Judgment :- Ramakrishnan, J. The tenant in a Rent Control Petition filed under S.11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (for short 'The act) is the petitioner in this revision. The land-lady, who filed the RCP, is the respondent. Respondent is the step mother of the petitioner. 2. As the respondent in the RCP, petitioner has filed a detailed counter affidavit disputing the bonafides and opposing the prayer for eviction. The Rent Control Petition, which was filled in 1980, was ultimately included in the special list and posted for enquiry to 2.1.1992. However, on 2.1.1992, it was adjourned for reporting settlement 'finally' to 7.1.1992. But on that day petitioner remained absent. It would appear that counsel appearing for the petitioner also reported 'no instructions' on that day. As such, after declaring the petitioner, ex parte, the Rent Control Court examined the land-lady as P.W.1 and marked Exts. Al and A2 as evidence on her side. After accepting the evidence adduced by the land-lady, an order of eviction was passed under S.11(3) of the Act finding that the need alleged by the land-lady is genuine. Thereafter, petitioner filed IA 368 of 1992 for setting aside the ex-parte order alleging that he was prevented from appearing in Court as he was advised to take complete bed rest. Along with the petition, the petitioner seems to have produced a certificate issued by Dr. A.K. Sreedharan stating that the petitioner had a minor-cardiac infraction and he was advised to take bed rest. While the application for setting aside the ex parte was pending, the petitioner also filed an appeal against the order under S.18 of the Act which was numbered as RCA 25 of 1992 on the file of the Rent Control appellate Authority (District Court), Palakkad. After filing the appeal, the petitioner got the application for setting aside the ex parte order dismissed as not pressed. The appellate Authority has dismissed the appeal finding no merit in it as per the impugned order. Aggrieved by the dismissal of the appeal, the petitioner has filed this revision under S.20 of the Act. 3. Apart from the formal grounds, the two substantive grounds raised in the memorandum of appeal filed before the appellate Authority are the following: "2. The Rent Control Court had erred in its decision. The lower court ought to have given opportunity to the appellant/respondent to prove his case. 3. Apart from the formal grounds, the two substantive grounds raised in the memorandum of appeal filed before the appellate Authority are the following: "2. The Rent Control Court had erred in its decision. The lower court ought to have given opportunity to the appellant/respondent to prove his case. The principle of "audi alteram partem' has been grossly ignored by the Rent Control Court. The order has been passed by the Rent Controller Court without giving any importance to natural justice and equity. 3. The Rent Controller had arbitrarily decided the case and thus caused irreparable loss and considerable hardship to the appellant/respondent". It may be relevant to note here itself that the petitioner has not raised a specific ground dealing with the alleged reason for his absence from Court on 7.1.1992 for challenging the order of eviction passed against him in the RCP. He has also not produced the original or certified copy of the medical certificate produced in support of the case by him in the application for setting aside the ex parte order either along with the memorandum of appeal or thereafter while the appeal was pending before the appellate Authority. Except stating in ground No. 2 that the*Rent Control Court ought to have given him an opportunity to prove Ins case and there is gross violation of the principles of audi alteram partem, the petitioner has not made any averment as to the reason why he was prevented from appearing in Court on 7.1.1992. 4. The appellate Authority has disposed of the appeal finding that there is no material before him to hold that petitioner was prevented by sufficient reason from appearing before the Court on 7.1.1992. It was also found that the evidence adduced by the land lady in the RCP is sufficient to sustain the finding of the Rent Control Court that the need alleged by her is bonafide. On the basis of the materials available on record, we are of the view that the appellate Authority has not committed any illegality, irregularity or impropriety in dismissing the appeal on the findings recorded by it as indicated above. On the basis of the materials available on record, we are of the view that the appellate Authority has not committed any illegality, irregularity or impropriety in dismissing the appeal on the findings recorded by it as indicated above. Whatever may be the reason for not pressing the application filed for setting aside the ex parte order, since the petition has actually been dismissed as not pressed, it cannot be said that there is any legally acceptable material on record to hold that the petitioner was prevented by sufficient reason from appearing in Court on 7.1.1992, the date on which the petitioner was declared absent and ex parte. Similarly, it cannot also be contended that the finding entered by the Rent Control Court and the appellate Authority on the question of bonafides of the land-lady is not supported by any evidence on record. As such, we find that the appellate Authority was perfectly justified in dismissing the appeal for the reasons contained in the impugned judgment. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has advanced a further contention that the appellate Authority was not justified in relying upon the fact that the petitioner has not pressed IA 368 of 1992 for concluding that there was no ground for the tenant not to appear before the Rent Control Court on 7.1.1992. Counsel submitted that the application for setting aside the ex parte order was not pressed only because he has filed an appeal and the same was pending and not because there was no ground for his non-appearance before the Court on 7.1.1992. It was submitted that the appellate Authority was bound to consider whether the absence of the petitioner in Court on 7.1.1992 was due to sufficient reasons and if so, whether the ex parte order was liable to be set aside on that ground, before taking a final decision in the appeal. We do not think that in this appeal filed under S.18 of the Act against an ex parte order of eviction, the appellate Authority was bound to consider the sufficiency or otherwise of the reason for the absence of the petitioner on the date on which the petition was posted for trial or the legality or otherwise of the order declaring him ex parte before disposing of the appeal. Apart from the fact that no specific ground was raised in the memorandum of appeal to that effect, we think that it was not open to the petitioner to raise any such contention in an appeal like the one filed in this case challenging the sustainability of the order of eviction passed ex parte. In an appeal filed against an order of eviction, whether ex parte or on merits, the appellant can succeed only on merits establishing that the order of eviction is illegal on the materials available on record and not for the reason that he was denied an opportunity to contest the petition for eviction. We find sufficient support for the above view, which we are inclined to take in this case, in the following observations made by Balanarayana Marar, J. in the decision reported in Bava alias Asees v. Madhavan and Ors. (1995 (2) KLJ 706): "An appeal is provided from an ex parte decree under sub-s.(2) of S.96 of the Code. B u t the enquiry in an appeal can only relate to an error, defect or irregularity which has affected the decision of the case. The party having chosen to resort to that remedy the appellate court can consider it only as an appeal on the merits of the case or any question of law arising therefrom. In other words, the enquiry has to be limited to the question whether the decree can be sustained on the materials on record. Permitting the appellant to raise points of injustice of the ex parte order in an appeal under S.96 of the Code would be virtually converting the appeal into a petition for setting aside the ex parte decree. Without any evidence it will not be possible for the appellate court to decide whether the summons was duly served or not or whether defendant was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing. The reason that when a particular remedy is provided for setting aside an ex parte decree and there is by way of appeal another special remedy against an order refusing to set aside, these remedies and none other must be followed. The reason that when a particular remedy is provided for setting aside an ex parte decree and there is by way of appeal another special remedy against an order refusing to set aside, these remedies and none other must be followed. A party is therefore, not entitled to ask the appellate court to accept the appeal on a ground which he could urge in an application under R.13 of O. IX and request for remand of the suit for re-hearing". True that it was with reference to an appeal filed under S.96 of the Code that the learned judge has made the above observations. B ut, in our view, the principle followed in the matter of appeals filed under S.96 is equally applicable to an appeal filed under S.18 of the Act also. The learned judge has noted in the above decision the conflicting view taken by different courts on the above question. We need not refer to the decisions which has taken a different view on the point as we are inclined to agree with the view which was found favour by the learned judge in the above decision. However, we may note that the High Courts of Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh have also taken a similar view in the decision reported in Munassar Bin v. Fatima Begum (AIR 1975 AP 366) and Smt. Laxmibai v. Keshrimal Jain (AIR 1986 MP 138) respectively. 6. In the light of what is discussed above, we would dismiss the revision as without any merit. Taking note of the relationship between the parties, we direct the parties to bear their respective costs making it clear that the respondent will be entitled to withdraw the amount deposited by the petitioner to comply with the condition imposed by this Court while ordering stay of execution of the order of eviction as per the order passed in CMP 108 of 1993, if not already withdrawn, notwithstanding the dismissal of this revision.