JUDGMENT Pal, J.: This appeal has been preferred from an order dated 22nd November, 1996, dismissing the writ application. 2. The writ petitioner applied to the Senior Divisional Engineer (Co-ordination) at Kharagpur for permission to fill up unused railway borrowpits by fly ash. A survey was held of the area. The survey report indicated three conditions subject to which the dumping should be permitted. By a letter dated 5/4.7.96, the South Eastern Railway wrote to the petitioner permitting him to fill up the borrowpits between certain specified kilometres and incorporating the three conditions mentioned in the survey report. The writ petitioner wrote a letter on 26th July, 1996 submitting that he should not be asked to comply with the second condition mentioned as be would suffer financially. By a letter of the same date the petitioner wrote to the railway authorities asking for handing over the physical possession of the land and stating that he was interested in starting the work immediately. 3. According to the records produced by the railway authorities the permission granted to the petitioner to fill up the borrowpits by fly ash was cancelled by a letter dated 30th July, 1996. Subsequently, the railway authorities issued a tender on 7th October, 1996, Inviting applications for, inter alia, filling up of the borrowpits with fly ash and earth covering the area for which the permission had been granted to the writ petitioner. The last date for opening of the tender was 27th November, 1996. Tender forms, which were to be obtained from 1.11.96 to 26.11.96, were to be had from the railway authorities upon payment of Rs. 300/-. Earnest money was also to be deposited at the rates specified. 4. The writ petitioner appears to have affirmed the writ application on 20th November, 1996. In the writ petition the tender notice dated 7th October, 1996 was challenged. A direction was also prayed for on the respondent authorities the act in terms of the permission dated 4/5.7.96 or alternatively to compensate to petitioner for the loss and damages already incurred by the petitioner. 5. The writ application was dismissed on 22nd November, 1996 by S. B. Sinha, J. on the ground that it involved an enforcement of a contract qua-contract and the remedy of the petitioner for breach of contract on the part of the respondents was to file a suit for damages. 6. 5. The writ application was dismissed on 22nd November, 1996 by S. B. Sinha, J. on the ground that it involved an enforcement of a contract qua-contract and the remedy of the petitioner for breach of contract on the part of the respondents was to file a suit for damages. 6. Being aggrieved by this rejection, the writ petitioner filed the appeal. The railway authorities were directed to produce the records relating to the case by this Court. 7. Having considered the arguments of the parties as well as the materials produced before us we are of the view that the order under appeal has been correctly passed and that the appeal should be dismissed. 8. At the highest, the permission granted to the writ petitioner was a mere licence unsupported by any consideration and was, Therefore, terminable. The writ petitioner cannot in effect seek specific enforcement of such a permission. The writ petitioner claims that the permission was in fact a representation made to the writ petitioner on the basis of which the writ petitioner had acted to his detriment by making arrangements with a third party for dumping or the fly ash. 9. It is well settled that the principles of promissory estoppel will apply only if the representation is clear and unequivocal. In this case the representation, if any, was subject to the certain conditions, which as has already been seen, had not been fully accepted by the writ petitioner. The writ petitioner's case is that he bad withdrawn the first letter dated 26th July, 1996 and agreed to dump the fly ash unconditionally as was evidenced by the second letter dated 26th July, 1996. The second letter dated 26th July, 1996 does not in term refer to the withdrawal of the earlier letter of the same date. 10. Even assuming that there was a representation made to the writ petitioner, it is well settled that the rule of promissory estoppel like other rules of equity will not be enforced against the Government in certain conditions such as either illegality or where it would be contrary to the public interest to do so. It appears from the records produced by the railway authorities that in fact there were several applicants for the dumping by fly ash in the borrowpits of the railway authorities. It appears from the records produced by the railway authorities that in fact there were several applicants for the dumping by fly ash in the borrowpits of the railway authorities. This was the reason why the railway authorities thought it fit to Issue the tender and allow the dumping of fly ash on payment of a price. The price so obtained would enure to the interest of the public. If the railway authorities are called upon to comply with the permission dated 4/5th July, 1996, it would lead to deprivation of public revenue. The estoppel as such is one which should not in these circumstances be enforced. 11. The petitioner then claims that the petitioner had reasonable expectation that the railway authorities would allow the permission as contained in the letter dated 4/5th July, 1996. It is doubtful whether the principles of legitimate expectation would apply in the facts of this case. Even if it be so, that principle like other equitable consideration must also be subject to the overriding consideration of the public interest. 12. Apart from any other question is the case of the termination of the permission as stated by the railway authorities and appearing from the records. No doubt, the writ petitioner has disputed the receipt of the letter of termination. In that event, the question becomes a disputed question of fact which the Court should not go into in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226. Finally, we are of the view that the learned Single Judge was correct in dismissing the writ application and relegating the parties to a suit in view of the claim for compensation made by the writ petitioner in the writ application. 13. The appeal and the stay application are accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Let xerox copies of this judgment be made available to the learned Advocates appearing for the parties on their usual undertakings. Jain, J.: I agree.