M. F. SALDANHA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner who is the plaintiff had filed a suit against the transport Company who is the defendant to the original proceeding as a dispute had arisen in relation to the alleged non-delivery of certain material that was consigned to Madras. The prayer clauses in the suit basically concerned a relief of a mandatory injunction and no alternative prayer for damages had been set out. The suit in question was filed in the year 1989 and I. A. III was taken out in the year 1992 for amendment of the plaint. By this amendment, apart from some factual averments prayer (e) was sought to be added claiming damages from the defendant. This was opposed by the other side and the learned trial Judge has dismissed I. A. III on the solitary ground that the relief is time barred. The present civil revision petition is directed against that order. Petitioner's learned Advocate has seriously assailed the correctness of the order because he submits that no new case has been made out and that the relief asked for is only an ancillary to the main relief and is basically an alternate prayer which the law itself contemplates. He seeks to place reliance on the provisions of Section 40 of the Specific relief Act in support of his contention that where a party has prayed for a mandatory injunction that it shall be permissible for the party at any stage of the proceedings to incorporate; an alternate prayer for damages. Learned Advocate submits that the Courts over a period of time, in a string of decisions upheld the view that an amendment of this type which is nothing, more than a mere formality, whereunder a specific alternative relief is asked for within the same cause of action is a mere formality and that it is wrong to equate such a relief with an independent relief claimed through a suit instituted for that purpose and furthermore that there can be no bar of limitation in such cases. ( 2 ) THE oldest of the decisions relied upon is a decision of the Privy Council in the case of Charandas and Others v Amir Khan and Others, wherein the Court held that the plea of limitation cannot come in the way of such an amendment. ( 2 ) THE oldest of the decisions relied upon is a decision of the Privy Council in the case of Charandas and Others v Amir Khan and Others, wherein the Court held that the plea of limitation cannot come in the way of such an amendment. This view was followed in a later decision by the Supreme Court in the case of l. J. Leach and Company Limited and Another v Messrs Jardine skinner and Company. More recently the Division Bench of the madras High Court while interpreting Section 40 of the Specific relief Act, in the decision in V. R. Nathan v Mac Laboratories (P) limited, had an occasion to take the same view following the earlier Supreme Court decision. The Division Bench of this court in the decision in M. R. K. Rau and Others v Corporation of the City of Bangalore, once again permitted an amendment claiming damages even at the appellate stage overruling the plea that such an amendment would be barred by limitation. Petitioner's learned Advocate therefore submits that having regard to the well - settled law on the point that the amendment in question ought to have been permitted. ( 3 ) THE consensus of the reasoning of the various Courts as faras this particular aspect of the law is concerned, proceeds on the footing that it is erroneous to equate a claim for damages which is an alternate plea and which the Specific Relief Act entitles a party to do in law, with a situation where a claim for damages simpliciter in any other proceeding, is being put forward at a belated stage when that particular claim is otherwise time barred. It is only in the latter instances that the question of comparing it with the institution of a fresh proceeding which the law limitation would not permit, is justified. I need to clarify here that even though a party is required to approach the Court with a complete case at the very outset, that if a situation arises whereby the alternative plea by way of a claim for damages has not been specifically set out then it would preclude a Court from granting such a relief because Section 40 of the Specific Relief act requires that such a prayer must be before the Court before damages can be awarded. The effect of such an error or default would be that a plaintiff who would otherwise have been entitled to the claim of damages would be disqualified from obtaining such a relief on a technical ground. The law therefore makes a special concession in such cases virtually permitting the party to exercise what may be termed as its inherent right as the refusal to permit this purely on the ground of limitation would result in a virtual failure of justice. What needs to be borne in mind is that it is not a new claim nor is it independent of the main relief but it is incidental in so far as it is an offshoot to the main relief that is claimed. There can be no two opinions about the fact that the Courts are entitled to expect responsible and careful drafting but the question still arise as to whether if errors or defaults take place this should disqualify the litigant from the relief which is available in the alternative. The basic reasoning is that if the original relief has been asked for and the suit is otherwise maintainable because that relief is not time barred, then the plea of limitation can never arise with regard to the subsidiary relief which the law entitled the party to. Having regard to the unambiguous position in law, the Trial Court was clearly in error in having dismissed LA. III. ( 4 ) THE impugned order is set aside. I. A. III is accordingly allowed. The petitioner shall carry out the amendment within a period of eight weeks from today. The interim order to stand vacated. Parties to appear before the Trial Court on 23-9-1996 for further orders. ( 5 ) THE civil revision petition accordingly succeeds. No order asto costs. --- *** --- .