JUDGMENT J.G. Chitre, J. 1. This appeal has been admitted on following substantial question of law :- "Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the judgment of the first appellate Court is vitiated on account of the Court having misdirected itself introducing the element of increase of business and requiring the same to be proved by the plaintiff, when the plaintiff had not come with such a case and on this account the judgment suffers from legal infirmity?" 2. Shri A. K. Sethi for appellant and Shri S. H. Agrawal for respondents have been heard in context with the substantial question of law and the judgment and decree which are being assailed in view of the evidence on record. 3. Shri Sethi, learned counsel for appellant argued that provision of section 12(1)(f) of M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act for convenience) does not provide that the landlord, for the purpose of getting a decree for evicting the tenant is required to prove "increase in the business". He argued that when the legal provisions of the Act were not requiring the plaintiff/landlord, the appellant, to prove his case on the point of "increase in the business", it was not legal for the first appellate Court to dislodge the finding of fact recorded by the trial Court. He pointed out that the act of first appellate Court in dislodging the finding of fact recorded by the trial Court on that point is illegal when the appellant-plaintiff did not come to the Court with such a case. Shri Sethi made reference to the evidence on record in that context as well as the judgments of the trial Court and the first appellate Court. 4. Shri S H. Agrawal, learned counsel for respondents supported the finding recorded by the first appellate Court by placing reliance on the judgment of this Court in the matter of Bhagwania Bai v. Krishna Sewak, 1964 MPLJ Note No. 12. 5. Provisions of section 12(1)(f) of the Act read as follows : "12(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract no suit shall be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds only, namely : ... ... ... ... ... 5. Provisions of section 12(1)(f) of the Act read as follows : "12(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract no suit shall be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds only, namely : ... ... ... ... ... (f) that the accommodation let for non-residential purpose is required bona fide by the landlord for the purpose of continuing or starting his business or that of any of his major sons or unmarried daughters if he is owner thereof or of any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned." 5. The first appellate Court has pointed out in paragraphs Nos. 13 and 14 of its judgment that the averments in the plaint filed by the present appellant were vague because it was not made clear by him that he required the suit premises bona fide as his business increased. The first appellate Court pointed out that the appellant was already operating a huller machine used for making by-product of rice seeds. The first appellate Court pointed out that the case of the appellant was of continuing his business and the requirement of suit accommodation for that. After pointing out this, the first appellate Court has concluded that the appellant did not make the averment in the plaint that he is required to stop the flour mill when said huller machine is in operation, therefore, his need is not proved objectively. The first appellate Court also blamed the plaintiff and non-suited him for not proving that his business has increased. 6. The trial Court has considered the evidence on record and in its judgment after elaborate discussion pointed out that it is the evidence of the appellant that whenever the flour mill is in operation, he cannot operate the huller machine and whenever the huller machine is in operation he cannot operate the flour mill. It pointed out that even the defendant admitted in paragraph No. 2 of his examination-in-chief and paragraph No. 5 of his cross-examination that both the machines cannot be put to operation at one and the same time. It pointed out that even the defendant admitted in paragraph No. 2 of his examination-in-chief and paragraph No. 5 of his cross-examination that both the machines cannot be put to operation at one and the same time. Learned trial Court also pointed out that it has come in his evidence that when the huller machine is in operation, the flour mill gets stopped and when the flour mill is in operation the huller machine gets stopped. It has also pointed out that the respondent (original defendant) has admitted in his evidence that all the four rooms are not sufficient for the business of the appellant and he does not have any additional accommodation for the purpose of operating the said huller machine. It also pointed out that after the amendment was effected by the appellant in the plaint, there was no consequential amendment in the written statement. It also pointed out that there was no proper cross-examination on the point of reasonable suitability of the accommodation. On the contrary the respondent came with the theory of eviction for the purpose of increasing the rent which was also negatived by the trial Court. 7. When the first appellate Court was to dislodge these findings of facts based on elaborate discussion of the evidence, the first appellate Court was obliged to give cogent reasons for dislodging these findings of the trial Court which are borne out by evidence and arrived at after appreciation of evidence on record. It was necessary for the first appellate Court to peruse the averments made by the appellant in the plaint and then come to an independent conclusion on the basis of that for the purpose of arriving at a finding that the plaintiff had come to the Court with the averments which are embodied in provisions of section 12(1)(f) of the Act or otherwise. The averments made in the plaint, so far as present matter is concerned, show that it was not the case of the appellant that he required the suit premises for the purpose of increasing his business. When that was not the case pleaded by the appellant in the plaint, it was not proper for the first appellate Court to blame the appellant to prove that point by evidence when the law does not require such plaintiff to do so. When that was not the case pleaded by the appellant in the plaint, it was not proper for the first appellate Court to blame the appellant to prove that point by evidence when the law does not require such plaintiff to do so. If the plaintiff is corning to the Court by basing his suit on provisions of section 12(1)(f) of the Act, he is obliged to prove that the suit accommodation is required bona fide by him for the purpose of continuing or starting his business for any of his major sons or unmarried daughters if he happens to be the owner of such premises. He is also obliged to prove that suit premises are required for any other person for whose benefit the accommodation is held, as section 12(1)(f) requires. When that is the requirement of law, the plaintiff cannot be non-suited for not proving the ground which is not contemplated by the said provision of the Act. In view of provisions of section 12(1)(f) of the Act, plaintiff is not required to prove "increase in business" and he cannot be non-suited on account of no evidence on that count. 8. The judgment of this Court in Bhagwania Bai's case (supra) relied on by learned counsel for respondents is totally related with different set of facts. In that matter the member of joint family who was owning a shop was requiring the suit premises for the purpose of opening a cloth shop and the landlords wanted the suit accommodation for "future expansion of their. business". From the reading of the short note it is clear that the said suit was based on that particular point and the requirement. Therefore, this Court had adjudicated that way by making observations in that context. The said case is not applicable so far as the set of facts indicated by the present matter is concerned. 9. In view of the discussion made above, I answer the substantial question of law formulated by this Court in negative. Therefore, the appeal is allowed with costs. The judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court are hereby set aside by maintaining the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. Counsel's fee Rs. 500, if certified.