JUDGMENT Sinha, J.: All these appeals, which are directed against a common judgment dated 14.6.96 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court, were with the consent of the parties heard analogously and are being disposed of by this common judgment. The learned trial Judge allowed hundreds of writ applications filed by thousands of Primary School Teachers' claiming regularisation s upon granting recognition of the schools. The learned trial Judge also issued several directions to the State and other respondents of the said writ applications setting out the modalities relating to on recognition of schools and appointment of Organiser Teachers and Teachers-in-Position. 2. The learned trial Judge treated the applications as a Social Action Litigation and directed that all writ applications would be governed by the said judgment as the same would sub-serve the requirement of society by upholding the interest of the public and by allowing vast number of Citizens/Litigants to have access to the deliver) system of Justice without any further expenditure in the Court. 3. While deciding the aforementioned questions the learned trial Judge framed two primary issues, namely;- (i) whether the organiser teachers, as contemplated in Bengal (Rural) Primary Education Act, 1930, (hereinafter referred to as the 1930 Act) who have/had organised rural and urban part of the States are entitled to be absorbed after due recognition of the respective schools? or alternatively; (ii) whether services of such organiser teachers would be regularised by granting recognition of the schools where writ petitioners who have been still imparting education as primary teachers since its inception? 4. With a view to adjudicate the aforementioned principal issues, the learned trial Judge also framed the following four subsidiary issues:- 1. Whether substitution of Old Rule 3D by the subsequent Rule 3D, introduced by G.O. No 713-EDN(P) dated 11th September, 1980 will obliterate the Old Rule 3D as contrary to or in conflict with the rule relating to appointment of Primary Teachers? 2. Whether substituted Rule 3D will be deemed to be obliterated and stands repealed, then whether such repeal has any retrospective effect? 3. Right to have organised primary schools to be recognised along with the approval of organiser teachers under the Old Rule 3D, is a vested right and as such cannot be taken away otherwise than by an express provision of law? 4. 3. Right to have organised primary schools to be recognised along with the approval of organiser teachers under the Old Rule 3D, is a vested right and as such cannot be taken away otherwise than by an express provision of law? 4. Whether the judgment in (1) Chairman, Ad-hoc Committee v. Jitendra Nath Chatterjee reported in 95 CWN 754 is an authoritative precedent and act as a stare decises in the present cases relating to organiser teachers and binding upon the single bench? 5. While deciding the different categories of cases the learned trial Judge divided the grievances raised before him in seven categories which read thus :- "(a) Organised Primary Schools were never granted recognition. (b) Primary Schools were granted recognition but organiser teachers were not appointed. In some cases even interview was held long ago. (c) Primary Schools were granted recognition but Organiser Teachers attached to such schools were not appointed but outsider were appointed in those schools by the concerned Ad-hoc Committees of the respective District School Board/Council. (d) Organised Primary Schools run by the Organiser Primary Teachers for a long time, subsequently, the said schools were selected by the erstwhile Ad-hoc Committees School Board/Council for recognition and appointment was given to persons other than Organiser Teachers, i. e. a new set of teachers. (e) Schools organised before 1978, inspection held but not yet recognised. (f) Schools situated in Municipal Area, small amount of money paid to the teachers by the concerned Municipality but subsequently payment stopped and the schools were not yet granted recognition. (g) Where trained Primary Teachers were not appointed by the concerned District School Boards/Council, though schools set up by trained Organiser Teachers were accorded recognition." 6. In our opinion categories (f) aforementioned is not relevant for the purpose of disposal of the appeals. 7. According to the learned trial Judge, although the Court was not called upon to answer other ancillary issues, it was observed that unless such ancillary issues are considered, the principal issue cannot be answered effectively and meaningfully. 8. The learned trial Judge in an elaborate and painstaking judgment considered the provisions of the 1930 Act and the Rules framed thereunder and the various circulars and notifications issued by the State as also the provisions of the West Bengal Primary, Education Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1973 Act') and the West Bengal Primary Education Rules, 1991. 9. The learned trial Judge in an elaborate and painstaking judgment considered the provisions of the 1930 Act and the Rules framed thereunder and the various circulars and notifications issued by the State as also the provisions of the West Bengal Primary, Education Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1973 Act') and the West Bengal Primary Education Rules, 1991. 9. The learned trial Judge also considered the effect of two division bench decisions of this Court, viz In re: Monoranjan Moity & Ors. and Chairman, Ad-hoc Committee v. Jitendra Nath Chatterjee & Ors. reported in 95 CWN 754 which bas been affirmed by the Appeal Court and held that the decision in Monoranjan Maity's Case (supra) shall prevail over the decision in Jitendra Nath Chatterjee Case which is also a division bench decision. The learned .trial Judge further held that Rule 3D as inserted in the year 1980 whereby and whereunder the Old Rule 3D was substituted was ultra fires. Before the learned trial Judge vires of the 1991 Rules framed under the 1973 Act was questioned. Despite the fact that the learned trial Judge upheld the vires of the 1991 Rules but directed stay of operation thereof so as to enable the State to give effect to the directions issued by him in the operative portion of the judgment by reason whereof a completely new scheme was formulated. 10. In short the learned trial-Judge directed that all the organised school teachers should be absorbed upon granting recognition and so long the same is not done, the State shall not open any other primary school in a rural area. 11. These appeals have been filed against the aforementioned judgment. An appeal was filed against the findings of the learned Judge to the effect that 1991 Rules were intra vires which was treated as cross-objection to the appeals. Before the learned trial Judge the vires of notification dated 30.6.90 being No 323-EDN(P) dated 30.6.90 and the West Bengal Primary Education (Amendment) Act, 1996 which came into force on and from 1st Day of February, 1996 were not questioned. Before the learned trial Judge the vires of notification dated 30.6.90 being No 323-EDN(P) dated 30.6.90 and the West Bengal Primary Education (Amendment) Act, 1996 which came into force on and from 1st Day of February, 1996 were not questioned. In order to resolve the dispute once for all and with a view to prevent further litigation in the matter, an application for amendment of the writ petition questioning the vires of the aforementioned notification and provisions of the said Amending Act was filed on or about 4.10.96 by the West Bengal Primary Teachers Association in F. M. A. T. No. 2096 of 1996 and this Court by an order dated 7.10.1996 directed that the said application for amendment shall be considered along with the main judgment. The learned Counsels, however, were given liberty to make submissions on the basis as if such application for amendment has been allowed. 12. Before entering into the merit of the matter it may be placed on record that Counsel for all the parties appearing in these appeals have agreed that keeping in view the uncertainty prevailing in the State in respect of the fate of the organiser teachers in Primary Schools, this judgment should govern all the appeals and writ petitions pending before different benches. 13. In that view of the matter all formalities were dispensed with and the applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act stand allowed. All the appeals were treated as ready for hearing upon dispensing with the formal service of notice as all the Counsels for the writ petitioner-respondents who had appeared before the learned trial Judge have appeared before us and made their submissions. Some of the Counsels have also filed their written submissions. We also allow the application for amendment in the writ petition. The said application may be treated as a part of the writ application. 14. The main question in our opinion, which arises for consideration is as to whether the writ petitioners who claim themselves to be organiser teachers have any subsisting right to be appointed without going into the formalities for such appointment as laid down in the Rules framed both under 1930 Act and 1971 Act in terms of Rule 3D despite the substitution thereof by New Rule 3D in the year 1980. 15. 15. Before dealing with the merit of the matter the legislative history as also the various decisions of this Court as also the Apex Court may be noticed. 16. The 1930 Act was enacted to make better provision for the progressive expansion and for effective management and control of primary education system in rural areas in Bengal so as to make it available to all children and with a view to make it compulsory within, 10 years. The said Act had no application in relation to the town of Calcutta and any area where a Municipality under the provision of Bengal Municipal Act, 1932 would be constituted. 17. It is not necessary to reproduce all the relevant provision except a few which are absolutely necessary for the purpose of disposal of these appeals as the learned trial Judge has dealt with the same in extenso. The scheme laid down under the 1930 Act was required to be implemented by the District School Board, a body corporate under the said Act. Under the scheme of the Act Elementary Education has been divided into two categories, namely, the education imported through the schools managed by the private bodies and the schools established and/or managed under public management. 18. The primary schools under 1930 Act are those schools or departments of a school giving instruction in primary education (which means education in such subject and upto such standard as may be prescribed) either managed by the Board or recognised as a primary school in terms of Section 54. Section 54 provided for recognition of the said school if in the opinion of the Board it fulfils the conditions prescribed therefor and in the event the managing committee of the school expresses such desire and files an application in the form prescribed therefor. A primary school however, could be recognised even without filing any application. All order passed by the Board was appealable. 19. Section 23 of the said Act enumerates the duties of District School Board. Section 56 of 1930 Act provided for issuance of a notification declaring that primary education shall be compulsory within such area if it is satisfied that there is adequate provision for primary education in any area lying within the jurisdiction of a Union Board, Union Committee, Panchayat or Gram Panchayat but such a notification was to be issued after consultation with the Board concerned. 20. 20. Section 66 was the rule making power which empowered the State to make rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act. In exercise of the said power, inter alia, framed rules to provide for the condition of appointment of teachers in primary schools maintained by the District School Board as also to provide for the condition of appointment fixation and payment of salaries referred to in Clause (g) of sub section (1) thereof by a notification dated 25th July, 1940 framed rules which were substituted, added and amended or new rule was inserted therein from. time to time. 21. The said rules provide for a detailed procedure as to how the teachers were to be appointed in the schools managed by the District School Board etc" 22. Rules 3 to 3C provide for the mode or manner of appointment of teachers in Primary Schools. 23. Rule 3D (Old) which is the sheet-anchor of the case of the petitioner was incorporated by notification 975 - EDN (P) dated 26th Oct, 1971 which was modified by a subsequent notification dated 1st December, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as Old Rule 3D) and later on substituted by a notification dated 11th September, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as New Rule 3D). The said Old Rule 3D and New Rule 3D are set out herein-below :- "(Old) 3D: Notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 3, Rule 3A or Rule 3B, but subject to the provision of Rule 3C, a qualified person serving as an organiser teacher in a primary school, ever since that school was established. may be appointed with the prior approval of the Director of Public Instruction, West Bengal as an Assistant Teacher of the School at the time it is granted recognition. (New) 3D: Notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 3, Rule 3A or Rule 3B, but subject to the provisions of Rule 3C, a ward of a primary teacher who dies-in-harness may be appointed with the approval of the Director of Public Instruction, West Bengal, as an Assistant Teacher/School Mother against regular vacancy irrespective of whether the available vacancy is to be reversed for trained or untrained candidates, provided that he/she fulfils the minimum qualifications for such appointment." 24. In respect of the schools which did not come within the purview of the 1930 Act, West Bengal (Urban) Primary Education Act, 1963 was enacted (upon repeal of The Bengal Primary Education Act, 1919) which Act had also not been applicable to the town of Calcutta, The said Act was enacted for grant of free primary education. It is relevant to note that in the said 1963 Act there does not exist any provision for appointment of organiser teachers. Thus the question of appointment of any person as organiser teachers in urban schools does not arise. 25. No recruitment rule bas been framed under 1963 Act nor there exists any provision for recognition or grant of aid in relation thereto. 26. By a letter dated 11th July, 1969 issued by the Deputy Secretary to the Government of West Bengal to the Director of Public Instruction, West Bengal, it is stated:- "Sub. Recruitment and Confirmation rules for the teachers under District School Board Application of-to schools in urban areas. The undersigned is directed to state that the rules laid down in this department Notification No 196-Edn(P) dated the 28tb April, 1969 on the above subject are applicable mutatis-mutandis-mutandis to all aided/recognized Primary (including Junior Basic) schools under private management and to the Government Sponsored Free Primary Schools in Calcutta/other urban and rural areas, excepting those under the management of Calcutta Corporation or other local bodies. These rules will also be applicable as far as possible to the schools under the management of those municipalities which are receiving grant from the Education Department and in particular of those municipalities where Free and. Compulsory Primary Education has been introduced under the provision of the West Bengal Urban Primary Education Act, 1963." 27. The said Circular letter, therefore, had no application to all types of schools. 28. Again by another letter bearing No. 1614 Edn (P) dated 8th November, 1974 issued by the Deputy Secretary to the Government of West Bengal to the Director of Public Instruction, West Bengal on the subject of appointment of teachers in the recognised and aided primary schools and in Government Sponsored Primary Schools in municipal areas, inter alia, it bas been laid down:- "3. In the circumstances, in partial modification of the G. O. No. 1472 Edn (P) dated 20.7.72, the Governor is pleased to order that the Advisory Committee of each municipal area (including Calcutta) constituted by Government be empowered to prepare panels of candidates for appointment of teachers (Both trained and untrained) in recognised Primary and Junior Basic Schools in urban areas. Rules and Orders for preparation of panels under the District School Boards will apply mutatis-mutandis in this case. The case of unapproved teachers now working (appointed prior to 1.4.74) in aided Primary and Junior Basic Schools may be considered at the time of preparation of panels. The Managing Committees of recognised (aided) Primary and Junior Basic Schools shall appoint teachers from out of the approved panels for the respective municipal areas after the names of candidates are formally communicated by the District Inspectors of Schools (P.E) to the schools concerned. 4. The Govern or is also pleased to order that all appointments in Government Sponsored Primary Schools in urban areas (including Calcutta) shall be made by the District Inspectors of Schools (P.E.) from nut of the approved panels for each municipal area. Appointments in Government Sponsored Primary Schools in rural areas shall be made from out of the panels prepared by the District School Boards and approved by the District School Boards and approved by the Director of Public Instruction as usual.” 29. The said letter took effect from 1.1.75. 30. The condition of recognition and numbers of teachers to be appointed had been laid down. The aforementioned circular letters are merely internal departmental letters and do not have the sanction of any statute. 31. In any event by reason of the said letters, Rule 3D (Old), was not and could not have been made applicable to schools situate within urban area, which are governed under 1963 Act. Rule 3D (Old), thus had no application in respect of the Schools situated in the urban area and thus, apparently the direction of the learned trial Judge in this regard cannot be sustained. 32. The State, however, enacted the West Bengal Primary Education Act, 1973 to make better provision for the development, expansion, management and control of primary education with a view to making it universal, free and compulsory. The said Act is applicable to the entire State of West Bengal including the town of Calcutta (Underlining is mine for emphasis) 33. 32. The State, however, enacted the West Bengal Primary Education Act, 1973 to make better provision for the development, expansion, management and control of primary education with a view to making it universal, free and compulsory. The said Act is applicable to the entire State of West Bengal including the town of Calcutta (Underlining is mine for emphasis) 33. The said 1973 Act was to come into force in such areas and on such dates as the State Government may, by notification, appoint and different dates could be appointed for different areas or for different provisions of the Act. The said Act received the assent of the President and was published in the Calcutta Gazette on 20th September, 1974. At one point of time there had been confusion as to when the said Act had come into force inasmuch as in different books and judgments different dates had been mentioned. Whereas in a book written by Sri Amal Kumar Das the dale of coming into force bas been stated to be 2nd July, 1990; in (2) District School Board, Midnapore & Ors. v. Paschimbanga Prathamik Sikshak Shikshan Prapta Bekar-O-Sikshak Samiti, West Bengal & Ors. reported in 1991(1) CLJ 479 , a division bench stated that the said Act had come into force on 20th September, 1974. 34. The learned trial Judge had also in the impugned judgment stated that the said Act had come into force with effect from 2nd July. 1990. The State of West Bengal also in the Statements of Objects and Reasons of the West Bengal Primary Education (Amendment) Bill, 1996 stated that the Act came into force with effect from 2.7.1990 This aspect of the matte: has been considered by us in our order dated 27.9.96 on which date, the matter had to be adjourned till 7th October, 1996 with a view to give an opportunity to all concerned to clarify the position. 35. However, it now appears that the State by a notification bearing No. 1851-EDN(P)/1B/72 dated 30th September, 1974 appointed the 1st day of January, 1975 as the date on which the provisions of all the Section of the said Act except Sections 77, 78, 89 and 105 shall come into force in the whole of the State of West Bengal. 35. However, it now appears that the State by a notification bearing No. 1851-EDN(P)/1B/72 dated 30th September, 1974 appointed the 1st day of January, 1975 as the date on which the provisions of all the Section of the said Act except Sections 77, 78, 89 and 105 shall come into force in the whole of the State of West Bengal. By a notification dated 27.3.81 Section 78 of the said Act was directed to come into force in the whole of State of West Bengal with effect from 1.4.81. By another notification dated 30th July, 1990 Section 105 of the Act has come into force in the whole of West Bengal excepting the area comprising of the District of North 24 Parganas and South 24 Parganas and the Hill area as defined in the said Act with effect from 2.7.1990. 36. It is relevant to note that Section 05 of the 1973 Act has a great significance for the purpose of resolving the dispute involved in this appeal. The said provision deals with repeal and continuance of the Bengal (Rural) Primary Education Act, 1930, the West Bengal (Urban) Primary Education Act, 1963 and the West Bengal (Rural) Primary Education (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1969. 37. After the issuance of the notification dated 30th July, 1990 the State Government by different notifications appointed Primary School Councils for different districts and also appointed Ad-hoc Committees therefor. 38. Admittedly, rules have also been framed under 1973 Act which came into force in the year 1991. 39. The legislature of the State thereafter, as noticed hereinbefore, amended the 1973 Act by an Ordinance published in the Calcutta Gazette on 11th January, 1996 whereby and whereunder inter alia, the definitions of primary Education', 'Primary School' was amended. Section 60 of the Act which provided for recognition of the School was substituted by Section 3 thereof. The Legislature of the State thereafter repealed and replaced the said Ordinance by a legislative Act which came into force with effect from 1st February, 1996 In terms of the said Act, Section 60 of the Principal Act which deals with the duties of the Primary School Council, substituted Clauses (1) and (2) thereof which read as follows:- "1. The Legislature of the State thereafter repealed and replaced the said Ordinance by a legislative Act which came into force with effect from 1st February, 1996 In terms of the said Act, Section 60 of the Principal Act which deals with the duties of the Primary School Council, substituted Clauses (1) and (2) thereof which read as follows:- "1. (i) to withdraw recognition of any primary school on such ground and following such procedure, as the State Government may prescribe, and (ii) to grant financial aid to a recognised primary school, or to withdraw financial aid to a recognised primary school on such ground and in such manner as the State Government may prescribe. 2. to amalgamate two or more primary schools into one primary school, to split a primary school into two or more primary schools, and to shift a primary school from one site to another." 40. Section 4 of the said Act provides that in sub-section (3) of Section 105 of the Principal' Act for the words "shall be deemed to have been recogaised" the words 'shall continue to be recognised' shall be substituted. 41. In view of the aforementioned amendment, at present no provision for grant of fresh recognition to any institution imparting primary education exists although the night to withdraw such recognition subsists. 42. Having taken into consideration the relevant statutory provisions it may be useful to refer to certain decisions upon which strong reliance has been placed by learned trial Judge as also by the learned Counsels appearing on behalf of the parties. 43. Monoranjan Matty & Another filed a writ application, inter alia, questioning the action on the part or the State to recognise the school in question although applications therefor were filed prior to coming into force of the substituted Rule 3D (New) in the year 1980. A learned Single Judge of this Court a Bowed the said writ application. In the said writ application two notifications dated 20.4.77 and 27.3.88 were questioned in terms whereof the Governor was pleased to pass an order in super-session of all previous orders in that regard that the system of all recognised primary schools both in Urban and Rural Areas of the State shall be discontinued with effect from 1st March, 1977 begining with the new quota of schools sanctioned in terms of Government Order No. 213-EDN (P) dated 1st March, 1977. The learned trial Judge only held that New Rule 3D did not operate retrospectively and thus thereby the right of the teachers prior to its amendment are not affected. 44. In appeal the division bench comprising of M. M. Dutta (as His Lordship then was) and C. K. Banerjee. J., upheld the contention of the writ petitioners, inter alia, on the ground that by reason of a notification the provisions of the Act, namely, Sections 54 and 55 cannot be superseded and in any event, the application for recognition made prior to issuance of Rule 3D would not be affected. The learned Judges, however, made the following observations:- "The Organiser Teachers have devoted themselves to the cause of the education of the children. They are poor people and it will be the duty of the Board to see that the mission of these teachers are not frustrated. Accordingly, the Board should try to help these teachers by granting recognition to the schools started by them and appointing them as Assistant Teachers of the Schools. There may be circumstances where the Board can refuse to grant recognition. But except under compelling and unavoidable circumstances, the Board should not normally refuse to grant recognition to the Primary Schools which have been set up by experienced organiser teachers. Viewed from the above points, it can be said that the learned Judge was not at all unjustified in directing the Board not to establish any school pending the consideration of the applications for recognition. So far as Lochananda Chak Primary School is concerned it has been stated already that the Board selected it for recognition but could not give effect to the resolution in view of an interim order granted by this Court. As there is no such order, we direct the Board to give recognition to the said Lochananda Chak Primary School within three months from date. Further we direct that the Board shall consider the question of recognition of the primary schools set up by the writ petitioners within three months from date.” 45. The observations made by the Division Bench do not lay down any law nor create any binding precedent. Neither the arguments which have been advanced in this case were advanced nor any case law cited or discussed in support of the said observations. The observations made by the Division Bench do not lay down any law nor create any binding precedent. Neither the arguments which have been advanced in this case were advanced nor any case law cited or discussed in support of the said observations. They were made out of sympathy for the petitioners without deciding the question as to whether they had any legal right therefor. Even the provisions of Old Rule 3D was not interpreted in accordance with the well-settled principles vis-a-vis New Rule 3D. The right of the State to amend the sub-ordinate legislation was also neither taken into consideration nor discussed. 46. However, in another matter one Jitendra Nath Chatterjee questioned non-grant of recognition of the school and the said writ application was allowed. The Chairman, Ad-hoc Committee preferred an appeal against the said judgment which was registered as F. M. A. T. No 3594 of 1990. The said appeal was placed for consideration before N. P. Singh, C J (as the learned Judge of the Supreme Court then was) and Tarun Chatterjee, J. (reported in 95 CWN 754). The learned Judges upon taking into consideration New Rule 3D as also the provision of Section 60(1) of 1973 Act, inter alia, held that in view of the amendment and substitution of Rule in now there is no provision enabling the authorities concerned to appoint a qualified person serving as au organiser teacher in a primary school. The learned Judges, however directed:- "Taking all facts and circumstances into consideration, we direct the organisers of the school in question to file an application in the prescribed manner for recognition of the school before the District. Primary School Council within six weeks from today. If any such application is filed, the District Primary School Council shall get the school inspected within one month from the date of making of such application and thereafter an appropriate order in accordance with law shall be passed in respect of recognition of the school in question within one month from the date of holding the inspection. As observed earlier, now there is no question of approving the appointment of any organiser teacher under the changed circumstances. If the school in question is recognised, it will be open to any organiser teacher to apply for his name to be included in the panel to be prepared in accordance with the provisions in the Rules. As observed earlier, now there is no question of approving the appointment of any organiser teacher under the changed circumstances. If the school in question is recognised, it will be open to any organiser teacher to apply for his name to be included in the panel to be prepared in accordance with the provisions in the Rules. If any such application for inclusion of name in the panel is made, the same shall be considered in accordance with law." 47. It is admitted at the Bar that the aforementioned decision has been upheld by the Supreme Court as an S.L.P. was filed there against being S. L. P. No. 14667 of 1991 which was summarily dismissed on 16.9.1991. 48. It appears that despite the same several other writ applications were filed by trained teachers questioning preparation of panel by different District Councils inter alia, on the ground that in the panels more than 50% of the untrained teachers had been included. A learned single Judge of the High Court allowed the writ application by a judgment dated 28th September, 1989 upon a finding that the appointment of untrained candidates as Assistant Teachers in the Primary School was unauthorised and illegal. Later an appeal was preferred as against the said judgment before the division bench which was disposed of on 10th May, 1991 with certain directions. A special leave petition was filed before Supreme Court of India which was also disposed of on 30th September, 1991 with certain observations and directions. However, again a writ petition was filed alleging that the respondent were preparing panels and giving appointment in utter disregard of the order of the division bench dated 10.5.91 and contrary to the rules framed and circulars issued in that behalf. In those writ applications certain interim orders were issued restraining the respondents from issuing any appointment letter. Another appeal was taken from the said orders wherein the division bench stayed the operation thereof. The division bench appointed two special 'Officers to submit a report as regards preparation of such panels and upon consideration thereof the Director of School Education was directed to consider the matter afresh and further directed that he may recast the panel. if necessary, upon removing all the anomalies, if there be any. The division bench appointed two special 'Officers to submit a report as regards preparation of such panels and upon consideration thereof the Director of School Education was directed to consider the matter afresh and further directed that he may recast the panel. if necessary, upon removing all the anomalies, if there be any. Certain other directions had been made in respect of the Districts of Midnapore and Howrah However, as regards other Districts no direction was made. 49. In a special leave application being (3) Dlip Kumar Chatterjee v. The Chairman, Ad-hoc Committee, Burdwun & Ors being S. L. P. No. 3591 of 1995 disposed of on l4.12.95, the Supreme Court interpreted the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Jitendra Nath Chatterjee (supra) to mean that upon recognition, the organiser teachers shall be automatically appointed. 50. The learned trial Judge in his impugned judgment, inter alia, held that in Jitendra Nath Chatterjee's Case there was no scope for examination of legality and vires of Rule 3D and, thus, the said decision must have been held to have been rendered per incurium as therein the earlier decision in Monoranjan Maity's Case had not been taken into consideration. According to the learned Judge, such a decision which has been rendered per in curium is not binding upon the Court on the ground "where authorities of equal standing are irreconcilably in conflict a lower Court bas the same freedom to pick and choose between them as the schizophrenic Court itself." 51. The learned trial Judge thereafter held that the State has not been able to formulate any uniform policy and in fact the number of college going students in India is too much less compared to even the smaller countries. The learned Judge advocated privatisation of the education by inducting new teachers on contractual basis, in which event the claim of the organiser teachers ran be entertained provided the organiser teacher can render effective service and can demonstrate their excellence in imparting primary education as a result whereof no compromise is required to be made with inefficiency. The learned Judge aha observed, that if the State Government desires to consider the requirement of the society, upgradation of primary education is prime necessity. It is high time that all necessary efforts are taken in organising a rational approach in the scheme for upgradation of Primary Education. 52. The learned Judge aha observed, that if the State Government desires to consider the requirement of the society, upgradation of primary education is prime necessity. It is high time that all necessary efforts are taken in organising a rational approach in the scheme for upgradation of Primary Education. 52. The learned trial Judge declared the notification being G. O. No. 713 EDN(P) dated 11th September, 1980 whereby and whereunder Old Rule 3D was substituted by New Rule 3D as ultra vires observing that the New Rule 3D incorporates a welfare scheme by extending its network for the welfare to the family of the deceased teachers. The said opinion of the learned Judge was based on the finding that the said substitution was contrary to and in conflict with the scheme of the Act and the Rules relating to recognition and appointment of organiser primary teacher. He, however, directed that separate and distinct welfare scheme to be introduced in respect of the appointment of the family members of the deceased teachers who had died-in-harness. The learned Judge held:- “I think and hold that modalities for recognition of primary schools and consequential appointment of Organiser Teachers would only arise when a School was recognised within the meaning of Old Rule 3D, which is still subsisting. The scheme of the recognition and appointment of Organiser Teachers will become nonest after the date of enforcement of the Act 1973 and rules framed thereunder. The scheme of Old Rule 3D would remain effective and operate in the field till 2nd July, 1990 when the West Bengal Primary Education Act, 1973 (West Bengal Act, XLIII of 1973) came into force in the whole of West Bengal except the area comprising the Districts of North 24 Parganas, South 24 Parganas and the hill areas as defined in the Act and other those two Districts till 6th April, 1994, when the Act 1973 came into force. Hence the claim of Organiser Teachers of Managing Bodies for recognition of Primary School be entertained for which necessary applications and claims have been made upto 2nd July, 1990 in respect of whole of West Bengal excepting the Districts of North & South 24 Parganas. In case of applications claims made by the Organiser Teachers of North & South 24 Parganas Districts, the recognition shall be granted to the schools organised before 1994 when the said Act 1973 came into force. In case of applications claims made by the Organiser Teachers of North & South 24 Parganas Districts, the recognition shall be granted to the schools organised before 1994 when the said Act 1973 came into force. After recognition, consequential appointment shall be given to the Organiser Teachers and Teachers-in-Position, as the case may be, on the basis of prescribed ratio of teachers and students. Put this exercise has to be completed after taking into consideration of the following requisites which are essential for being eligible in claiming recognition and the requisite qualification for securing absorption as Primary Teachers in those Schools." 53. Thereafter the modalities for such appointment had been detailed in several sub-paragraphs of the said paragraph by the learned Judge. 54. Mr. Balai Chandra Roy, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, inter alia submitted that the learned trial Judge having upheld the vires of 1991 Rules, could not have held that the Board was bound to recognise any school in derogation to the Act and the Rules. It was further submitted that a direction to recognise all the schools by the learned trial Judge is ex facie bad in law as no finding of fact had been arrived at that the school had fulfilled all conditions of recognition particularly in view of the fact that they have not been able to prove that they are entitled for such recognition and consequently appointment as organiser teachers under the existing law. The learned counsel submits that the findings of the learned trial Judge to the effect-that the impugned Rules are hit by doctrine of the promissory estoppel is bad in Jaw inasmuch as the notification issued under a statute cannot amount to a representation. The learned Counsel further submitted that as there is nothing to show that the teachers altered their position pursuant to any such alleged promise, the doctrine of promissory estoppel or legitimate expectation has no application in the fact of this case. The learned Counsel further submitted that as there is nothing to show that the teachers altered their position pursuant to any such alleged promise, the doctrine of promissory estoppel or legitimate expectation has no application in the fact of this case. The decisions of the Apex Court in (4) Union of India v. Anglo Afgan Agencies reported in AIR 1968 SC 718 and (5) Century Spinning Manufacturing Company Ltd. v. Ulhasnagar Municipality reported in AIR 1971 SC 1021 ; (6) M. P. Sugar Mills v. State of U. P. reported in AIR 1979 SC 621 and (7) Roberson v. Minister of Pensions reported in 1949(1) KB 227 relied on by the learned trial Judge have no application to the facts of the case. 55. It was submitted that the learned trial Judge misdirected himself in so far as he failed to take into consideration that no effect could not be given to the Old Act and the Rules framed there under as the 1930 Act was a temporary Act and in any event in view of the notification dated 2nd July, 1990. 56. It was submitted that by reason of Rule 3D as introduced in 1971, no vested right was created in favour of the petitioners and, thus, it could be taken away. 57. The learned Counsel submits when the Government took upon itself the responsibility of primary education, the directions issued by the learned trial Judge must be held to be bad in law. It was contended that no prohibition has been placed on an establishment of a private institution but by establishing such institutions, the teachers thereof cannot expect salary from the State. The learned Counsel further submitted that the learned trial Judge ought not to have refused to follow the decision in Jitendra Nath Chatterjee's Case as the same was upheld by the Supreme Court. 58. Mr. Swaraj Bhuian, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Midnapore District Council, inter alia, submitted that as the impugned judgment has been passed after coming into force of 1991 Rules, i. e. on 22.11.91, the same cannot be upheld. The learned Counsel submits that the learned Judge committed an error in making an attempt to find out an inconsistency between Old Rule 3D and 1973 Act. 59. The learned Counsel submits that the learned Judge committed an error in making an attempt to find out an inconsistency between Old Rule 3D and 1973 Act. 59. In any event, it is contended, that the substitution of a provision has a different connotation inasmuch as the same cannot be equated with an Amendment. Reliance in this connection has been placed in (8) Bhagat Ram Sharma v. Union of India and Ors reported in 1988 Supp (1) SCC 30. The teamed Counsel submits that as by reason of the saving clause only the vested rights have been saved and the petitioners having no legal right, Section 10 (4) will have no application in the instant case. Reliance in this connection has been placed on Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 44, Paragraphs 883, 971 and 1005 at pages 991 and 1003. 60. As regards the question as to whether Monoranjan Maity's Case or Jitendra Nath Chatterjee's Case should be followed, the learned Counsel has relied upon (9) Lala Shri Bhagwan & Anr. v Ram Chand & Anr. reported in AIR J965 SC 1767 Paragraph 18, It was submitted that judicial advise should not be rendered inasmuch as the Court does not decide the policy. Reference in this connection has been placed on (10) Sukumar Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal & Ors. reported in AIR 1993 SC 2335 . The learned Counsel also relied upon (11) Union of India v. Kirloskar Prenmatic Co. Ltd. reported in 1996(4) SCC 453 for the proposition that the power cannot be invoked by the High Court to direct the statutory authorities to act contrary to law. 61. According to the learned Counsel, in this case even the doctrine of legitimate expectation will have no application and reliance in this connection has been placed in (12) Food Corporation of India v. Kamdhenu reported in AIR 1993 SC 1601 . 62. Mr. Basu, appearing on behalf of the State of West Bengal as also on behalf of the Advocate General appellant in several appeals, inter alia, submitted that as in terms of 1930 Act, there was no provision for appointment of organiser teachers, Old Rule 3D was ultra vires Sections 54 and 23(1) (g) of the Act. According to the learned Counsel it was just a policy and such procedural right cannot efface any substantive right. According to the learned Counsel it was just a policy and such procedural right cannot efface any substantive right. Referring to Section 6 of the General Clause Act the learned Counsel submits that by reason of New Act the Old Policy decision does not survive inasmuch as thereby only a right which is accrued may survive. Reliance in this connection has been placed in (13) Osman Gani J. Khetri v. Canton Board & Ors. reported in 1992(3) SCC 455 . 63. Mr Sarkar, appearing on behalf of the Hooghly, Bankura and Birbhum District Primary Councils submitted that the school being not recognised the question of appointment of the organiser teacher does not arise. According to the learned Counsel, Jitendra Nath Chatterjtee's Case was binding upon the learned trial Judge. 64. Mr. Maity, the learned, Counsel appearing on behalf of the Calcutta District Primary Council took us through various circulars and submitted that in terms of the circulars issued by the State, only 3 organiser teachers could be appointed in the rural areas whereas four teachers could be appointed in the urban areas and thus the question of appointment of all the orgaoiser teachers did not arise. According to the learned Counsel the limitations of the Councils in making appointment had not been taken into consideration by the learned trial Judge. Our attention in this connection has been drawn to the rules framed for appointment by the State in exercise of its power under Section 66(1) and Section 66(2) of the 1930 Act. The learned Counsel has also drawn our attention to the provisions of Section 60(1) (l) and submitted that in terms thereof only a provision for grant of recognition had been made and there is no provision for appointment of the organiser teachers. It was also submitted that the right of an organiser teacher was a contingent right and not a vested or accrued right. The learned Counsel submits that in the instant case the learned trial Judge ought to have applied the doctrine of stare decisis. Reference in this connection has been made to (14) Karnal Improvement Trust v. Prekashwanlt reported in 1995(5) SCC 159 and Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 26 Paragraphs 580 and 581. 65. Mr. The learned Counsel submits that in the instant case the learned trial Judge ought to have applied the doctrine of stare decisis. Reference in this connection has been made to (14) Karnal Improvement Trust v. Prekashwanlt reported in 1995(5) SCC 159 and Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 26 Paragraphs 580 and 581. 65. Mr. B. R. Bhattachariee the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Murshidabad and Jalpaiguri District Primary School Councils submitted that the learned trial Judge has assigned no reason in bolding that New Rule 3D is ultra vires inasmuch as no provision can be said to be ultra vires if it is in consonance with the scheme of the Act. It was submitted that as a new scheme had been introduced the provision contrary thereto would be deemed to have been impliedly repealed. Reliance in this connection has been placed in (15) Peddinti Venkati Murchi Rayanatha v. Govt. of A. P. reported in 1996(3) SCC 75 . It was further submitted that the constitutionality of a legislation cannot be challenged on the ground of mala fide. It was further submitted that a Court should give effect to the plain meaning of a statute Reliance in this connection has been placed on (16) Maharashtra State Financial Corporation v. Jaycee Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Ltd reported in 1991(2) SCC 637 . 66. Mr. Bhattacharjee submits that the substitution of New Rule having brought a new welfare scheme which was welcome by the learned trial Judge, he could not have declared the Rule 3D (New) as ultra vires. According to the learned Counsel the said findings are contrary to each other. 67. Mr. Pal the learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of the writ petitioners-respondents conceded that the learned trial Judge has not answered even the principal issues. According to Mr. Pal in the year 1971 the State inserted Rule 3D by way of a scheme and, thus, it conferred a legal right upon the concerned teachers. However, Mr. Pal, accepted that such a right was not a right of appointment as an organiser teacher but was a right to be considered therefor. According to Mr. Pal in the year 1971 the State inserted Rule 3D by way of a scheme and, thus, it conferred a legal right upon the concerned teachers. However, Mr. Pal, accepted that such a right was not a right of appointment as an organiser teacher but was a right to be considered therefor. Elaborating his argument learned Counsel submits that the very fact that the recruitment rules framed under the 1930 Act provided a mode of recruitment, Rule 3D was introduced by way of a non-obstante clause and, thus they had a right to be considered for appointment as soon as the schools in question were recognised. According to the learned Counsel recognition and appointment, therefore, goes hand in band and it is in that context, the scheme of absorption had to be taken into consideration. It was submitted that Organiser Teachers were considered to be different class requiring different treatment. The learned Counsel has drawn our attention to a judgment of Supreme Court of India in Dilip Kumar Chatterjee v. Chairman of Ad-hoc Committee, Burdwan being special leave petition No. 3594/95 disposed of on 14th September, 1995 and submitted that from a perusal thereof it would appear that the Apex Court bad interpreted the observations made by this division bench in Jitendra Nath Chatterjee (supra) of this Court to the effect:- "We direct the organisers of the school in question to file an application in the prescribed manner for recognition of the school before the District Primary School Council within six weeks from today. If any such application is filed, the District Primary School Council shall get the School inspected within on month from the date of taking of such application and thereafter an appropriate order in accordance with law shall be passed in respect of recognition of the school in question within one month from the date of bolding the inspection. As observed earlier, now there is no question of approving the appointment of any organiser teacher under the changed circumstances. If the school in question is recognised, it will be open to any organiser teacher to apply for his name to be included in the panel to be prepared in accordance with the provisions in the Rules. As observed earlier, now there is no question of approving the appointment of any organiser teacher under the changed circumstances. If the school in question is recognised, it will be open to any organiser teacher to apply for his name to be included in the panel to be prepared in accordance with the provisions in the Rules. If any such application for the inclusion of the name in the panel is made, the same shall be considered in accordance with law." In the following terms:- "Special Leave Petition (Civil) No 14667 of 1991 filed against the said judgment of the Calcutta High Court was rejected by this Court vide order dated September 16, 1991. In view of the said decision of the Calcutta High Court, the organiser teachers could move an application for recognition of their schools and in the event of recognition being granted, they could be automatically empanelled for the purpose of appointment as teachers in the said• Schools. The said judgment of the High Court has become final". (Emphasis supplied) 68. It was submitted that the right of the petitioner has to be considered in the light of the aforementioned Supreme Court judgment and as such upon recognition of the school, thus do not have to compete with other general candidates for being empanelled. There according to the learned Counsel, exists a clear dichotomy giving the to a confusion. Mr. Pal has also referred to a decision of the Supreme Court of India in (17) Paschimbanga Prothamik Sikshak Sikshan Prapta Bekar-O-Sikshak Samiti & Ors v. President, West Bengal Primary School Council & Ors. reported in 1996(1) Service Law Reporter 47 and submitted that by reason of the said judgment, the Apex Court cleal1y quashed the panel prepared by the District Primary School Councils for the Districts of Maida and Midnapore and in relation to the other districts directed that the decision dated 10.5.91 rendered by the division bench should be followed. The decision according to the learned Counsel, having been rendered after coming into force the 1991 Rules should also be taken into consideration. According to the learned Counsel, the operation of 1991 Rules had been stayed by the High Court on 23.9.92 and, thus, the same had merged with the final order passed by the learned trial Judge. The decision according to the learned Counsel, having been rendered after coming into force the 1991 Rules should also be taken into consideration. According to the learned Counsel, the operation of 1991 Rules had been stayed by the High Court on 23.9.92 and, thus, the same had merged with the final order passed by the learned trial Judge. Tracing the history of appeal under 1930 Act the learned Counsel has taken us through different circulars and submitted that since 1969 the concept of appointment through advisory committee was developed and our attention in particular bas been drawn to a notification dated 6.7.71 to show that in terms thereof student teacher ratio at the rate of 1 : 40 had been taken into consideration and on that basis the organiser teachers were to be appointed with the approval of D. P. I. Our attention had further been drawn to the notification dated 26th October, 1971 in terms whereof procedure has been laid down for appointment of teacher by empanelling a candidate therefore, which according to the learned Counsel amounts to a further amendment of 1940 Rules and as by reason of an amendment in the Rules itself Rule 3D was introduced, the writ petitioners had derived a legal right. Emphasis has been laid on the words by Mr. Pal, "ever since the school was established" which was a stricter term. 69. It was submitted that even much prior to 1930, schools had been established at the instance of the local people and teachers had been working therein as organiser teachers for a long time and, thus, therein absolutely no reason as to why their services should not be directed to be regularised. 70. As regards validity of 1991 Rules it was submitted that right given for recognition of school and consequent simultaneous appointment of organiser teachers who having obtained a right of appointment as a special class, the same can neither be arbitrarily taken away nor a legislative power in that regard can be exercised by the executive. It was submitted such rights of organiser teachers were conferred by reason of issuance of G. Os. which are statutory in nature. As regards vires of New Rule 3D it was submitted that such a power could not be exercised by the executive on mere ipse dixit. It was submitted such rights of organiser teachers were conferred by reason of issuance of G. Os. which are statutory in nature. As regards vires of New Rule 3D it was submitted that such a power could not be exercised by the executive on mere ipse dixit. The learned Counsel contends that recognition of any institution would not be harmful in public interest particularly in view of the fact that public were encouraged to set up such schools. In such view of the matter, according to the learned Counsel, the doctrine of promissory estoppel would be applicable. Reliance in this connection has been placed in (18) Surya Narayan Yadav and Ors v. Bihar State Electricity Board reported in 1985(3) SCC 38 : AIR 1985 SC 94l. 71. Mr. Pal would contend that in view of sub-section (4) of Section 105 of 1930 Act the rule had remained in-force and, thus, if Old Rule 3D survives, the same would not be inconsistent with the provision of the Act. So far as the notification dated 30th December, 1974 in terms whereof the 1973 Act was brought in force, the learned Counsel submits that from that date till 2.7.90 all the three Acts, namely, 1930 Act, 1969 Act and 1973 Act were all in force and, thus, a question arises as to which Act will prevail as on 1.9.1979. According to the learned Counsel, 1969 Act is totally inconsistent with 1930 Act and two different modes of appointment had been issued under 1930 Act as also 1973 Act inasmuch as different bodies are to make appointments of teachers in view of making of transitional provisions relating to ad-hoc committee. The learned Counsel submits that as in (19) Monoranjan Maity's Case (85 CWN 788). B. C. Roy, J. (As His Lordship then was) clearly held that Rule 3D as inserted by notification dated 11.9.80 would operate prospectively and, thus, all those organiser teachers of such schools which were established prior thereto had a right to he considered for appointment. Right of the organier teachers therefore, according to the learned Counsel, could not be taken away before 1973 Act came into fore. Right of the organier teachers therefore, according to the learned Counsel, could not be taken away before 1973 Act came into fore. Reliance in this connection has been placed in (20) Income Tax Officer, Alleppey v. I. M. C. Ponnoossee reported in AIR 1970 SC 386 and (21) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Tikamdas reported in AIR 1975 SC 1429 and thus, according to the learned Counsel, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would have no application in the instant case. The learned Counsel submits that keeping in view the fact that Section 105 was not brought in force, although 1973 Act came into force with, effect from 1.1.1975, the same did not rake away the right under 1940 Rules as Rule 3D was a special provision Reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel in (22) Ratanlal Adukia & Anr. v. Union of India reported in AIR 1990 SC 104 . 72. Mr. Pal, learned Counsel, would urge even if it be assumed that by reason of the notification dated 11.9.80 the right of the organiser teacher is sought to be destroyed the same would be ultra vires as organiser teachers were statutorily recognised since 1969 and also by various G.Os. being dated 30.12.70, 28.1.71, 6.7.71, 26.10.71, 23.11.71, 24.4.74, 5.8.75 and 7.9.77. 73. The learned Counsel urges that as the organiser teachers had been granted a special right, the same could not have been denied arbitrarily and in any event, reasons have to be assigned therefor and as the respondents have not assigned plausible reasons the same is lative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India the learned Counsel submits that in any event, equity is in favour of the petitioners. 74. As regards 1996 Amendment Act the learned Counsel contends that the effect thereof would be that no primary school henceforth can be recognised which would be completely against the scheme of the Act and as a result thereof, the definition of primary school would become inoperative. It was further submitted that even in terms of the provision of the 1973 Act toe schools which were recognised would be deemed to be continued to be recognised and such a right granted under a legal fiction cannot be taken away. It was also submitted that the said Act is ultra vires Article 254(2) of the Constitution. 75. Mr. It was further submitted that even in terms of the provision of the 1973 Act toe schools which were recognised would be deemed to be continued to be recognised and such a right granted under a legal fiction cannot be taken away. It was also submitted that the said Act is ultra vires Article 254(2) of the Constitution. 75. Mr. Das appearing in some of the appeals for the writ petitioners submitted that 1991 Rule is ultra vires the 1973 Act. 76. Mr. Banerjee, appearing in some cases, submitted that 'education' being a subject falling in the concurrent list, the State is bound to take the President's assent in all cases irrespective of any repugnancy. It was submitted that the New Rule 3D could not have been given a retrospective effect. He has relief upon the decisions of Supreme Court in (23) AIR 1979 SC 888 ; (24) AIR 1975 SC 2275 ; (25) AIR 1980 SC 1872 ; (26) AIR 1994 SC 55 and AIR 1975 SC 1429 . Mr. Banerjee would contend that the 1996 Amendment Act is ultra vires as despite amendment in Section 60(1) (l) of the Act no amendment was made in Section 67(1) (a) in terms whereof a Recognition Committee was to be constituted. It was also submitted that the State having not yet prepared any scheme in terms of Chapter-V of the 1973 Act, no purpose is achieved by reason of the Amendment. 77. In the case of West Bengal Primary Organiser Teachers' Association which has been taken to be the model case by the learned trial Judge and on the basis whereof the learned Counsel for the parties bad argued, the following reliefs had been prayed for:- "(a) to issue a writ in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondent No.1 to grant recognition to organised primary schools situated in the District of 24 Parganas as per decision in F. M. As. Nos. 370-375 of 1983 (District School Board, Midnapore & Anr. v. Monoranjan Maity & Ors.) as referred to in Paragraph No. 24 of the petition of motion. (b) to issue a writ in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondent No.1 to give appointment to the organiser teacher in the District of 24 Parganas as per decision in F.. M. As. Nos. 370-375 of 1988 (District School Board, Midnapore and Anr. (b) to issue a writ in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondent No.1 to give appointment to the organiser teacher in the District of 24 Parganas as per decision in F.. M. As. Nos. 370-375 of 1988 (District School Board, Midnapore and Anr. v. Monoranjan Maity & Anr.) as referred to in Paragraph No. 24 of the petition of motion. (c) to issue a writ in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondent No.1 not to set up any new primary school as contained in Annexure 'Q' to this petition of motion until all the organised primary schools within the District of 24 Parganas are granted recognition. (d) to issue a writ in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondent No. 1 not to issue any appointment letter to any teacher in the schools so selected by the Ad-hoc Committee as contained in Annexure 'Q' to this petition of motion." 78. The cause of action for filing the aforementioned writ application arose whence a panel was prepared by the District Primary School Council, 24 Parganas as in a meeting of the ad-hoc committee of the District School Board held on 7.5.87 a list of sites were selected for setting up of new primary schools although in some of concerned villages private primary schools were functioning and the same were not granted any recognition. 79. It is difficult to comprehend as to how the State can be debarred from establishing any primary institution under public management although there exists some primary schools run under private management. It is surprising that on the one hand, the Counsels for the petitioners rely upon the Directive Principles embodied in Articles 41 and 45 of the Constitution and on the other hand reliefs have been sought for to the effect that the State should not open new primary schools which is their constitutional obligation. The statutory authorities, there cannot be any doubt have the requisite jurisdiction nay duty to establish primary institution so as to spread literacy amongst the children in terms of the directive principles of the Constitution of India. 80. In (27) Brown v. Board of Education, (1953) 34 US 483 at page 494 : 98 Law Ed 8/3 at page 880. Warren, Chief Justice, has held that:- "Education is perhaps the most important function of State and local Governments. 80. In (27) Brown v. Board of Education, (1953) 34 US 483 at page 494 : 98 Law Ed 8/3 at page 880. Warren, Chief Justice, has held that:- "Education is perhaps the most important function of State and local Governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of education. Such an opportunity, where the State has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms." 81. In fact, the children upto the age of 14 years have a fundamental right to receive primary education. If the State makes an attempt to fulfil its constitutional goal, in our opinion, no exception thereto can be taken. 82. The reliefs sought for by the petitioner in this regard are wholly misconceived and thus, could not have been granted by the learned trial Judge. It is necessary to bear in mind that development in law in this regard. The Scheme under 1930 Act provided for spread of education through both the schools managed and controlled by the District Board as well as private schools. The 1963 Act did not make any provision for imparting education through privately managed schools which was reiterated with more elaboration in the 1973 Act. 83. The 1930 Act which had been bolding the field for a long time was also enacted as it was considered expedient to make better provision for the progressive expansion and in the management and control of primary education in rural areas in Bengal so as to make it available to all children and with a view to make it compulsory within 10 years. The Government in the State of West Bengal, thus, even in the pre-independence era had been making attempts to make primary education compulsory and make a strive in that regard. The Government in the State of West Bengal, thus, even in the pre-independence era had been making attempts to make primary education compulsory and make a strive in that regard. Although it might not have been possible for the State so far to achieve its objectives and the citizens came forward to establish such schools either with or without any motive, the new institutions sought to be established certainly were entitled to function. 84. As indicated hereinbefore, the learned trial Judge himself had raised two primary questions but did not answer the same. The learned trial Judge sought to answer the subsidiary questions and bad gone out of its way to formulate a policy decision as regards recognition of the primary schools set up by the private persons and employment of the organiser teachers. The learned trial Judge, with utmost respect in our opinion, erred in so far as it debarred the State from setting up any school unless all organiser teachers are appointed. The Constitution of India provides that its three limbs, namely, legislature, executive and judiciary would strive to work within their own respective spheres without trying to encroach upon the areas of activity of other two organs. There cannot, however, be any doubt that this Court in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as also the Apex Court in exercise of its. power under Articles 32, 136 and 142 of the Constitution of India have the jurisdiction to issue necessary direction where the other two limbs of the State fail to perform their duties and/or whence its actions are found to be unconstitutional or contrary to Jaw and/or to set aside such legislative actions which may be found to be unconstitutional. 85. We do not mean to say that the Courts do not legislate. In certain areas and certain spheres, the Courts do legislature but such orders must be passed in exceptional circumstances. 85. We do not mean to say that the Courts do not legislate. In certain areas and certain spheres, the Courts do legislature but such orders must be passed in exceptional circumstances. In view of the constitutional framework the policy decision bas to be adopted by State and once such policy decision are adopted either by reason of a statute or executive direction, the same may be scrutinised in the light of the constitutional and other legal rights of a citizen of India but they cannot be by-passed and in their place and stead the Court cannot make an alternative legislation or direct the State of formulate any other scheme when a legislation is already operative. The Courts can only test the constitutionality of such legislation but can neither supplant the statutory law and not supplement the same. There may be some exceptions to the aforementioned rule where the Courts, in order to uphold the constitutionality of a statute may read the same up or read the same down unless such statutes are clearly violative of the fundamental rights as enshrined under Part-III of the Constitution of India. 86. In these writ petitions only specific questions of law has been raised and thus this Court is called upon to answer such questions but in our opinion we cannot go beyond the pleadings of the parties and thrust our own views on the Government. Such attitude on our part would subvert the constitutional goal. 87. The principal questions which were formulated by the learned trial Judge are not difficult to answer inasmuch as only because the concerned teachers were organiser teachers, they did not have a right to be absorbed automatically nor the primary schools did have a legal right of recognition. 88. Recognition and appointment of the organiser teachers even in terms of Old Rule 3D although may go hand in hand the same were circumscribed by the conditions prescribed therefor, namely, first the schools had to be recognised upon fulfilling the conditions prescribed therefor and only upon such recognition in view of the circular letter bearing No. 4432(32) Sc/P dated 26.8.1975 at best three teachers could be appointed as organiser teachers in rural primary schools and four teachers in urban primary schools, although as noticed hereinbefore. Old Rule 3D had no application in respect of the schools situate within urban areas. Old Rule 3D had no application in respect of the schools situate within urban areas. Even therefor the permission of the Director of Education was necessary. 89. For the purpose of obtaining a writ of mandamus the petitioners must plead and prove existence of a legal right in themselves and a corresponding legal duty in the respondents. Even according to the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners the organiser teachers did not have any legal right for appointment but merely bad a right to be considered therefor subject to the condition that the school in question had fulfilled the conditions for recognition. Even when selected the appointment of organiser teachers was subject to the approval of the Director of Public Instruction. Thus, the question of their being absorbed does not arise. Absorption of an employee signifies relationship of employer and employee. The teachers of a private school were employees of the said school. They did not have any status. Their recruitment was not governed by any statute or statutory rules. Thus they had no independent right to be automatically absorbed. Even it bas not been contended that apart from Old Rule 3D, the organiser teachers had any other right. Thus, ex facie, the said question did not arise in the instant case. 90. The second Principal question framed by the learned trial Judge must also be answered in negative in view of the fact that the teachers when so appointed having not been appointed under any provision of law or upon following any rule conforming to the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and their services being not protected under any statute, question of their regularisation does not arise. This bench in several cases including in (28) Registrar of North Bengal University v. Biplab Roy & Ors. in F.M A. No. 159/93 disposed of on 24.1.96, inter alia, observed:- "The Supreme Court of India in a number of decisions categorically held that regularisation cannot be a mode of appointment. Reference in this connection may be made to (29) B. N. Nagrajon v. State of Karnataka reported in 1979(3) SCR page 937 and (30) R. N. Nenjundeppa v. J. Thimmaiah reported in 1972(2) SCR page 749 : 1972 Labour & Industrial Cases 618, which have recently been followed by the Supreme Court in (31) V. Shrinibas Reddy v. Govt. of A. P. & Ors. of A. P. & Ors. reported in AIR 1995 SC 586 ; (32) Sk. lamaluddin v. State of West Bengal reported in 1995 Lab IC 1853. Similar view has been taken in (33) Asoke Kumar Pal v. State of West Bengal; C. O. No. 4244 (W) of 1995 disposed of on 25.4.1995 and reported in 1995 Lab IC (NOC) 319; (34) Narendra Nath Palui v. State of West Bengal reported in 99 CWN 440 : 1995(2) SLR 670; (35) 1995 Lab IC 37 (Kerala); (36) 70 FLR 294 (All) and (37) 1994 (2) SCC 630 ; (38) 1993 (2) SCC 213 ; (39) AIR 1995 SC 962 ; (40) 1995(2) Cal LJ 255; (41) Bishnudeo Chowdhury v. Slate of Bihar and Ors. reported in 1995 (1) PLJR 123 (Pat) (F.B.). This aspect of the matter has also been considered by, various Division Benches of the Parna High Court on amongst others in (42) 1994 (1) PLJR 68 ; (43) 1995 (2) PLJR 309 and (44) 1995 (2) PLJR 573 " 91. Reference in this connection may be made to (45) Birbhum Zilla Parishad v. Nitya Hari Chatterjee reported in 100 CWN 748. 92. It is not necessary to multiply decisions on this point. 93 In (46) Slate of Orissa v. Dr. Pyari Mohan Misra reported in AIR 1995 SC 974 , the Apex Court held :- "Mere prolonged or continuous service does not ripen into a regular service to claim permanent or substantive status." 94. Moreover, it is a well settled principle that when the services of a teacher is made de hors the statute and his condition of services is not protected by any statute, he does not derive any right to continue in service inasmuch as conditions of his service is governed by a contract and not by reasons of any provision of any statute. This aspect of the matter has been considered by one of us in (47) Ram Saran Shastry v. State of West Bengal reported in 1995 (1) CHN 419 wherein it was held :- "The appointment of the petitioner, therefore was de hors the statute. A fortiorari, his services are not protected by any statute and thus, the same is governed under common law of master and servant." 95. A fortiorari, his services are not protected by any statute and thus, the same is governed under common law of master and servant." 95. Thus, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the right to be considered for appointment as organiser teacher was at best in terms of Rule 3D (Old) but the organiser teachers could not claim any right to be absorbed by way of regularisation or otherwise. 96. Organiser Teachers, are those teachers who had been working since the inception of the schools. The teachers who had joined the school after its establishment are known as teachers-in position. The teachers-in-position had, thus, no statutory right even under Old Rule 3D. 97. The State framed rules for recognition of the school in terms of Section 66(2)(n) and (o) of the 1930 Act laying down the procedure therefor. Thus a primary school, in terms of the provision of Section 54 of 1930 Act could be recognised as and when the condition prescribed under the aforementioned rules which came into force with effect from 27.3.1940 were fulfilled. The primary schools, thus, did not have any legal right to be recognised only upon its establishment, but a right to be considered therefor which was hedged by conditions. It is neither denied nor disputed that the right of the organiser teachers under Rule 3D (Old) could be considered only upon recognition of the schools. 98. The State by a notification dated 25th July, 1940 made rules as regards recruitment of assistant teachers. Such rules for appointment were made in respect of the schools which were under public management, namely, under the management of the then District School Board. It may be noticed that Section 54 only speaks of recognition while Section 55 provides for grant. A school in view of Section 55 could apply for grant irrespective of recognition. Thus, a primary school could be a recognised school or an aided school or both reeognised and aided. No provision was made under the 1930 Act for absorption of organiser teachers engaged in primary schools upon its recognition or upon grant of aid. Such schools despite recognition were to be treated as privately managed schools. The submission of some of the learned Counsels to the effect that by recognition, the school comes under public management cannot be accepted. No provision was made under the 1930 Act for absorption of organiser teachers engaged in primary schools upon its recognition or upon grant of aid. Such schools despite recognition were to be treated as privately managed schools. The submission of some of the learned Counsels to the effect that by recognition, the school comes under public management cannot be accepted. This aspect of the matter has been considered by this Court on (48) Bijoy Bahadur Singh v. Mr. D. Ghosh in C. R. No. 13081 (W) of 1979, disposed of on 14.11.1995. By getting recognition a primary school at best acquires a status and comes under direct control of the Board. 99. Mr. Pal has, however, referred to a circular letter dated 22nd/23rd August. 1974 addressed by the Director of Public Instruction to the District Inspector of Schools, Secondary Education, as regards the subject of ‘Admission in Class V at Secondary Schools’. The said circular reads thus:- "It has been decided by Government that Primary Final Examination shall be abolished with effect from 1974, and that in ifs place, a scholarship examination at the end of Class-IV be held in the month of December 1974 to start with in an experimental basis (Vide Government Order No. 1076-Edn (P) dated 88.74). Further it has been decided that the Head Teachers of Primary Schools will hold annual examination and issue certificate to the pupils on the basis of results of the annual examination. He is requested to inform the Headmasters of Secondary Schools under his control that the certificates as issued by the Head Teachers of Primary Schools should be honoured without reservation, so that the students may get their admission in Class-V without any difficulty. The Headmaster of Secondary Schools may take admission test if they deem it fit." 100. The aforementioned circular goes against the contention of the writ petitioner inasmuch as there is no primary final examination. The said circular was issued in respect of the publicly managed schools or the recognised schools. 101. The Headmaster of Secondary Schools may take admission test if they deem it fit." 100. The aforementioned circular goes against the contention of the writ petitioner inasmuch as there is no primary final examination. The said circular was issued in respect of the publicly managed schools or the recognised schools. 101. Even assuming that the said circular still survives 1991 Rules, such a certificate can also be granted by the respective Headmasters of the unrecognised primary schools and can be used for admission in Class-V as it is accepted by all concerned that there is no legal bar in admitting a student in Class- V although he had taken his primary education in an unrecognised primary school. 102. Only by reason of notification No. 975 dated 26th October, 1971 the appointment rules were amended in terms whereof the procedures therefor were laid down. Rule 3A provides for preparation of a panel of qualified teachers which were to be prepared upon giving adequate publicity and in the manner provided in Rule 38. Rule 3C provided for reservation to the persons belonging to the members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes as also women candidates. Clause (2) of Rule 3C provides that a Board shall ensure, as far as possible, that any schools in the area wholly or mainly inhabited by the persons belonging to Scheduled Tribes or Scheduled Caste, appointments are given to qualified persons belonging to them Old Rule 3D was much by way of an expansion inasmuch as the said provision contained non-obstante clause as regards Rule 3, 3A or 3B but subject to the provision of Rule 3C. If he had been serving as an organiser teacher ever since the school was established and his appointment was to be made with the prior approval of the Director of Public Instruction, he could be appointed as an Assistant Teacher of the School at the time it is granted recognition. 103. In this view of the matter, the fact relating to recognition and claim of the organiser teachers for being appointed were to be considered simultaneously and even if different orders were required to be passed at different points of time, such appointment was to take effect to the date of recognition. Although there appears to be some substance in the submission of Mr. Although there appears to be some substance in the submission of Mr. Basu that Old Rule 3D was inconsistent with the provision of the 1930 Act as the same did not contemplate appointment of any teacher in a recognised privately managed school but assuming the said Rule to be intra vires there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that such a right to be considered for appointment subject to fulfilment of the conditions mentioned in Section 54 and the Rules framed in that behalf also the conditions laid down under Old Rule 3D was merely a contingent and/or an inchoate right. In view of the definition of primary school, a teacher is not to be considered as a teacher under the said Act, unless the school itself is recognised or taken over. The right was not an absolute right inasmuch as such a right for consideration would come into being only upon the school being recognised and not prior thereto. The right of such organiser teachers, thus, cannot be said to be an independent right but was dependent on recognition wherefor, the managing authority the school was required to file application in prescribed form. 104. If a right has been conferred by a statute, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the same can be taken away also by a statute, in our opinion, even assuming that some right was granted in favour of the organiser teachers by reason of Old Rule 3D, such a right having been created by the executive in exercise of its legislative power, although no such provision existed in the statute, such right can also be taken away in a similar manner, namely, by substitution of such & rule by another. 105. Thus, the submission to the effect that by reason of Old Rule 3D the organiser teachers derived a vested right which could not be taken away by the executive in exercise of their legislative power, cannot be accepted. If Old Rule 3D was valid in law there cannot be any doubt that the same having been made by the executive the same also could be amended/substituted by it. If Old Rule 3D was valid in law there cannot be any doubt that the same having been made by the executive the same also could be amended/substituted by it. If the submission of the learned Counsels appearing for the writ petitioners are accepted that the executive had no right to substitute Old Rule 3D, then on the same analogy they had no right to frame the said rule and thus the organiser teachers did not derive any right at all thereunder. We do not find any substance that by reason New Rule 3D a vested right has been taken away by a substance legislation. If their argument accepted, as a necessary coronary, it has to be held that no right also could not he vested by reason of a sub-ordinate legislation unless there exists an express provision in the Principal Act. The submission of the writ petitioners is self-contradictory. 106. For the purpose of disposal of these appeals, it may not be necessary for us to consider the question as regards the effect of all the relevant Act remaining existing from 1.1.75 to 1.7.90 as the State had the jurisdiction to substitute Rule 3D both under 1930 Act and 1973 Act. It is now well known that wrong mentioning of a provision does not invalidate a law, if there exists another source. So long Section 105 of the 1973 Act and the Rules framed thereunder did not come into force, the 1940 Rules governed the field in terms of both 1930 Act as well as 1973 Act. The State, thus could exercise the power of amendment in 1940 Rules in exercise of its Rule making power both under 1930 Act or 1973 Act. 107. An amendment not only repeals a law but re-enacts it. In Bhagat Ram Sharma v. Union of India reported in 1988 Supp (1)SCC 30, the Apex Court held that in case of executive instruction the bare issue of fresh instruction on the same subject would replace a previous instruction. In any event, even if Rule 3D is said to have been amended, it could be done by replacement of a New Rule. By reason of substitution of Old Rule 3D, the same became effaced from the statute book. Even if Old Rule 3D can be considered as a part of the scheme, the State is entitled to alter the scheme. By reason of substitution of Old Rule 3D, the same became effaced from the statute book. Even if Old Rule 3D can be considered as a part of the scheme, the State is entitled to alter the scheme. When such a scheme is made by sub-ordinate legislation, the same can also be changed by the State in exercise of the self-same power. 108. In interpreting the word 'substitution' the dictionary meaning is not very helpful. Mr. Das relied upon a decision in (49) N. N. Chakrabarty v. State of Assam reported in AIR 1960 Assam 11 wherein it has been stated :- "In some cases I agree that the word 'substitution' may be employed to mean replacement by cancellation of the previous one. It might also mean the replacement of one by another, which might be equal to it, but differently expressed as mentioned in the Chamber's Twentieth Century Dictionary." 109. In the way the word 'substitution' has been used while re-placing Old Rule 3D by Rule 3D, it must be held to mean that Old Rule 3D stood repealed by' New Rule 3D and only in its place, the State had come out with a new sub-ordinate legislation. 110. However, the matter is no longer res integra in view of a recent decision of the Apex Court in (50) State of Rajasthan v. Mangrlal Pindwal reported in 1996 (5) SCC 60 wherein the law has been stated in the following terms:- "As pointed out by this Court, the process of a substitution of statutory provision consists of two steps; first, the old rule is made to cease to exist and, next, the new rule is brought into existence in its place. (See: Koteswar Vittal Kamath v. K. Rangappa Baliga & Co., SCR at p. 48). In other words, the substitution of a provision results in repeal of the earlier provision and its replacement by the new provision. (See: Koteswar Vittal Kamath v. K. Rangappa Baliga & Co., SCR at p. 48). In other words, the substitution of a provision results in repeal of the earlier provision and its replacement by the new provision. As regards repeal of a statute the law is thus stated in Sutherland on Statutory Construction: "The effect of the repeal of a statute where neither a saving clause nor a general saving statute exists to prescribe the governing rule for the effect of the repeal, is to destroy the effectiveness of the repealed act in future and to divest the right to proceed under the statute, which, except as to proceedings past and closed, is considered as if it had never exist." 111. Similarly in Crawford's interpretation of laws it bas been said "Effect of Repeal, Generally-In the first place an outright repeal will destroy the effectiveness of the repealed act in future and operate to destroy inchoate rights dependent on it, as a general rule. In many cases, however, where statutes are repealed, they continue to be the law of the period during which they were in force will reference to numerous matters." 112. Substitution of one provision by another sometimes creates enormous difficulties and depends on the intention of the legislature. In (51) Firm A. T. B. Mehtab Majid & Co. v. State of Madras and Anr. reported in 1963 Supp (2) SCR 435, the Apex Court has held:- "Once the Old Rule has been substituted by the New Rule, it ceases to exit and it does not automatically get revived when the New Rule is held to be invalid." 113. The aforementioned decision has been distinguished in the latter cases including the decision of the Supreme Court in (52) Koteswar Vittal Kamath v. K. Rangappa Baltga & Co reported in 1969 (1) SCC 255 . However, the ratio of the said decision is beyond any question. 114. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 44, 4th Edition, Paragraph 977, it Is stated:- "Where an Act passed after 1850 repeals a previous enactment and substitutes provisions for the enactment repealed, the repealed enactment remains in force until the substituted provisions come into force." 115. However, the ratio of the said decision is beyond any question. 114. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 44, 4th Edition, Paragraph 977, it Is stated:- "Where an Act passed after 1850 repeals a previous enactment and substitutes provisions for the enactment repealed, the repealed enactment remains in force until the substituted provisions come into force." 115. It has further been stated:- "It bas been said that, where a provision is one statute re-enacts a provision of an earlier statute, it cannot have the effect of repealing an intermediate provision which is inconsistent with the first, but it is clear that this statement cannot be accepted without qualification even where the re-enactment involves no modification." (Emphasis supplied) 116. There, thus cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the intention of the concerned authority is absolutely clear that by reason of substitution of Old Rule 3D by a New Rule 3D, the Old Rule 3D bad been repealed for all intent and purport. It is not a case where the New Rule 3D makes a similar provision like Old Rule 3D but thereby a new right is created in favour of third parties. In that view of the matter, it must be held, that Old Rule 3D stood repealed. 117. It is difficult to accept the submission of the learned Counsel that the New Rule 3D is ultra vires the Constitution and/or is inconsistent with the provision of the 1930 Act or 1973 Act A provision made either by way of executive instruction or by making a sub-ordinate legislation for giving employment to the widow and unemployed sons and daughters of a deceased employee who has died-in-harness conforms to the requirements of Clause (2) of Article 16 of the Constitution of India. By reason of Rule 3D appointment on compassionate ground is sought to be given only to those person who were teachers within the meaning of provision of the said Act and not to the teachers of all primary schools irrespective of the fact that the same were privately managed and/or unrecognised. 18. It is also difficult to accept the submission that by reason of New Rule 3D a vested right is sought to be taken away by retrospective effect. 18. It is also difficult to accept the submission that by reason of New Rule 3D a vested right is sought to be taken away by retrospective effect. Apart from the fact that right of the concerned teachers who were working in an unrecognised schools is not a vested right, it is well settled that when such a right can be taken away, where the intention of the legislature is absolutely clear even a vested right can also be taken away with retrospective effect Of course the same cannot be gone by way of sub ordinate legislation retrospective) (See AIR 1975 SC 1429 and AIR 1980 SC 1872 ). Unless the same is for the benefit of some persons hi whose favour such legislation is being made. Reference in this connection may be made to (53) West Bengal Headmasters' Association v. State of West Bengal reported in 1995 Lab IC 1919 wherein this bench referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in (54) State of West Bengal v. Ratan Bihari Dey reported in Calcutta Law Times 1994 (1) SC page 9 : 1993 Lab IC 2199 wherein the Apex Court held:- "A date can be specified both prospectively as well as retrospectively. The only question is whether the prescription of the date is unreasonable or discriminatory. Since we have found that the prescription of the date in this case is neither arbitrary nor reasonable, the complaint of discrimination must fail." 1I9. The submission of Mr. Das to the effect that Section 23(1)(d) of 1930 Act could not have been encroached upon the field covered by Section 23(1)(h) thereof is without any substance. Section 23(1)(a) and Section 23(2)(g) dealt with the schools under public management whereas sub-rule (h) (j) (k) dealt with the matter relating to the schools falling under private management. Both the duties of the Board operated in different fields and one did not encroach upon the field occupied by the other. 120. In Joint Secretary to the (55) Govt. of India and Ors. v. Khillu Ram and Anr. reported in AIR 1975 SC 2275 upon which Mr. Both the duties of the Board operated in different fields and one did not encroach upon the field occupied by the other. 120. In Joint Secretary to the (55) Govt. of India and Ors. v. Khillu Ram and Anr. reported in AIR 1975 SC 2275 upon which Mr. Banerjee relied upon the question which arose before the Apex Court was as to whether deletion of displaced persons (compensation and rehabilitation) rules does not affect pending action There is no case where a writ petition was pending with Old Rule 3D was substituted by a New Rule 3D and, thus the said decision has no application in the instant case. 121. In the instant case, no retrospective effect bas been given to New Rule 3D. It certainly operates prospectively. 122. Furthermore, a statute is not retrospective merely because it affects existing rights nor is it retrospective merely because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing. See Paragraph 921 of Haisbury's Laws of England, Vol. 44, 4th Edition. In that view of the matter, New Rule 3D cannot be said to have any retrospective application. 123. However, in (56) K. N. Jrayanan and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors. reported in AIR 1994 SC 55 , the Apex Court held that the appointment of diploma holder from cadre of Junior Engineer to Assistant Engineer from back date without test or selection being not reasonable and fair, the said rules which were given retrospective operation would be violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The aforementioned decision has no application in the fact of the present case. 124. If the State in its wisdom thought it fit not to give fresh appointment to any organiser teacher, the same cannot be said to be unreasonable or arbitrary inasmuch, as noticed herein before, the provision of 1930 Act merely provides for recognition and grant of aid. If an Institution is recognised or aid is granted the State play be entitled to exercise some amount of control but that does not mean that in absence of any legislation, the State will be bound to provide for employment to the teachers who bad been serving a private institution from the time of its being set up. If an Institution is recognised or aid is granted the State play be entitled to exercise some amount of control but that does not mean that in absence of any legislation, the State will be bound to provide for employment to the teachers who bad been serving a private institution from the time of its being set up. In terms of the Recruitment Rules, even the teachers of primary schools whether they were organiser teachers or teachers-in-position could have applied for being appointed in the schools managed under public management. Such a right had not been taken away nor can be taken away in view of the provision of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 125. This brings us to the question as to whether Monoranjan Maily's Case (supra) would prevail over Jitendra Nath Chatterjee's Case. We do not find any conflict between the said two decisions as both the decisions were rendered in different fact situation and on consideration of arguments advanced therein respectively. In the instant case, we intend to cover all points argued before us on their own merits. This question, although academic, is required to be considered as the learned Counsel for the parties advanced a great deal of arguments thereon. 126. In Monoranjan Maily's Case, as noticed hereinbefore, the only ground of challenge was that the right to be considered for recognition granted in terms of the statutory enactment in terms of Section 54 of the 1930 Act could not have been taken away by issuance of an exception instruction. No exception thereto can be taken but only because the learned Judges made certain observations the same cannot be said to be the ratio of the judgment. A judgment has to he read in the context of the factual matrix involved therein. Ratio of a judgment is the reason assigned and not the observations made therein. Even an obiter dicta contained in a judgment is not binding on a co-ordinate bench. 127. On the other hand, in Jitendra Nath Chatterjee's Case the question which arose for consideration was as to whether in view of the substitution of Rule 3D any organiser teacher could be appointed. Chief Justice N. P. Singh (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the division bench clearly answered the question in negative. 127. On the other hand, in Jitendra Nath Chatterjee's Case the question which arose for consideration was as to whether in view of the substitution of Rule 3D any organiser teacher could be appointed. Chief Justice N. P. Singh (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the division bench clearly answered the question in negative. In the said case, all the primary Councils were parties and certain directions had been given to them. The decision in Jitendra Nath Chatterjee’s Case has been upheld by the Supreme Court and In Dilip Kumar Chatterjee's Case (supra), it has been held to have attained finality and in that view of the matter, Jitendra Nath Chatterjee's Case binds a subsequent bench. In fact in this jurisdiction, Jitendra Nath Chatterjee's Case had been followed in a number of cases upon distinguishing Monoranjan Matty's case. It is not correct that only because Monoranjan Maity's Case was not considered by the division bench in Jitendra Nath Chatterjee's Case, the latter decision must be held to have been rendered per incurium and/or passed sub silentio. In order to arrive at a finding that the decision of a co-ordinate bench has been rendered per incurium or passed sub silentio, it is necessary to hold that a Court has passed a judgment without considering a binding precedent or in ignorance of law and had such earlier binding precedent or provision of law was brought to its notice, the result would have been different. 128. It is true that a point not argued in an earlier case shall not be considered to be a binding precedent on that point. Indeed in Monoranjan Maily's Case, the learned Counsels were remiss in bringing to the notice of the Court the scheme of the Act and the provisions relating to schools under public manatement. It was nut brought to Their Lordships' notice that other than grant of recognition and aid the 1930 Act does not contain any provision relating to management of Private Institution. The said Act did not contain any provision as regards recruitment or service condition of teachers of a privately managed primary school. The purpose and object of 1930 Act had also not been considered by the said bench, nor did it take into consideration the change in the legislative policy as was reflected in the provisions of 1973 Act. The said Act did not contain any provision as regards recruitment or service condition of teachers of a privately managed primary school. The purpose and object of 1930 Act had also not been considered by the said bench, nor did it take into consideration the change in the legislative policy as was reflected in the provisions of 1973 Act. Thus, in fact, the observation of the learned Judge in that case passed sub silentio as the relevant provisions wife not noticed. 129. The question which has to be posed and answered is as to whether the subject matter of the two cases were same. The answer-to the said question must he rendered in negative. As noticed hereinbefore, the ratio of Monoranjon Maity's Case was rendered in a given situation which point did not arise in Jitendra Nath Chatterjee's Case. 130. The Court in such a matter is bound to apply its blind as to the true ratio which could be deciphered upon considering the fact of each case, If the fact involved in two cast's are different and a different conclusion has been arrived at, no exception can be taken thereto. In filet in (57) The Reginonal Manager & Ors. V. Pawan Kumar Dubey reported in AIR 1976 SC 1766 , the Apex Court stated the law thus :- "Indeed we do not think that the principles of law declered and applied so often have really changed. But the application of the same law to the differing circumstances and facts of various cases which have come up to this Court could create the impression sometimes that there is some conflict between different decisions of this Court. Even where there appears to he some conflict, it would we think, vanish when the ratio decidendi of each case is correctly understood. It is the rule deducible from the application of law to the facts and circumstances of a case which constitutes its ratio decidendi and not some conclusion based upon facts which may appear to be similar. One additional or different fact can make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases even when the same principles are applied in each case to similar facts." 131. One additional or different fact can make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases even when the same principles are applied in each case to similar facts." 131. It is not necessary to consider a large number of decisions on this point as the question bas been discussed in great details by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court recently in (58) Natraj Chavan Sigra v. State of U. P. reported in AIR 1996 All 375 . 132. In (59) State Bank of India Staff Association v. Election Commission of India & Ors. reported in 1994(1) BLJR 128 , I had held:- 'It is well known, as was observed by Lord Halsbury In (60) Quinn v. Leathem. (1903) 1 All ER (Reprint) page 1 at page 6, that a decision is an authority for what it decides and not logically can be deduced therefrom'.” 133. It is also well known that a judgment of the Supreme Court bas to be read in a reasonable manner and like any other documents in its entirety. 134 In (61) Central Coalfields Ltd. v. State of Bihar, 1993 (1) PLJR 617 , a Division Bench of this Court (of which I was a member) observed as follows :- "It is also well known that judgment of a Court is not to be read as a statute." 135 In (62) General Electric Co, v. Renusagar Power Co., 1987 (4) SCC 137 , it was held :- "As often enough pointed by us, words and expressions based in a judgment are not to be construed in the same manner as statutes or as word and expression' defined in statutes. We do not have any doubt that when the words, 'adjudication of the merits of the controversy in the suit were used by this Court in State of U. P. v. Janki Saran Kailash Chandra the words were not used to take in every adjudication which brought to an end the proceeding before the Court in whatever manner but were m ant to over only such adjudication as touched upon the real dispute between the parties which gave rise to the action. Objections to adjudication of the disputes between the parties, on whatever ground, are in truth not aids to the progress of the suit but hurdles to such progress. Objections to adjudication of the disputes between the parties, on whatever ground, are in truth not aids to the progress of the suit but hurdles to such progress. Adjudication of such objections cannot be termed as adjudication of the merits of the controversy in the suit. As we said earlier a broad view has to be taken of the principles involved and narrow had technical interpretation which tends to defeat the object of the legislation must be a voided.". 136. It is now well known that a decision is an authority for what it decides and not what logically can be deduced therefrom. It is also well-settled that a point not argued does not create a binding precedent with regard thereto. 137. In (63) Rajeshwar Prasad Mishra v. The State of West Bengal & Ors., AIR 1965 SC 1887 , it was held:- "Article 141 empowers the Supreme Court to decide the law and not enact it. Hence the observation of the Supreme Court should not be read as statutory enactments. It is also well known that ratio of a decision is the reasons assigned therein." 138. Dias on 'jurisprudence' at page 139 observed :- "Knowing the law-What is law in a precedent is its ruling or ratio decidendt, which concerns future litigations as well as those involved in the instant dispute. Knowing the law in this context means known how to extrat the ratio decidendi from cases Statements not part of the ratio decidendi are distinguished as obiter dicta and are not authoritative. Three shades of meaning can be attached to the expression 'ratio decidendt'. The first, which is the translation of it, is the reason for (or of) deciding. Even a finding of fact may this sense be the ratio decidendi. Thus a Judge may state a rule and then decide that the facts do not fall within it Secondly, it may mean the rule of law preferred by the Judge as the basis of his decision, or thirdly it may mean the rule of law which others regard as being a binding authority. There is a temptation to suppose that a case has one fixed ruling which is there (and discoverable here and now and once and for all). There is a temptation to suppose that a case has one fixed ruling which is there (and discoverable here and now and once and for all). This is not so, for the ratio is not only the ruling given by the deciding Judge for his decision, but any one of a series of rulings as elucidated by sub-sequent interpretations. The pronouncement of the Judge who decided the case is a necessary step towards ascertaining the ratio, but the process by no means ends there, subsequent interpretation is at least as significant, sometimes more so. It is not sufficient said Jessel M. R. That the case should have been decided on a principle if that principle is not itself a right principle or one not applicable to the case; and it is for a subsequent Judge to say whether or Dot it is a right principle, and, if not, he may himself lay down the true principle" 139. In Paragraph 842 of Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol 44, 4th Edition, it is stated :- "The ordinary rules as to the binding force of precedent and as, to the powers of superior Courts to revise or overrule the decisions of inferior Courts, apply to cases of interpretation of statutes as to other cases. It is, however, the actual decision of a Court which is binding and not the words used by the Judges in giving the decision and the Courts must guard against the danger of construing the expositions of a statute in previous cases, instead of the words of the statute itself." 140. The decision of the Supreme Court in (64) Bengal Immunity Ca. Ltd. v. State of Bihar & Ors. reported In AIR 1955 SC 661 , upon which Mr. Das has placed strong reliance, is not very apposite in the context of the present case. In that case the Supreme Court held that it can overrule its earlier decision but there cannot be any doubt that the same has to be done by a larger bench and in such cases, the Supreme Court or for that matter even the High Court will not be bound by the doctrine of stare decises. 141. In that case the Supreme Court held that it can overrule its earlier decision but there cannot be any doubt that the same has to be done by a larger bench and in such cases, the Supreme Court or for that matter even the High Court will not be bound by the doctrine of stare decises. 141. It will bear repetition to State that whereas in Monoranjan Maity's Case, the question involved was whether a notification can be issued in derogation of a statute, in Jitendra Nath Chatterjee's Case the question was as to whether in view of substitution of Rule 3D the Organiser Teachers can be appointed. The learned Judges clearly held that upon coming into force of New Rule 3D organiser teachers bad no right to be appointed. Even in Monoranjan Maity's Case despite the fact that New Rule 3D was noticed by the bench, it was not declared ultra vires but was merely held that it would operate prospectively and recognition can be granted in respect of such schools where applications bad been filed prior to coming into force of New Rule 3D. 142. In this view of the matter Jitendra Nath Chatterje’s Case being a direct decision on the point we feel bound thereby particularly in view of the fact that the sail decision has been upheld by the Supreme Court. Reference in this connection may be made to Paragraph 580 of Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edition, Vol. 26. 143. In Lala Shri Bhagwan and Anr. v. Ram Chand and Anr. reported in AIR 1965 SC 1767 , the Apex Comt observed :- "Before we part with this appeal, however we ought to point out that it would have been appropriate if the learned Single Judge bad not taken upon himself to consider the question as to whether the earlier decisions of the Division Benches of the High Court needed to be reconsidered and revised. It is plain that the said decisions bad not been, directly or even by necessary implication overruled by any decision of this Court indeed the judgment delivered by the learned Single Judge shows that he was persuaded to re-examine the matter himself and in fact he had substantially recorded his conclusion that the earlier decisions were erroneous even before his attention was drawn to the decision of this Court in (65) Laxman Purshottam Pimputkar's Case. 1964 (1) SCR 200 : AIR 1964 SC 436 (supra) It is hardly necessary to emphasize that considerations of judicial propriety and decorum require that of a learned Single Judge hearing a matter is inclined to take the view that the earlier decisions of the High Court, whether of Division Bench or of a Single Judge, need to be reconsidered, he should not embark embank that enquiry sitting as a Single Judge, hut should refer the matter to a Division Bench or, in a proper case, place the relevant pipers before the Chief Justice to enable him to constitute a larger Bench to examine the question. That is the proper and traditional way to deal with such matters and it is founded on healthy principles of judicial decorum and propriety. It is to be regretted that the learned Single Judge departed from this traditional way in the present case and chose to examine the question himself." 144. In this view of the matter we are of the opinion that J. N. Chatterjee's Case (supra) should prevail. The learned trial Judge has referred from Salmond's on Jurisprudence wherein also it has clearly been stated :- “In all ordinary cases it is binding, but there is one special case in which its authority may be lawfully denied. It may be overruled or dissented from, when it is not merely wrong but so clearly and seriously wrong that its reversal is demanded in the interest of the sound administration of Justice. Otherwise it must be followed, even though the Court which follows it is persuaded that it is erroneous and unreasonable." 145. The observation quoted hereinbefore does not militate against the findings recorded hereinbefore. 146 Such is not the case here not any such reason bas been assigned by the learned Single Judge. 147. It has been rightly submitted that the findings of the learned trial Judge in this relation is self contradiction. If the substitution of Old Rule 3D by New Rule 3D was bad, the Court cannot direct formulation of a benevolent scheme. On the other hand by such substitution the Old Rule stands repealed. It is futile to contend that a vested right cannot be taken away. A vested right granted by a statute may be taken away by a statute and similarly a right, if any, conferred by a subordinate legislation may be taken away by another sub-ordinate legislation. On the other hand by such substitution the Old Rule stands repealed. It is futile to contend that a vested right cannot be taken away. A vested right granted by a statute may be taken away by a statute and similarly a right, if any, conferred by a subordinate legislation may be taken away by another sub-ordinate legislation. 148. In Osman Gani J Khetri v. Canton Board reported in 1992(3) SCC 455 , the Supreme Court while considering the building rules held that building plan bas to be made in terms of the building rules then existed and not at the time when such application was filed. Building rules are also made by way of a sub-ordinate legislation, thus, when under one sub• ordinate legislation a builder had better benefits, such benefits call be curtailed by subsequent sub-ordinate legislation. 149. As discussed hereinbefore, in any event Rule 3D did not create a vested right but merely a contingent or inchoate right. No reason has been assigned by the learned trial Judge as to how the said New Rule 3D is ultra vires. A rule does not become ultra vires only because it is inconsistent with a scheme. On the other hand, a subordinate legislation bas to be read in the context of the Principal Act and if validity made the same becomes a part thereof. In deciding upon the validity of sub-ordinate legislation, the Court has a threefold task; first to determine the meaning of words used in the Act of Legislature itself to describe the sub-ordinate legislation which the authority is authorised to make, secondly to determine the meaning of the subordinate legislation itself, and finally to decide whether the sub-ordinate legislation complies with that description. 150. A sub-ordinate legislation cannot be struck down only because it is unreasonable. It can be struck down only when the same does not conform to the statutory or constitutional requirements and not otherwise or is patently contrary to or inconsistent with the provision of the Act There is always a presumption that a sub-ordinate legis1ation is valid. The onus to prove such legislation to be invalid is upon the petitioners. It can be struck down only when the same does not conform to the statutory or constitutional requirements and not otherwise or is patently contrary to or inconsistent with the provision of the Act There is always a presumption that a sub-ordinate legis1ation is valid. The onus to prove such legislation to be invalid is upon the petitioners. Except on the ground that a purported vested right has been taken away or as has been held by the learned trial Judge that the same was against the scheme of the Act, no other point has been taken as to how New Rule 3D is ultra vires. 151. The submission of Mr. Pal to the effect that Old Rule 3D created a vested right for being considered for appointment, in the aforementioned situation does not require consideration in view of our findings aforementioned that even a right granted by a statute can be taken away by another statute. There cannot be any doubt that a rule when validly made from part of the statute, In view of J. N. Chatterjee's Case it must be held that after coming into force New Rule 3D the Organiser teacher did not have any right to be appointed only upon recognition of school in question as but for Old Rule 3D. recognition of a school by itself would not confer any right of appointment in the Organiser Teachers, far less the teachers-in-position. 152. It is true that in Dilip Kumar Chatterjee's Case special leave petition No 3594/95 the Apex Court sought to interprete the order dated 5.6.91 passed by a division bench of this Court. The division bench in the aforementioned order dated 5.6.91 passed in J. N. Chatterjee's Case clearly observed that if the school in question is recognised it would be open to the organiser teacher to apply for his name to be included in the panel to be prepared in accordance with the provisions of the rules and if any such application for inclusion of the name in the panel is made, the same shall be considered in accordance with the law. The aforementioned decision bas been upheld by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in a later decision was not concerned with the interpretation of the judgment of this Court. The aforementioned decision bas been upheld by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in a later decision was not concerned with the interpretation of the judgment of this Court. But it appears that inadvertently while reciting the effect thereof it was stated that in the event of recognition being granted they, could be automatically empanelled for the purpose of appointment as teacher in the said school. 153. The decision of the division bench clearly shows that the inclusion of their names was to be considered in 'accordance with law and there was no question of automatic empanelment inasmuch as in absence of Rule 3D, the cases of organiser teachers of recognised schools were also required to be considered in terms of Rule 3, 3A and 3B of the Recruitment Rules which was then in force. A fortiorari, after coming into force of 1991 Rules their cases are required to be considered in terms therewith. Such consideration of the cases of all candidates shall be in conformity with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 154. The said observation, evidently is a typographical or clerical mistake and does not create any binding precedent inasmuch as the Court in the aforementioned case was not concerned with the interpretation of the decision in J. N. Chatterjee's Case but merely referred to it by way of history of litigation. The fact stated in judgment is not a ratio of that judgment nor can be said to be the law laid down under Article 141 thereof. 155. The submission of Mr. Pal to the effect that in the instant case the New Rule 3D would be hit by the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be accepted. 156. There is no averment in the writ petition to show that any promise was made by the State and/or District School Board asking them to establish the schools or on an allurement that they would be given appointment. Admittedly the local people had established primary schools and engaged teachers therein voluntarily. Their acts were laudable but they having done so on their own volition and without any corresponding promise the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be said to have any application. 157. In (66) Director of Administrative Training Institute & Ors. v. Sri Subhas Chandra Misra & Anr. Admittedly the local people had established primary schools and engaged teachers therein voluntarily. Their acts were laudable but they having done so on their own volition and without any corresponding promise the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be said to have any application. 157. In (66) Director of Administrative Training Institute & Ors. v. Sri Subhas Chandra Misra & Anr. reported in 1995(2) Calcutta Law Journal 89, a division bench of this Court distinguished the decision of the Supreme Court in Surya Narayan Yadav & Ors. v. Bihar Slate Electricity Board & Ors. reported in AIR 1985 SC 941 and stated the law thus:- "The service conditions of the employees are governed by the Rules framed either under a statute or under the rules framed under proviso appended to Act 309 of the Constitution of India In this case also the respondent Shri Sisra evidently was sent on deputation in terms of provisions of the West Bengal Service Rules. In such a situation the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot possibly be made to apply as it is well known that there cannot be any estoppel against the statute. For attracting the principles of promissory estoppel the following three pre-conditions must be fulfilled :- 1. Unequivocal promise by a public authority. 2. An act or omission resulting from the representation, whether actual or by conduct by the person to whom the representation is made 3. Alteration of his position by the promise pursuant to such promise. Reference in this connection may be made to (67) Sone Vanaspati Ltd. v. State of Bihar & Ors. reported in 1995(1) PLJR 2 . In (68) Amrit Banaspali Co. Lid & Anr. v, State of Punjab & Anr. reported in 1992(2) SCC 411 , it has been held that promise or agreement which is prohibited by statute or is against public policy cannot be enforced in Court." 158. Furthermore, it is not the case that the organiser teachers altered their position pursuant to any promise made to them and in this view of the matter too the doctrine of promissory estoppel has no application. Reference in this connection may also be made to (69) 1996 AIHC 3639 ; (70) 1996 AIHC 3880; (71) 1996 AIHC 3401 and (72) 1996 AIHC 3763. Reference in this connection may also be made to (69) 1996 AIHC 3639 ; (70) 1996 AIHC 3880; (71) 1996 AIHC 3401 and (72) 1996 AIHC 3763. In any event the promise by reason of Old Rule 3D, if any, was for those who became organiser teachers after the said rule was framed. Rule 3D (Old), on the submission of learned Counsel, themselves had prospective operation. 159. Furthermore, it is well settled that there cannot be any estoppel against statute. Reference in this connection may be made to (73) Shabi Construction Company v. City & Industrial Development Corporation & Anr. reported in 1995 (4) SCC 301 and (74) State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. v. Ganesh Wood Products & Ors. reported in 1995 (6) SCC 363 : 1995 (6) JT (SC) 485. It is also well known that a promise can be withdrawn. A promise can be withdrawn even unilaterally. See (75) Mangalam Timber Products Ltd. V. State of Orissa & Ors. reported in AIR 1996 Orissa 13. 160. In State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. v. Ganesh Wood Products & Ors. reported in 1995(6) SCC 363 : 1995(6) JT SC 485, it has clearly been held that the said doctrine does not contain any rigid rule. The said doctrine should not be reduced to a rule of thumb nor can be applied as a pure question of law. 161. As indicated hereinbefore, there is no pleadings nor there is any proof as regards factual foundation for invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 162. In a recent decision in (76) P. T. R. Exports (Madras) Pvt. Ltd & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. reported in 1996(5) SCC 268 , the Apex Court negatived a plea of applicability' of the doctrine of promissory estoppel when there did not exist any vested or accrued right in case of change of policy taken by the Government in public interest, in the following words :- "It would, therefore, be clear that grant of licence depends upon the policy prevailing as on the date of the grant of the licence. The Court, therefore, would not bind the Government with a policy which was existing on the date of application as per previous policy. A prior decision would not bind the Government for all times to come. The Court, therefore, would not bind the Government with a policy which was existing on the date of application as per previous policy. A prior decision would not bind the Government for all times to come. When the Government is satisfied that change in the policy was necessary in the public interest, it would be entitled to revise the policy and lay down new policy. The Court, therefore, would prefer to allow free play to the Government to evolve fiscal policy in the public interest and to act upon the same. Equally, the Government is left free to determine priorities in the matters on allocations or allotments or utilisation of its finances in the public interest. It is equally entitled, therefore, to issue or withdraw or modify the expert or import policy in accordance with the scheme evolved. We, therefore, hold that the petitioners have no, vested or accrued right for the issuance of permits on the MEE or NQE, nor is the Government bound by its previous policy. It would be open to the Government to evolve the new schemes and the petitioners would get their legitimate expectations accomplished in accordance with either of the two schemes subject to their satisfying the conditions required in the scheme. The High Court, therefore, was right in its conclusion that the Government is not barred by the promises of legitimate expectations from evolving new policy in the impugned notification" 163. In Sukumar Mukherjee v. Stare of West Bengal & Anr. reported in AIR 1993 SC 2335 , it has been held by the Apex Court while considering the question as to whether the right given to Doctors, to carryon private practise can be withdrawn, held that if the State Government finds that the extension of said privilege even to some posts affects the patients' care, it is free to withdraw even the said limited privilege. Negativing a contention that there was no evidence as regards deterioration in the standards of teaching in the Medical Institutes of the State, the Apex Court observed :- "Further even if there was no evidence, the Stale Government was competent to lay down as one of the service conditions for its Medical Officer that they would not have the right to practise privately. That being a matter of policy strictly rests within the exclusive jurisdiction of the State Government." 164 In (77) Union of India & Ors v. Syed Mohd. Raza Kazmi & Ors. reported in 1992 Supp (2) SCC 534, while considering a matter of policy relating to promotion the Apex Court observed:- "The policy decision is not arbitrary, discriminatory or meaningless. It has a background and it has a purpose. It is for the department to decide on policies of promotion which will be consistent with the interests of all employees belonging to various cadres. It is not for the Administrative Tribunal or for the Courts to interfere with this and to dictate the avenues of promotion which the department should provide for its various employees. The Courts cannot direct that TAs should be made a direct feeder post to HCs to UDCs." 165. In (78) U. P. Kartha Factorips' Association v. State of U. P. & Ors. reported in 1996(2) SCC 97 , the Supreme Court refused to interfere with a policy decision as regards fixation of a cut off date for the purpose of allotment of a forest produce. 166. Furthermore, it is now a well-settled principles of law that this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot give any direction to the statutory authorities to act contrary to law. In (79) Union of India & Anr. v. Kirloskar Pneumatic Co. Ltd. reported in 1996(4) SCC 453 , the Apex Court while considering a power of the High Court as regards its jurisdiction to issue a direction in terms of Section 27(4) of the Customs 1962 held:- "Even assuming that Section 27 did not apply either to a suit filed by the importer or to a writ petition filed by him and that in such cases the period of limitation would be three years, it is not permissible for the High Court, even white acting under Section 226 of the Constitution, to direct the authorities under the Act to act contrary to the aforesaid statutory provision. The power conferred by Articles 226/227 is designed to ensure that the several to enforce the rule of law and to ensure that the several authorities and organs of the State act in accordance with law." 167. The Apex Court recently in a criminal case, in (80) Bonkya Alias Bharat Shivaji Mane & Ors. The power conferred by Articles 226/227 is designed to ensure that the several to enforce the rule of law and to ensure that the several authorities and organs of the State act in accordance with law." 167. The Apex Court recently in a criminal case, in (80) Bonkya Alias Bharat Shivaji Mane & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra reported 10 AIR 1996 SC 257 , observed:- “The amplitude of powers available to the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India is normally speaking not conditioned by any statutory provision but it cannot be lost sight of that this Court exercises jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution with a view to do Justice between the parties but not in disregard of the relevant statutory provisions." 168 The decisions cited by the learned trial Judge were rendered absolutely on different facts and circumstances which have no bearing on the facts of this case. 169. In Surya Narayan Yadav v. Bihar State Electricity Board reported in 1985 (3) SCC 38 : AIR 1985 SC 941 , the Apex Court was concerned with a representation made by a statutory body relying upon which the employees acted to their own prejudice such representations were made repeatedly by the Electricity Beard that its ex-cadre trainee engineers would be permanently absorbed and any cadre without taking any examination would be confirmed after two years probation but such representation was honoured and in that situation it was held that the trainees form a special class in the peculiar fact 6ituation entitled to the special benefit assured to them. Such is not the position here. 170. Mr. Pal submitted that in any event the organiser to chers were encouraged to set up new schools. Neither there is a pleading to that effect nor such a question bas been raised before learned trial Judge. By reason of introduction of Rule 3D in the year 1971 merely certain benefits were sought to be granted and by reason thereof, organiser teachers were not in any way encouraged inasmuch as the question of encouragement would not have been arisen as organiser teachers had not joined the school pursuant to any representation made to them at the time of establishment of such institution. In fact, it is the consistent case of the petitioners that the schools were established by the local people and the teachers volunteered their services therefore Rule 3D (Old) itself stipulates appointment of such organiser teachers who were attached from the very inception namely from the time of establishment of the schools. Rule 3D (Old), therefore, cannot be said to have been enacted by way of giving incentive to establish any schools or to persons for becoming its organiser teachers. As noticed hereinbefore, no such alleged incentive or encouragement is borne out from the provisions of 1930 Act. 171. The submission of Mr. Pal to the effect that such organiser teachers had a legitimate expectation is state to be rejected. There could not have been any legitimate expectation in absence of any practice when the matter of appointment is governed by rules. Such rules have to be followed. The State is also bound by the constitutional mandates as enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. No appointment can be made in violation of the statute and the statutory rules. The services of the teachers were initially governed by contract. Principles of legitimate expectation bas no application in case of contract. In (81) D. Wren International Ltd & Anr. v. Engineers India Ltd. & Ors. reported in AIR 1996 Cal 424 . I have considered in details the law as the subject and as such it is not necessary to reiterate the same. Reference in this connection may also be made to (82) A C. Roy & Co. v. Union of India & Ors. reported in AIR 1995 Cal 246 . 172. The writ petitioners also cannot rely upon various circulars in support of their cases as the same ceased to have any effect whatsoever after coming into force of the 1973 Act and the rules framed thereunder. 173. In Ram Saran Shastry v. State of West Bengal & Ors. reported in 1995(1) CHN 419 , this Court quoted with approval the decision of the Supreme Court in (83) Madras City Wine Merchants Association & Anr. v. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. 173. In Ram Saran Shastry v. State of West Bengal & Ors. reported in 1995(1) CHN 419 , this Court quoted with approval the decision of the Supreme Court in (83) Madras City Wine Merchants Association & Anr. v. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. reported in 1994(5) SCC 509 and stated :- "From the above it is clear that legitimate expectation may arise :- (a) If there is an express promise given by the public authority; or (b) because of the existence of a regular practice which the claimant can reasonably expect to continue; (c) such an expectation must be reasonable. However, if there is any change in policy or in public interest the position is already by a rule or legislation, no question of legitimate expectation would arise." Reference in this connection may also be made to a recent decision of House of Lords in (84) R. v. Secretary of Slate/or Transport ex parte Richmond Union Themes London Borough Council & Ors reported in (1994) 1 All ER 577 at P. 599" 174. Moreover a mere anticipation or wish cannot give rise to legitimate expectation. 175. In any event the doctrine of promissory estoppel or legitimate expectation cannot have any application whatsoever while a right is claimed under a statute and by reason of another statute, such a right is taken away. The only question in such an event would be as to whether the amended statute is constitutional or not. The doctrine of promissory estoppel or legitimate expectation having no relevance as regards a statutory law, the same cannot be said to have any application whatsoever in the instant case. 176. Such organiser teachers who established its schools prior to 1971, could have made an attempt to enforce their claims, if any, but after 1980, they cannot do so as they do not have any existing statutory right. 177. Reference to various circulars by Mr. Pal which had been issued during the aforementioned period, namely, in between 1971 to 1980 is not at all relevant inasmuch in view of our findings aforementioned that after deletion of Rule 3D nobody can be appointed as organiser teacher but their cases are required to be considered in the manner hid down under the rules. It is now well known that Executive Instruction can supplement the law but not supplant the same. It is now well known that Executive Instruction can supplement the law but not supplant the same. In any event, such circulars lost their force after coming into force of New Rule 3D and any circular issued thereafter, if in conflict there with must be held to be bad in law. 178. Although in view of our findings hereinbefore it is not necessary to decide the other questions raised in these appeals but as the learned Lawyers have argued at great length, we would discuss the same. 179. The next question which arises for consideration is as to whether the 1991 Rules framed by the State in exercise of its power conferred upon it under Section 106 of the West Bengal Primary Education Act, 1973 is unconstitutional. 180. Mr. Pal has raised only two questions in support of the aforementioned contentions. namely, (a) by reason of such rule vested right has been taken away; (b) the executive in exercise of its legislative power cannot take away a vested or accrued right. 181. We, for the foregoing reasons, do not find any substance in the said argument. 182. Mr. Das appearing on behalf of some of the respondents, however, took us through various' provisions of the Rules and submitted that provisions of the said Rules are contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions of 1973 Act. The learned Counsel contends that the field occupied by reason of the legislation covered by Old Rule 3D in respect of the organ her teacher could not have been made as the right provision therefor has not been stated, The learned Counsel had further taken us through various circular letters to show that in between the year 1971 and 1975 notifications bad been issued by the State showing the availability of the fund and making direction to the concerned authorities to establish additional school and appoint teachers keeping in view the resources available at their bands. It was further submitted that the question as regards recognition of a school having not been provided in the Rules, the same must be held to be arbitrary as Rules 3 and 4 of recognition rules framed under 1930 Act if read in the context of Section 54(4) of 1930 Act would show that recognition used to be granted even when no application therefor was filed. The said submission has no force as after 1973 Act came into force, question of granting any other recognition did not arise as the said Act did not contain any provision like Section 54(4) in 1930 Act Thus after the 1973 Act came Into force, the managing committees of the school were required to file application for grant of such recognition in terms of the extent rules. 183. While considering the validity of the said Amendment Act, it would be relevant to consider that in terms of 1930 Act there was no provision for imputing free primary education not there was any constitutional obligation upon the State in terms of the directive principles. 184. When 1973 Act came into force the vires of the said Act had been challenged and different Courts passed interim orders staying operation of the Act. The said interim orders having been vacated, the aforementioned notification dated 30th July, 1990 could ultimately be issued. Again as noticed hereir before the vires of 1991 Rules had been challenged and the learned trial Judge granted stated operation of the said Rules. 185. The learned trial Judge himself as noticed hereinbefore, held that 1991 Rules is valid. As soon as the said judgment was pronounced, the interim order stood vacated and the 1991 Rules must be held to hold the field with effect from 25.11.91. Even the provisions of Section 105(4) of 1973 Act will have no force as since 1980 the organizer teachers ceased to have any right whatsoever for being considered for appointment. The 1991 Rules being valid all appointments were required to he made in terms of the New Rules pursuant whereto appointments can be made in primary schools only from the panels prepared by the District Primal y Councils. Reliance in this connection may be made to (85) Municipal Board, Bareilly v. Bharat Oil Co. & Ors. reported in AIR 1990 SC 548 . 186. The learned trill Judge, in our opinion was not correct in holding :- "As such without express provision of law, operation of the executive declaration in introducing a new guidelines for recruitment of primary teachers in Notification No. 768 Edn (p) dated 22.11.1991 shall be stayed till organiser teachers are fully observed." 187. The said direction is not a guideline as was sought to be argued by Mr. The said direction is not a guideline as was sought to be argued by Mr. Das but laying down a law which cannot be sustained as the learned Judge himself has upheld the vires of 1991 Rules. 188. In Union of India and Ors. v. Syed Mohd. Raza Kozmi and Ors. reported in 1992 Supp (2) SCC 534, the Apex Court bas held that the tribunal or Court cannot issue direction as regards policy of promotion which is within the exclusive domain of the Government. Reference in this connection may also be made to (86) D. C. Bhatia & Ors. v. Union of India & Anr. reported in 1995(1) SCC 104 . 189. The legislative policy as envisaged in the 1973 Act or 1991 Rules conforms to the provision of Articles 14 and 16 of Constitution of India inasmuch as all eligible persons including those who ale working in private schools are to be considered for the purpose of appointment in primary schools which are run under public management. 190. It is now well known that with the passage of time the legislature has the requisite right to adopt and follow a different scheme and such legislative policy by itself cannot be a subject matter of challenge in a writ application unless the same is held to be unconstitutional. 191. The Court is not empowered to consider the wisdom of the legislature and even it holds a different view, the same by itself would not be a ground for striking it down nor is the Court empowered to direct the legislature and/or executive either to frame a New Act or Rules or to act in terms of the guidelines fixed by it despite the fact that the same may contravene the provision of the Act and the Rules. Even if there exists any conflict between 1930 Act and 1973 Act, it is now well known principal of statutory interpretation that in such a case, maxim : leges posteriors priores conterarias abrogant later laws abrogate earlier contrary laws) shall apply. See (87) Asoke Marketing Ltd. & Anr v. Punjab National Bank & Ors. reported in AIR 1991 SC 855 ; (88) Dharangadhra Chemical Works v. Dharangadhra Municipality & Anr. reported in 1985 (4) SCC 92 and (89) India Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. The Commercial Tax Officer, Bhavanipore & Ors. reported in AIR 1975 SC 155 . 192. See (87) Asoke Marketing Ltd. & Anr v. Punjab National Bank & Ors. reported in AIR 1991 SC 855 ; (88) Dharangadhra Chemical Works v. Dharangadhra Municipality & Anr. reported in 1985 (4) SCC 92 and (89) India Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. The Commercial Tax Officer, Bhavanipore & Ors. reported in AIR 1975 SC 155 . 192. In Ratan Lal Adukia and Anr. v. Union of India reported in AIR 1990 SC 104 upon which Mr. Pal has placed strong reliance, the fact of the matter was absolutely different. In that case the Court was concerned with a pre-existing remedy. Even in that case it was held that Section 80 of the Railways Act shall prevail over Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 18 of the Presidency Small Cause Act. The Apex Court observed:- "The doctrine of implied repeal is based on the postulate the legislature which is presumed to know the existing state of the law did not intend to create any confusion by retaining conflicting provisions. Courts in applying this doctrine are supposed merely to give effect to the legislative intent by examining the object and scope of the two enactments. But in a conceivable case, the very existence of two provisions may be itself, and without more, lead to an inference of mutual irreconcilability if the later set of provisions is by itself a complete code with respect to the same matter In such a case the actual detailed comparison of the two sets of provisions may not be necessary, It is a matter of legislative intent that the two sets of provisions were not expected to be applied simultaneously. Section 80 is a special provisions. It deals with certain class of suits distinguishable on the basis of their particular subject-matters," 193. A subordinate legislation has to be interpreted in the light of the enabling statute generally and it in particular has to be consistent with its substantive provisions. Section 80 is a special provisions. It deals with certain class of suits distinguishable on the basis of their particular subject-matters," 193. A subordinate legislation has to be interpreted in the light of the enabling statute generally and it in particular has to be consistent with its substantive provisions. It is well known that normally a sub-ordinate legislation ceases to be in force en the repeal of the enactment under which it was made but in the instant case, the 1940 Rules remained in force but only to the extent it was consistent with the provision of 1973 Act However, as on the date of coming into force of Section 105, the organiser teachers did not have existing legal right, the question of saving their right to be considered for appointment in terms of Old Rule 3D did not arise and it must be held that after New Rule 3D came into force there being no existing right of organiser teachers, the question of its being saved did not arise. 194. When a statute is framed by the State keeping in view its constitutional obligation. to promote free and compulsory education, the question as to how the same is to be implemented, must be left to the legislature so as to enable it to device the system which is considered to be most suitable and which would promote public interest and serve the system. 195. In the instant case it has been held that the impugned Act is not violative of Articles 41 and 45 of the Constitution of India. In any event, unless the said Act violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India, question of any Act being declared unconstitutional only because it violates the directive principles and, thus being I able to be struck down, would not arise Reference in this connection may be made to a decision of (90) Mine in Forum of Scientists, Engineers & Technologists & Ors. v. Union of India reported in 1996(2) Cal LJ 159, wherein it was held :- "This Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot declare a statute unconstitutional only on surmise and conjectures. Factual foundation must be laid dawn therefor. The onus to prove that a statute is unconstitutional lies upon the petitioners. v. Union of India reported in 1996(2) Cal LJ 159, wherein it was held :- "This Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot declare a statute unconstitutional only on surmise and conjectures. Factual foundation must be laid dawn therefor. The onus to prove that a statute is unconstitutional lies upon the petitioners. In the instant case the petitioners have failed to discharge the said onus." 196 However, in these cases as noticed hereinbefore, the 1973 Act or the 1991 Rules are not violative either of Part-III or Part-IV of the Constitution of India and, thus the question of the Amending Act being violative of Part-IV of Constitution of India does not arise. 197. Mr. Das further submitted that it was obligatory on the part of the respondents to specify the relevant provisions of Section 106(2) to show as to which rule is being framed under which provision of the main Act. 198. The submission of the learned Counsel cannot be, accepted for more than one reasons. The learned Counsels themselves contended that the right of recognition itself was neither a vested right and nor an accrued right but recognition of a primary school under Section 30 of the Act could be issued subject to the fulfilment of the conditions therefor. Furthermore, the right vested under the 1930 Act did not contemplate vesting of any right of appointment or consideration therefor so far as appointment of organiser teachers are concerned. The 1930 Act did not deal with the organiser teachers. It merely dealt with the matter relating to recognition of private institution and grant of aid thereto. The scheme for spreading the primary education in the Act in terms of preamble thereof does not anywhere show that any teacher be he an organiser teacher or the teacher-in-position would be appointed in the said service. The question as to whether by reason of Old Rule 3D the organiser teachers acquired a vested right had to be considered in that context. 199. We have already held hereinbefore that the right of the Organiser Teacher, if any, under the Old Rule 3D was not a vested or accrued right but merely a right to be considered and/or a conditional right. 199. We have already held hereinbefore that the right of the Organiser Teacher, if any, under the Old Rule 3D was not a vested or accrued right but merely a right to be considered and/or a conditional right. It has also been held that such a right purported to have been granted by reason of a sub-ordinate legislation also could have been taken away by amending or repealing such a provision. 200. In that view of the matter the submission of Mr. Pal fails. So far as the submission of Mr. Das is concerned, in our considered opinion, the same are wholly irrelevant. The question as regards vires of 1991 Rules have to be considered in the light of the provision of 1973 Act. Under the 1973 Act a direct provision as regards grant of recognition was not enacted. Section 60(1) lays down a duty of Primary Council to grant recognition to primary schools with or without conditions or to withdraw recognition and to grant financial aid and to any such primary schools or to withdraw such aid, in such manner as may be prescribed. Section 67(1) (a) of the said Act provides for Constitution of a recognition committee by the Primary School Council. The duty to grant recognition, therefore shifted from the State to Primary School Council. However, so long 1991 Rules were not framed the matter relating to recognition was governed by the 1940 Rules framed under 1930 Act. 201. It is not the case that any Managing Committee of the concerned school had filed any petition for grant of recognition after the 1991 Rules had come into force. Even if such an application bad been filed, the s3mecouid have been disposed of by the District Primary School Council. The matter relating to recognition of schools is not such that in absence of any rule, the entire Act could become inoperative. 202. Furthermore, teachers have no independent right to file an application for recognition. It is only the Managing Committee of the School concerned which could file such an application. In that view of the matter it is not for this Court to go into an academic question inasmuch as it is now well known that the Courts unnecessarily do not enter into any academic question In. It is only the Managing Committee of the School concerned which could file such an application. In that view of the matter it is not for this Court to go into an academic question inasmuch as it is now well known that the Courts unnecessarily do not enter into any academic question In. view of our findings aforementioned that organiser teachers did not have any right• to be appointed in view of substitution of Old Rule 3D by New Rule 3D in the year 1980, the purported challenge of 1991 Rules must be held to have no substance. 203. It is now well known that while framing sub-ordinate legislation and passing an order, non-mentioning of the source of power or wrong mention thereof is not fatal. If the executive has the requisite power to make a sub-ordinate legislation, wrong mentioning of the relevant provision would not invalidate its act, is its source of power can be traced to another statute. 204. In (91) Union of India v. Khazan Singh reported in AIR 1992 SC 1535 , it is stated:- It is settled proposition of law that when the exercise of power can be justified under any provision of law, then non-mention of the said provision in the order cannot invalidate the same". 205. Reliance in this connection may be made to (92) State of Karnataka v. Krishnaji Srinivas Kulkarni & Ors. reported in 1994(2) SCC 558. 206. We also do not find any force in the submission of Mr. Das to the effect that even in the matter of appointment the provisions of the Act and the Rules are not being followed. It is not the case of the petitioners that they bad filed applications for their appointment in a regular manner. It is, their case that they formed a separate class in view of Old Rule 3D and they should have been appointed without following the procedure laid down under the Act or the Rules framed thereunder. The petitioners have also not questioned nor could have questioned the formation of any panel by any District Primary Council as they were not the candidates therefor. It is now a well-settled principle of law that in terms of the Service Jurisprudence only those persons aggrieved, can raise such grievances questioning the appointment of other teachers provided they were candidates therefor. It is now a well-settled principle of law that in terms of the Service Jurisprudence only those persons aggrieved, can raise such grievances questioning the appointment of other teachers provided they were candidates therefor. It is not a case where the Court is required to issue a writ of quo warranto. Even in the facts and circumstances of this case a writ of certiorari shall also not be maintainable in view of well-settled principles of Service Jurisprudence. See (93) R K. Jain v. Union of India reported in 1993(4) SCC 119 . 207. This brings us to the question as regards vires of 1996 Act. It has neither been argued nor could it be argued that the entire Amending Act is ultra vires. The question of vires of the Act has to be considered in the factual matrix relating to the right of the petitioner. 208. Mr. Pal urged:- (a) the said Amending Act is ultra vires Articles 14, 21 and the directive principles as admittedly the right of recognition is a vested right and the schools were set up on the basis of the encouragement, they received from the State; (b) the schools had a right to be considered for recognition; (c) the recognition being not automatic, the reasons assigned in the Statements of Objects and Reasons are non-est inasmuch as rules and norms were prescribed for such recognition as also for withdrawal therefor. 209. In support of his aforementioned contentions the learned Counsel bas placed strong re1ignce upon (94) Miss. Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka & Ors. reported in AIR 1992 SC 1858 and (95) Unni Krishnan, J. P. & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. reported in AIR 1993 SC 2178 . 210. As regards the proposition that the Court can look into the Statements of Objects and Reasons, strong reliance bas been placed on (96) Shashikant Laxman Kale & Anr v. Union of India & Anr. reported in AIR 1990 SC 2114 : 1990(4) SCC 366 . 211. It was further submitted that In any event, the 1973 Act having been enacted upon receiving the assent of the President of India, the Amending Act was also required to undergo the same formalities in view of the fact that it is repugnant to the provision of 1930 Act. 211. It was further submitted that In any event, the 1973 Act having been enacted upon receiving the assent of the President of India, the Amending Act was also required to undergo the same formalities in view of the fact that it is repugnant to the provision of 1930 Act. Reliance in this connection bas been placed on a decision of the special bench of the Patna High Court in (97) Brij Bhukan Kalwar & Ors. v. S. D. a Siwan & Ors. reported in AIR 1955 Patna 1. 212. Mr. Binode Dutta, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of F. M. A. T. No. 2239/96 and some other cases, further, submitted that once an Act has been enacted upon following the directive principles, the same cannot be amended so as to take away the will of the founding father of the Constitution. 213. It is not possible for us to accept the aforementioned contention. The right of recognition in respect of an institution is not a constitutional right. It was at best a statutory right and that too a conditional right. 214. The interpretation of the provisions of a statute requires to be decided on the touch stone of the constitutional provisions and the same are required to be considered keeping in, view the existing situation and the prevailing circumstance in the society. The only question raised is that by reason of the Amending Act, the right of recognition of any institution has been taken away. As indicated hereinbefore, the petitioners are organiser teachers. Even the organisations which have filed these writ applications have taken up the cause of the organiser teachers. They had no independent right to file an application for' recognition nor recognition could be claimed by any school as a matter of right. In that view of the matter ex facie the petitioners have no locus standi to question the vires of the said Act in so far as it bas been held herein before that they have lost their right to be appointed as organiser teachers in terms of Old Rule 3D after the New Rule 3D came into force in the year 1980. Even in Jitendra Nath Chatterjee (supra), the Division Bench gave direction to apply for recognition within the time stipulated therein only to the 'Organisers of the School' and not to the' 'Organiser Teachers'. 215. Even in Jitendra Nath Chatterjee (supra), the Division Bench gave direction to apply for recognition within the time stipulated therein only to the 'Organisers of the School' and not to the' 'Organiser Teachers'. 215. There is no doubt that 1973 Act contemplated recognition but as indicated hereinbefore such a provision was engrafted in the duties of the District Primary Council as opposed to the right conferred upon the Managing Authority of the School for obtaining such recognition in terms of Section 54, occuring in Chapter. IX of 1930 Act. It is relevant to mention that such a duty was also cast upon a Board in terms of Rule 23(1) (h) of 1930 Act. 216. The submission of the learned Counsel to the effect that withdrawal of the provision of recognition is arbitrary cannot be accepted as the State is entitled to enact a law within its legislative power. 217. It is now well known that a legislation cannot be challenged on the ground of mala fide. The theory of legislative expectation has also no role to play in a matter of consideration of validity of a statute. See (98) Sri Srinivasa Theatre & Ors. v. Government of Tamil Nadu & Ors. reported in 1992 (2) SCC 643 . Even an administration action can be interfered by the High Courts on limited grounds (See Tata Cellular v. Union of India reported in 1994 (6) SCC 651 . The right of judicial review of legislation is more restricted. 218. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that in terms of Article 41 of the Constitution of India the State is required to make an effective provision, Inter alia, for securing the right to education but the same is subject to the limits of its economic capacity. 219. In Miss. Mohini Jain's Case (supra) the Apex Court was considering a matter relating to charging of capitation fee for admission in private educational institutions Paragraph 17 of the said decision upon which strong reliance has been placed by Mr. Pal states that the State is under an obligation to establish educational institutions to enable the citizens to enjoy the said right which may be discharged through State-owned or State-recognised educational institutions, and thus if capitation fee is charged, the same would be a patent denial of a citizen's right to education under the Constitution. 220. Pal states that the State is under an obligation to establish educational institutions to enable the citizens to enjoy the said right which may be discharged through State-owned or State-recognised educational institutions, and thus if capitation fee is charged, the same would be a patent denial of a citizen's right to education under the Constitution. 220. Article 45 of the Constitution reads thus :- "The State shall endeavour to provide, within a period of ten years from the commencement of this Constitution, for free and compulsory education for all children until they complete the age of fourteen years." 221. In Unni Krishnan's Case (supra), the Apex Court while considering the cases of private educational institutions purporting to be engaged in imparting medical and engineering education was considering the correctness of its earlier decision in Miss Mohini Jain's Case (supra) on the ground that if the said decision is valid, the private institution would have to be closed down. 222. Miss. Mohini Jain's Case was partly overruled as according to the Apex Court the dictum of the Mohini Jain's Case cannot be stretched to education at all levels and must be confined to what is envisaged under Article 45 of the Constitution. 223. The observations made in Paragraphs 168 and 169 in Unni Krishnan's Case must be viewed in the fact of the matter involved therein. In fact the Apex Court therein has clearly stated that nobody has a right to establish educational institutions and this right is subject to such law as may be made by the State in the interest of the general public. If prohibition can be imposed as regards establishment of an institution, we fail to understand as to why the state cannot adopt a legislative policy that no recognition to such private institution shall be granted whereby State may discourage establishment of such schools. 214. So far as the matter relating to grant of recognition is concerned, the same has to be viewed in the factual matrix of each case. 225. The word 'recognition' must be held to have different meaning in different context. In (99) T. V. V. Narasimham & Ors. v. State of Orissa reported in AIR 1963 SC 1227 , whereupon Mr. Das has relied upon, the Apex Court bas observed :- "Recognition signifies an admission or an acknowledgement of, something existing before. To recognise is to take cognizance of a fact. In (99) T. V. V. Narasimham & Ors. v. State of Orissa reported in AIR 1963 SC 1227 , whereupon Mr. Das has relied upon, the Apex Court bas observed :- "Recognition signifies an admission or an acknowledgement of, something existing before. To recognise is to take cognizance of a fact. It implies an overt act on the part of the person taking such cognizance.” 226. By obtaining primary education, nobody receives any certificate which is recognised under any statute like University-Grants-Commission Act or by any other institution. In law, there is no impediment in the students getting admission in the 1st year of Secondary Education in a School imparting secondary education. 227. Moreover, it may be noticed that the State has made a substantial change while enacting the 1973 Act. The scheme under the 1973 Act is more comprehensive and wider as compared to the scheme under 1930 Act. Whereas under 1930 Act the goal of the legislature was to make private education available to all children with a view to make it compulsory within 10 years which object admittedly has not been fulfilled; the 1973 Act was enacted to make better provision for the development, expansion, management and control of primary education with a view to making it universal, free and compulsory. A policy decision can be taken by State to sub-serve the requirements of Article 45 of the Constitution of India. If it shows reluctance for establishment of private educational institutions or its recognition no exception can be taken thereto if it is in a position to fiufil the constitutional goal. Even in Mobini Jain, the Apex Court had observed that such a goal can be achieved either by establishing institution by the State or through the institutions run under Private Management. 228. Even in Mobini Jain, the Apex Court had observed that such a goal can be achieved either by establishing institution by the State or through the institutions run under Private Management. 228. It is relevant to mention that Section 98 of 1973 Act empowers the Board or any Primary School Council to take over management of any primary school which is being run under private ownership and upon such take over to bring such school under the control and management of primary school council having jurisdiction and also to appoint an administrator for its day to-day administration pending formation of a duly constituted managing committee or welfare committee, as the case may be The properties of such primary schools can only be transferred by way of voluntary gift as provided under subsection (2) of Section 98 and not otherwise. In fact, in some States Private Elementary or Secondary Schools have been nationalised by enacting statute in that regard. If the State finds that it cannot achieve its goal by establishing sufficient number of primary schools, it can take over private institutions. 229. In this writ application we are not concerned as to whether the State has been able to perform its duties as adumbrated under the said Act. In any event recognition or affiliation being a matter not covered under the Articles of 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India as stated in Unni Krishnan's cafe (supra). the same cannot be declared unconstitutional only because it might not have generated hope, aspiration or anticipation of managing committees establishing the primary schools. 230. So far as the submission of Mr. Pal that the said amending Act violates Article 254 of Constitution of India Is concerned the same is stated to be rejected. Admittedly there is no parliamentary law covering the field of education. The only ground taken is that 1973 Act was enacted upon receipt of the President's assent. The 1973 Act was enacted keeping in view the 1930 Act which received the previous sanction of the Governor General under sub-section (3) of Section 80A of the Government of India Act. 231. In Brij Bhukan Kalwar and Ors. v. S. D. O. Siwan arid Ors. The 1973 Act was enacted keeping in view the 1930 Act which received the previous sanction of the Governor General under sub-section (3) of Section 80A of the Government of India Act. 231. In Brij Bhukan Kalwar and Ors. v. S. D. O. Siwan arid Ors. reported in AIR 1955 Patna 1, the question which arose for consideration before the full bench of the Patna High Court was as to whether there exists any repugnancy between the Limitation Act (A Parliamentary Act) and Bihar Land Encroachment Act. The Court held Stare law cannot be taken to be inconsistent with a union law it is possible to obey the State law without its obeying the Union law and the question of inconsistency between the two will arise only when one says 'do' and the other says 'don't'," 232. No such case arise, in the instant writ application. In fact, the full bench states:- "If the new law is a valid law, that is, if it is in pith and substance a legislation which is within the competence of the State legislature, when it is to be regarded as valid, even if it incidentally encroaches upon prohibited field." 233. The 1996 Amendment Act is not repugnant to any Act made by Parliament. However, according to Mr. Pal, it is repugnant to an existing law. The word 'existing law' bas been defined in Article 366(1) to include even a provincial Act. It stands admitted that apart from 1930 Act or 1963 Act or 1969 Act no other Act operated in the field, upon repeal of 1930 Act. 1969 Act and 1963 Act no other law is operating in the field and, thus, the question of the 1996 Act being repugnant to any Parliamentary Law or any existing law does not arise and in that view of the matter Clause (2) of Article 254 of the Constitution of India cannot be said to have any application whatsoever. The submission of Mr. Banerjee that all Legislative Acts failing under concurrent list must receive the assent of the President of India is wholly misconceived and devoid of any merit whatsoever. 234. In (100) State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. v. Ram Raghubir Prasad Agarwal & Ors. reported in AIR 1979 SC 888 , upon which Mr. The submission of Mr. Banerjee that all Legislative Acts failing under concurrent list must receive the assent of the President of India is wholly misconceived and devoid of any merit whatsoever. 234. In (100) State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. v. Ram Raghubir Prasad Agarwal & Ors. reported in AIR 1979 SC 888 , upon which Mr. Banerjee himself bas placed reliance, the Apex Court while considering the provisions of Madhya Pradesh Act relating to Nationalisation of Text Books held that once the State Government considers Nationalisation of Text Books manufacture necessary to do, competence to deprive the private sector and entrust the public sector is beyond chanllenge. The said decision, therefore, does not help the petitioner. 235. It is also difficult to accept the submission of Mr. Pal that for the purpose of construction of an Act the Court can look to the Statements of Objects and Reasons. It is now well settled that the Statements of Objects and Reasons only seeks to explain what reasons induced the mover to introduce the bill and what objects was sought to be achieved. But the same grounds correspond to the objective which the majority members had in view when they passed it into law. The Statements of Objects and Reasons is not admissible for interpretation "of plain words of a statute, far less can it control the actual words used. (See (101) Central Bank of India v. Their Workmen reported in AIR 1960 SC 12 at page 21). Reference in this connection may also be made to (102) State of West Bengal v. Union of India reported in AIR 1963 SC 1241 at page 1247; (103) Jailal v. Delhi Administration reported in AIR 1962 SC 1781 at page 1787; (104) Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab reported in AIR 1965 SC 632 at page 637; (105) P. Vajravelu Mudaliar v. Special Deputy Collector for Land Acquisition reported in AIR 1965 SC 1017 at page 1021 and (106) Narain Khamman v. Parduman Kumar lain reported in 1985 (1) SCC 1 at page 8 : AIR 1985 SC 4 . 236. Thus Statements of Objects and Reasons can be looked into only for a limited purpose. Even in Shashikant Laxman Kale and Anr. v. Union of India and Anr. reported in AIR 1990 SC 2114 upon which strong reliance has been placed by Mr. 236. Thus Statements of Objects and Reasons can be looked into only for a limited purpose. Even in Shashikant Laxman Kale and Anr. v. Union of India and Anr. reported in AIR 1990 SC 2114 upon which strong reliance has been placed by Mr. Pal, the Apex Court has not deviated from the aforementioned principles. 237. All statutes are presumed to be constitutional and Statements of Objects and Reasons may be considered for the purpose of knowing the factual background prevailing prior to introduction of the said bill and not otherwise. The constitutionality of a provision has to be considered upon taking into consideration the plain meaning of the section and not otherwise. The submission of Mr. Dutta to the effect that by reason of an amendment the directive principles has not been adhered to is stated to be rejected. It will bear repetition to state that right to obtain recognition or affiliation is merely a statutory right and not a right either under Part-III or Part-IV of the Constitution of India. 238. It is also not possible to accept the argument of the learned Counsel that amendment made in Section 60(1) (l) is inconsistent with Section 67(1) (a) of the 1973 Act whereby the recognition committee was framed. Recognition committee was framed in respect of all the matters covered by the aforementioned provision of Section 61(1) (1). The purpose of constitute a recognition committee is not only for the purpose of grant of recognition but also to consider the matter relating to withdrawal thereof. Even after amendment, the power to withdraw recognition exists and such matters have to be considered by the said committee. 239. This leaves us to certain incidental questions. Mr. Dutta appearing in some cases admitted that in his cases the petitioners had filed writ applications earlier for being appointed as organiser teachers and their cases having been directed to be considered by this Court, the respondents appointed 25 teachers out of 33 applicants and, thus a clear case of discrimination has been made out. We have noticed hereinbefore that an appointment bas to be made in terms of Rules. If appointment is given in violation of such rules, the same would be a nullity and in terms thereof such petitioners who had been denied appointment in view of New Rule 3D cannot be said to have derived any right whatsoever. 240. We have noticed hereinbefore that an appointment bas to be made in terms of Rules. If appointment is given in violation of such rules, the same would be a nullity and in terms thereof such petitioners who had been denied appointment in view of New Rule 3D cannot be said to have derived any right whatsoever. 240. This bench in F. M. A. T No. 3882/95 has held :- "So far as the finding of the learned trial Judge to the effect that as in several other cases tenancy was not terminated is concerned, the same in our opinion, suffers from an obvious error. Article 14 of the Constitution of India mandates equality before Jaw and equal protection of law. Where there exists an illegality, it is uncurable. Reference in this connection may be made to (107) AIR 1974 SC 2177 and (108) AIR 1995 SC 705 ; his not necessary to multiply decisions on this point inasmuch as it is a settled law that illegality cannot be allowed to be perpetuated." 241. Article 14 brings within its purview a positive concept. In (109) Gursharan Singh & Ors. v. New Delhi Municipal Committee & Ors. reported in 1996(2) SCC 459 it was held:- "Under Article 14 guarantee of equality before law is a positive concept and it cannot be enforced by a citizen or Court in a negative manner. If an illegality or irregularity has been committed in favour of any individual or a group of individuals, others cannot invoke the Jurisdiction of the High Court or of the Supreme Court, that the same irregularity or illegality be committed by the Stale or an authority which can be held to be a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, so far such petitioners are concerned, on the reasoning that they have been denied the benefits which have been extended to others although in an irregular or illegal manner. Such petitioner can question the validity of orders which are said to have been passed in favour of persons who were not entitled to the same, but they cannot claim orders which are not sanctioned by law in their favour on principle of equality before Jaw, Neither Article 14 conceives within the equality clause this concept nor Article 226 empowers the High Court to enforce such claim of equality before law. If such claims are enforced, it shall amount to directing to continue and perpetuate an illegal procedure or an illegal order for extending similar benefits to others. Before a claim based on equality clause is upheld, it roust be established by the petitioner that his claim being just and legal, has been denied to him, while it has been extended to others and is this process there bas been a discrimination." 242. Moreover, no right is created in an illegality as it is incurable. 243. Recently in (110) Bhanmati Tapubhai Muliya v. State of Gujarat & Ors. reported in 1996 Lab. IC 885, B. N. Kirpal, C.J., (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the division bench stated :- "The grant of an injunction under Order XXXIX of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 has to be according to the known principles of law. Merely because hardship may be caused, cannot by itself be the sale ground for the Court to grant an injunction. There bas to be a substantive right which requires protection and it is in those cases that an injunction should be granted. The Supreme Court in (111) Chandigarh Administration & Anr. v. Jagjit Singh & Anr., JT 1995 (1) SC 445, has clearly stated that the mere fact that an authority bas passed a particular order in the case of another person similarly situated can never be a ground for issuing a writ in favour of the petitioner on the basis of discrimination. The same principle in law will apply even in a case, where another employee may have been successful in getting a judicial order which is contrary to established principles of law. The appellant is unable to satisfy this Court that she has any right to the post in question and the only right which is being claimed is founded on the basis of the injunction, which was granted and which allowed her to continue in service for years." 244. The appellant is unable to satisfy this Court that she has any right to the post in question and the only right which is being claimed is founded on the basis of the injunction, which was granted and which allowed her to continue in service for years." 244. In view of our findings aforementioned, there cannot be any doubt, that the writ petitioners were not entitled to any relief as contained in prayers 'A' and "B' thereto on the basis of Monoranjan Maity's Case except to the extent mentioned hereinafter in view of the changed situation as also in view of findings aforementioned, So far as the prayers contained in relief "C' to 'E' are concerned, such reliefs prayed for, if granted would be contrary to the law and, thus the same must be held to be misconceived, Similarly, prayer 'F’ cannot be allowed as Rule 3D ceased to have any force after it was substituted by New Rule 3D in the year 1980. We also hold that New Rule 3D is not ultra vires the 1930 Act and in any event, after coming into force of the 1973 Act and the Rules framed thereunder, no question of granting the said relief arises. 245. So far as relief ‘H’ is concerned, again the same is based on repealed Act and no right in the organiser teachers subsists now and in that view of the matter no such relief could be granted by the learned trial Judge. 246. Relief 'I' apart from being misconceived is also contrary to the provisions of 1973 Act and the 1991 Rules and thus it cannot be granted in view of coming into force of the 1991 Rules as also the 1996 Amendment Act. 247. It is unfortunate that by reason of the bureaucratic lapses or oversight several Acts were allowed to prevail at the same time in view of the fact that despite coming into force of the 1973 Act some provisions including Section 105 was not brought in force. However, the learned Counsel for the parties have not been able to show that the 1930 Act, 1963 Act and the West Bengal (Rural) Primary Education (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1969 were repugnant to each other to the extent that they cannot coexist together. 248. However, the learned Counsel for the parties have not been able to show that the 1930 Act, 1963 Act and the West Bengal (Rural) Primary Education (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1969 were repugnant to each other to the extent that they cannot coexist together. 248. However, in our opinion, the same does not render a very complicated question inasmuch as we are concerned with the interpretation of Old Rule 3D vis-a-vis New Rule 3D of 1940 Rules which although framed under 1930 Act but continued despite coming into operation of 1973 Act. 249. After coming into force 1991 rules, however, the position completely changed inasmuch as the 1973 Act fully came into operation and all matters relating to recruitment etc. are now governed by the 1973 Act and 1993 Rules. 250. The learned trial Judge appears to have granted the reliefs to the writ petitioners on the basis of equity. It is true that this Court is both a Court of law as also a Court of equity. Equity although is higher than the law but the rule of equity has to be applied in accordance with law. No relief can be granted on the basis of equity if the same contravenes any provision of the law and/or the Court is debarred from granting the same. 251. Although we have all the sympathies for the organiser teachers but no relief can be granted on the basis of sympathy alone. In (112) Latham v. Richard Johnson & Newphew Ltd. reported in 1911 to 1913 All England Law Reports (Reprint) 117 at page 123, it was observed :- "We must be careful not to allow our sympathy with the infant plaintiff to affect our judgment. Sentiment is a dangerous will of the wisp to take as a guide in the search for legal principles." 252. Reference in this connection may also be made to (113) Sm. Debirani Bhattacharjee & Anr. v. District Inspector of Schools (S.E.), Burdwan & Ors. reported in 1996 (2) CHN 415 . 253. Sentiment is a dangerous will of the wisp to take as a guide in the search for legal principles." 252. Reference in this connection may also be made to (113) Sm. Debirani Bhattacharjee & Anr. v. District Inspector of Schools (S.E.), Burdwan & Ors. reported in 1996 (2) CHN 415 . 253. Before, however, we part with this case we may notice that the State while making statements on "Education Budget" for the year 1996-97 under the head "Primary Education" had, inter alia, taken into consideration the matters relating to Establishment of Primary Schools, Distribution of Text Books, Incentive Schemes by way of distribution of school dress and in particular to all the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe Girl students and 25% of other category Girl Students from poor families in primary schools and Sports Meet Midday Meal Programme, Improvement of school buildings, the District Primary Education Programme and Quality of learning etc. 254. We have been informed that the amount sanctioned in the earlier budgets, for construction of school buildings and other related matters, has lapsed because of grant of injunction by this Court in various writ applications. It is unfortunate that the State could not pursue its policy of getting up new primary schools which is one of its goals and objective under the 1973 Act in pursuit it of its policy towards implementation of the directive principles as enshrined in Article 45 of the Constitution. 255. There cannot be any doubt that the State is bound to implement its policy decision as reflected in the 1973 Act and 1991 Rules in letter and spirit. It, therefore, must make all endeavours to sub-serve the said goal and fulfil its promise to the citizens. 256. It is stated at the Bar that the State had so far not implemented-its own policy decision. It is, therefore, directed to do so as it is bound to give effect to its policy decision based on constitutional obligations" 257. However, there cannot be any doubt that the cases of those organiser primary teachers and in fact the cases of all teachers working in privately managed schools should be considered along with other eligible candidates keeping in view the fact that they had been working for a long time. The Director of School Education shall consider the desirability of relaxation of the age bar in suitable cases if it is permissible in law. 258. The Director of School Education shall consider the desirability of relaxation of the age bar in suitable cases if it is permissible in law. 258. Furthermore, in view of the admitted position that the State is yet to frame a scheme in terms of Chapter-XI of the 1973 Act and as further, the scheme under 1973 Act is to be given its full effect, the concerned authorities of the State, in our opinion, should consider the desirability of taking over the management as many schools as possible in exercise of its power under Section 98 of 1973 Act so that not only the student studying in the schools may feel secure but the State would be in a position to provide employment to a large number of teachers working therein. Such an action on the part of the State would ameliorate the difficulties which are faced by thousands of teachers working in different primary schools in rural and urban areas and who might have a reasonable chance of being appointed in a school under public management. 259. We may also mention that we have not considered the question as to whether in a situation of this nature, the writ petitions could have been treated as Social Action Litigations as we have proceeded to decide the matters on their own merits. 260. However, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever, that in view of our findings aforementioned in cases where schools had been recognised prior to coming into force of New Rule 3D, the organiser teachers had derived a right to be considered for appointment, and thus they having acquired such a right were entitled to be considered in terms of the circular letters existing at the relevant time and as such writ petitioners, thus, had been deprived of their right for a long time, the respective District Primary School Councils are hereby directed to consider those cases and consider their cases for appointment in terms of Old Rule 3D and the circulars existing at the relevant point of time and if they were suitably qualified therefor. If in any such case interview has already been held, appointment may be made on the basis of such interview. 261. If in any such case interview has already been held, appointment may be made on the basis of such interview. 261. In case there are any cases where primary schools were granted recognition but, the organiser teachers were not given appointment or absorbed but subsequently such recognition of schools were withdrawn, in those cases also the writ petitions would stand allowed subject to the observations made hereinbefore inasmuch as even in these cases on the date of recognition, the concerned candidates had a right to be considered for appointment and once they were entitled to appointment in terms of Old Rule 3D, the right vested in them could not have been taken away by de-recognition of the said school subsequently. We have, however, not able to follow as to how after recognition of the schools, outsiders could be granted appointment as bas been alleged in some cases. On recognition of the school, it does not come within the purview of the scheme of 'Public Management' as there was no such provision under the 1930 Act. The Director of Primary School Education is hereby directed to hold an enquiry in this regard and take appropriate action in the matter. For the reasons aforementioned, these appeals are allowed in a part but in the facts and circumstances of this case there will be no order as to costs. The life of panels which has expired will stand extended for a month from date. (Later) Prayer for stay of operation of the judgment is considered and refused. Chakraborty, J.: I agree.