Judgment :- C.S. Rajan, J. The petitioner is an employee of the Central Bank of India (hereinafter referred to as 'the bank'). Ext. P5 memo of charge sheet was served on him and an enquiry was conducted against the various charges levelled against the petitioner in Ext. P5. the above enquiry resulted in Ext. P8 report of enquiry. The findings in the enquiry report were as follows: "Findings : Charge 1 and III have been framed under clause 19.5(c) of the Bipartite settlement dated 19.10.66 which read as follows: Drunkness or riotous or disorderly or indecent behaviour on the premises of the Bank as per my findings in para 14 of tins report charge (i) has not been proved and as per my findings in Para. 20 of this report charge (iii) has been proved under the clause. Charge ii has been framed under clause 19.50) of the Bipartite settlement dated. 19.10.66 which reads as under: 'doing any act prejudicial to the interest of the Bank or gross negligence involving or likely to involve the Bank in serious loss'. As per my findings under para. 16 of this report this charge has not been proved. At worst it can be construed as a breach of rule as evidenced in clause 19.7(d) which reads as follows: breach of any rule of business of the bank or instructions for running a department". Thereafter, Ext. P9 show cause notice was issued to the petitioner proposing to award the punishment of stoppage of six increments in the time scale permanently. After considering the explanation offered by the petitioner Ext. P10 order was passed confirming the proposed punishment. In appeal filed by the petitioner Ext. P12 order was passed by which the punishment of stoppage of six increments in the time scale permanently was modified as stoppage of 5 increments in the time scale permanently. The above two "orders are under challenge in this original petition. 2. Since the findings in the enquiry report were accepted by the disciplinary authority as well as by the appellate authority, I do not propose to go into the correctness of the above factual findings which are based on evidence. 3. Sri. The above two "orders are under challenge in this original petition. 2. Since the findings in the enquiry report were accepted by the disciplinary authority as well as by the appellate authority, I do not propose to go into the correctness of the above factual findings which are based on evidence. 3. Sri. K. Chandrasekharan, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner made a strong plea of violation of the principles of natural justice on the ground that the petitioner was not permitted to engage a lawyer or to be represented by another employee in the enquiry and therefore, he was not able to present his case effectively and this had prejudiced him so as to vitiate the whole enquiry proceedings. 4. The learned senior counsel cited the ruling of the Supreme Court reported in C.L. tramaniamv. Collector of Customs, Cochin (AIR 1972 SC above point. Paragraph 22 of the above ruling is as follows: Subramaniam v. Collector of Customs, Cochin (AIR 1972 SC 2178) to drive home the "It is needless to say that R.15 is a mandatory rule. That rule regulates the guarantee given to Government Servants under Art.311. Government servants by and large have no legal training. At any rate, it is nobody's case that the appellant had legal training. Moreover, when a man is charged with the breach of a rule entailing serious consequences, he is not likely to be in a position to present his case as best as it should be. The accusation against the appellant threatened his very livelihood. Any adverse verdict against him was bound to be disastrous to him, as it has proved to be. In such a situation, he cannot be expected to act calmly and with deliberation. That is why R.15(5) has provided for representation of a Government servant charged with dereliction of duty or with contravention of the rule by another Government servant or in appropriate cases by a legal practitioner." 5. In order to understand the scope of the above dictum, it is advantageous to refer to paragraph 13 of the same judgment: "13, The grievance of the appellant was that he was pitted against a trained prosecutor and not mat Sivaraman was a legal practitioner. The disciplinary Authority did not consider that grievance. In order to understand the scope of the above dictum, it is advantageous to refer to paragraph 13 of the same judgment: "13, The grievance of the appellant was that he was pitted against a trained prosecutor and not mat Sivaraman was a legal practitioner. The disciplinary Authority did not consider that grievance. It brushed aside the request of the appellant on the ground that Sivaraman was not a legal practitioner, a consideration which was not relied on by the appellant. The grounds urged by the appellant in support of his request for permission to engage a legal practitioner were by no means irrelevant. The fact that the case against the appellant was being handled by a trained prosecutor was a good ground for allowing the appellant to engage a legal practitioner to defend him lest the scales should be weighted against him. The Disciplinary Authority completely ignored that circumstance. Therefore, that authority clearly failed to exercise the power conferred on it under the rule. It is not unlikely that the Disciplinary Authority refused to permit the appellant to engage a legal practitioner in the circumstances mentioned earlier had caused serious prejudice to the appellant and had amounted to a denial of reasonable opportunity to defend himself." 6. Another ruling which was relied on by the learned senior counsel is the one reported in Union of India v. Karunakran Nair (1985 KLT 680). The Division Bench of this Court upheld the decision of the learned single judge setting aside the penalty imposed on the respondent-petitioner therein on the following reasoning: "It is important that in an enquiry, the delinquent officer should not be denied a full opportunity to prove his innocence. Normally, a lawyer has no place in a disciplinary enquiry. But, when the presenting officer, even if he is not a lawyer, is one who is well trained in prosecution work and if the delinquent officer cannot have the services of a legally trained person and is allowed only to have the services of a colleague of his, who, in the normal course, will not be well versed in the subject, it goes without saying that that will be nothing but denial of an opportunity to the officer to defend himself in the disciplinary enquiry. The presenting officer need not be a lawyer for the delinquent officer to insist that he should be allowed to make use of the services of a lawyer. The presenting officer need only be a person who has got training in the technique of a disciplinary enquiry. In this case, the CBI Inspector who was the presenting officer in the normal course was more than a lawyer and the denial of the services of a lawyer to the delinquent officer was nothing but denial of natural justice to the delinquent officer, which has vitiated the whole disciplinary enquiry. In this view of the matter, there is no reason why this Court should interfere with the judgment of the learned single judge setting aside the order imposing the penalty on the respondent - petitioner." In the case in hand, the Presenting Officer was neither a Prosecutor nor a legally trained officer. 7. Sri. Devan Ramachandran, learned counsel appearing for the Bank brought to any notice a ruling of this Court reported in Subramonia Sharma v. State Bank of Travancore (1987 (2) KLT 632). In the above case, the learned single judge was considering the scope of the regulation framed by the State Bank of Travancore. The relevant clauses of the above Regulation were as follows: "(vi) Where the Disciplinary Authority itself enquires or appoints an Inquiring Authority for holding an enquiry, the Bank may, by an order appoint an officer, or a public servant to be known as the "Presenting Officer" to present on its behalf the case in support of the articles of charge". "(vii) The officer may take the assistance of an Officer as defined in the clause (i) of regulation 3 (hereinafter referred to as officer's representative ) but shall not engage a legal practitioner for the purpose". After analysing the various rulings of the Supreme Court and this Court including C.L Subramaniam's case, (AIR 1972 SC 2178) and Karunakaran's case (1985 KLT 680) Justice M.P. Menon held as follows: "Two tailings seem to be important: one, the statutory prescription governing the procedure, and two, the suffering of some prejudice by the delinquent. The rules in this case have already been seen: they do not permit a lawyer's presence at the enquiry. The rules in this case have already been seen: they do not permit a lawyer's presence at the enquiry. And as for prejudice, no attempt at all was made at the hearing to suggest that despite the engagement of a brother officer experienced in participating in such enquiries, any kind of prejudice was caused to the petitioner because of the appearance of a trained prosecutor on the other side". 8. It is heartening to point out that years after the Supreme Court has also followed the same reasoning of Justice M.P. Menon (perhaps as a posthumous tribute) in the ruling reported in State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma (1966) 3 SCC 364). The following principle summarised in the above judgment is relevant to decide this case: "In the case of violation of a procedural provision, the position is this: procedural provisions are generally meant for affording a reasonable and adequate opportunity to the delinquent officer/ employee. They are, generally speaking, conceived in his interest. Violation of any and every procedural provision cannot be said to automatically vitiate the enquiry held or order passed. Except cases falling under - "no notice", "no opportunity" and "no hearing" categories, the complaint of violation of procedural provision should be examined from the point of view of prejudice, viz., whether such violation has prejudiced the delinquent officer/ employee in defending himself properly and effectively. If it is found that he has been so prejudiced, appropriate orders have to be made to repair and remedy the prejudice including setting aside the enquiry and/or the order of punishment. If no prejudice is established to have resulted therefrom, it is obvious, no interference is called for. In this connection, it may be remembered that there may be certain procedural provisions which are of a fundamental character, whose violation is by itself proof of prejudice. The Court may not insist on proof of prejudice in such cases. As explained in a body of the judgment, take a case where there is a provision expressly providing that after the evidence of the employer/ Government is over, the employee shall be given an opportunity to lead defence in his evidence, and in a given case, the enquiry officer does not give that opportunity inspite of the delinquent officer/ employee asking for it. The prejudice is self evident. The prejudice is self evident. No proof of prejudice as such need be called for in such a case. To repeat, the test is one of prejudice, ie., whether the person has received a fair hearing considering all tailings". Therefore, it is necessary to look into the relevant rules which govern the procedure adopted in this case. Clause 19.12 of the First Bipartite settlement is as follows: "Clause 19.12: The procedure in such cases shall be as follows: a) An employee against whom disciplinary action is proposed or likely to be taken shall be given a charge sheet clearly setting forth the circumstances appearing against him and a date shall be fixed for enquiry, sufficient time being given to him to enable him to prepare and give his explanation so also to produce any evidence that he may wish to tender in his defence. He shall be permitted to appear before the Officer conducting the enquiry, to cross-examine any witness on whose evidence the charge rests and to examine witness and produce other evidence in his defence. He shall also be permitted' to be defended. i) (x) by a representative of a registered trade union of bank employees of which he is a member on the date first notified for the commencement of the enquiry. (y) where the employee is not a member of any trade union of bank employee on the aforesaid date, by a representative of a registered trade union of employees of the bank in which he is employed: ii) at the request of the said union by a representative of the State federation or All India Organisation to which such union is affiliated. OR iii) with the Bank's permission, by a lawyer". 9. The petitioner in this case was entitled to be represented (1) by a representative of a registered trade union of Bank employees of which he is a member (2) by a representative of a registered trade union of employees of the Bank in which he is employed (3) a representative of the State Federation of All India Organisation to which such union is affiliated (4) with the Bank's permission by a lawyer. According to the petitioner he is not a member of any trade union and therefore, he could not engage a representative of a trade union. The petitioner requested for the assistance of a lawyer which was refused by the Bank. According to the petitioner he is not a member of any trade union and therefore, he could not engage a representative of a trade union. The petitioner requested for the assistance of a lawyer which was refused by the Bank. But it is to be remembered that there is no right for the petitioner to be represented by a lawyer. The petitioner can engage a lawyer only with the permission of the Bank. Moreover, as held by the Supreme Court in the State Bank of Potiala's case (1996 (3) SCC 364) the real test is one of prejudice. There is no averment, much less positive proof to the effect that the petitioner has been prejudiced by the refusal of the Bank to engage a lawyer. Since the complaint of the petitioner is only against the violation of procedural provision and there is no mandate in the rules that the petitioner must be given the assistance of a lawyer, I do not find any reason to hold that the entire disciplinary proceedings are vitiated. I am satisfied in this case that the petitioner was given full opportunity to defend his case and a fair hearing was afforded to him by the Bank. Under these circumstances, the argument of violation of principles of natural justice is without any basis. 10. Another argument put forward by the learned senior counsel is that there is no consideration of the points raised by the petitioner in the impugned orders. A reading of the two orders will go to show that both the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority have considered in detail all the points raised by the petitioner. Under these circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief in this original petition. The original petition is devoid of any merit and the same is dismissed.