H. L. DATTU, J. ( 1 ) PETITIONER, a discharged probationer, who was working in the office of Principal Munsiff and J. M. F. C. , Chickmagalur is before this Court in a petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the constitution of India, inter alia seeking the following reliefs:" (I) to quash, by issue of writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ or order, the impugned Order No. 62 of 1990, dated 5-7-1990 (Annexure-C) and No. 81 of 1990, dated 21-8-1990 (Annexure-E) of the 2nd respondent and the letter No. LCA-II 214 of 1990, dated 14-8-1990 (Annexure-D) of the 1st respondent; (ii) to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or order directing the 2nd respondent to take the petitioner back to duty immediately treating the period of absence from duty from the date of removal from service to the date of reinstatement as duty for all purposes including salary; (iii) to direct the 2nd respondent to consider and assess the suitability of the petitioner to hold the post of peon without any regard to the allegations of misconduct referred to in his order dated 5-7-1990 and pass appropriate orders in the matter". ( 2 ) BRIEF facts are, petitioner was appointed as peon and placed on probation for a period of two years, pursuant to an office proceedings No. 20 of 1987 of the 2nd respondent with effect from 11-5-1987. In the normal course, the probationary period would have come to an end by 10-5-1989. Petitioner's services were found unsatisfactory and for giving him a chance for improvement, his probationary period was extended by one more year with effect from 11-5-1989, as per the office proceedings No. 16 of 1990 of the second respondent dated 14-2-1990. Even this extended period of probation should have come to an end on 10-5-1990 but due to various circumstances, 2nd respondent had not declared the probationer to have satisfactorily completed his probationary period. Subsequently, by an Order No. 62 of 1990, dated 5th July, 1990, 2nd respondent exercising his powers under clause (b) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 of Karnataka Civil services (Probation) Rules, 1977 (for short 'probation Rules') has discharged the services of the petitioner on the ground of unsuitability to hold the post for which he was appointed as probationer. Subsequently, by an Order No. 62 of 1990, dated 5th July, 1990, 2nd respondent exercising his powers under clause (b) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 of Karnataka Civil services (Probation) Rules, 1977 (for short 'probation Rules') has discharged the services of the petitioner on the ground of unsuitability to hold the post for which he was appointed as probationer. The order so passed by 2nd respondent reads as under:"sri N. H. Ningegowda, peon was appointed as such on probation for a period of 2 years with effect from 11-5-1987 as per proceedings of this office read at Serial No. 1 above. Since the work and conduct report in respect of the official was not satisfactory his period of probation was extended by one year with effect from 11-5-1989 as per proceedings of this office read at serial No. 2 above. The Principal munsiff and J. M. F. C. , Chikmagalur in his letter dated 25-1-1990 under No. Nil of 1990 has reported that the official was absent from duty as watchman on 13-1-1990 and 14-1-1990 when he was placed incharge of watchman. Further, it is reported in the letter that the official has not improved himself in spite of warning issued on several occasions. Further, it is reported in the letter that the official is in the habit of remaining absent unauthorisedly for instance from 8-9-1989 to 10-9-1989 and also he is in the habit of leaving headquarters without permission. Further, it is reflected from the letter that the official is irresponsible, disobedient and unreliable. Further from the letter dated 19-6-1990 under No. 858 of 1990 the Principal munsiff and J. M. F. C. , Chickmagalur it is reflected that the official has not improved at all to become suitable to hold the post. In view of the above, I am satisfied that Sri N. H. Ningegowda, peon is not suitable to hold the post he has held so far. Hence, the following: "order No. 62 of 1990 chickmagalur, dated 5th July, 1990 in exercise of the powers vested in me under Rule 5 (1) (b) of the Karnataka Civil Services (Probation) Rules, 1977, Sri N. H. Ningegowda, peon, Principal Munsiff and j. M. F. C. Court, Chickmagalur, who is found not suitable to hold the post of peon for which he was appointed on ' probation is discharged from service". ( 3 ) THE 2nd respondent had intimated the aforesaid order to his higher authority namely the 1st respondent by his letter No. 379 of 1990, dated 5-7-1990. The 1st respondent by his letter dated 4th August, 1990 has confirmed the order discharging the petitioner from service as required under Rule 6 (1) of Probation rides and has further informed the 2nd respondent to incorporate the confirmation in the proceedings that would be issued by him. The Order No. LCA-II 214 of 1990, dated 13/14-8-1990 is extracted and it reads as under:"with reference to your letter No. 379 of 1990, dated 6-7-1990 on the subject cited above, I am directed to state that the Order No. 62 of 1990, dated 5-7-1990 passed by you discharging Sri N. H. Ningegowda, peon, Court of the principal Munsiff and J. M. F. C. , Chikmagalur from service on the ground that the said official is unsuitable to hold the post to which he was appointed is confirmed as required under Rule 6 (1) of the Karnataka Civil Services (Probation) Rules, 1977. This confirmation may be incorporated in the proceedings to be issued by you". ( 4 ) SECOND respondent pursuant to the letter of the 1st respondent, dated 13/14-8-1990 has discharged petitioner from service with immediate effect by his order No. 81 of 1990, dated 21-8-1990. The proceedings of the 2nd respondent reads as under:"order No. 81 of 1990 chickmagalur, dated 21st August, 1990 as the order No. 62 of 1990, dated 5-7-1990 passed by the undersigned discharging Sri N. H. Ningegowda, peon, court of the Principal Munsiff and J. M. F. C. , Chickmagalur from service is confirmed by the Hon'ble High Court of karnataka, Bangalore as required under Rule 6 (1) of the karnataka Civil Services (Probation) Rules, 1977, he is discharged from service with immediate effect". ( 5 ) IT is these proceedings and orders made by 1st and 2nd respondents have brought the petitioner before this Court, aggrieved by the same. ( 6 ) SRI B. 6. Bajantri, learned Counsel appearing for petitioner contends that the impugned orders are wholly invalid, illegal and inoperative and they are required to be quashed and further a direction has to be issued to the respondents to reinstate the petitioner into service with all consequential benefits including backwages. ( 6 ) SRI B. 6. Bajantri, learned Counsel appearing for petitioner contends that the impugned orders are wholly invalid, illegal and inoperative and they are required to be quashed and further a direction has to be issued to the respondents to reinstate the petitioner into service with all consequential benefits including backwages. The learned Counsel would contend further that the appointing Authority could not have passed the impugned order terminating the services of the petitioner after the expiry of extended period of probation and the action of the 2nd respondent, according to the learned Counsel is illegal. That apart it is contended that the impugned order is punitive in nature and it casts a stigma on the conduct of the petitioner and under the guise of order of termination simpliciter, 2nd respondent could not have passed the impugned order without holding an enquiry in accordance with the Karnataka Civil services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957 (for short 'c. C. A. Rules') and the entire action of the 2nd respondent is opposed to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution and therefore, before resorting to such an action and before passing the impugned order, the principles of natural justice should have been followed. According to the learned Counsel, the unilateral action by the 2nd respondent without offering an opportunity to show-casue against such an action is violative of Article 14 of the constitution, provisions of C. C. A. Rules, provisions of Probation rules, 1977 and against principles of natural justice. To reinforce his submission, the learned Counsel relies upon the observations made by Apex Court in number of cases, to which I will advert to during the course of this judgment a little later. ( 7 ) SRI B. Veerappa, learned High Court Government Pleader has filed counter-affidavit on behalf of respondents and further seeks to justify the impugned orders on the ground that the petitioner was only a probationer and his services could be discharged without assigning any reasons, and further he would contend that since the impugned order is only in the nature of discharge simpliciter, question of offering an opportunity to show cause or to hold any enquiry by following requirements of article 311 (2) of the Constitution does not arise. ( 8 ) THE rules which require to be considered in the present case is the Probation Rules, 1977. ( 8 ) THE rules which require to be considered in the present case is the Probation Rules, 1977. Under the rules, person "appointed on probation" means appointment on trial. Rule 3 of the Rules speaks of prescription pf probationary period as may be provided for in the rules of recruitment specially made for any post or service, which shall be riot less than two years. Rule 4 of the Rules envisages the extension or reduction the period of probation by the Appointing Authority. Rule 5 of the Rules which is an important provision for our purpose reads as under:"5. Declaration of satisfactory completion of probation, etc. (1) At the end of the prescribed or, as the case may be, the reduced or extended period of probation, the Appointing Authority shall consider the suitability of the probationer to hold the post to which he was appointed, and,- (a) if it decides that the probationer is suitable to hold the post to which he was appointed and has passed the special examinations or tests, if any, required to be passed during the period of probation, it shall, as soon as possible, issue an order declaring the probationer to have satisfactorily completed his probation and such an order shall have effect from the date of the expiry of the prescribed, reduced or extended period of probation; (b) if the Appointing Authority decided that the probationer is not suitable to hold the post to which he was appointed or has not passed the special examinations or special tests, if any, required to be passed during the period of probation, it shall, unless the period of probation is extended under Rule 4, by order, discharge him from service. (2) A probationer shall not be considered to have satisfactorily completed the probation unless a specific order to that effect is passed. Any delay in the issue of an order under sub-rule (1) shall not entitle the probationer to be deemed to have satisfactorily completed his probation". ( 9 ) SUB-RULE (1) of Rule 5 of the Probation Rules casts a duty on the Appointing Authority to consider the suitability of the probationer to hold the post to which he is appointed at the end of prescribed, extended or reduced period of probation. ( 9 ) SUB-RULE (1) of Rule 5 of the Probation Rules casts a duty on the Appointing Authority to consider the suitability of the probationer to hold the post to which he is appointed at the end of prescribed, extended or reduced period of probation. It also provides that after such consideration, if it decides that the probationer is suitable to hold the post to which he is appointet or has passed the special examinations or tests, if any, required to be passed during the period of probation, issue an order declaring the probationer to have satisfactorily completed his period of probation. The effect of such an order will have the effect from the date of expiry of the prescribed, reduced or extended period of probation. The language employed in the sub-rule clearly gives an indication that such an exercise has to be done by the Appointing Authority as early as possible after the expiry of the prescribed, reduced or extended period of probation and such a declaration has the effect from the date of the expiry of the period of probation. Clause (b) of sub-rule (1) of rule 5 of Probation Rules envisages a different situation altogether. It authorises the Appointing Authority to pass an order of discharge from service, the services of a probationer, if it decides that the probationer is not suitable to hold the post to which he is appointed or has not passed prescribed specisl examinations or tests which are required to be passed during the period of probation. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 indicates that unless a specific order is made by the Appointing Authority declaring the completion of probationary period of a probationer, it cannot be presumed that the probationer after completion of the probationary period to have completed the period of probation. White construing the scope and ambit of sub-rule (2) of Rule 5, a division Bench of this Court in the case of L. Kumarachandra v state of Karnataka , was pleased to observe as under:"7. White construing the scope and ambit of sub-rule (2) of Rule 5, a division Bench of this Court in the case of L. Kumarachandra v state of Karnataka , was pleased to observe as under:"7. All that sub-rule (2) provides is that, as in the nature of things calling for information about the work and performance of a probationer during the period of probation and taking a decision as to whether he had satisfactorily completed the period of probation or not, requires sometime, that a probationer cannot claim that he must be deemed to have completed the period of probation satisfactorily immediately on the expiry of the period of probation. The rule does not confer power on the appointing Authority to keep quiet without passing any order indefinitely. If any Appointing Authority fails to make the necessary declaration within a reasonable time after the expiry of the period of probation, it would be a clear failure on its part to discharge its duty cast upon it under clauses (a) and (b) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 5. In fact, sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 is intended in public interest, in that, if either on account of lapse on the part of an Appointing authority or on account of administrative delay in getting the report about the work and performance of the probationer or on account of any inadvertance on the part of the Appointing Authority, no order is made as required under clause (a) or (b) of Rule 5 (1), it should not so happen that a probationer, who is otherwise unsuitable could claim that he had completed the period of probation and to have 'aequired a right for confirmation against a substantive vacancy in a permanent post available immediately after the expiry of the period of probation. In other words, the rule requires application of the mind of the Appointing authority as to the satisfactory completion of probationary period and making of a declaration in writing in the case of each of the probationers that he had completed the period of probation satisfactorily which gives him the right to be confirmed as provided in Rule 9. In other words, the rule requires application of the mind of the Appointing authority as to the satisfactory completion of probationary period and making of a declaration in writing in the case of each of the probationers that he had completed the period of probation satisfactorily which gives him the right to be confirmed as provided in Rule 9. The effect of such a declaration is that a probationer could not thereafter be as probationer even if there were to be any time-lag between the date of declaration and the date of confirmation, which depends upon the availability of a substantive vacancy in a permanent post. Therefore, the contention that sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 confers arbitrary power on the Appointing Authority is incorrect and untenable". ( 10 ) THEN we come to Rule 6 of the Probation Rules, which speaks of discharge of a probationer during the period of probation. The rule permits the Appointing Authority tol terminate the services of the probationer during the period ofl probation on grounds arising out of the conditions, if any imposed by the rules or in the order of appointment or on account of unsuitability of the probationer to hold the post to which he is appointed. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 6 provides that such an order discharging the probationer under that rule should specify the grounds on the basis of which Appointing Authority decides to discharge the probationer and such an order shall not be given effect to till it is submitted and confirmed by the next higher authority. To pass such an order of discharge from service, no formal proceedings under C. C. A. Rules is required. Then we have Rule 7 of Probation Rules which speaks of terminating the services of the probationer except in accordance with C. C. A. Rules either during or at the end of the period of probation for any misconduct. Rule 9 of the Rules speaks of the confirmation of a probationer. ( 11 ) HAVING noticed the relevant provisions of the Probation Rules, now let me advert to the facts of the present case. Petitioner was appointed as peon on probation for a period of two years by second respondent in its proceedings No. 20 of 1987, dated 5-5-1987 with effect from 11-5-1987. ( 11 ) HAVING noticed the relevant provisions of the Probation Rules, now let me advert to the facts of the present case. Petitioner was appointed as peon on probation for a period of two years by second respondent in its proceedings No. 20 of 1987, dated 5-5-1987 with effect from 11-5-1987. Since, according to the Appointing Authority the work and conduct of the petitioner was unsatisfactory, the probationary period came to be extended for further period of one year with effect from 11-5-1989. After the expiry of the extended period of probation, the second respondent by his Order No. 62 of 1990, dated 5-7-1990, exercising his powers under Rule 5 (l) (b) of the Probation Rules, has discharged the services of the petitioner on the ground of unsuitability to hold the post for which he was appointed on probation taking into consideration the letters and the report of principal Munsiff and J. M. F. C. , Chickmagalur in whose office petitioner was working as a probationary peon. Here, there is some dispute by the learned Counsel for the petitioner who contended that the impugned order is not made by the appointing Authority exercising his powers under clause (b) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 of the Probation Rules, but made under rule 6 (1) of the Probation Rules, since 2nd respondent after passing the impugned order discharging petitioner from service had given effect only after it was confirmed by next Higher authority, namely first respondent. This controversy need not detain me for a long, since the provision of the Probation Rules makes and clear distinction insofar as discharge of a probationer during and after the expiry of period of probation prescribed, reduced or extended. Since the impugned order in the present case has been made by the Competent Authority after the expiry of the extended period of probation, the impugned order necessarily must have been passed under clause (b) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 of Probation Rules. ( 12 ) UNDER Rule 5 (1) of Probation Rules casts an obligation on the" Appointing Authority to consider the suitability of the probationer to hold the post at the end of the prescribed extended or reduced period of probation. ( 12 ) UNDER Rule 5 (1) of Probation Rules casts an obligation on the" Appointing Authority to consider the suitability of the probationer to hold the post at the end of the prescribed extended or reduced period of probation. Sub-rule (2) provides for calling for information about the work conduct and performance of the petitioner during the period of probation and taking a decision as to whether probationer had satisfactorily completed the period of probation or not. The rule requires the application of mind by the Appointing Authority as to the satisfactory completion of probationary period and making of a declaration in writing to the effect that the probationer has completed the period of probation satisfactorily, which gives him a right to be confirmed as provided under Rule 9 of the probation Rules. Clause (b) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 also authorises the Appointing Authority to pass an order of discharge of the services of the probationer, if the Appointing authority is of the opinion that the probationer concerned was not suitable to hold the post to which he was appointed as probationer. In the present case, the Appointing Authority after receipt of the letter and the report from Principal Munsiff and j. M. F. C. , Chickmagalur and after being satisfied that the petitioner is not suitable to hold the post to which he was appointed has passed the impugned order exercising his powers under clause (b) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 of Probation Rules. The impugned order clearly gives an indication that Principal munsiff and J. M. F. C. , Chickmagalur in whose office petitioned was working had informed the Competent Authority about his assessment of the performance of the probationer. In fact principal Munsiff, Chickmagalur in his letter to the Appointing authority indicates that the petitioner is irresponsible disobedient and unreliable and the official has not improved at all. It is this letter which formed the basis and the foundation foil the Appointing Authority to form an opinion that the petitioner is unsuitable, to hold the post for which he was appointed as probationer and it is that assessment which disentitles the petitioner from being confirmed under Rule 7 of the Probation rules. It is this opinion which has been reflected in the impugned order made by the Appointing Authority while discharging the services of probationer. It is this opinion which has been reflected in the impugned order made by the Appointing Authority while discharging the services of probationer. The question then is whether the termination could be said to be penal and whether it casts any stigma on the conduct of the probationer so as to obligate the Appointing Authority to observe the rules of natural justice and to conduct an enquiry as required under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India before discharging the services of the petitioner? ( 13 ) LEARNED Counsel appearing for the petitioner throughout his submissions would contend that the impugned order is stigmatic in nature and asserts that the foundation for termination of the services of the petitioner lies in the allegations of bad conduct and behaviour and unsatisfactory performance and it is also asserted that the order of termination was mainly based on the allegations of misconduct. On the other hand, respondents defended the impugned order and pleaded that the services of the petitioner was terminated due to unsatisfactory performance and the same cannot be equated with termination of service by way of punishment. ( 14 ) IT is well-settled that in the case of temporary Government servants, his services can be discharged in accordance with clause (b) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 of Probation rules or he can be terminated during the period of probation in accordance with Rule 6 of the Probation Rules without assigning any reasons. If the Appointing Authority finds that the probationer is unsuitable to continue in Government service on account of unsatisfactory record of service and that in such cases, it is not necessary to hold a departmental enquiry before such termination but it has also been held consistently by Apex court that when the termination of service is punitive in nature or an order with stigma attached to it, it is necessary to hold an enquiry before such termination observing the principles of natural justice. In fact, Supreme Court in the case of State of uttar Pradesh and Another v Kaushal Kishore Shukla, was pleased to observe:"under the service jurisprudence, a temporary employee has no right to hold the post and his services are liable to be terminated in accordance with the relevant service rules and the terms of contract of service. In fact, Supreme Court in the case of State of uttar Pradesh and Another v Kaushal Kishore Shukla, was pleased to observe:"under the service jurisprudence, a temporary employee has no right to hold the post and his services are liable to be terminated in accordance with the relevant service rules and the terms of contract of service. If on the perusal of the character roll entries or on the basis of preliminary enquiry on the allegations made against an employee, the competent Authority is satisfied that the employee is not suitable for the service, whereupon the services of the temporary employee are terminated, no exception can be taken to such an order of termination". ( 15 ) THE Apex Court again in the case of Governing Council of Kidwai Memorial Institute of Oncology, Bangalore v Dr. Pandurang Godwalkar and Another, was pleased to observe:"if an employee who is on probation or holding an appointment on temporary basis is removed from service with stigma because of some specific charge, then the plea cannot be taken that as his sendee was temporary or his appointment was on probation, there was no requirement of holding any enquiry, affording such an employee an opportunity to show that the charge levelled against him is either not true or it is without any basis. But, whenever the service of an employee is terminated during the period of probation or while his appointment is on temporary basis, by an order of termination simpliciter after some preliminary enquiry, it cannot be held that as some enquiry had been made against him before the issuance of order of termination, it really amounted to his removal from service on a charge and as such, termination is penal in nature". The Apex Court further held as under: appointment made on a probation presupporter that the conduct, performance, ability and the capacity of the employee concerned have to be watched and examined during the period of probation. He is to be confirmed after the expiry of probation only when his service during the period of probation is found to be satisfactory and he is considered suitable for the post against which he has been appointed. He is to be confirmed after the expiry of probation only when his service during the period of probation is found to be satisfactory and he is considered suitable for the post against which he has been appointed. The principle of tearing of the veil for finding out the real nature of the order shall be applicable only in a case where the Court is satisfied that there is a direct nexus between the charge so levelled and the action taken. If the decision is taken to terminate the service of an employee during the period of probation after taking into consideration the overall performance and some action or in action on the part of such employee, then it cannot be said that it amounts to removal from service as punishment. It need not be said that the Appointing Authority at the stage of confirmation or while examining the question as to whether the service of such employer be terminated during the continuance of the period of probation is entitled to look into any complaint made in respect of such employee while discharging his duties for the purpose of making assessment of the performance of such employee". An order of termination simpliciter of a probationer will not be vitiated merely because some preliminary enquiry or examination of some allegations had been made. ( 16 ) KEEPING these well-settled proposition of law in view, now let us peep into the impugned order made by second respondent discharging the services of probationer. The impugned order first refers to extension of period of probation by an year after the expiry of initial period of probationary period of two years. The reason assigned for such extension is unsatisfactory work and conduct report in respect of the probationer. It is not the case of the respondents that the reason for extension of the period of probation was told to the probationer and it is also not their case that probationer was asked to improve his work and conduct at any time during the period of probation. Then the Competent authority refers to letter dated 25-1-1990 of Principal Munsiff and J. M. F. C. , Chickmagalur who had reported certain omissions and coinshission the probationer during the prescribed period of probation and also the extended period of probation. Then the Competent authority refers to letter dated 25-1-1990 of Principal Munsiff and J. M. F. C. , Chickmagalur who had reported certain omissions and coinshission the probationer during the prescribed period of probation and also the extended period of probation. Here again it is stated that the official has not improved himself in spite of repeated warnings issued on several occasions. To find out the correctness of this statement, learned Government pleader was specifically asked to inform the Court about the correctness of this statement with reference to records maintained by Principal Munsiff and J. M. F. C. , Chickmagalur, since it was seriously disputed by learned Counsel for the petitioner. But the learned Government Pleader was not in a position to substantiate the correctness of this statement with reference to the records. The obvious inference could only be that the probationer was never informed about any defect or deficiencies about his work by his superiors at any point of time and was never asked to improve his work and performance since timely communication of the assessment of the work might have put the probationer on the right track. Then the Competent authority refers to the performance of the probationer as reflected in the letter of Principal Munsiff, Chickmagalur. It is apropos to mention here that Principal Munsiff had stated in his letter that the probationer was irresponsible, disobedient and unreliable and the official has not improved to become suitable to hold the post. If the Competent Authority had stopped at this and had passed an order terminating the services of the probationer, then, it could have been safely said that those remarks of Principal Munsiff was only a motive and not the foundation for termination of service. But, in the present case, the Appointing Authority goes one step ahead and says that he is satisfied with the allegations made against the probationer and therefore, probationer is not suitable to hold the post for which he was appointed. In my view, the acceptance of the allegations by the Appointing Authority while discharging the services of the probationer is the foundation for such an action and the same has been done without offering an opportunity of hearing to the probationer and this amounts to violation of principles of natural justice. In my view, the acceptance of the allegations by the Appointing Authority while discharging the services of the probationer is the foundation for such an action and the same has been done without offering an opportunity of hearing to the probationer and this amounts to violation of principles of natural justice. The concept of 'motive' and foundation has been explained by a Bench of Kerala High Court in the case of V. Sadanandan v Circle Inspector, Excise Circle office, Adoor and Others. The Court was pleased to observe as under:"7. In this context it is necessary to bear in mind, the fundamental distinction between a termination of service on the basis of certain allegations which are merely the 'motive' and a termination where not only the allegations, but also the acceptance of the correctness thereof becomes the 'foundation' for the termination of service. In the former case, Where the allegations were only kept in mind, but no finding is arrived at either in the note file or in the order of termination of service in regard to truth of allegations, the allegations remained merely a motive for the termination. In the latter case, where the notice file shows that the employer, without giving an opportunity to the employee, accepted the truth of the allegations, and gave findings and came to the conclusion that the allegations, were true, then the acceptance of the allegations as true would become the foundation for the termination, and it would violate the principles of natural justice. 8. Initially there was considerable doubt in the minds of the Supreme Court as to the difference between the word 'motive' and 'foundation'. In Samsher Singh's case, supra, krishna Iyer, J. , observed: "in some cases, the rule of guidance has been stated to be 'the substance of the matter' and the 'foundation' of the order. When does motive trespass into 'foundation? When do we lift the veil of form to touch the 'substance? When the Court says so? These 'freudian frontiers obviously fall in the work a day word and Dr. Tripathi's observation in this context are not without force". The Supreme Court then referred to the observations of dr. Tripathi. 9. When does motive trespass into 'foundation? When do we lift the veil of form to touch the 'substance? When the Court says so? These 'freudian frontiers obviously fall in the work a day word and Dr. Tripathi's observation in this context are not without force". The Supreme Court then referred to the observations of dr. Tripathi. 9. Keeping the above said doubts in mind, Krishna Iyer, j. , himself explained the matter in a very significant and beautiful passage in Gujarat Steel Tubes Limited v Its mazdoor Sabha (sic), as to when the allegations for termination could be treated merely as a 'motive' not requiring any inquiry either under Article 311 of the constitution of India or following the principles of natural justice. It was observed:"54. On the contrary, even if there is suspicion of misconduct the master may say that he does not wish to bother about it and may not go into his guilt but may feel like not keeping a man he is not happy with. He may not like to investigate nor take the risk of continuing a dubious servant. Then it is not dismissal but termination simpliciter, if no injurious record of reasons, or punitive pecuniary cut-back on his full terminal benefits is found. For, in fact, misconduct is not then the moving factor in discharge. . . . "10. However, where termination is based upon 'satisfaction' of the correctness of the allegations of misconduct, and the said satisfaction is arrived at without any enquiry and/or following the principles of natural justice, the termination would be vitiated. This is clear from the observations of Krishna Iyer, J. , in paragraph 53 which reads as follows:"53. . . . To put it slightly differently, a termination affected because the master is satisfied of the misconduct and of the consequent desirability of terminating the service of the delinquent servant, it is a dismissal, even if he had the right in law to terminate with innocent order under the standing order or otherwise. Whether in such a case the grounds are recorded in a different proceeding from the formal order does not detract from its nature. Nor the fact that after being satisfied of the guilt, the master abandons the enquiry and proceeds to terminate. Whether in such a case the grounds are recorded in a different proceeding from the formal order does not detract from its nature. Nor the fact that after being satisfied of the guilt, the master abandons the enquiry and proceeds to terminate. Given an alleged misconduct and a live nexus between it and the termination of service the conclusion is dismissal, even if full benefits as on simple termination are given and non-injurious terminology is used". Therefore, whenever it is alleged that the Court can lift the veil and go into the question whether the order of simple termination even without any express stigma is in fact punitive, the Court would have to consider whether the allegations against the employee were the motive or the foundation. They would be a mere motive making termination valid, if the order of termination of service or the other record pertaining to the matter does not disclose any satisfaction as to the truth of correctness of the allegations made against the employee. It would be open to the employer to say that he does not wish to bother about the truth of the allegations against the temporary employee, but he may not feel like keeping a man against whom there are certain allegations. In such an event, where the employer has not recorded his satisfaction about the correctness of the allegations, then the termination could be merely treated as based on a motive, and would be valid, even if no reasonable opportunity in regard to the said allegations had been given to the employee. However, where the order of termination contains a finding as to the guilt or stigma or where the other records of the case contain such a finding relating to satisfaction as to the correctness of the allegations, then notwithstanding, that the termination is by way of an order simpliciter, it would be open to the Court to lift the veil and come to the conclusion that it was punitive, and that the absence of enquiry and violation of principles of natural justice required the termination to be struck down". ( 17 ) A reading of the impugned order does not appear to be in my view an order of discharge simpliciter. ( 17 ) A reading of the impugned order does not appear to be in my view an order of discharge simpliciter. No doubt, the negative assessment of the quality of the probationer cannot be termed as a stigma or aspersion, since the concept of probation implies, discharge in case of unsatisfactory service. In such cases, the service of the probationer are dispensed with because he is held to be unfit or unsuitable for the post. Such termination of service cannot be considered as penal. Irresponsible disobedient and unreliable are the adjectives which the Principal munsiff, Chickmagalur had attributed against the petitione and they are certainly stigmas against the probationer about his work and conduct during the period of probation and if the appointing Authority had not stated that he is 'satisfied' tha the petitioner is. not suitable to hold the post, it would have been difficult to characterise the impugned order as penal, since the termination would not have been by way of punishment. In the present case, Appointing Authority after being satisfied tha petitioner is irresponsible, disobedient and unreliable conclude that it would not be in the best interest of judicial departmen not to confirm the services of the probationer since the petitioner is not the right kind of person for the job. In my view, such an order of termination is penal in nature and made by way of punishment. The assertion of respondent's Counsel that the so-called disobedience, unreliable and irresponsible guilty of the petitioner did not form the ground for termination of the probationer nor the order of termination is not passed by way of punishment cannot be accepted. Just because in the body of the order such a thing is not mentioned cannot be ground to urge that there was no stigma attached in the impugned order. ( 18 ) THIS is not one of those cases where the Appointing Authority has taken into consideration the overall assessment of the performance of the probationer including his misconduct and other faults if any to conclude that the probationer will not be a fix person for the job and then terminate his services by an order of discharge simpliciter and such an order cannot be said to have been passed by way of punishment. This is because the masconduct is taken into consideration not with a view to punish the probationer but solely for the purpose of deciding as to whether the probationer was a fit person to be confirmed and retaned in service. In the present case, the Appointing authority does not merely take into consideration the merits and demerits of the probationer before passing the impugned order but he records a finding that he is satisfied that the probationer is disobedient, probationer is irresponsible and the probationer if unreliable and this unilateral decision is taken by the appointing Authority merely relying upon the correspondence of principal Munsiff and J. M. F. C. , Chickmagalur without even hearing the petitioner on this aspect of matter. The authority takes into consideration the misconduct of the probationer and gats himself satisfied and then proceeds to pass the impugned order. In such a case the misconduct attributable to the probationer is not mere motive for termination but the foundation for such termination and in my view, before passing such an order, probationer should have been afforded an opportunity to refute those allegations by holding an enquiry as required under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. Having not done so, the impugned order suffers from violation of principles of natural justice, contravention of provisions of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution, violation of Rule 7 of Probation Rules and also violation of provisions of Karnataka Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957 and the same is liable to be quashed. ( 19 ) THAT apart that the temporary services of the probationer had been extended since the work and conduct report in respect of the probationer was not satisfactory and he is discharged from service solely for the reason that he has not improved in spite of repeated warnings. The case of the petitioner before the Court is that he was not informed by the authorities under whom he was serving to correct the defects or deficiencies. In my view, the unilateral action of the respondents without even intimating the probationer to set his track record correct, the so-called defects and deficiencies is nothing but an arbitrary action and this action cannot be countenanced by this Court and even on this score, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. In my view, the unilateral action of the respondents without even intimating the probationer to set his track record correct, the so-called defects and deficiencies is nothing but an arbitrary action and this action cannot be countenanced by this Court and even on this score, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. ( 20 ) THE learned Counsel for petitioner relies upon several decisions of the Apex Court only to indicate that when the termination order is stigmatic in nature, the same cannot be made unless the probationer is afforded an opportunity to explain his stand before proper enquiry forum. This principles is well-established and in view of this, it may not be necessary to refer to plethora of decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner ( 21 ) SINCE, I have taken the view that the impugned order is made by way of punishment and it casts a stigma on the conduct of the probationer, in that view of the matter, before such an order was made by the Appointing Authority, an enquiry should have been held as contemplated under Article 311 (2) of the constitution and in accordance with C. C. A. Rules, 1957. Since such a thing is not done, the impugned order in No. 62 of 1990, dated 5-7-1990 and No. 81 of 1990, dated 21-8-1990 passed by second respondent and the letter No. LCA-II 214 of 1990, dated 14-1-1990 passed by first respondent is quashed. Further a direction is issued to second respondent to reinstate the petitioner into service. In view of this, it is further declared that the petitioner is entitled to all the backwages from the date of the impugned order till the date of reinstatement. ( 22 ) FURTHER, liberty is reserved to the second respondent to consider and assess the suitability of the petitioner to hold the post of peon without any regard to the allegations of misconduct referred to in the letter of Principal Munsiff and J. M. F. C. , chickmagalur, dated 25-1-1990 and 19-6-1990 and to pass appropriate orders thereon. ( 23 ) WITH the above observations and directions, writ petition is allowed. Rule made absolute. In the facts and circumstances of the, case, parties are directed to bear their own costs. --- *** --- .