JUDGMENT 1. - This petition under section 482 Cr.P.C. is directed against the order dated Feb. 20, 1996 whereby the learned Additional Sessions Judge (Bharatpur) at Bayana allowed the application under section 311 Cr.PC. of the prosecution seeking permission of the Court to produce certain documents. 2. The facts relevant to the disposal of the present petition are that a piece of land called `Nohra' belonged to Uday Singh Prosecution witness who had allegedly sold the same to petitioner's party. When the petitioner tried to start construction on the said land Uday Singh PW and his men resisted their actions. It led to a `marpit' between the parties and in the course of the incident persons on both sides sustained injuries. One person on prosecution side is stated to have succumbed to his injuries. Cross First Information Reports were lodged and both the parties were challaned. They are stated to be facing their trials in cross-cases in the court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Bayana. The prosecution evidence in the case of non-petitioners party is still being recorded. 3. On January 31, 1996 Uday Singh through the Public Prosecutor moved an application seeking permission of the court to file certain documents. The documents sought to be filed by the prosecution included the copies of the judgment and decree dated 3.8.94 made by the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division) Roop-bas in favour of Udey Singh & party in a suit for Specific performance of contract and a sale-deed dated 9.11.94 executed by the said court on behalf of the defendant-judgment debtors in favour of the plaintiff-decree holders. By the said decree dated 3.8.94 the sale-deed dated 30.4.93 said to have been executed by Nihal Singh deceased, father of Udey Singh PW in favour of Sher Singh, Than Singh and others of the accused-party had also been. cancelled. It was submitted to the trial Judge that the said documents were relevant and material for the just decision of the case pending before him in as much as the documents related to the very piece of land which was the bone of contention between the parties and had led to the incident resulting in the loss of life of one person and injuries to many on both sides. After hearing the parties at length the learned Addl. Sessions Judge allowed the prosecution to produce the said documents. After hearing the parties at length the learned Addl. Sessions Judge allowed the prosecution to produce the said documents. Hence this petition by the accused-party. 4. Mr. Dharam Gopal Chaturvedi, the learned counsel for the petitioners vehemently urged that since the documents in question were not submitted under section 173 Cr.P.C. alongwith the police report they could not be produced now under section 311 Cr.P.C. The learned counsel further submitted that the said documents could also not be produced under section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act as they go to fill up a lacuna in the prosecution case to the disadvantage of the accused-party. Mr. Chaturvedi urged that the degree dated 3.8.94 was a collusive Ex-parte decree and the same also stands challenged by the accused parted through appropriate forum and was thus not final in its effect. It was also submitted that in his statement recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C. Udey Singh had clearly admitted that the land in question was sold by his father and others to Sher Singh and Than Singh and others of the accused part and the production of and reliance on the documents by the prosecution at this stage of the proceedings would amour to taking away the valuable right of private defence available to the accused party in the facts and circumstances of the case. In support of his arguments Mr. Chaturvedi relied upon the Supreme Court decision in the case of Jamatraj v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 178 . 5. It could not be successfully challenged by Mr. Chaturvedi before me that the documents viz the judgment and decree and the sale-deed alongwith the map sought to be produced by the prosecution at a stage when the prosecution evidence is still being recorded in the case relate to the very piece of land which is the kernal of dispute between the parties and which led to the unfortunate incident bringing both the parties before the Criminal Court. These documents are, therefore, relevant and material to the issues involved in the litigation between the parties and irrespective of the fact whether the documents support the case of one party and/or adversely affect the rights and interests of the other they may certainly help the trial court to understand and appreciate the stand taken by the parties and thus to decide the issues justly. The effect and the probative value of the documents sought to be produced by the prosecution may be considered by the trial court in the light of the evidence brought by the accused party on record of the trial court in rebuttal to the evidence so produced by the prosecution. Such a right has already been given by the trial court to the accused party and they may exercise the same by bringing on the record of the trial court evidence to the effect that the judgment and decree of the Civil Court and the sale deed executed in pursuance to such decree were the result of some fraud, coercion or collusion between the concerned persons and therefore, the evidentiary value of the documents sought to be produced by the prosecution is nil or stands considerably minimised or reduced. That being the position of the evidence sought to be produced by the prosecution and allowed by the learned trial court to be produced neither any abuse of the process of the court is involved nor any injustice to the petitioners is likely to result if the impugned order is allowed to stand. 6. The submission of a report under section 173 Cr.P.C. by the police normally indicates the end of the investigation of the case. But the submission of the report under section 173 Cr.P.C. by the police does not create a bar to the right, nay duty, of the police to submit such further supplementary report alongwith the evidence, oral or documentary, as may have a bearing upon the guilt or innocence of the accused. It may happen that after submitting a report under section 173 Cr.P.C. the police may come in possession of such evidence which throws light upon the guilt or innocence of the accused and may thus help the court in the just decision of the case. Visualising such a situation the Legislature, in its wisdom, thought it proper to make a statutory provision in Sub-sec. (8) of S. 173 which reads as under : "S. 173(8). Visualising such a situation the Legislature, in its wisdom, thought it proper to make a statutory provision in Sub-sec. (8) of S. 173 which reads as under : "S. 173(8). Nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude further investigation in respect of an offence after a report u/sub-section (2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate and where upon such investigation, the Officer Incharge of the Police Station obtains further evidence, oral of documentary, he shall forward to the Magistrate a further report or reports regarding such evidence in the form prescribed; and the provisions of sub-sec. (2) to (6) shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2)." 7. It is evident from the above provision contained in S. 173 that even after the submission of a report under sub- section (2) of Section 173 by the police, conduct of further investigation into the case and thereby collection of such evidence, oral or documentary, as has a bearing upon the guilt or innocence of the accused, has been legally permitted. Once further investigation and collection of relevant evidence during such investigation and thereafter submission of a supplementary report by the police has been legally permitted it does not appeal to reasons that the court to which such additional evidence and supplementary report was intended to be submitted and which is required to consider such evidence and supplementary report cannot permit the production of such evidence from a source other than by way of a supplementary police report. The grant of permission to the police to further investigate the case, collect such evidence as has a bearing on the guilt or innocence of the accused and submit a supplementary report under section 173(8) indicates the anxiety of Legislature not to shut the doors of fair-play and substantial justice upon the parties to a criminal litigation. It is unconceivable that such a power to allow production of material evidence at any stage of the trial is not rested in the court. It is unconceivable that such a power to allow production of material evidence at any stage of the trial is not rested in the court. The provisions contained in sub-section (8) of Section 173 Cr.P.C are not to be construed in such restricted or limited way as may permit the production of the additional material evidence only when such evidence is forwarded by the police to the court and not when the same material evidence is produced by a party to the litigation before the criminal court. In my opinion sub-sec. (8) of S. 173 does not in any way restrict or impair the power of the court to receive evidence, oral or documentary, which has a bearing upon the guilt or the innocence of the accused, at any stage of the proceedings. The objection of Mr. Chaturvedi is over- ruled. 8. Coming to the next argument of Mr. Chaturvedi regarding the scope and applicability of Section 311 Cr.P.C. and Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act it may be observed that the two provisions contained in two separate but supplementary statutes confer a wide discretion on the court to act as the exigencies of justice demand. The object of the two provisions is, as is gathered on a combined reading thereof, to arrive at truth and decide a case justly irrespective of the fact that the request to take the additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, on the record of the court is made by the prosecution or by the defence. The object of the two provisions is, as is gathered on a combined reading thereof, to arrive at truth and decide a case justly irrespective of the fact that the request to take the additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, on the record of the court is made by the prosecution or by the defence. The two provisions read as under :S. 311 Cr.P.C. "Any Court may, at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code, summon any person as a witness, or examine any person in attendance, though not examined as a witness, or recall and re-examine, any person already examined; and the court shall summon and examine or recall and re-examine any such person if his evidence appears to it to be essential to the just decision of the case." S. 165 Indian Evidence Act "The Judge may, in order to discover or to obtain proper proof of relevant facts, ask any question he pleases, in any form, at any time, of any witness, or of the parties about any fact relevant or irrelevant, and may order the production of any document or thing; and neither the parties nor their agents shall be entitled to make any objection to any such question or order, nor, without the, leave of the Court, to cross-examine any witness upon any answer given in reply to any such question." 9. A combined reading of the provisions contained in Sections 173(8) and 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 and S. 165 of the Indian Evidence Act clearly convey the message that in order to meet the exigencies of justice and fair trial the court has been given widest possible discretion, bordering to duty and obligation, to take such evidence, oral or documentary, either at the instance of a party to the litigation or suomoto, as it considers relevant and material to the issue involved in the case and essential for the just decision of the case before it. The three provisions are complementary to each other and confer wide jurisdiction upon the court to act in aid of justice.In the case of Jamatraj (supra), relied upon by Mr. Chaturvedi their Lordships of the Supreme Court examined the scope of S. 540 of the Old Cr.P.C. which now stands replaced by S. 311 of the New Code and Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act. Chaturvedi their Lordships of the Supreme Court examined the scope of S. 540 of the Old Cr.P.C. which now stands replaced by S. 311 of the New Code and Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act. In Para 6 of the report at page 180 their Lordships observed : "The section (S. 540 of Old Cr.P.C.) gives a power to the Court to summon a material witness or to examine a person present in court or to recall a witness already examined. It confers wide discretion on the court to act as the exigencies of justice require. Another aspect of this power and complementary to it is to be found in S. 165 of the Indian Evidence Act.......... These two sections between them confer jurisdiction on the Judge to act in aid of justice." In para 10 their Lordships further observed that ".......As the section stands there is no limitation on the power of the Court arising from the stage to which the trial may have reached, provided the court is bonafide of the opinion that for the just decision of the case, the step must be taken. It is clear that the requirement of just decision of the case does not limit the action to something in the interest of the accused only. The action may equally benefit the prosecution. There are however two aspects of the matter which must be distinctly kept apart. The first is that the prosecution cannot be allowed to rebut the defence evidence unless the prisoner bring forward something suddenly and unexpectedly .............here is, however, the other aspect namely of the power of the court which is to be exercised to reach a just decision. This power is exercisable at any time and the Code of Criminal Procedure clearly so states." 10. Judged in the light of the observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court the impugned order of the learned Addl. Sessions Judge can, by no stretch of imagination, be called to be contrary to the spirit and object behind Sections 173(8) and 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and S. 165 of the Indian Evidence Act. There is absolutely no ground to assume that learned trial Judge passed the impugned order without being bonafide of the opinion that it was expedient in the interest of justice to pass such an order. There is absolutely no ground to assume that learned trial Judge passed the impugned order without being bonafide of the opinion that it was expedient in the interest of justice to pass such an order. His direction is clear & states that the evidentiary value of the incoming evidence shall be judged in the light of the exercise of the right of rebuttal allowed to the petitioners and after taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case. This court, therefore, finds no abuse of the process of the court or any damage done to any rights of the petitioners. 11. In the result this petition fails and is hereby dismissed.Revision dismissed. *******