ARUN KUMAR DUTTA, J. ( 1 ) THIS Revisional Application under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as Code) is directed by the plaintiffs petitioners (hereinafter referred to as plaintiffs) against the Order dated 17th July, 1989 passed by the learned Munsif, 1st Court at Sealdah, in title suit No. 58 of 1983 before him, for the reasons stated and on the grounds made out therein. ( 2 ) BY the aforesaid Impugned Order (dated 17. 7. 89) the learned Munsif has disposed of the application filed by defendant No. 1 under Section 17 (2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act (hereinafter referred to as Act) in terms thereof, holding that the said application has been filed In time, and that nothing Is due to plaintiffs by the defendant towards rents for the suit premises, signifying that there was no default on the part of the defendants In paying rents in respect of the suit premises. ( 3 ) THE impugned order Is challenged by the plaintiffs mainly on the grounds that (i) the relevant two applications filed by the defendants Nos. 1and2 separately under Section 17 (1) and 17 (2) of the Act are barred by limitation, (ii) that default having been admitted by the contending defendants the learned Munsif was not justified in holding to the contrary, and (iii) the D. W. I Bijoy Kumar Jalan having admitted in his evidence that M. O. was remitted in the name of the plaintiff No. 2 alone, and deposits of rent having been made accordingly, the deposits made by the defendants cannot be held to be valid deposits. ( 4 ) THE Revisional Application is resisted by the contending opposite parties. ( 5 ) LET me now consider the points urged on behalf of the petitioners, as indicated above. To the first point first. The plaintiffs have consistently contended that the summons in the relevant suit had been served upon the defendants on 16/3/1983, and the contending defendants having filed the relevant two applications under Section 17 (1) and 17 (2) on 14/5/83, the applications so filed by them are clearly time barred. The plaintiffs' aforesaid contention has been overruled by the learned Munsif for the reasons recorded in the impugned order. The plaintiffs' aforesaid contention has been overruled by the learned Munsif for the reasons recorded in the impugned order. But on perusal and scrutiny of the record I find considerable force in the plaintiffs' aforesaid contention for the reasons I shall presently discuss: (a) The plaintiffs have contended that summons had been served upon the defendants on 16. 3. 83. The contending defendants, on the other hand, sought to contend that the summons had not been served upon them. In paragraph-1 of the relevant application filed by the defendant No. 1 under Section 17 (2) of the Act he has contended that he has entered appearance without service of Summons, and the application under Section 17 (1) has been filed by the defendant No. 2 for allowing him to deposit arrears of rents with the statutory interest thereon, in the circumstances stated therein. But unhappily for them, the contending defendants Nos. 1,4,6,7 and 9 appear to have admitted with more than usual clarity and conviction in paragraph-6 of the written statement by them in the suit that they have been depositing monthly rents in court and have filed an application under Section 17 (2) of the Act after service of Summons upon them. It was submitted by the learned Advocate for the contending Opposite parties herein that an application for amendment of the written Statement for amendment of the aforesaid averment has already been filed in the trial court, which is yet to be disposed of. So long as the said application for amendment of the written statement, if so filed, is not allowed by the court, the aforesaid admission made by the aforesaid defendants in paragraph-6 of their written statement cannot clearly be discarded. (b) On perusal of the applications filed by the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 separately under Section 17 (1) and 17 (2) of the Act it would pretty clearly appear that the said two applications had been verified by Bijoy Kumar Jalan (hereinafter referred to as Bijoy) as Agent of the defendants. The said Bijoy, admittedly and evidently, therefore, is an Agent of the defendants. The Process Server's return dated 16/3/83 In the Lower Court Records would seem to indicate that the Process Server concerned had gone to the locale on that day (16/3/83) for service of sumons upon the defendants In the relevant suit, but did not find the defendants at their residence. The Process Server's return dated 16/3/83 In the Lower Court Records would seem to indicate that the Process Server concerned had gone to the locale on that day (16/3/83) for service of sumons upon the defendants In the relevant suit, but did not find the defendants at their residence. Finding Sri Bijoy Kumar Jalan, the Agent of the defendants and the minors, at the locale he had requested him (Bijoy) to accept the Summons on acknowledgement (granting receipt therefor), after informing him the contents thereof. Sri Jalan having refused to accept the summons on acknowledgement, he (process server) had served the summons by hanging in presence of the witnesses named in the returned after obtaining their signatures thereon, as stated in his relevant return. That Bijoy is the Agent of the defendants is admitted, as stated above. In terms of the Process Server's aforesaid return he appears to have served the Summons upon the defendants by hanging, presumably under the provisions of Order 5, Rule 17 of the Code, in the absence of the defendants and on refusal by Bijoy to accept the same on acknowledgement. The said Bijoy in his examination-in-chief before the court below as D. W. I has clearly admitted at page 3 of his deposition that Summons has issued to the defendant No. 1 Rajendra Kumar Bagaria, but the summons were not given to him (Bijoy) though he wanted to accept the same on their behalf. In his cross- examination at page-6 of his deposition he further appears to have clearly admitted that the defendants Nos. 5 and 10 got Summons. He went on to add that the bailiff wrote his presence (obviously implying the report return ). By admitting so the DW1 Bijoy has clearly indirectly admitted that the bailiff had gone to the locale to serve summons in his presence, as reported by him (bailiff ). As already stated above the DW1 had also admitted in his examination-in-chief that the summons were not given to him, though wanted by him. On his aforesaid evidence the report of the process server that he went to the locale on 16/3/93 to serve Summons upon the defendants in his (DWl's) presence cannot be deemed to be untrue/incorrect. The Process Server has reported in his return that he had tendered the Summons to the DW1 Bijoy, the Agent of the defendants, who had refused to accept the same. The Process Server has reported in his return that he had tendered the Summons to the DW1 Bijoy, the Agent of the defendants, who had refused to accept the same. The report of the process server to that effect does not at all seem to be unacceptable, gauged in the background of the aforesaid evidence of the DW1. That the bailiffs report is true/correct and acceptable would all the more be confirmed by the admission of the DW1 Bijoy in his very examination-in-chlef at page-3 of his deposition that after the receipt of summons of the suit they started depositing rents in the court, as admitted by the contending defendants in paragraph-6 of their written statement, as stated above. 5. The defendants Nos. 1 and 2 have filed their applications under Section 17 (1) and 17 (2) of the Act separately without asking for copy of the plaint or concise statement thereof from the plaintiffs. They could not have conceivably filed the same had they not received copy of the plaint. They presumably, therefore, have obtained the copy of the plaint from the summons served upon them, enabling them to file the aforesaid two applications separately, the way they did. The said fact would as well seem to lend point to and re-inforce the conclusion that summons in the relevant suit had been served upon the defendants. ( 6 ) REALISING the difficulty somewhat tardily, the learned Advocate for the contending defendants/opposite parties, by referring me to the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Jainarain Agarwala v. S. Banerjee, 90 CWN 279 and the Order dated 4/4/83 passed by the learned Munsif, sadly sought to submit that the summons in the relevant suit could not be held to have been served upon the defendants. The order dated 4/4/83 passed by the learned Munsif reads as follows:"plaintiff files hazira. S/r received not served. A/d have not yet been received. To 21/6/83 for Orders awaiting A/d". ( 7 ) THE Division Bench of this court has indeed held in the aforesaid decision that under the provisions of Order V when service is effected under Rule 17, as it was purported to have been done by the Process- server, the court is to apply its judicial mind to the process-servers return and his declaration. ( 7 ) THE Division Bench of this court has indeed held in the aforesaid decision that under the provisions of Order V when service is effected under Rule 17, as it was purported to have been done by the Process- server, the court is to apply its judicial mind to the process-servers return and his declaration. On application of its judicial mind, the court unless it decides to make further enquires, "shall either declare that summons has been duly served or order such service, as it thinks fit. ". ( 8 ) AS already indicated above, the Process Server in his relevant return dated 16/03/83 had declared that the Summons had been served upon the defendants by hanging on refusal of the DWl-Bijoy to accept the same on acknowledgment in presence of the witnesses named, in the manner indicated therein (presumably under Order V, Rule 17 of the Code ). The learned Munsif in his aforesaid Order dated 4/4/83 had recorded "s/ R received not served", which is contrary to the process server's return and declaration that Summons had been served. The learned Munsif clearly did not bother to look to the process server's return and declaration. He could not be said to have applied his judicial mind to the process server's return and declaration. He having not applied his judicial mind to the process server's return and declaration the aforesaid order dated 4/4/83 passed by him would clearly be of little moment and consequence. The learned Munsif has not made any declaration in his aforesaid order that Summons had duly been served upon the defendants. He did neither direct service of Summons. He had only posted the suit to 21/6/83 "for orders awaiting A/d". The said order, such as it is, cannot clearly be meant to mean that Summons had not been served upon the defendants. Per contra, having regard to the overwhelming and cumulative materials on record, as they are, and for the reasons amply and appallingly discussed above, the summons in the relevant suit must be held to have been served upon the defendants on 16/3/83. The aforesaid decision referred to by the learned Advocate for the contending opposite parties further appear to be distinguishable from the facts and circumstances herein. in the relevant case in the aforesaid decision the trial court had passed an order directing the issuance of a registered Post Card. The aforesaid decision referred to by the learned Advocate for the contending opposite parties further appear to be distinguishable from the facts and circumstances herein. in the relevant case in the aforesaid decision the trial court had passed an order directing the issuance of a registered Post Card. In the instant case no such direction has been given by the learned Munsif. He had merely posted the case to 21/6/83 for Orders awaiting A/d. ( 9 ) WITH things as they are, there could clearly, therefore, be no running away from the inescapable conclusion that summons in the relevant suit had been served upon the defendants. The question which would at once emerge for consideration is; when and how the same had been served upon the defendants. According to the report of the process server dated 16. 3. 83, the Summons had been served upon the defendants on that very day (16/3/83) in the manner stated in the return. There is no other material on record to show that the Summons had been served upon the defendants on any other day and/or in any other manner. And, as already stated above, the return of the process server concerned dated 16/3/83 on record must be held to be acceptable for much the same reasons indicated. The materials on record being, what they are, the learned Munsif should have held that the Summons had been served upon the defendatns on 16/3/83. The relevant two applications under Section 17 (1) and 17 (2) of the Act having been filed by the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 separtely on 14/5/83 clearly, therefore, be held to be time-barred. The impugned Order passed by the learned Munsif to the contrary cannot be sustained as such. ( 10 ) AS regards the second point urged on behalf of the plaintiffs/ petitioners it would pretty clearly appear from the applications made by the defendants Nos. 1and2 separately under Section 17 (1) and 17 (2) of the Act that the contending defendants themselves have clearly admitted therein that there were arrears of rent payable by them for which they had prayed the court for allowing them to make the deposits of arrears of rents with statutory interest thereon. Default in payment of rents by the defendants clearly, therefore, had been admitted therein. So also admitted by the DW1 Bijoy in his evidence before the court. Default in payment of rents by the defendants clearly, therefore, had been admitted therein. So also admitted by the DW1 Bijoy in his evidence before the court. But even though default had been so admitted by the contending Defendants the learned Munsif had held in his impugned order that there is nothing due to the plaintiffs by the defendants towards rent in respect of the suit premises, signifying that there had been no default on the part of the defendants in payment of rents in respect of the suit premises. The impugned order passed by the learned Munsif could neither be sustained on this score as well. ( 11 ) AS regards the third point urged on behalf of the petitioners, it would pretty clearly appear from the evidence of the DW1 Bljoy that he had clearly admitted in his evidence before the court that Money Order was sent in the name of plaintiff No. 1 alone, and on his refusal to accept the Money Order, they had been depositing rents in court thereafter. Rents having thus been tendered and deposited in the name of the plaintiff No. 1 alone, and not in the names of all the plaintiffs/landlords the tender and deposit made by the contending defendants cannot be held to be valid. ( 12 ) IN view of the discussions above and having regard to the materials on record the learned Munsif clearly appears to have acted with material irregularity in disposing of the relevant application filed by the contending defendant No. l under Section 17 (2) of the Act, the way he did, by passing the impugned order. The same cannot be clearly sustained on any reckoning. ( 13 ) IN the premises above, the Revisional Application should clearly succeed, as it must, and be accordingly allowed. The impugned Order passed by the court below be hereby set aside. The relevant application filed by the defendant No. l under Section 17 (2) of the Act be rejected. The learned Munsif is directed to proceed with the suit according to law. Since the suit is pending from 1983 for more then a decade, he shall seek to dispose of the same, as early as possible, preferably within a period of eight months from the date of communication of the order and receipt of the Lower Court records, called for. Since the suit is pending from 1983 for more then a decade, he shall seek to dispose of the same, as early as possible, preferably within a period of eight months from the date of communication of the order and receipt of the Lower Court records, called for. In the facts, circumstances and nature of the instant matter, I direct the parties to bear their respective cost of this hearing.