Judgment Dharmpal Sinha, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for both the sides. 2. This revision-petition is directed against an order dated 28- 7-1995 passed by the Ist Additional District judge, Godda, in Title Appeal No.3 of 1995, whereby the has negatived the prayer of the petitioners (Respondents in the appeal) to hold that the appeal was not maintainable in view of the provisions of Sec.14 (8) of the Bihar buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction)Control Act, 1982 (for short "the Act" ). 3. The order has been passed in the following back grounds: the petitioners instituted Title (Eviction) Suit No.2 of 1990 praying for eviction of the opposite party (defendant in the suit), on the ground of personal necessity, from the suit premises. During the course of the proceeding of the suit, a written statement had been filed by the Opposite party on 15-5-1991 and thereafter issues were also framed and till that stage no petition seeking leave with affidavit as contemplated by sub- section (4) of Sec.14 of the Act had been obtained by the opposite party. Subsequently on 3-8-1991 the opposite party filed petition as also an affidavit praying for allowing him leave to contest the suit on the ground mentioned in the affidavit, and that leave was granted. Thereafter the hearing of the suit proceeded and the trial court eventually decreed the suit and ordered the opposite party to vacate the suit premises within sixty days from the date of passing of the order. Against that order/decree which was passed on 31-3-1995, the opposite party preferred an appeal bearing Title Appeal No.3 of 1995 in which the-impugned order was passed, whereby the objection regarding non-maintainability of the appeal raised by the petitioners has been negatived by the learned Appellate Court. The main reason given by the learned Appellate court for over ruling the objection raised about non-maintainability of the appeal in view of the provision of Sections 14 (8) of the Act, is that special procedure, that has been prescribed by sub-sections (4), (5), (6) and (7) of Sec.14 of the Act was not followed. 4. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the suit was definitely a suit only on the ground of. 4. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the suit was definitely a suit only on the ground of. personal necessity and the defendant-appellant (opposite party herein) had obtained permission or leave to contest the suit by filing a petition dated 3-8-1991 with affidavit and then he was accorded leave to content and so the Lower Appellate Court was absolutely wrong in holding that the special procedure of Sec.14 of the act was not followed. According to his submission, the written statement filed earlier without obtaining such leave in a suit of this nature as has been contemplated by sub-section (4) of Section 14 of the Act was absolutely without any legal effect inasmuch as the opposite party could be allowed to contest the suit only on obtaining leave as is required by the provision of Sec.14 (4)of the Act, and so even if he had filed written statement earlier and subsequently obtained permission, the order that was eventually passed by the learned Trial Court must be deemed to have been passed in accordance with the procedures of sub-sections (4) to (7) of section 14 of the Act. According to his further contention, in view of the provision of Sec.14 (8) of the Act, the appeal in the aforesaid facts and circumstances was not maintainable, but the learned Appellate Court has committed illegality/material irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction in passing the impugned order holding that the appeal was maintainable. 5. On the other hand, Learned counsel for the opposite party has contended that in this case special procedures as contemplated by sub-sections (4) to (7) of Sec.14 of the Act was definitely not followed, and it is settled law, in view of the Single Bench decision reported in 1984 PLJR 64 : 1984 BLJ 56 Md. Akhtar Khan and another V/s. Md. Salamul Haque which has been upheld by a Division Bench judgment reported in 1992 (2) PLJR 111 ; 1992 (2) BLJ 54 (Shailendra Kumar singh V/s. Katnala Singh and others), that appeal will be maintainable if the special procedures as prescribed have not been followed. According to him, the impugned order is legally justified and proper and no interference is needed. He repeatedly emphasised the fact that the special procedure has not been followed; and in this connection, during the course of argument, reference was made to some orders passed by the Trial court. According to him, the impugned order is legally justified and proper and no interference is needed. He repeatedly emphasised the fact that the special procedure has not been followed; and in this connection, during the course of argument, reference was made to some orders passed by the Trial court. The order sheet would indicate that on 20-3- 1991 the derendant had appeared and he was directed to file written statement and later on 25-4-1991 a further strict order was passed by the learned Trial Court that the defendant must file written statement by 15-5-1991, on which date the written statement was filed and thereafter on 5-7-1991 both parties were asked to give (draft of) issues and documents, and issues were thereafter framed on 30-7-1991. According to his submissions all these steps taken by the defendant and permitted by the Trial Court would indicate that normal procedure which to ordinarily followed under the provision of the Code of Civil Procedure in any suit had been adopted in this case, and not the special procedure as prescribed by sub-sections (4) to (7) of Sec.14 of the Act. According to his submission the fact that on 3-8-1991 opposite party filed a petition with affidavit and obtained leave will not make any difference, and only because of obtaining leave belatedly if cannot be held that the special procedure was followed. He also contended that since the judgment passed by the learned Trial court indicates that the issues were framed and findings were given issue wise, after evidence, which too was not recorded in summary manner; and so the procedure which was required to be followed as a Court of Small Causes in summary manner was not followed. The suit, according to his submission, has rightly been held to have been tried by the ordirary procedure and so the appeal was maintainable and the objection raised by the petitioner-plaintiff respondents has been rightly over-ruled by the learned appellate court. 6. Now it may be mentioned at the very outset that if a suit is for eviction on the ground of personal necessity and special procedure prescribed by Sec.14 of the Act is followed and order for recovery of possession is made, no appeal against such order can be preferred in view of the provisions of section 14 (8) of the Act and only revision is permissible. This position has been clarified even in the decision reported in 1992 (2) P. L. J. R.111 cited by the learned Counsel for the opposite party. The other decision reported in 1984 PLJR 64 cited by him appears to support this view though that case related to a suit in which eviction had been sought not only on the ground of personal necessity but also arrears of rent and on fact it was held that the special procedure had not been followed. 7. In case at hand, it is not disputed that order is for recovery of possession. There is also no dispute that the suit had been brought only on the ground of personal necessity. From the copy of plaint (Annexure 1 of this petition), it appears that even though there was some arrears of rent allegedly due, the plaintiff-petitioners did not seek any relief about the arrears of rent and reserved their right to bring another suit later for that relief. 8. No doubt, it appears that written statement was filed and the Court below, as the order sheet indicates, also had permitted the defendant-opposite party to file written statement and even issues were framed but all these steps were only procedural aberrations, and as soon as it was realised by the opposite party that this was a suit in which leave was to be sought by filing a petition with affidavit indicating the grounds on which the opposite party could contest the suit which has been brought for eviction only on the ground of personal necessity, a petition with affidavit was filed and it was allowed. Earlier steps taken obviously were against the mandatory prohibitions of sub-section (4) of Sec.14 of the Act under which the defendant-opposite party could not be allowed to contest without obtaining leave, and so any other steps taken must be ignored, as if they were non- existent in the eye of law. The opposite party even though later obtained permission to contest the suit by filing a petition seeking leave to contest the suit, with affidavit disclosing the ground on which he wanted to contest, he can , not be later allowed to say that the special procedure v/as not followed only because he was permitted to file written statement earlier or issues were framed. It appears that initially, before obtaining leave, some procedure, not permissible at all by law was followed; but subsequently it was corrected by obtaining leave as contemplated in sub-section (4) of Sec.14 of the Act. Of course, under the prescribed procedure only after obtaining leave written statement could be filed within 15 days and in this case it had been filed earlier. The written statement filed earlier before obtaining leave had to be ignored. Under the provision of sub-section (6) of Sec.14 of the Act, the opposite party could, after grant of leave by the court under Sec.14 (5), file petition for treating the affidavit disclosing the ground of contest as written statement or file a written statement within 15 days. Since a written statement had been filed earlier and the affidavit with which the petition for leave was filed (copies of which have been placed for perusal during the course of argument) show that grounds taken in both were the same, necessity of filing another written statement after obtaining leave was not felt and during the hearing of the suit both parties contested on that basis, as appears from the copy of the judgment of the Trial Court. 9. The whole object of introducing this special procedure by legislation (as contemplated in Sec.14 of the Act)was to expedite final decision in suit brought for eviction only on two grounds, namely, personal necessity or expiry of the period of tenancy and appeal was prohibited in such suits with a view to ensuring that the suits of such nature (and only of such nature) could reach early final termination, without there being intermediate steps of appeal. Sec.13 of the Act clearly give overriding effect to the provision of Sec.14 and sub-section (1) of Sec.14 mandatorily lays down that suit brought under the Act on two grounds as. mentioned in clause (c) or (e) of Section 11 (1) "shall be dealt in accordance with procedure specified in this Section". Sec.13 of the Act clearly give overriding effect to the provision of Sec.14 and sub-section (1) of Sec.14 mandatorily lays down that suit brought under the Act on two grounds as. mentioned in clause (c) or (e) of Section 11 (1) "shall be dealt in accordance with procedure specified in this Section". If, despite such stringent provisions of Sections 13 and 14 (1)of the Act, a defendant even in such a suit files written statement without obtaining leave, when the law permits him to contest only after he seeks leave under Section 14 (4) and the Court grants leave under section 14 (4) of the Act and later he is allowed to make grievance even after contesting the suit after obtaining leave, that the special procedure has not been followed, the whole purpose of prescribing special procedure for particular types of suits may be defeated. Even though some of the orders of the Court below indicated that the defendant-opposite party was allowed to file written statement and after filing of the written statement, issues were framed, they as already indicated above, were all good for nothing in the eye of law, as all those steps were against the mandatory prohibition laid down under Sec.14 of the Act. In this view of the matter I reject the contention of the learned counsel for the opposite party in this regard. 10. The last argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is based on the provision of sub-section (7) of Sec.14 of the Act which reads as follows: "notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) or any other law, the Court while hearing a suit under this section shall follow the practice and procedure of a Court of Small Causes including recording of evidence. " Putting emphasis on the expression" shall follow the practice and procedure of a Court of Small Causes including recording of the evidence. " Putting emphasis on the expression" shall follow the practice and procedure of a Court of Small Causes including recording of the evidence. " learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that it is mandatory to follow the procedure of Small Cause Courts and procedure of Small Cause Court does not require framing of issues, nor does it require recording of evidence in the narrative form, and only substance of the evidence of each witness is to be recorded; but in this case issues were framed and the evidence of witnesses was recorded not only in substance, but in narrative form and so it must be held that the procedure prescribed by Sec.14 (7) of the Act was not followed. 11 This contention too, in my opinion, cannot be accepted. It is settled law that when used in a statute, the word shall sometime may be interpreted to mean "may" and sometime "may" is equivalent to "shall" depending upon the context. Framing of issues, in my opinion, cannot be said to be strictly prohibited for a Court of Small Cause when it is proceeding to try a suit of a claim triable by it. Since normally simple and small claim are cognizable by Small Cause Court, necessity may not be there for framing of issues and only it has to be seen whether the claim made before the Small Cause Court can or cannot be allowed in whole or in part. But when in an eviction suit, if the defendant is allowed leave to contest on the ground mentioned in the affidavit contemplated to be filed under the provision of Sec.14 (4) of the Act and while seeking leave to contest he raises several grounds including such as lack of title of the plaintiffs, who claim to be landlord, over the suit premises, separate issues may be raised and taken up separately while writing judgment for convenience and systematic discussions of the evidence relating to the particular issue. If the defendant has not been debarred under the Act from raising other issues, even when a suit for eviction has been instituted on the ground of personal necessity or on the expiry of the term of the lease and if different pleas can be taken by him, I think it will be indeed necessary for convenience as well as for systematic discussion of the evidence to take up issue wise consideration while writing judgment by the Trial Court, I do not think that merely because issues would be framed by the Trial Court, and then decision given thereon, it can be held that the procedure, prescribed by section 14 (7) of the Act has not been followed. Framing or not framing of the issues in my opinion, cannot be decisive, not to say conclusive, factor for determining whether the practice and procedure of Small Cause Court as laid down in Sec.14 (7) of the Act has or has not been followed. 12. The fact that the evidence of the witnesses is recorded in narrative form (sentence wise) and not only substance of the evidence (after witnesses are allowed to speak several sentences), in my opinion, would equally be immaterial for determining the question as to whether the procedure of Section 14 (7) of the Act has been followed or not. I do not think that the law enjoins that the Court of Small Cause must record only substance of evidence of witnesses examined or cross-examined before the Court and never in narrative form. 13. I may notice in this connection that if the expression "shall follow" appearing in Sec.14 (7) of the Act is taken, as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, to be absolutely mandatory in the sense that if issues are framed and the evidence is recorded in a narrative form, the whole process of recording evidence after framing of issues may have to be held to be without jurisdiction, and null and void because of violation of the mandatory provision of that sub-section, but this, I think, will be an absurd proposition. 14. 14. The requirement regarding following the practice and procedure of small Cause Court, in my opinion, has been laid down in sub-section (7) of section 14 of the Act for the purpose of shortening the hearing and early conclusion of suit for eviction brought on personal necessity or on expiry of term of the tenancy, as the legislature wanted quick disposal of such suit. But if a court which is permitted by law to shorten procedure but adopts a little elaborate procedure, which cannot be considered to be prejudicial to any party, and if such deviation is taken up to lead to the conclusion that the procedure prescribed by sub- section (7) of section 14 of the Act has not been followed, the very purpose of the legislation which was intended to bring early termination of suit of the two categories will be defeated. Again if first appeal will be permitted only for this little deviation despite categorical prohibition by sub-section (8) of Sec.14 of the Act, then final termination of the suit of this nature is bound to be prolonged. 15. So in the light of discussions made and the reasons indicated above, I am definitely of the opinion that the impugned order holding the appeal as maintainable is erroneous is law and against the provision of Sec.14 (8) of the Act and the learned Appellate court seems to have committed illegality in exercise of appellate jurisdiction in holding that the appeal is maintainable. So I set aside the impugned order, allow this revision-petition and hold that the appeal (Title appeal No.3 of 1995) in which the impugned order has been passed is not maintainable and it shall stand dismissed for that reason. Revison Allowed.