Judgment R. M. Prasad, J. 1. As in both the writ applications, the parties are same and the common question is involved, with the consent of the parties, they have been heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. In both the writ applications, the prayer is for quashing of the re-assessment order dated 29.10.1985 passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (respondent No.2) in exercise of the power under Sec.19 (1) of the bihar Finance Act, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) as well as the consequential demand notices dated 26.12.1985 for the periods 1982-83 and 1983-84, contained in Annexures 2 and 3, respectively of the said writ applications. 3. In short, the case of the petitioner firm is that they are manufacturers of sprayers of various types used in agricultural operations for spraying insecticides and pesticides. It is stated that the sprayers manufactured by them are mainly supplied to the Department of Agriculture, Government of Bihar. 4. The petitioner filed return for the aforementioned periods in question i. e.1982-83 and 1983-84 showing their g. T. O. at Rs.22,97,363.05 and Rs.5,41,185.13 and claimed exemption in respect of the aforesaid items on the ground that they are agricultural implements. The Deputy Commissioner of commercial Taxes, vide order dated 14.11.1984 (Annexure 1), accepted the claim of exemption and passed order of assessment accordingly. However, on 18.9.1985, notices under Sec.19 (1)of the Act for re-assessment were issued on account of alleged erroneous grant of exemption to the petitioner, who in response to the same filed their show cause saying that the exemption granted earlier, vide aforesaid order, was rightly granted. 5. The Deputy Commissioner, vide impugned order (Annexure 2), after noticing the audit objection that food sprayer, knap sack sprayer, hard compressor sprayer, rocking sprayer, etc. are taxable items and that the exemption granted earlier in respect of the same was erroneous, treating the said items as agricultural implements, held the petitioner liable to pay tax and consequently issued impugned demand notice, contained in Annexure 3. 6. are taxable items and that the exemption granted earlier in respect of the same was erroneous, treating the said items as agricultural implements, held the petitioner liable to pay tax and consequently issued impugned demand notice, contained in Annexure 3. 6. It was submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the very initiation of the re-assessment proceeding as well as the ultimate re-assessment impugned order are wholly without jurisdiction and are fit to be set aside inasmuch as, according to the learned counsel, the impugned orders for re-assessment have been passed merely on the recommendation of the audit objection which is not permissible in law. He submitted that the audit objection cannot be said to be an information within the meaning of Sec.19 (1) of the Act which is a condition precedent for initiation of re-assessment proceeding and for passing of the re-assessment order. According to him, in the absence of said valid condition, the assessing Officer had no jurisdiction to either initiate or to make re-assessment order. Learned counsel also submitted that from the facts and circumstances of the case, the re-assessment is based on account of mere change of opinion on the same set of facts and materials, which were already on the record and which had been verified by the assessing officer at the time of making original assessment order and as such, the re-assessment order is wholly without jurisdiction and fit to be quashed, in view of the law settled by this Court as well as by the Apex court in the cases of M/s. Bhimraj madan Lal V/s. The State of Bihar and another, 1984 PLJR 584 and 875, M/s. Indian and Eastern Newspapers Society, new Delhi V/s. The Commissioner of income-tax, New Delhi, AIR 1979 S. C.1960 and Shree Bihariji Mills Ltd. and another V/s. The State of Bihar and another (1988) 71 S. T. C.293 (para 8 ). It was submitted that the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Indian and Eastern newspapers Society, New Delhi (supra)held that an audit report is merely a second opinion on second thought of the auditor and the same cannot form basis for initiation of re-assessment proceedings under the Act. On merit, learned Counsel submitted that the sprayers sold and supplied by the petitioner are agricultural implements and, therefore, exemption was rightly granted. On merit, learned Counsel submitted that the sprayers sold and supplied by the petitioner are agricultural implements and, therefore, exemption was rightly granted. In support of this, he placed reliance on a Division Bench decision of allahabad High Court in case of Commissioner of Sales Tax V/s. Bishram Tiwari (1971) 28 STC 485 . 7. On the other hand, learned standing Counsel No.1 submitted that there is no substance in either of the aforementioned submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner. 8. It is true that the Supreme court, in the case of M/s. Indian and Eastern Newspapers Society, New Delhi (supra), while dealing with the provisions contained in Sec.147 (b)of the Income Tax Act, held that the opinion of Internal Audit Party of the income Tax Department on the point of law cannot be regarded as "information" within the meaning of sub-section (b)and, therefore, re-assessment cannot be re-opened on the basis of the opinion of the Internal Audit party of the Income tax Department and that the basis of the belief of Income-tax Officer for the purpose of re-opening assessment must be the law of which he has become aware. According to the Supreme court, in short, the true evaluation of the law in its bearing on the assessment must be made directly and solely by the Income-tax Officer. 9. It was submitted by learned standing Counsel No.1 that in the instant case, the Deputy Commissioner though has noticed the audit objection while passing the impugned order but from the reading of the impugned order it cannot be said that the re- assessment has been solely based on the said objection and that the Deputy Commissioner has not applied his independent mind directly. 10. I find substance in the submission of learned Standing Counsel No.1. It is true that in the impugned order (Annexure 2), the Deputy Commissioner has referred to the audit objection but, while narrating the fact, he also considered the notification dated 26.12.1977 in which the names of the aforementioned sprayers do not find place in the list of agricultural implements on which the exemptions were granted. 11. From the earlier order of assessment (Annexure 1) I find that there is no mention even of the aforesaid notification regarding exemption. In the said order the Deputy Commissioner allowed the exemption on mere claim being raised by the petitioner. 11. From the earlier order of assessment (Annexure 1) I find that there is no mention even of the aforesaid notification regarding exemption. In the said order the Deputy Commissioner allowed the exemption on mere claim being raised by the petitioner. Thus, obviously, the Deputy Commissioner, while passing the re- assessment order, has taken into consideration the list of the exempted items relating to agricultural implements, contained in the aforementioned notification dated 26.12.1977, which, in my opinion, will be an information within the meaning of section 19 (1) of the Act. The aforementioned decisions of the Supreme Court as well as of this Court relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, in my opinion, are of no help to the petitioner. In fact, in the said decision of the Supreme Court their Lordships have held that the basis of the belief of the Income-tax officer for the purpose of re-opening assessment must be the law of which he has become aware. 12. In exercise of the power conferred under the Act the State Government was pleased to exempt agricultural implements from the levy of sales tax, vide serial No.14 of the Notification no. Bikrikar/san. .1026/77-14547, dated 26.12.1977 and vide Notification No. S. O.1613, dated 28.10.81, the State government was further pleased to exempt |the agricultural implements from the levy of taxes. The entry agricultural implements for the purpose of exemption, as mentioned in the concerned notification, reads as follows:- "14. Agricultural implements worked by human or animal power, namely:- (i) Rahat Water lift. . . (ii) Archimedean screw pump. . . (iii) ploughs and parts thereof. . . (iv) spades (Kudali ). . . . (v) Hoes. . . (vi) phavras. . . (vii) Iron and leather mhots. . . (viii) Harrows. . . (ix) Sickles. . . (x) Khurpies. . . . (xi) Karing. . . . (xii) Kundi. . . . . (xiii) Chaff-cutter and spare parts thereof. . . . (xiv) Seed drill. . . . . (xv) Thrashers. . . . (xvi) Mowers. . . . (xvii) Cultivators. . . (xviii) Ridgers, and. . . . (xix) Land levellers. . . . " 13 In the instant case, respondent no.2 passed the impugned re-assessment order after becoming aware of the exact items of the Agricultural implements mentioned in the aforementioned notification granting exemption from levy of tax. . . . (xvi) Mowers. . . . (xvii) Cultivators. . . (xviii) Ridgers, and. . . . (xix) Land levellers. . . . " 13 In the instant case, respondent no.2 passed the impugned re-assessment order after becoming aware of the exact items of the Agricultural implements mentioned in the aforementioned notification granting exemption from levy of tax. Thus, I do not find substance in the first submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 14. On the question as to whether the aforementioned sprayers, though npt specifically included in serial No.14 of the list of agricultural implements exempted under the aforementioned notification, are also covered for exemption from the levy of sales tax under the said notification, the learned Standing counsel No.1 submitted that bare perusal of the said Government did not intend to grant exemption in respect of different kinds of sprayers, irrespective of the fact whether any of them is used in agriculture or not. 15. It is true that the Allahabad high Court in the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax V/s. Bishram Tiwari [ (1971) 28 stc 485 ] has considered a similar notification issued under Sec.4 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act granting exemptions from tax in respect of the agricultural implements by human or animal power. In the said notification also, items were specified by the use of the expression namely which did not contain the sprayers, yet it was held that the word namely has got no fixed meaning. Depending upon the context, it may mean that things which have been named or it may mean, "for example" or "such as" or "at least". Accordingly, the court held that it did not appear to have been the intention to exempt only some of the agricultural implements driven by human and animal power and to leave out others. According to the court, the idea was to exempt all agricultural implements driven by human or animal power and to tax only those agricultural implements which are worked otherwise than by human or animal power. However, in the said case, no dispute by the Sales lax department was raised that a sprayer is an agricultural implement. 16. In the case of In re Brocket dawes V/s. Miller. However, in the said case, no dispute by the Sales lax department was raised that a sprayer is an agricultural implement. 16. In the case of In re Brocket dawes V/s. Miller. , reported in 1908 (1)Chancery Division 185, while dealing with the question to determine as to what was the intention of the testatrix of a will held that the specification by name and locality introduced by the word "namely" is analogous and equivalent to a specification in a conveyance by schedule, or schedule and plan, and is not merely an imperfect enumeration of the properties intended to be devised. In other words, according to the Chancery Division, the specification by name and locality, which is free from all ambiguity, forms the leading description ana that No.1, Hare Court did not pass by the specific devise in question; and that is what a testatrix really intended. I wish to quote some discussion in the said decision made by the Chancery Division in support of the aforesaid proposition:- "in West vs. Lawday (1) Lord westbury proceeds further to say-it is in the very next paragraph (2): "it is altogether a mistake to suppose that the language of this will" he is speaking of the will of course, In West V/s. Lawday (1) - "is capable of being brought within the range of that maxim. That maxim to which I refer is applicable to a case where some subject-matter is devised as a whole under a denomination which is applicable to the entire land, and then the words of description that include and denote the entire subject-matter are followed by words which are added on the principle of enumeration, but do not completely enumerate and exhaust all the particulars which are comprehended and included within the antecedent, universal, or generic denomination. Then the ordinary principle and rule of law, which is perfectly consistent with common sense and reason, is this: that the entirely which has been expressly and definitely given shall not be prejudiced by an imperfect and inaccurate enumeration of the particulars of the specific gift. Then the ordinary principle and rule of law, which is perfectly consistent with common sense and reason, is this: that the entirely which has been expressly and definitely given shall not be prejudiced by an imperfect and inaccurate enumeration of the particulars of the specific gift. "now, notwithstanding this, I think I may say that there is certainly no rule that in a will where there are two complete descriptions the former shall prevail over the latter; and I cannot think that Lord Westbury meant to lay down positively that in a will where you have once got a complete description of a subject-matter in general and collective terms every or any subsequent enumeration of particulars must necessarily be rejected if it do not include each and every item of the particulars which would be included in the first or general designation standing by itself. Obviously, I think, much must or may depend upon the terms in which the enumeration of the particulars is introduced. It may be introduced in such a way as to show that what the testator was doing was, in Lord Westburys own words (1), to use words plainly meant to substitute a definite and precise statement for an antecedent generality. Supposing in the present case the testatrix instead of the word "namely" had made use of the expression "what I mean is," the enumeration following by name and locality must then, i think, necessarily have been read as explanatory, and if required as restrictive, of the prior general description. For instance, in the case of Barton V/s. Dawes (2)there was a conveyance of all that messuage of farm-house closed of land, and so on, called Gottom Farm in the occupation of J. S. , and containing and consisting of the several particulars specified in the first division of a schedule thereunder and more particularly delineated in a map, and it turned out that there was a piece of land, part of the farm, which was not included in the schedule or plan, though part of the farm, and so occupied. It was held that what was not included in the schedule did not pass. It was held that what was not included in the schedule did not pass. In Griffiths V/s. Penson (1), which is a decision of Pollock c. B. in the Court of Exchequer, there was a conveyance by a deed of ail that messuage with the land, and C. , belonging, late in the occupation of Barrett, and which house and lands are called by the names following, naming the greater part but not all the close whereof the farm consisted, and the conveyance was held to pass only closes expressly named, and not the residue also. Numerous other cases to the same effect are to be found in Norton on deeds at p.210 and the following pages. It is quite clear, to my mind, that if there be a conveyance of real estate described in general terms followed by a definite and specific enumeration of particulars, as by schedule with or without plan, which enumeration omits something which might otherwise have been covered by the general description, then, generally speaking, the designation by schedule and plan would not be read as an imperfect enumeration to be disregarded as "falsa demonstratio," but as restrictive of the prior general description. " 17. The Supreme Court in the case of Mahindra Engineering and Chemical products Ltd. V/s. Union of India and others (1992) 1 SCC 727 was dealing with the scope of Items 22-F (4) and 68 of the First Schedule of Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944. The question raised therein was that if the tubular-shaped are chamber housing manufactured by the appellants from glass fabrics which they purchased from manufacturers were exigible to duty under tariff Item 22-F (4) or under residuary Item 68 in the First Schedule to the aforesaid Act. Manner of manufacture of arc chamber housing was not in dispute nor there was any dispute that it was manufactured from glass fabric purchased from open market in which glass fibre predominated. Manner of manufacture of arc chamber housing was not in dispute nor there was any dispute that it was manufactured from glass fabric purchased from open market in which glass fibre predominated. The issue was whether the arc chamber manufactured from glass fibre, a product of intermediate stage and not directly from mineral fibre of yarn was exigible to duty under Item 22-F (4) which read as under:- "22-F. Mineral fibres and yarn and manufactures therefrom, in or in relation to the manufacture of which any process is ordinarily carried on with the aid of power, the following, namely : (1) glass fibres and yarn including glass tissues and glass wool; (2) asbestos fibre and yarn; (3) any other mineral fibre or yarn, whether continuous or otherwise, such as, slag wool and rock wool; (4) other manufactures in which mineral fibres or yarn or both predominate or predominates in weight. Explanation: This item does not include asbestos cement products. " The Assistant Collector held that the goods were covered under tariff item 22-F (4) as the percentage of the mineral fibre yarn was predominant in the weight. In appeal it was held that the words "manufacture therefrom" in tariff Item 22-F (4) would include not only first manufacture of mineral fibre of yarn but also subsequent manufacture where in mineral fibre or yarn was used. This was affirmed by the Tribunal on construction of the expression "manufacture therefrom" which were capable of a simple and straightway meaning that the goods should be manufactured from mineral fibre and yarn. 18 The Apex Court in the said case held that the entry is in two parts, one, descriptive and the other explanatory. Both are to be read together to bring out the scope and extent of its applicability fully. The first declares the items which are exigible to duty. But restricts it to only those in relation to the manufacture of which any process is ordinarily carried on with the aid of power. It was further held that having thus specified the items and the condition on which it would be covered in the entry it proceeds to amplify it in the second part by using the words following namely thus explaining the items that were intended to be covered in this entry. It was further held that having thus specified the items and the condition on which it would be covered in the entry it proceeds to amplify it in the second part by using the words following namely thus explaining the items that were intended to be covered in this entry. Use of expressions namely or that is to say followed by description of goods is usually exhaustive unless there are strong indications to the contrary. As the Supreme Court found that the language of serial No.4 is plain and simple, it intends to clarify the expression manufacture therefrom by expanding it to include in its ambit even those manufactures in which fibre or yarn predominated in weight. But it did not go beyond it and purported to include manufactures out of manufacture of a commodity in which mineral fibre or yarn predominated. A reference in this connection is also made to the supreme Court decision reported in (1976) 37 STC 319 . 19. In the present case, at serial no.14 of the notification the items, which have been exempted from the levy of tax, are agricultural implements worked by human and animal power, namely, those mentioned at serial No. (i) to (xix ). The Supreme Court has held in the aforesaid decision the use of the expressions namely, or that is to say followed by description of goods is usually exhaustive unless there are strong indications to the contrary. Here in the aforesaid notification, the use of the expression namely followed by description of goods mentioned in items no. (i) to (xix), in my opinion, is exhaustive as i do not find any indication to the contrary in the same much less strong indication. In fact, at serial No.14 every items, howsoever big or small it may be, which the Government intended to include for grant of exemption in respect of agricultural implements worked by human and animal power, have been included therein so much so that as against some items even parts thereof or spare parts thereof have been mentioned to include them also for exemption of levy of tax. 20. The aforementioned view that the description of goods mentioned in serial No.14 is exhaustive also gets support from the very use of the expression namely at serial No.14 containing "agricultural implements worked by human and animal power". 20. The aforementioned view that the description of goods mentioned in serial No.14 is exhaustive also gets support from the very use of the expression namely at serial No.14 containing "agricultural implements worked by human and animal power". Had the intention of the Government to include items other than which are described at items (i) to (xix), then the very description of agricultural implements worked by human and animal power was sufficient and there was no necessity to mention the description of goods/items of the principal item, namely, "agricultural implements worked by human and animal power". Any other construction would, in my opinion, result in altering the principal clause which would be contrary to the scheme of the entry and principle of construction. 21. It is not the case of the petitioner that the aforementioned sprayers manufactured by them are only used for agricultural purposes and only supplied to the State Government. In fact, as I have already noticed above their case is that the sprayers manufactured by them are mainly supplied to the Department of Agriculture, government of Bihar and not that they are supplied only to the Department of agriculture of the State of Bihar and that too as agricultural implements for agricultural purposes. Thus, in view of the aforementioned decision of the supreme Court as well as the aforementioned view expressed by the Chancery division, I am unable to accept the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax V/s. Bishram Tiwari (supra ). As such, I do not find any substance also in the second submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the sprayers sold and supplied by the petitioner are agricultural implements and, in any case, that they are covered for exemption of levy of sales tax under the aforementioned Government notification. 22. Accordingly, I do not find any merit in either of the two writ petitions and the same are dismissed. However, in the peculiar facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. Petition Dismissed.