JUDGMENT Ruma Pal, J. This judgment disposes of two appeals preferred from a judgment and order dated 11th October, 1996, allowing a writ application filed by Smt. Rita Devi Sahu (the appellant in the second appeal). Smt. Sahu had challenged the procedure followed by the State Transport Authority in the selection for grant of permanent Stage carriage permit for the inter-State route Purulia - Kiruburu. 2. The advertisement inviting applications for grant of stage carriage permits along various routes, including the one in question, was published in April 1994. The copy of the advertisement relied upon by the parties was in Bengali. The official translation of the advertisement in so far as it is relevant reads : "The applicant has to definitely be a resident of West Bengal. The ration card and a certificate is necessary for proof of residence. The person issuing this certificate will be the officers-in-charge of the Police Station of the applicant's locality, who will give the certificate by mentioning the true address of the applicant. Or this certificate can be obtained from any Central/State Govt. Gazetted Officer, the capability of the applicant/ applicants (M/F) should be such that he/they, will be able to ply a vehicle -according to the fixed specifications, which shall certainly have to be (his) own and at the time of sanction of permit in his/their favour, for the fixed route, (it) shall also have to be registered in West Bengal. The application from W. Bengal, along with blank verification statement will be hung in the office of S.T.A. Block II, top floor, Writers' Building, Calcutta-1." 3. The appellants in the first appeal are three brothers and are hereafter referred to as the Goswamis. They applied jointly for a permit on the route together with the necessary documents. Smt. Sahu also applied for the same route. She had a 1984 model bus. The State Transport Authority (S.T.A. in brief) held interviews of the applicants on 5.5.95. The Goswamis produced a written declaration of their father who is the registered owner of WB-55/ 0700 a 1992 model bus, undertaking to let the bus on hire to the Goswamis in the event they were selected for grant of the permit. 4. The State Transport Authority (S.T.A. in brief) held interviews of the applicants on 5.5.95. The Goswamis produced a written declaration of their father who is the registered owner of WB-55/ 0700 a 1992 model bus, undertaking to let the bus on hire to the Goswamis in the event they were selected for grant of the permit. 4. By letter dated 16th October 1995 the STA informed the other applicants for the route permit including Smt. Sahu, as follows : "As advertised in the daily newspapers in terms of STA Notice No.1450-STA dated 4.4.94, I am directed to inform you that the selection of the candidates for having permits on the route stated above for which you are an applicant, has been finalised. Priority was given to the applicant who possessed the latest model vehicle. Judging your candidature on the above ground, you could not be selected." 5. In fact it was the Goswamis who were selected by the STA. An offer letter was issued to the Goswamis by the STA on 22.10.95. The offer letter specified that the selection of the Goswamis for grant of the carriage permit was subject to their placing vehicle No. WB-55/0700. In terms of his written declaration the Goswami's father entered into an agreement with the Goswamis letting out the vehicle to them on hire for plying against any permit. This agreement was sent to the STA and on 1.1.96 the Goswamis were issued a permanent stage carriage permit valid from 1.1.96 till 31.12.2000 on the route Purulia-Kiruburu. They have been running the said bus on the route in question since that' date. 6. In the meantime Smt. Sahu filed a writ application challenging the letter dated 18th October 1995. The primary challenge to the decision of ST A was that by choosing the applicant with the latest model they had acted on parameters which were neither in the Motor Vehicles Act 1988 nor in the advertisement. Subsequently, Smt. Sahu filed an application raising an additional challenge namely, that the Goswamis were not the owners of the vehicle No. WB-55/0700 nor were they in possession of the vehicle either on the date of making the application or on the date of the interview and were thus not eligible applicants at all. 7. By the impugned judgment and order the writ application was allowed. The grant of the permit to the Goswamis was quashed. 7. By the impugned judgment and order the writ application was allowed. The grant of the permit to the Goswamis was quashed. The only ground on .which the writ application was allowed was that the State Transport Authority had rejected the application of Smt. Sahu on consideration of a factor which had not been indicated in the advertisement inviting applications from intending operators. The Learned Judge was of the view that if the State Transport Authority wanted to apply the criteria of giving weightage to latest model vehicles the same should have been indicated in the advertisement, and that by failing to indicate the criteria for preference, prejudice had been caused 'to the intending operators. Liberty was however granted to the STA to proceed afresh but if the STA wished to give preference to the latest model vehicle in the matter of grant of permit it was to specify the same in the advertisement. 8. The Goswamis then appealed. They submitted that the Learned Judge himself had found that the preference of an applicant having a newer model vehicle was a relevant consideration. It was submitted that this is a matter of evaluation and was not required to be stated in the advertisement. It was also submitted that the Learned Single Judge had proceeded on the basis of prejudice caused to the petitioner by non-indication of the preferential factor in the advertisement whereas no such case had been made out by the writ petitioner herself and there was nothing to show that she had in fact a vehicle of the latest model which she was capable of placing. It was also submitted that the Learned Judge should have considered that the writ petitioner had not approached the Court with clean hands in as much as she had suppressed from the Court that at the time when she had applied, her vehicle was already covered by a temporary permit. It is finally submitted that the State Transport Authority had exercised its discretion legally 'and reasonably and that the Court should not have interfered with its decision under Art. 226. 9. The State Transport Authorities adopted the submissions of the Goswamis and have stated that it was not possible for the selecting authority to foresee and provide for all possible factors which may affect the exercise of discretion in the advertisement. 10. Subsequently, Smt. Sahu preferred an appeal. 9. The State Transport Authorities adopted the submissions of the Goswamis and have stated that it was not possible for the selecting authority to foresee and provide for all possible factors which may affect the exercise of discretion in the advertisement. 10. Subsequently, Smt. Sahu preferred an appeal. She submitted that this requirement for a new model was not one of the pre-conditions statutorily provided for under s. 71(3)(d) of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) or Rule 109 of the West Bengal Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules). According to Smt. Sahu, these provisions exhaustively dealt with the matters which could be considered for grant of a permit. It was submitted that in any event the Goswamis were outside the zone of consideration as the advertisement required the applicant to be the owner of the vehicle but it was the admitted fact that at the date of the application as also on the date of consideration by the State Transport Authority the Goswamis were not the owners of the vehicles in question nor were they in possession thereof. It was submitted that the writ application should have been disposed of by setting aside the selection of the Goswamis and by directing the STA to consider the selection on the basis of the advertisement already published. 11. The first question which needs to be answered is-What is the nature of the power exercised by the Transport Authority in granting a stage carriage permit? 12. Section 7H3)(d) provides: "After reserving such number of permits as is referred to in clause (c), the Regional Transport Authority shall in considering an application have regard to the following matters, namely :- (i) financial stability of the applicant; (ii) satisfactory performance as a stage carriage operator including payment of tax if the applicant is or has been an operator of stage carriage service; and (iii) such other matters as may be prescribed by the State Government: Provided that, other conditions being equal, preference shall be given to applications for permits from :- (i) State transport undertakings; (ii) co-operative societies registered or deemed to have been registered under any enactment for the time being in force; or (iii) ex-servicemen." Rule 109 of the Rules provides : “R. 109. Preference in granting Stage Carriage permit. Preference in granting Stage Carriage permit. Under sub-clause (iii) of clause (d) of sub-section (3) of section 71 of the Act, in addition to the provisions under clause (c) of sub-section (3) of section 71 of the Act and financial stability and satisfactory performance including payment of tax, a preference shall be given to the educated unemployed, project affected persons, applicant having a Diploma in Automobile Engineering and/or a Diploma in Tourism or Transport Management from recognised Institute, or a travel Agent recognised by India Tourism Development Corporation or the West Bengal Tourism Development Corporation." 13. Smt. Sahu says that the choice must be limited to the factors mentioned in s. 17(3)(d) and Rule 109. The submission is unacceptable. Section 71(3) only lays down the minimum requirements which an applicant must fulfil and does not limit the discretion to be exercised even after the fulfilment of the requirements mentioned in that section. Rule 109 similarly has no application as it only deals with preference with regard to the categories of applicants and it has no relevance on the question of assessment of better qualification. There is in fact no provision in the Act or the Rules which covers a situation where the STA has to choose between two applicants who have fulfilled all the statutory conditions and who are otherwise equally placed. In such a situation it is obvious that the concerned authority must make a selection by evaluating the relative merits of both. Therefore, the authorities must have a discretion over and above the statutory requirements. This is implicit in the word selection. 14. An argument similar to the one urged by Sm. Sahu had been rejected by the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in Dholpur Cooperative T. & M. Union vs. Appellate Authority ( AIR 1955 Raj 19 ). It had been contended that the authority was limited to a consideration of the factors specified in s. 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (corresponding to s. 71 of the 1988 Act). Wanchoo, CJ said: "Section 47 lays down the general conditions regard will be paid to which in granting or refusing a stage carriage permit. These conditions are not necessarily exhaustive in details and in deciding between one applicant and another, the Regional Transport Authority or the Appellate Authority may well consider other allied matters. Wanchoo, CJ said: "Section 47 lays down the general conditions regard will be paid to which in granting or refusing a stage carriage permit. These conditions are not necessarily exhaustive in details and in deciding between one applicant and another, the Regional Transport Authority or the Appellate Authority may well consider other allied matters. For example if there are two applicants and only one permit is to be granted, and one of the applicants was an old operator while the other applicant is a new operator, the Transport Authority may well take into account the fact that one of the applicants is an old experienced operator and as such better entitled to the permit. Or, there are two persons applying for a permit, and one of them has better buses than the other, the Transport Authority may well take that into consideration also in granting the permit. Similar other matters can also be considered by the Transport Authority for preferring one applicant to other provided these are all in the interest of the public and it cannot, in our opinion, be said that in so doing the Transport Authority is taking into account matters so extraneous to s. 47 that its decision must be held to be guided by considerations other than those provided by law and the rules." 15. A distinction should therefore be made between a condition of eligibility and a factor implicit in the power of choice or selection. The first relates to the elimination from the zone of consideration altogether and the second relates to the process of assessment in comparing and determining the relative suitability of the eligible competitors. 16. The next questions is - what are the factors which may be considered in the exercise of such discretion ? 17. The answer is that there can be no exhaustive enumeration. All that is required is that the selection should not be made for oblique motives or on extraneous considerations and the only question which the Court will consider when a challenge is thrown to a selection made by the authority is whether any of the considerations which played in the minds of the authority when making the selection was extraneous. [See: Patiala Bus (Sirhind) Pvt. Ltd. vs. STA Tribunal, Punjab, 1974(2) SCC 245 and State of U.P. vs. Rafiquddin, AIR 1988 se 162, 175]. [See: Patiala Bus (Sirhind) Pvt. Ltd. vs. STA Tribunal, Punjab, 1974(2) SCC 245 and State of U.P. vs. Rafiquddin, AIR 1988 se 162, 175]. The objective criterion for determining whether the STA or other permit granting authority has acted on extraneous considerations is to see whether the norms for selection are rationally relatable to the objects of the Act. This is clear from s. 71 which provides that a Regional Transport Authority (RTA) shall, while considering an application for a state-carriage permit, have regard to the objects of the Act. The underlying end of all the objects specified in the Act is the interest of the traveling public. 18. Keeping these principles in view it is clear that the choice of a better bus or a bus of a later model is not an extraneous consideration as the interest of the traveling public would clearly be better served by a better vehicle. Therefore if an applicant having a better or a newer bus is preferred for grant of a permit over an applicant whose vehicle is not as good as it cannot be said that the exercise of discretion by the STA was illegal or arbitrary. The Learned Single Judge himself was of the view that the consideration that the Goswamis had a better vehicle was not an extraneous one. In Jadumani vs. Srinibash, AIR 1974 Ori 202 , 204 it was also said: "It is open to a Transport Authority preferring one applicant to the other to take into consideration the fact that the applicant preferred has a ready vehicle of an acceptable model as also a spare vehicle to work as a stand-by. It cannot be forgotten that the paramount consideration under the Act is the convenience of the traveling public and the business of the operator is only the means." [See also: Dholpur CD-operative T & M Union vs. Appellate Authority (supra)]. 19. The next question is should the STA have mentioned that they would prefer an applicant having a better vehicle in the advertisement? I think not. The insistence on the matter being' included in the advertisement is really a demand that natural justice should be complied with. But it is axiomatic that an applicant is required to put his best foot forward when he applies for grant of permit. I think not. The insistence on the matter being' included in the advertisement is really a demand that natural justice should be complied with. But it is axiomatic that an applicant is required to put his best foot forward when he applies for grant of permit. If he does not do so he runs the risk of being overshadowed by someone who puts up a better show than him. No applicant in fact keeps his best assets hidden when he is competing and it is only reasonable to assume that if an applicant had a good vehicle he or she would produce it before the State Transport Authority for their consideration. 20. But this is not to say that the authority cannot say in the advertisement that only persons with new models would be considered. This would be an eliminating condition. But as said in Munni Devi vs. R.T.A. AIR 1995 All 330 fixing the model condition and granting permits to better models are two different things' and even when the model condition is fixed, "it is always open to the transport authorities to grant permits to those applicants who have vehicles of a better model;". The choice of a better model is merely a reason which may weigh with an authority in taking a decision. It cannot be elevated to a principle of weightage needing to be expressly provided for in an advertisement inviting applicants for permits. 21. As already noted there may be several reasons for preferring one applicant over another. They can neither be foreseen nor predicted. To ask the authority to provide for all these eventualities is to ask for the impossible. 22. The matter may also be viewed from a different perspective. Assuming that the rules of natural justice required the setting out of all factors which may be considered for relative evaluation in the advertisement, it is not every violation of natural justice that would involve the decision arrived at being set aside. "The complaint should be examined on the touchstone of prejudice" (State Banll of Patiala vs. S. K. Sharma, AIR 1996 SC 1669 at 1681 also at page 1683) and it is for the complainant to make out the case. 23. "The complaint should be examined on the touchstone of prejudice" (State Banll of Patiala vs. S. K. Sharma, AIR 1996 SC 1669 at 1681 also at page 1683) and it is for the complainant to make out the case. 23. There is force in the submission of the Goswamis that the writ petitioner had not made out any case of prejudice at all either in the writ petition or in the affidavit in opposition to the stay application filed in the Goswami's appeal or indeed in the stay petition filed by Smt. Sahu in the appeal preferred by her. She has not stated in any pleading before the Court or before the Court below that she had in fact a newer vehicle which could have been produced had this been notified in the advertisement. Prejudice is a question of fact. A party must lay a proper foundation for it in his pleadings. He must at least aver it. Where he has done neither the Court cannot make out the case for him (Pt. Samboo Nath Tikoo vs. S. Gian Singh 1995 Supp. (3) SCC 266 para 20). 24. The final question is, did the Goswami's come within the zone of consideration at all ? Or were they excluded because they were not owners of or in possession of the vehicle when they applied or at the time of interview? 25. There is no requirement in the Act or Rules that an applicant must be an owner or in possession of a vehicle before being considered for grant of a permit. 26. This view is supported by the decision in Jadumoni Pradhan vs. Srinibash Sahu AIR 1974 Ori 202 , 204 where it was held that under the Act and the Rules made thereunder ownership or possession of a vehicle is not a condition precedent to making an application for grant of a permit. "The applicant is entitled to say that if granted a permit, he would procure a vehicle to use under it."(bid) 27. The Supreme Court in Veerappa vs. Raman & Raman, AIR 1952 SC 192 went to the extent of saying that even the issue of a permit is not dependent on ownership of the vehicle. All that is required even then is the possession of the vehicle (See also in this connection Khali-ul-Rahman vs. STA Tribunal, AIR 1963 All 363 affirmed in AIR 1969 SC 493 ). All that is required even then is the possession of the vehicle (See also in this connection Khali-ul-Rahman vs. STA Tribunal, AIR 1963 All 363 affirmed in AIR 1969 SC 493 ). 28. The advertisement also did not require the applicant to be the owner of the vehicle either on the date of the application or at the time of consideration. All that the advertisement required was the establishment before the authority that the applicant was capable of plying of a vehicle of the fixed specifications along the route which would be his own. 29. This is also in keeping with rule 141 of the Rules which reads as follows: "141. Every permit must contain the Registration Mark(s) of the vehicle(s) which shall ply by virtue of the permit granted and during the period prescribed by the Transport Authority granting the permit in the Offer Letter which shall not normally exceed one month from the date on which the Offer Letter is issued, the grantee must produce the documents in respect of the vehicle(s) showing that he is in possession on ownership of the vehicle(s) and that the change of address of vehicle(s) concerned has/have been effected within this State, if previously registered outside this State and that the vehicle(s) is/are not covered by any kind of permit(s) : Provided that the Transport Authority granting the permit may allow time up to a limit of four months in respect of a grantee under the Additional Employment Programme or an Ex-serviceman: Provided further that the Transport Authority granting the permit may for reasons to be recorded in writing relax the condition as to possession by ownership for such period as it might consider reasonable but in any case not beyond six months from the date on which the permit is granted. In such contingency, also, the condition as regards transfer or change of address shall not be relaxable." 30. Furthermore the advertisement has been issued under the provisions of the Act. It is therefore reasonable to construe the use of the word 'owner' in the advertisement in accordance with the definition of the word in the Act. (See s. 20 of the General Clauses Act, 1897). 31. Furthermore the advertisement has been issued under the provisions of the Act. It is therefore reasonable to construe the use of the word 'owner' in the advertisement in accordance with the definition of the word in the Act. (See s. 20 of the General Clauses Act, 1897). 31. The word 'owner' has been defined in s. 2(30) of the Act as follows : "2(30) "Owner" means a person in whose name a motor vehicle stands registered, and where such person is a minor, the guardian of such minor, and in relation to a motor vehicle which is the subject of a hircpurchase agreement, or an agreement of lease or an agreement of hypothecation, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement." 32. The Goswamis had submitted a declaration from their father that he would make available the vehicle in question to his three sons (being the appellants in the first appeal) if they were granted the permit under an agreement of lease. The authorities accepted the declaration as establishing the capability of the Goswamis. The acceptance cannot be faulted. The agreement of lease between the Goswamis and their father in respect of the vehicle was executed before the issue of the permit and the vehicle is plying along the route in question since that date. 33. The decisions cited on behalf of Smt. Sahu are not relevant to this case. The case of UPPSC, Allahabad vs. Alpana (1994) 2 SCC 723 turned on the construction of an advertisement issued by the UP Public Service Commission for filling a post. Similarly the decision in Rehha Chaturvedi vs. University of Rajasthan 1993 Supp. (3) SCC 168 deals with the date for scrutiny of applications in service matters. 34. The decision of a Single Judge in M/s. Shy Highways vs. STAT AIR 1994 P&H 155 merely holds that when an applicant never possessed a bus it cannot claim preferential treatment. I have failed to find out the applicability of the decision in S. V. Sivaswami vs. Hafez Motor Transport 1990 (4) SCC 459 to this case either in fact or law. 35. In the circumstances of the case the appeal of the Goswamis is allowed and the order under appeal is set aside. The appeal of Smt. Sahu is for the same reasons dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. 36. Devendra Kumar Jain, J.: I agree, 37. 35. In the circumstances of the case the appeal of the Goswamis is allowed and the order under appeal is set aside. The appeal of Smt. Sahu is for the same reasons dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. 36. Devendra Kumar Jain, J.: I agree, 37. Ruma Pal, J.: Let a xerox copy of the Judgment duly signed by the Assistant Registrar of this Court be given to the parties upon their undertaking to apply for certified copy of the Judgment and on payment of usual charges. Devendra Kumar Jain, J.: I agree. APOIT No. 595 of 1996 allowed. APOIT No.T628 of 1996 dismissed.