JUDGMENT S.C. Pandey, J. 1. This is an appeal filed by the defendants under Section 100 Of the Code of Civil Procedure, against the judgment and decree passed by Additional Judge to the Curt of District Judge, Sagar, dated 7.9.1983, in Civil Appeal No. 29-A of 1983 arising out of judgment and decree dated 2.8.1972, passed by I Civil Judge Class-II Sagar, in Civil Suit No. 131-A of 1970. 2. The plaintiff's suit for ejectment was on the grounds of sub-letting, denial of title, need of rebuilding and also for causing damage to the accommodation, in question. The defendants 1 to 4 are alleged to have sub-let the suit premises to defendants 5 and 6 without taking permission of the plaintiff. The defendant No. 5 was running a typing shop and the defendant No. 6 was running a Pan-shop in the suit premises. Since the defendants 1 and 2 had pleaded in their written statement that there are two rooms on the eastern side belong to them which are in possession of the defendants; and they asserted title to the same in their own right as owners thereof, it amounts to denial of title of the plaintiff. Consequently, the defendants were liable to be evicted under Section 12 (1) (c) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act (herein after referred to as 'the Act') also. 3. The defendants 1 to 2 denied the allegations and submitted that the defendant No. 5 was permitted by the father of defendants 1 and 2 for carrying on the typing business in the suit premises with the permission of the plaintiffs. The defendant No. 5, being the son-in-law of Balmukund, who was the original tenant and the father of defendants 1 and 2, was occupying the land belonging to Nazul Department. The defendant No. 6 was in occupation of the premises constructed on the suit land, but it did not require re-building. It was further pleaded that the defendants had taken possession of the said premises by virtue of the gift-deed executed in favour of the father of the defendants 1 and 2. It was also pleaded that the two rooms in question belong to the defendants which they had purchased by a registered sale-deed. It was further pleaded that the defendants had taken possession of the said premises by virtue of the gift-deed executed in favour of the father of the defendants 1 and 2. It was also pleaded that the two rooms in question belong to the defendants which they had purchased by a registered sale-deed. It was, as well, pleaded that the defendants, though constructed some portion, but that did not alter to the detriment of the interest of the plaintiffs, nor any damage to the premises was caused. 4. The trial Court dismissed the suit. The plaintiff preferred the first appeal which was allowed holding that the denial of title under Section 12 (1) (c) of the Act had been proved and further sub-letting of the accommodation was also proved. Hence, ground under Section 12 (1) (b) of the Act is also made out. The other grounds under Section 12 (1) (a), 12 (1)(d) and 12 (1) (h) of the Act were not accepted by lower appellate Court. 5. The following substantial questions of law were framed by this Court prior to remand:- 1. Whether, in view of the judgment and decree dated 18.9.1978, passed by Shri N.S. Rajput, First Civil Judge (Cl. II), Sagar, in Civil Suit No. 6-A of 1977, it could be said that the defendant has sub-letted the suit premises to Ram Mohan; and has, thereby, liable to ejectment under section 12 (1) (b) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. ? 2. Whether, in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, any case for the defendant's ejectment under Section 12 (1) (c) of the Act, has been made out? 6. This Court, by judgment dated 31.7.1.990 passed the following order:- 14. Having heard the arguments of both the parties and on perusal of the documents. I feel that this case must be sent back to the lower appellate Court for reconsideration of the documents filed in this case at this stage as those documents would require reconsideration of the entire evidence and the documents on record. Since these documents are filed in this Court with an application under Order 41, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, I feel it just and proper to admit all documents and remand the case for appreciation of the entire evidence both oral and documentary and for giving a finding according to law. Since these documents are filed in this Court with an application under Order 41, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, I feel it just and proper to admit all documents and remand the case for appreciation of the entire evidence both oral and documentary and for giving a finding according to law. If the parties want to lead any further evidence or plead further, it will be open to them to amend their pleadings and lead evidence. If the plaintiffs desire to file documents in rebuttal, they will be at liberty to file the documents. The lower appellate Court shall, thereafter, give a finding and send the record to this Court within four months from today. 15. The case is remanded with the directions as given in paragraph 14 above. The parties are directed to appear before the First Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Sagar, on 8.9.1990. 7. As already stated, the lower appellate Court was required to give a fresh judgment in light of above order of remand, passed by this Court and the learned Additional District Judge, by order dated 18.4.1994 has recorded the findings again. The findings of learned Additional District Judge may be summarised as follows:- (i) That it has not been proved that land lord (respondent in the appeal) is entitled to evict the tenants-appellants under Section 12 (1) (a) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. (ii) The respondents No. 1 landlord was unable to prove its requirement under Section 12 (1) (h) of the Act and the findings of the trial Court were confirmed. (iii) There is no evidence to prove the ground under Section 12 (1) (d) of the Act. (iv) There is no ground for eviction under Section 12 (1) (c) of the Act. (v) So far as Section 12 (1) (b) of 'the Act' was concerned the lower appellate Court has recorded a finding partially, in favour of the tenant-appellant and partially in favour of the landlord-respondent. It was found by the lower appellate Court that the respondent was unable to prove that appellants had sub let any portion of the suit accommodation to Premnarayan Panwala. The other finding in this respect is that appellants predecessor-in-title was sub-let of parted with possession in a portion of the suit accommodation to Ram Mohan Purohit and the appellants are liable to be evicted on that ground. The other finding in this respect is that appellants predecessor-in-title was sub-let of parted with possession in a portion of the suit accommodation to Ram Mohan Purohit and the appellants are liable to be evicted on that ground. It was also held that Mewalal entered into premises at instance of Ram Mohan Purohit who had sublet or parted with its possession. Therefore, also ground under section also 12(1) (b) of the Act has been proved. 8. The remand order did not expressly set aside the judgment and decree of the Court below and did not call for a fresh finding a trial Court in the light of additional evidence produced by the appellant on the issues in the appeal. The counsel for parties also did not point out to the Court in case the learned Single Judge wanted to remand the case on the issues involved and retain sesin of the case then this Court should have framed the point on which the findings of the lower appellate Court was called for. The attention of this Court was not drawn to the case of Temple Shri Radha Krishna Vs. Ramlal Baijal 1965 J.L.J. 507 wherein the Supreme Court has held that the findings should be called from the trial Court first and then they should be sent to first appellate Court so that they be binding in second appeal. Nor was the attention of the learned single Judge drawn to Order XLI Rule 29 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In such a situation the lower appellate Court has given entirely new findings and the counsel for the parties have argued on that basis. This Court too is bound by the order of remand and lakes it that learned single Judge had remanded the case on all issues retaining the sesin of the case and therefore, only the findings recorded by the Additional District Judge after remand, shall guide this Court in deciding the issues involved in this appeal and not earlier judgment passed by the lower appellate Court. 9. I find from record that counsel for respondent, on 1.8.94, has filed a cross objection. The appellant has filed an objection to the finding recorded by the lower appellate Court on 24.1.96. Alter going through the objections to finding it is not necessary to frame any substantial question of law. 9. I find from record that counsel for respondent, on 1.8.94, has filed a cross objection. The appellant has filed an objection to the finding recorded by the lower appellate Court on 24.1.96. Alter going through the objections to finding it is not necessary to frame any substantial question of law. The cross-objection filed by the respondent, however, raises on substantial question of law which is being framed without any objection on the part of the counsel for the appellant. Both the counsel had addressed the Court on this point and counsel for the appellant had agreed that in case, this Court agrees with the contention of respondent, raised by him in ground No. 14, then it would not be necessary to decide this appeal under the provisions of the Act. In view of the aforesaid situation, this Court frames a substantial question of law No. 3, as follows:- (3) Whether the lower appellate Court rightly held that Act would still be applicable to appellant despite by Notification dated 7.9.89 a public trust fulfilling the conditions of section 3 (2) of the Act exempted from the operation of the Act? This Court was not required to frame any other question of law proposed by counsel for the parties. 10. As it claimed that the respondent No. 1 is a registered public trust, this point can be decided assuming the respondent No. 1 to be a public trust, at the outset. The notification issued by the State Government reads as follows:- Notification No. F-24 - (4)-(83)-XXXII-I, dated the 7th September. 1989. - In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (No. XLI of 1961), the State Government hereby exempts all the accommodation owned by- (i) the Wakf, registered under the Wakf Act, 1954 (No. 29 of 1954), or (ii) the public trust registered under the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951 (No. XXX of 1851), for an educational religious or charitable purpose. from all the provisions of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (No. XLI of 1961). (Reproduced from 1989 (2) M.P.L.T. 199, Item No. (103). This notification is issued under Section 3 (2) of the Act. The language of section 3 (2) of the Act does not authorise the Government to issue a retrospective notification. The language is very clear. from all the provisions of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (No. XLI of 1961). (Reproduced from 1989 (2) M.P.L.T. 199, Item No. (103). This notification is issued under Section 3 (2) of the Act. The language of section 3 (2) of the Act does not authorise the Government to issue a retrospective notification. The language is very clear. However, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 argues that once the respondent No. 1 is exempted by subordinate registration, then it will ensure to the benefit of respondent No. 1 in a pending suit. This subsequent change in law could affect the pending litigation. Otherwise, the result would be absurd. The counsel for the appellant, on the other hand, urges that there cannot be any subordinate legislation in respect of a property unless there is specific power under the statute to do so expressly or by necessary implication. 11. It is not in dispute that when the suit was filed there was no such notification. The notification has published only in the year 1989. The question that props up is whether this Court can take notice of this subsequent event and hold that his subordinate legislation is retrospective in operation. In other words, whether this notification would ensure to benefit of the respondent-landlord. It is clear that Section 3 of the Act does not give power to issue notification with retrospective effect. Nor does the notification itself says that it is retrospective in operation. It is well settled that the parent Statute must give power to the delegate making a sub-ordinate legislation expressly or by necessary intendment to frame a rule, byelaw or notification with retrospective effect. If the language of the parent statute is not express, then the Court may examine the language of the parent Statute and find out if there was any intendment. In the leading case on this point there was no difference of opinion between the majority of Judges and Subba Rao J., on this point. However, the majority found as a matter of construction of the entire enactment, that there was necessary intendment in section 12 (1) of the Forward Contracts Regulation Act 1951 permitting the framing of bye law as to subsisting contracts. Subbarao, J. held to the contrary as a matter of construction of the Act aforesaid. However, the majority found as a matter of construction of the entire enactment, that there was necessary intendment in section 12 (1) of the Forward Contracts Regulation Act 1951 permitting the framing of bye law as to subsisting contracts. Subbarao, J. held to the contrary as a matter of construction of the Act aforesaid. Rajgopal Ayangar, J., speaking for the majority, held as follows in the case of Dr. Indramani Pyarelal Gupta and others Vs. W.R. Natu and others, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 274 :- .....It is clear law that a Statute which could validly enact a law with retrospective effect could in express terms validly confer upon a rule-making authority a power to make a rule or frame a bye-law having retrospective operation and we could add that we did not understand Mr. Pathak to dispute this position. If this were so the same result should follow where the power to enact a rule or bye-law with "retrospective effect" so as to affect pending transaction, is conferred not by expressed words but where the necessary intendment of the Act confers such power..... (Para 27) The view of Subba Rao. J. has been headnoted as under:- Unless a statute confers on the Government an express power to make an order with retrospective effect, it cannot exercise such a power. Section 12 (1) does not confer a power on the Central Government to make a bye-law with retrospective effect, and therefore, the new bye-law 52 AA made on January 21, 1968, in so far as it purports to operate retrospectively, is valid. The conferment of the power on the Government to make a bye-law with retrospective operation must be absolutely necessary and unavoidable to provide for the matter mentioned in sub-cl. (o) of S. 11 (2) or any other clause of sub-sec. (2) of S. 11. It cannot, therefore, be said that unless retrospective operation was given to the provisions of S. 12, the objects of the legislation would be defeated or the purposes for which the power was conferred could not be fulfilled. Section 12 (1) does not confer any such power on the Central Government by necessary implication. Union of India Vs. Madan Gopal A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 158 Modi Food Products Vs. Commissioner of Sales Tax. A.I.R. 1956 All 35 Strawboard Mfg. Company Vs. G. Mill Workers Union A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 95 India Sugars & Refineries Ltd. Vs. Section 12 (1) does not confer any such power on the Central Government by necessary implication. Union of India Vs. Madan Gopal A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 158 Modi Food Products Vs. Commissioner of Sales Tax. A.I.R. 1956 All 35 Strawboard Mfg. Company Vs. G. Mill Workers Union A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 95 India Sugars & Refineries Ltd. Vs. State A.I.R. 1960 Mys. 326 C.W. Motor Service (Pr.) Ltd. Vs. State of Kerala A.I.R. 1959 Ker 347 Howell Vs. Falmouth Boal Construction Co. Ltd. 1951 A.C. 837 relied on. Similar view was expressed by Supreme Court in the case of The Income Tax Officer, Alleppey Vs. I.M.C. Ponnoose and others, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 385; The Cannanore Spining and Weaving Mills Ltd., Vs. The Collector of Customs and Central Excise, Cochin and others A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1950, and in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax, U.P. II. Lucknow Vs. Bazpur Cooperative Sugar Factory, ltd. Bazpur. Dist. Nainital, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1263. 12. Thus, it is clear from the principles laid down above, one must construe the parent Statute to find that delegated making of law could be retrospectively enacted. There is nothing in the express words of Section 3 that a retrospective exemption could be granted. Nor docs the intendment could be found there in any other connected section. The learned counsel for the respondent was unable to say how as a matter of construction this Court could hold otherwise. Moreover, the plain language of notification makes it prospective in operation. In the case of Sri Vijayalakshmi Rice Mills, New Contractors Co. etc. Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1471, at page 1473 it was emphasised that:- .....It is well recognized rule of interpretation that in the absence of express words or appropriate language from which retrospectivity may be inferred, a notification takes effect from the date it is issued and not from any prior date .... Thus, the contention of the counsel for respondent No. 1 is not accepted. 13. The next question that has to be decided is whether Balmukund Pateriya had sub let or otherwise parted with possession so as to providing ground for eviction of the appellant in favour of respondent No. 1 under Section 12(1) (b) of the Act. The original lease-deed is Ex. P-17, dated 14.9.1937. 13. The next question that has to be decided is whether Balmukund Pateriya had sub let or otherwise parted with possession so as to providing ground for eviction of the appellant in favour of respondent No. 1 under Section 12(1) (b) of the Act. The original lease-deed is Ex. P-17, dated 14.9.1937. It is singed by lessee as well as one Noor Mohammad Vakil, who was appointed as the receiver and the manager of the property on behalf of respondent No. 1. The lease was for running a sweetmeat shop. The agreed rent was Rs. 30/- per month. The lease was agreed to be for two years from 1.10.37 to 30.9.1939. This is a registered document and is proved by P.W. 5 Mohd. Ibrahim in his evidence. The boundaries of the accommodation as existed, is shown at the foot of the agreement. It shows that at that lime on the Eastern side was the house of Masjid. On the Western side there was a road. On the North side there was Veterinary Hospital and on the southern side there was a house of one Hazzan. The measurement given in this deed are Noth-Sourth 18 feet and East-West 22 feet. Then there is another document, Ex. P- 18 dated 7.7.78 which is Kirayanama for the same house at the rale of Rs. 75/- per month. There is specific condition in this agreement that house would not be sub-let. Then there is Ex. P-19, dated 9.8.49, by which the rent was increased to Rs. 80/- from June, 1949. Here also there is specific condition that the house would not be sublet. Against this the appellant relics on certified copy Ex. D-7 dated 31.8.51. In paragraph 21 of his statement recorded on 15.2.93 after remand, D.W. 6/ appellant Santosh Kumar has staled that he had filed Ex. D-7, the certified copy of the order of Rent Controlling Authority, alongwith compormise application. It has been marked cumulatively as Ex. D-7. Therefore, there is no substance in argument of the respondent No. 1 that the compromise application in Revenue Case No. 33/7 of 1950-51 before Shri K.T. Damle. Rent Controlling Officer has not been proved legally. This document is part of Ex. D-7 and it should have been attached with Ex. D-7, the compromise order. However, this Court treats it as part of Ex. D-7. Rent Controlling Officer has not been proved legally. This document is part of Ex. D-7 and it should have been attached with Ex. D-7, the compromise order. However, this Court treats it as part of Ex. D-7. It is certified copy of the compromise application whereby the case was disposed of as per order dated 31.8.51. No objection was raised by the respondent No. 1 as to its admission. Therefore, it is and it shall be treated as part of Ex. D-1 and office is directed to attach it to Ex. D-7. Thus, the Court can look into this document dt. 24.9.51 alongwith the order on compromise of which it forms the part. Here rent is increased to Rs. 90/- per month from Rs. 75/- per month. It is interesting to note that this application was agreed to by both the parties. In this application, the Secretary, Jama Masjid Committee had given permission in writing to give the suit house to son-in-law and the Panwala. It is also further written in that application that anybody else other than above mentioned persons are to be inducted then lessee would seek permission of the committee. This document is signed by Balmukund Pateriya and the Secretary. 14. Now, in the light of above document we have to examine the evidence on record. It is clear from the evidence on record that Panwala referred to in the document Ex. D-7 is none other than Prem Narayan and son-in-law is Ram Mohan Purohit. The learned Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge has not referred to the aforesaid document while recording finding in case of Pan-shop or in case of Son-in-law. The learned Judge has found that the pan-shop has been opened on the Nazul plot and not in the suit property. As to possession of Ram Mohan Purohit, the learned Judge has given a halting finding. Despite the version of Ram Mohan Purohit on whose evidence the learned Judge relied, the learned Judge has not given specific finding as to subletting. When Ram Mohan Purohit himself says that he used to pay rent to Balmukund Pateriya, it could not be anything, but subletting. Despite the version of Ram Mohan Purohit on whose evidence the learned Judge relied, the learned Judge has not given specific finding as to subletting. When Ram Mohan Purohit himself says that he used to pay rent to Balmukund Pateriya, it could not be anything, but subletting. Without considering the finding of lower appellate Court that the pan-shop does not exist on leased premises, winch in all probability, exists in the suit premises, it is found that even if Balmukund Pateria sublet the suit - premises to Prem Narayan Panwala, respondent No. 5 and Ram Mohan Purohit a part of suit-premises, he had done so after obtaining previous permission in writing. This rules out the operation of Section 12 (1) (b) of the Act, so for subletting to Prem Narayan or Ram Mohan Purohit is concerned. In view of the fact that the learned single Judge has called direct finding from the lower appellate Court, this Court is entitled to consider the finding and reverse it, if need be, in view of decision of Supreme Court in the case of Temple Radha Krishna Vs. Ramlal Baijal. (supra). 15. Now, the next limb of argument of counsel for the appellants is that the suit house was not let out to another person Mewalal. The learned counsel for the appellants vehemently argued that this finding is totally contrary to preponderance of the probabilities of the case. This contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is well worth examining before embarking on outer points involved in the case. 16. The Court below has held in paragraph 57 that according to P.W. 5 Mohd. Ibrahim himself Ram Mohan Purohit had subject a part of protion in his occupation as a sub-tenant, to Mewalal. We have to examine the evidence of Ram Mohan Purohit (D.W. 1) (for defendants No. 3 and 5). His evidence in respect of Mawalals possession is that he is doing hotel business in the part of premises under his occupation and he has entered into agreement with Mewalal as per agreement Ex. D-1 (for defendants No. 3 and 5). Therefore, we have to examine the terms of Ex D-1 (for defendants No. 3 and 5) because Section 91, Evidence Act bars oral evidence, for ascertaining terms of document reduced to writing. After going through Ex. D-1 (for defendants No. 3 and 5). Therefore, we have to examine the terms of Ex D-1 (for defendants No. 3 and 5) because Section 91, Evidence Act bars oral evidence, for ascertaining terms of document reduced to writing. After going through Ex. D-1, aforesaid, carefully, this Court finds that there is no substance in the argument of counsel for the respondent No. 1 that Ram Mohan Purohit sub-let the house to Mewalal. On the other hand, the whole tenor of the document is that Mewalal is employed as a servant. It is also stipulated for the services rendered Mewalal shall gel Rs. 300/- per month from Ram Mohan. It is a long document but it is clearly envisaged that Mewalal shall work for Ram Mohan Purohit as a manager and would be liable for his business. In view of this position, this Court cannot come to conclusion that Ram Mohan either sub-let or parted with possession. He merely allowed Mewalal as a manager to serve in the premises. At best, Mewalal would be licencee. He is not a tenant. Nor was actual control lost by Ram Mohan Purohit. For the aforesaid reasons, the finding of lower appellate Court is bad and it is reversed. The respondent No. 1 is therefore, not entitled to evict the appellants on the ground of section 12 (1) (b) of the Act. 17. The learned counsel for the appellants tried to draw the attention of this Court to certified copy of judgment and decree in Civil Suit No. 6-A of 1977, dated 18.9.1978, decided by Shri N.S. Rajput, First Civil Judge, Class II, Sagar together with application under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, filed by the respondent No. 1 Jama Masjid Committee (appellant in the lower appellate Court), before the lower appellate Court, numbered as I.A. No. 4, in Civil Appeal No. 6-A of 1976. It was ordered by the lower appellate Court that this application shall be considered at the time of final hearing, by order sheet dated 8.11.78. This point was considered by Shri S.K. Tiwari. Additional District Judge, who passed the judgment and decree dated 7.9.83, in paragraph 15. It was ordered by the lower appellate Court that this application shall be considered at the time of final hearing, by order sheet dated 8.11.78. This point was considered by Shri S.K. Tiwari. Additional District Judge, who passed the judgment and decree dated 7.9.83, in paragraph 15. Since this Court had ordered the lower appellate Court to record its finding afresh on all the points, the learned Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Shri N.C. Nagraj should have again considered application under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure and considered the effect of judgment and decree dated 18.9.78 in civil Appeal No. 6-A/77. The lower appellate Court, in second round, has not admitted this document and it appears that this point was not pressed before him. Therefore, it would not be proper to consider the effect of this document at this stage. This Court has held that ground under Section 12 (1) (b) of the Act is not made out independently of the judgment in Civil Appeal No. 6-A of 1977. 18. The learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 has attacked the finding of the Court below on the ground under Section 12 (1) (c) of the Act, holding that no such ground is made out. He referred to Ex. P-1, the map and pointed out that on Eastern side at the points A and B there are two rooms, which were part of leased premises. This appellants have denied their title to these rooms. Therefore, the plaint was amended and paragraph 4-A was added to plaint raising the ground under Section 12 (1) (c) of the Act. 19. In order to examine the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1, it is necessary to examine the plaint to find out if there is any specific plea regarding leasing out of these rooms. The plaint map or the house number is not given. It is pleaded in the plaint that suit house was let out after reconstruction in the year 1940 at the rate of Rs. 50/- per month. Whereas, the document Ex. P-17 shows that two rooms and one verandas were the part of leased property. There is no change in Ex. P-18 and Ex. P-19 because the leased property is not shown in these documents. 50/- per month. Whereas, the document Ex. P-17 shows that two rooms and one verandas were the part of leased property. There is no change in Ex. P-18 and Ex. P-19 because the leased property is not shown in these documents. Now, since it is the case of respondent No. 1 that in 1940 there was additional rooms constructed by Balmukund at the rate of Rs. 40/- as rent, the burden of proof lay upon respondent No. 1 to plead and prove that additional rooms were the part of leased premises. The Ex. P-1 shows that leased premises were much more than what was leased initially, by the respondent No. 1. They now say that apart from two rooms and a verandah (Dalan) there was one Courtyard and two rooms used as shops and a Chhapri i.e. verandah covered by a root. The oral evidence on record does not establish that any reconstruction was made by Balmukund. On the other hand, there is document, Ex. P-10 on record, to the effect that Balmukund had purchased the premises from Abdul Majid, on 13.3.48, which had two rooms and a Chhapri. There is another sale-deed Ex. P-2 on record, whereby Balmukund had purchased nearby property. There is evidence of P.W. 5, Ibrahim to the effect that in the year 1940 Balmukund had been given a larger portion of accommodation than which was given to him earlier. However, we cannot rely on the evidence of this witness because the documentary evidence belies the case of respondent No. 1. If there was change of position in respect of lease, Ex. P-17, from 14.9.37 to 30.9.39 then it would have found mention in Ex. P-18 when the rent was increased to Rs. 75/-. The document Ex. P-19 mentions Kotha only and not the number of rooms and the courtyard. In this connection, evidence of P.W. 7 Mohammad Yunus, who was Secretary of respondent No. 1, from 1948 to 1960, is relevant. The witness says that the two rooms were let out prior to 1948. The committee must have the Kirayanama of 1950-51 showing possession, which, according to this witness, was executed in his hand. The witness was unable to say whether he had seen any map with old rent-rates. Why was this rent-note of 1950-51 was with held? There is no clear explanation given by the respondent No. 1 in its evidence. The committee must have the Kirayanama of 1950-51 showing possession, which, according to this witness, was executed in his hand. The witness was unable to say whether he had seen any map with old rent-rates. Why was this rent-note of 1950-51 was with held? There is no clear explanation given by the respondent No. 1 in its evidence. It would be proper to draw an adverse inference against the respondent No. 1 that this document would not help its case. In the State of affairs when none of the witnesses examined by respondent No. 1 could state about renewal of lease in favour of Balmukund Chourasia in respect of larger premises then that was let out in the year 1937, it would be in fitness of things to hold that respondent No. 1 was unable to prove that the rooms A and B marked in the map Ex. P-1 were part and parcel of leased premises. Therefore, ground under Section 12 (1) (c) of the Act is not made out. This Court has refrained from making any observations on title of roms etc, as is done by the Court below last it be resjudicata in a title suit. 20. Moreover, the learned counsel for the appellant has pointed out that respondent No. 1 itself has tiled a title suit in respect of two rooms. This is numbered as Civil Suit No. 61-A of 1971, in the Court of Civil Judge Class-II, for mandatory injunction and removal of additional structure as noted by this Court in para 6 of the remand order. Under such circumstances the denial of title would not be ground for evicting the appellants. The respondent No. 1, by filing a suit for title, tacitly admits or at least doubts that extra rooms should be subject matter of title suit rather than that of landlord against the tenant. When landlord himself is not sure as to extent of premise let out then the tenant, if he takes a stand that the landlord is claiming more than what was let out, can it be said that he has disclaimed the title of landlord. The answer would be in negative. Here, the tenant is asserting his right and landlord himself thinks that the tenant probably is right and shows that by its action of bringing a suit for title. The answer would be in negative. Here, the tenant is asserting his right and landlord himself thinks that the tenant probably is right and shows that by its action of bringing a suit for title. Under such circumstances the landlord must be estopped from asserting his claim of tenancy when he claims title and files the suit on that basis. For the aforesaid reasons also, this Court comes to the conclusion that the respondent No. 1 is unable to prove that a decree should be passed in its favour under Section 12 (1) (c) of the Act. 21. In view of the finding recorded by this Court, substantial question of law No. 1 is modified in the following manner in exercise of its power given to it by proviso to section 100 (4) of the Code of Civil Procedure: Whether the respondent No. I had been able to prove subletting in favour of Ram Mohan Purohit. Prem Narayan Panwala or Mewalal or parting with possession contrary to section 12 (1) (b) of the Act? The question No. 2 is the same as already quoted by this Court in paragraph 3. The question No. 3, framed by this Court is quoted in paragraph 9 of this judgment. The answers to all these questions go in favour of the appellants and against the respondent No. 1. 22. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that all the adverse findings recorded by lower appellate Court, after remand, in respect of the ground under section 12 (1) (b) of the Act act set aside. The conclusion of the lower appellate Court that under section 12 (1) (e) of the Act, no ground is made out, is confirmed. It is also held that the respondent No. 1 is not exempted from application of the Act, so far as this suit is concerned. 23. In view of the above conclusion of this Court, Judgment and decree passed by lower appellate Court, dated 7-9-1983, in Civil Appeal No. 29-A of 1983 are set aside and that of the trial Court dated 2.8.1972, passed in Civil suit No. 131-A of 1970 are restored. The appeal is allowed accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs of this appeal. Appeal allowed