Devinder Gupta, J. (Oral) ( 1 ). On 19th April, 1993 the petitioner approached this Court by filing this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking directions against respondents 1 and 2 not to proceed with the inquiry which was initiated through letter dated 16. 3. 1993 into the charges levelled against the petitioner through memo dated 28. 8. 1992. ( 2 ). The main and primary grounds on which the petitioner sought the reliefs are the inordinate delay of eight years in issuing charge sheet, alleging that while incident had taken place in August 1985, the first letter was received by the petitioner inquiring about the alleged incident on 16. 4. 1990 and calling upon him to reply to certain queries to which the petitioner submitted his reply in June, 1990. Respondents slept over the matter for another 2 and 1/4th years and issued charge sheet only on 28. 8. 1992. Due to inordinate delay defence of the petitioner was likely to be prejudiced, on account of retirement of many officials from service and it would be unfair to permit the departmental inquiry to be proceeded with at a belated stage. . It will be highly unfair to allow stall charges to be raked up after a long lapse of time. Considerable delay in initiating disciplinary proceedings on the alleged irregularities will also be a circumstance leading to drawing of an inference that the respondents must be deemed to have dropped the inquiry proceedings. In addition it is alleged that the circumstances on record clearly establish that it was the General Manager, B. M. Puri who was responsible for the alleged irregularities and the reason for delay in initiating inquiry was malafide, only to allow said B. M. Puri and others to retire and then to victimise the petitioner alone. ( 3 ). On 21. 4. 1993 notice was directed to be issued to show cause as to why rule nisi be not issued. On 17. 5. 1993 interim order was passed that the inquiry officer may not give final report till further directions. This order was modified on 20. 3. 1995, when it was directed that the inquiry may proceed against the delinquent officials but final order shall not be made till further orders. On 17. 5. 1993 interim order was passed that the inquiry officer may not give final report till further directions. This order was modified on 20. 3. 1995, when it was directed that the inquiry may proceed against the delinquent officials but final order shall not be made till further orders. On the same day it was observed that joint disciplinary proceedings were being held against the petitioner and two other officers, namely, O. P. Bhalla and P. K. Sabharwal. Since the other two persons were also likely to be affected, petitioner was directed to implead them as respondents. This is how the said respondents are also parties to this petition. ( 4 ). On 23. 8. 1995 interim order was again modified, permitting the inquiry proceedings to continue and the inquiry officer to submit his final report and directing that no action shall be taken on such final report till further orders. On 1. 3. 1996 it was directed that the inquiry report be perused by the disciplinary authority and in case it is proposed to take action against the petitioner, disciplinary authority may proceed in accordance with law by supplying a copy of the inquiry report and calling upon an explanation and then to proceed with in passing final order but effect shall not be given to the final order, to be passed, without the express permission of this Court. ( 5 ). It is stated today that the final order has since been passed and in terms of the court s order dated 1. 3. 1996, effect has not been given thereto. ( 6 ). Learned counsel for the petitioner placing reliance upon the two decisions of the Supreme Court in The State ofmadhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh and another, AIR 1990 SC 1308 , and State of Punjab and others v. Chaman Lal Goyal, JT 1995 (2) SC 18, has prayed for quashing of the charges on the ground of in- ordinate delay in issuing the memo of charges. It has been emphasised that it is necessary at this stage to determine that whether the right to speedy trial stood denied to the petitioner due to inordinate and unexplained delay and if the same has been infringed, because of the prejudice caused to the petitioner due to the delay it will be permissible for the court even at this stage to make an order quashing of the charges. ( 7 ). Having considered the submissions made at the Bar we are not inclined to interfere at this stage with the disciplinary proceedings in the facts and circumstances of the case. In Chaman Lal Goyal s case (supra) the apex Court, noticing the ratio in Bani Singh s case (supra) laid down para meters for quashing of the charges on the ground of delay in serving the charges or initiating disciplinary proceedings by observing: "it is trite to say that such disciplinary proceeding must be conducted soon after the irregularities are committed or soon after discovering the irregularities. They cannot be initiated after lapse of considerable time. It would not be fair to the delinquent officer. Such delay also makes the task of proving the charges difficult and is thus not also in the interest of administration. Delayed initiation of proceedings is bound to give room for allegations of bias, malafides and misuse of power. If the delay is too long and is unexplained, the court may well interfere and quash the charges. But how long a delay is too long always depends upon the facts of the given case. Morecover, if such delay is likely to cause prejudice to the delinquent office i in defending himself, the enquiry has to be interdicted. Wherever such a plea is raised, the court has to weigh the factors appearing for and against the said plea and take a decision on the totality of circumstances. In other words, the court has to indulge in a process of balancing. " ( 8 ). The Court observed that while indulging in the process of balancing, the principles, which have to be borne in mind, would be the one as set out by the Constitution Bench in A. R. Antuley v. R. S. Naik and another, 1992 (1) SCC 225 , namely, to determine in each case, whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case. Ordinarily speaking where the Court comes to the conclusion that right to speedy trial has not been infringed the charges or the final order, as the case may be, will be quashed. That alone is not the course open to the court and in a given case the nature of offence and other circumstances may be such that quashing of the charges may not be in the interest of justice. Insuch a case it would be open to the Court to make such other appropriate order as it finds just and equitable in the circumstances of the case. ( 9 ). Applying the ratio in Chaman Lal Goyal s case (supra) to the facts of the case, in which during pendency of this petition, disciplinary proceedings have culminated in a final order and the only step which now is required to be taken is to give effect thereto, in the interest of justice we do not consider it to be a fit case for going into the question raised in this petition. On the final order being given effect to, it will be open for the petitioner to challenge the same in an appropriate proceedings before appropriate forum, in accordance with law on all available grounds, including the one taken in this petition as also that the delay has caused prejudice to the petitioner s case and for that reasons not only the final order but also entire disciplinary proceedings deserve to be quashed and set aside. ( 10 ). Consequently we dismiss the petition. While permitting the respondents to give effect to the final order, liberty us reserved to the petitioner, as also to the respondents, who were ordered to be implemented as party to this petition, to challenge the final order in appropriate proceedings in accordance with law on all available grounds.