application was rejected by the learned court with the observation that the lease was created in favour of the partnership firm, although it was not registered. In this view of the matter, the lessee was the partnership firm but not Sri Babulal Lodha, since deceased in his individual capacity. Thus, the application filed by the opposite party Nos.1 and 2 did not cut any ice and finally it was rejected. The opposite party Nos. 1 and 2 filed the present suit before the learned 6th Judge, City Civil Court in T.S. No. 1162/87 for the reliefs already indicated above, inter alia, moved for ad-interim injunction. The learned court by its order dated 22nd September, 1993 directed the petitioner, his men and agent restraining them from interferring with the peaceful possession of the opposite party Nos. 1 and 2-plaintiff of the suit premises otherwise than in due course of law till the disposal of the suit. The petitioner had obtained an ex parte decree on 2nd September, 1993. Pursuant to the decree, he took possession on 7.7.1994 of the suit premises. 12A. Mr. 1 and 2-plaintiff of the suit premises otherwise than in due course of law till the disposal of the suit. The petitioner had obtained an ex parte decree on 2nd September, 1993. Pursuant to the decree, he took possession on 7.7.1994 of the suit premises. 12A. Mr. Dasgupta has relied upon the xerox copy of the receipts granted to Babulal Lodha even after his death i.e. in the year 1980-81, April, 1981, 2nd December, 1981 and 28th June, 1982 and contended that the opposite party Nos. 1 and 2 having accepted these receipts in the name of Babulal Lodha which patently disclosed that it was given to the firm but not individually to him. In such background the contention of Mr. Mukherjee that there was no existence of the firm has to be summarily dismissed. Mr. Mukherjee has countered the submission of Mr. Dasgupta by stating that since Babulal Lodha was the father of the opposite party nos. 1 and 2, in regular course it was given in the name of their father. Therefore, from the rent receipt no inference could be raised about the existence or non-existence of the firm. 13. Mr. Dasgupta has relied upon the lease deed wherein and whereunder Babulal Lodha has executed as the partner of the firm and the opposite party no.1 Sankarlal Lodha was cited as an attesting witness. From his submission it further appears that since no other plausible explanation having come from the opposite party nos. 1 and 2 about the non-existence of the firm, it would raise a factual presumption about the existence of M/s. Babulal Lodha firm. 14. Mr. Mukherjee, the learned senior advocate has placed an important circumstance that the opposite party Radhakishan Jhunjhunwalla filed a suit in T.S. 92/74 against Babulal Lodha in his individual capacity describing him as an agent in respect of the suit premises. It is submitted by Mr. Dasgupta that since that suit was filed under an erroneous impression and wrong legal advice, it was allowed to be dismissed for non-prosecution. Another circumstances has been placed by the opposite party nos. It is submitted by Mr. Dasgupta that since that suit was filed under an erroneous impression and wrong legal advice, it was allowed to be dismissed for non-prosecution. Another circumstances has been placed by the opposite party nos. 1 and 2 that D.P. Bagchi the learned advocate acting as an agent on behalf of Radhakishan Jhunjhunwalla gave a combined notice to opposite parties and 2 under s. 13(6) W.B.P.T. Act, 1956, on 12th February, 1981, calling upon the plaintiffs to pay arears of rent otherwise a suit for eviction will be lodged against them. Mr. Dasgupta also contended that the registered notice purported to have been given by the learned advocate appearing for the opposite party nos. 1 and 2 was under an erroneous legal advice. Therefore, such circumstance cannot be a ground to hold that the demised premises was given to Babulal Lodha in his individual capacity. Mr. Mukherjee has strongly relied on a decision reported in AIR 1960 SC 213 at page 217 (Kedar Nath Motani vs. Prahlad Rai & Ors.) "The rival admissions cancel each other and leave the matter at large. The matter was never put in issue except as to who paid the salami and the sufficiency or otherwise of the salami was never tried. In view of the fact that fraud cannot be said to have been effected, we do not think that the appellants who have clearly established the benami nature of the transactions can be deprived of their judgment." Mr. Mukherjee, the learned senior advocate, placed strong reliance on s. 42 of the Indian Partnership Act which reads as follows: "Dissolution on the happening of certain contingencies. - Subject to contract between the partners a firm is dissolved- (a) ........................................................... (b) ........................................................... (c) by the death of a partner." 15. The death of a partner in most cases does away with these elements and the law assumes, in the absence of any agreement between the partners, that it was their intention that death of one of them was to result in termination of the relationship subsisting between them. It has, accordingly, been laid down in this clause that the death of a partner will ordinarily have the effect of dissolving a firm. At this stage, it would be premature to hold in either way that whether there was an agreement to the contrary or not. It has, accordingly, been laid down in this clause that the death of a partner will ordinarily have the effect of dissolving a firm. At this stage, it would be premature to hold in either way that whether there was an agreement to the contrary or not. Since, the trial of the suit has yet to be conducted it would not be appropriate to dilate on this point any further. Therefore, I keep it open to agitate and the Court shall render its findings accordingly. The opposite party nos. 1 & 2 have relied on the case of Hadkinson vs. Hadkinson and Mr. Mukherjee has advanced his argument that when the petitioner knew that there was ambiguity in the injunction order; they ought to have approached the court which passed the order for necessary clarification and not take upon themselves to determine such question. In the instant case, the petitioner was armed with the decree of a court directing to take delivery of possession from the opposite party nos. 1 and 2. In the suit, the trial Judge while recording injunction order has not passed the clean-chit authorising the petitioner from taking possession of the demised premises. What all the orders speaks was that the petitioner was injuncted from dispossessing the opposite party nos. 1 and 2 otherwise than in due course of law. Since the petitioners 1 and 2 executed the decree and took delivery of the premises it cannot be said at this stage that they had dispossessed the opposite party nos. 1 and 2 otherwise than in due course of law. 16. Mr. Mukherjee has relied on a Judgment reported in AIR 1986 Cal page 230 in the case of Sujit Pal vs. Prabir Kr. Sen. There is no quarrel over the legal position. In so far as the implementation of the injunction order is concerned, the court would see that it is implemented by invoking its inherent power under s. 151 C.P.C. without waiting to see for causing disobedience, violation or stultifying its order passed earlier. Mr. Mukherjee has cited a decision reported in AIR 1922 Cal Page 390 in the case of Harjibandas Gordhandas vs. Bhaywandas Pursram and has contended that the petitioner ought to have complied with the provisions of Or. Mr. Mukherjee has cited a decision reported in AIR 1922 Cal Page 390 in the case of Harjibandas Gordhandas vs. Bhaywandas Pursram and has contended that the petitioner ought to have complied with the provisions of Or. 30 R. 3 of the C.P.C. and that the notice should have been sent to the partner or to other persons who had had control over the partnership business. In the instant case even on own showing at the petitioner's notice was not served on any of the partners of the firm. Therefore, after the death of Babula I Lodha and particularly in the absence of service of notice on any other partner the decree of eviction suit obtained by the petitioners should not be said to be in due course of law. 17. Since this is an important issue which the opposite party nos. 1 and 2 have raised in the suit, that has to be still resolved by the trial court, that contention raised by the opposite party nos. 1 and 2 at this stage if answered by this court I am afraid that it may likely result in serious prejudice against whom it is decided. 18. Mr. Mukherjee has contended by placing reliance on AIR 1951 Cal page 466 (Mohammed Siddiq vs. Mohamad Akbar) that since the cause of action accrued after dissolution of firm, the suit against the firm in the firm's name is incompetent. In support of his contention he wanted me to traverse through the pleading of the opposite party in the earlier suit and has submitted that it is patent from the pleadings that the cause of action for the suit arose after the demise of Babulal Lodha. Again such issue has to be answered by the trial Judge I refrain from making any observation. 19. Mr. Roy Chowdhury has relied upon a decision reported in AIR 1961 SC 221 . In the decision cited (supra) it has been held :"A party proceeded against under O. 39 R. 2(3) CPC for disobedience of an order of injunction cannot be held to have wilfully disobeyed the order provided two conditions are satisfied viz: (1) that the order was ambiguous and was reasonably capable of more than one interpretation, (2) that the party being proceeded against in fact did not intend to disobey the order, but conducted himself in accordance with his interpretation of the order. The question whether a party has understood an order in a particular manner and has conducted himself in accordance with such a construction is primarily one of fact, and where the materials before the Court do not support such a state of affairs, the Court cannot attribute an innocent intention based on presumptions for the only reason, that ingenuity of Counsel can discover equivocation in the order which is the subject of enforcement." and strongly argued that when the order was ambiguous which was capable of two interpretations the party who honestly pursues one such remedy should be exonerated with impunity inasmuch as the petitioners had obtained the possession by virtue of a decree from a Court. That decree shall remain valid till it is reversed or up-set by a Court in another suit or by higher Courts in appeal or revision. Therefore, at this stage, the petitioner cannot be held guilty for disobedience of the Court's order. The petitioner has again contended that in the meanwhile the term of the lease created in the name of the firm had already expired by lapse of time. Therefore, neither the plaintiff/opposite party nos. 1 and 2 nor firm has any legal right over the suit premises. Whether the plaintiffs are the tenants under the purview of W.B.P.T. Act or their case would be covered by the clauses of the lease has yet to be decided by the trial Judge. I do not enter into discussion at the present juncture. The petitioner has already taken possession under the strength of a decree through execution proceeding. After the decree it has been let out to a third party Mr. Roy Chowdhury submits that third party's tenancy right cannot be questioned in his absence. It is settled position of law that the third party cannot claim larger interest than that of his lessor. In case the petitioner would be held to have no interest over the demised premises, the third party cannot claim any tenancy right. The suit has already ripened for hearing. The petitioner has taken possession of the suit premises after the order of ad-interim injunction. Whether the delivery of possession was otherwise t4an in due course of law or not has to be answered by the trial court in the suit. Therefore, in the above background, since the petitioner has taken possession of the premises from the opposite party nos. The petitioner has taken possession of the suit premises after the order of ad-interim injunction. Whether the delivery of possession was otherwise t4an in due course of law or not has to be answered by the trial court in the suit. Therefore, in the above background, since the petitioner has taken possession of the premises from the opposite party nos. 1 and 2/plaintiffs after the order of injunction. I find his interest has to be also properly safeguarded to avoid future complication which may turn-out in the suit. Therefore, I deem it proper to appoint a receiver of the suit premises instead of directing delivery of the property to the opposite party nos. 1 and 2. Since the petitioner is in possession through the third party, without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties the defendant no. 1/petitioner be appointed as a receiver till the disposal of the suit. He shall be liable to render accounts and profits to the Court before the end of 31st March every year. Since the suit is already ready for hearing I direct the learned trial court to dispose of the suit within 3 months from the date. In the light of the above observation, the revisional application is disposed of but in the circumstances I direct the parties to bear their own cost. Application disposed of