H. N. TILHARI, J. ( 1 ) THIS second appeal has been filed from the judgment and decree passed in the matter of Land Acquisition proceeding. The compensation was awarded by the Special Land Acquisition officer at the rate of Rs. 12,000/- per acre, whereas the claimant claimed Rs. 2 lakhs per acre, in respect of the land acquired. Thereafter the matter was referred to the Civil Court. The learned Civil Judge considered the oral and documentary evidence and ordered that the claimants were entitled to get enhanced compensation at the rate of Rs. 28,950/- per acre as well as has been entitled to additional amount under Section 23 (1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act. Feeling aggrieved from the judgment and decree of the Preliminary Civil Judge, Shimoga, the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Karnataka Housing Board filed the first appeal bearing No. 12 of 1992. The learned District judge after having heard the learned Counsels for the parties, found the first appeal to be without merits and that the order of the Civil Judge according to the first Appellate Court did not call for interference and as such, dismissed the first appeal filed by the Land Acquisition Officer vide his judgment and decree dated march 15, 1996. Having felt aggrieved from the judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court, the Special Land acquisition Officer, Karnataka Housing Board, has preferred the second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure and according to the. provisions of the Karnataka High Court act, this appeal has been numbered as M. S. A. 183 of 1996. ( 2 ) I have heard the learned Counsel for the appellant for some length of time. The learned Counsel for the appellant submitted before me that the lower Courts below failed to believe the version of the appellant that an area of 80 /acre of land was purchased at Rs. 12,000/- per acre and that the Courts below failed to take note of sale deeds in respect of adjacent land and illegally enhanced the rate or amount of compensation. This contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant appears to be without substance as a perusal of the order of the Court below per se reveals. The learned Trial Court in its judgment had taken note of the Exs. R-4 to R-10 referred by the learned counsel for the present appellant. This contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant appears to be without substance as a perusal of the order of the Court below per se reveals. The learned Trial Court in its judgment had taken note of the Exs. R-4 to R-10 referred by the learned counsel for the present appellant. The material portion of the judgment reads as under:"on the other hand, Ex. R-1 to R-4 are placed before this court to show that the similar types of land which were acquired by the Karnataka Housing Board, for the purpose of house sites and compensation was paid by private negotiations at the rate of Rs. 12,000/- per acre. Though it was vehemently argued by the learned Counsel for the respondent that the value of the land of the claimant cannot be more than the value covered by Ex. R-1 and R-4 to 10. I find no much force in the said submission, as the value paid under Ex. R-l and R-4 to R-10 through private negotiations, could be the only value of the land in question, having regard to the fact that the potential value of the land has to be taken into consideration". ( 3 ) THE observations revealed that the evidence did not disclose that the land in those sale deeds and the present disputed land bear the same potentiality. Apart from that, the lower Appellate Court also applied its mind to Ex. R-l and R-4 to r-10. The learned lower Appellate Court has after indicating the circumstances in detail observed that "the discussed evidence above shows the circumstances in which Exs. R-l, R-4 to R-10 came to be executed. Those circumstances were favourable only to Karnataka Housing Board and Ex. R-1, R-4 to R-10 cannot be used as documents evidencing the true market value of the property in question. In paragraph 17 of the lower Appellate judgment the Court has again observed as under:"in the instant case, the documents Exs. P-1, 2 and P-3 bear testimony to the fact that the lands in Kallahalli was made into sites and was being sold piece by piece for a substantial sum. Ex. P-l which covers the sale of site measuring 30' x 72' has fetched Rs. 30,000/- to seller and said price is paid by P. W. 3-Harish Babu. This sale deed has come into existence on 21-1-1983. Ex. P-l which covers the sale of site measuring 30' x 72' has fetched Rs. 30,000/- to seller and said price is paid by P. W. 3-Harish Babu. This sale deed has come into existence on 21-1-1983. The preliminary notification in this case was issued on 8-12-1983. Therefore, Ex. P-1 has come in existence 11 months prior to date of notification. The authenticity of this sale deed has not been challenged by the Land Acquisition Officer and in fact there is no scope also for the claimant to have concocted such a sale deed. Of course, if such transaction had taken place subsequent to the notification, it was possible to assume that the sale transaction was in anticipation of the development that would take place in the area after the lands were acquired by Housing Board or to inflate the price of land. This sort of presumption cannot be drawn with respect to Ex. P-1. On the contrary, the executant of Ex. R-1 has stated c1ear1y that he was induced to execute sa1e deed on the promise of being given a free site in the deve1oped co1ony. He is a1so assured that he wou1d be given a constructed quarter by virtue of agreement. These two offers certain1y were 1ucrative and were possib1e irresistib1e to owners of 1and, who knew it was not possib1e to resist acquisition. The sword of acquisition was hanging upon them and it is easy to draw an inference that under such circumstances offer made to them was very attractive. Since this particu1ar aspect has not been fu11y contradicted by the Housing Board, I find that the evidence re1ating to Exs. R-1, R-4 to R-10 show that they were not who11y vo1untary and that the sa1e price of Rs. 12,000/- per acre received by the owners of the land was under inducement. The circumstances in which sale deeds have come in lessen its credibility and ultimately compel me to accept the sale price evidenced by Ex. P-l as the true market value of the property which the awardee would have got". ( 4 ) I have quoted these observation with the object to show that the contention made by the learned Counsel for the appellant is without substance. Here, the Courts below have applied their mind to Exs. P-l as the true market value of the property which the awardee would have got". ( 4 ) I have quoted these observation with the object to show that the contention made by the learned Counsel for the appellant is without substance. Here, the Courts below have applied their mind to Exs. R-1, R-4 to R-10 and thereafter found that those documents representing the true market value and are incredible documents for the purpose of determining the market price. This observation quoted above however disclose that the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that court has only relied on one oral evidence is incorrect and that in fixing the valuation, Court had relied on Ex. P-1 representing the market value on The date of acquisition in addition to oral evidence. The learned Counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the decision of The Special Land Acquisition Officer and another v Sri Siddappa Omanna Tumari and Others , and contended for the proposition that, when sale deeds are available the Court should not rely on the oral evidence. This case is not of any help to the learned Counsel for the appellant as in the present case the market value is assessed on the basis of Ex P-1 the sale deed. Therefore, in my opinion there is no substantial question of law involved in the case. The case is only one of appreciation of evidence on merits. The learned Counsel for the appellant tried to raise another technical objection and submitted that the order passed by the first Appellate Court dismissing the appeal filed by the present appellant i. e. Special land Acquisition Officer and the appellant having made application for substitution of the names of heirs, the Court below ought to have disposed of the application for substitution and thereafter decided the appeal. But the appeal was heard on merits and dismissed on merits by the first Appellate Court without disposing of the application for substitution of the names of the heirs of deceased-respondent. This mistake on the part of the lower Appellate Court that it did not dispose of the application for substitution of the names of the heirs of respondent before disposing of the appeal may be said to be an irregularity of procedure or an error of law of procedure. The court below should have disposed of that application before disposing of the appeal. The court below should have disposed of that application before disposing of the appeal. But the question before me is that, whether this appeal should be admitted or be allowed to hang on for long time when appellants are not affected, simply on the basis of this technical plea. No doubt, the application for substitution had been made by the present appellant in the lower Appellate Court, the Court ought to have passed an order. It appears both the parties have gone with the hearing, assuming as if this application has already been disposed of. The question is whether can this be said to be substantial error of law committed by the first Appellate Court in exercise of its jurisdiction vested in it and whether does a case arise for exercise of second appellate jurisdiction by this Court, as the second appellate jurisdiction can be exercised only when substantial question of law is there in the judgment of this court. A second appeal lies and arises only on substantial question of law. A question of law may be said to be a substantial question of law if the decision of that question of law or on the question of error of law would have any effect or would have been tendency to affect the decision, on the merits, of the case, or the jurisdiction of the Court. Section 99 of the Code of civil Procedure provides that, no decree be reversed or modified for error or irregularity not affecting the merits of the case or not affecting the jurisdiction of the Court. Section 99 of the Code of civil Procedure reads as under:"99. No Decree to be reversed or modified for error or irregularity not affecting merits or jurisdiction. No decree shall be reversed or substantially varied, nor shall any case be remanded, in appeal on account of any misjoinder or non-joinder of parties or causes of action or any error, defect or irregularity in any proceedings in the suit, not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court; provided that nothing in this section shall apply to non-joinder or a necessary party". ( 5 ) THE section clearly provides that no decree is to be reversed or substantially varied nor shall any case be remanded in appeal on account of any misjoinder or non-joinder of parties or causes of action or any error, defect or irregularity in any proceedings in the suit not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court. The dismissal of first appeal filed by Land Acquisition officer by District Judge i. e. first Appellate Court affirming the decree of Civil Judge enhancing the amount of compensation payable to deceased claimant or his heirs, after considering the evidence and merits of the case, and after hearing the appellants and respondents Counsel. ( 6 ) NO doubt application for substitution of names of the heirs of deceased respondent had been moved by appellants but Court failed to pass the order allowing substitution of names of heirs respondent. In my opinion, this may not effect the decision on the merits of appeal as it is a case where appellants' appeal has been dismissed. It will stand on same footing as dismissal of appeal for non-impleadment or non substitution of heirs of deceased respondent or dismissal of appeal of appellant on merits after impleadment or substitution of heirs of deceased respondent. The failure to pass order allowing substitution of application for substitution of heirs of respondent in a case where appeal is dismissed on merits by Appellate Court may at the most be said to amount simple irregularity having no effect on the merits of the decision of appeal nor to be effecting the legality of judgment or decree of the Court. ( 7 ) THE irregularity is curiable under Section 151, Civil Procedure Code by Appellate Court in such a case where it does not have the effect of adversely affecting the decision of case on merits as given by trial and lower Appellate nor has this irregularity caused nor has any tendency to cause any injury or injustice to the appellant. Therefore, I do not think that it is a fit case in which second appeal should be allowed nor I think it just and proper in the appeal to set aside the lower Appellate Court decree and remand the case on such technical point, as delay may adversely affect the interest of the heirs who have succeeded in lower Appellate Court and before Civil Judge. The second appeal is hereby dismissed with a direction to the Court that let the heirs be brought in that decree on the application which has already been moved and if necessary it may exercise its power and Sections 151 and 152, Civil Procedure Code. --- *** --- .