S. K. KESHOTE, J. ( 1 ) THE petititoner, an educational society running secondary school at Ahmedabad, has filed this writ petition challenging the order of the Tribunal constituted under the gujarat Secondary Education Act, 1972, (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") in application No. 184 of 1983 made on 30th march 1984. In the said application respondent no. 3 had challenged before the tribunal the order of the petitioner under which her services were terminated. The tribunal has declared the termination order to be invalid and inoperative in law and found the same to be made in violation of the mandatory provisions of Section 36 (1) (a) (b) of the Act. ( 2 ) IN the school run by the petititoner there were four vacancies of teachers at the relevant lime, out of which two were in the higher secondary section and two were in the secondary section. The school made application to respondent No. 4 for grant of no objection certificate to make appointment to the aforesaid four posts. Respondent no. 4, under letter dated 31st May 1983 granted necessary no objection certificate as teachers with requisite qualifications were not available even on the list of supernumerary teachers maintained by him. Out of those four posts one was in the subject of Hindi and Socially Useful Productive work. We are concerned with this post and the appointment of respondent No. 3 made thereon. The "no objection certificate" granted by respondent No. 4 to make appointment on this post clearly indicates that for the said post the required educational qualifications are B. A. with Hindi and G. B. T. C. (Gujarat Basic Training course) Respondent No. 2 was the Headmaster of the school at the relevant time. It is not in dispute between the parties that respondent No. 2-Headmaster is the father of respondent No. 3 who has been selected and appointment on the said post. ( 3 ) RESPONDENT No. 2-Headmaster of the school, advertised the said post in daily newspaper Gujarat Samachar on 2nd June 1983. In the advertisement it was clearly stated that the said post and three other posts advertised therein were reserved for scheduled Castes/scheduled Tribes and/or other backward class candidates. A copy of the advertisement has been produced by the petitioner at Annexure-P to the special civil application. In the advertisement it was clearly stated that the said post and three other posts advertised therein were reserved for scheduled Castes/scheduled Tribes and/or other backward class candidates. A copy of the advertisement has been produced by the petitioner at Annexure-P to the special civil application. Thus all those posts including the post in dispute were reserved for SC/st and other backward class candidates. Pursuant to this advertisement nine persons belonging to SC/st and backward class or baxi Panch applied for these posts. There is no dispute that out of these nine persons seven persons were possessing the requisite qualifications as laid down for the post. Respondent No. 2 has not proceeded further with that advertisement and he gave second advertisement on 9th June 1983 in the same newspaper inviting applications for those four posts including the post in dispute. In the second advertisement respondent no. 2 has not mentioned that the candidates who passed B. A. with Hindi were required to apply for the said post. In the advertisement the desired qualification mentioned was B. A. and G. B. T. C. Pursuant to this advertisement some more applications from SC/st candidates are received for the post in question. Respondent no. 2 did not also proceed further with this advertisement. He issued third advertisement on 12th June 1983. In the third advertisement it has been mentioned that persons with B. A. , G. B. T. C. or equivalent qualification were required to apply. One significant indication made in the said advertisement was that only female candidates were required to apply for the post. Thus respondent No. 2 issued three successive advertisements within a short span of time. In the last advertisement dated 12th june 1983 respondent No. 2 did not even indicate that the posts were reserved for sc/st and other backward class or Baxi panch candidates. The petitioner made statement in the petition, which is uncontroverted, that respondent No. 2 had issued the successive advertisements making changes in the requisite qualifications for the post without seeking approval cither of the management of the petitioner-Society or the District Education Officer. ( 4 ) IN pursuance to these three advertisements in all 27 applications were received for the post in question. Out of these 27 applicants, respondent No. 2 called only 7 candidates for interview to be held on 10th july 1983. ( 4 ) IN pursuance to these three advertisements in all 27 applications were received for the post in question. Out of these 27 applicants, respondent No. 2 called only 7 candidates for interview to be held on 10th july 1983. Respondent No. 3 also had applied pursuant to the third and last advertisement issued on 12th June 1983. ( 5 ) THE Secretary of the petitioner-Society asked respondnet No. 2 on 7th July 1983 that the original applications of all the applicants and of those candidates who were called for interview be sent to him. However, respondent No. 2 neither furnished the original applications nor a list of candidates to be called for interview to the secretary of the Society. The Selection committee which held the interview on 10th July 1983 consisted of the following members :1. Dr. R. P. Shah, representative of the management of the Society. 2. Dr. R. J. Amin, Principal, outside educationist. 3. Shri V. C. Dave, Social Welfare Officer. 4. Shri Vankar, representative of the district Education Officer. 5. Shri K. A. Patel, Proxy of respondent no. 2. In the interview all the five members of the Selection Committee were required to give marks to each candidate. The petitioner has come up with the case that in the mark-sheets the representative of the Management, dr. R. P. Shah and outside Educationist shri R. J. Amin made specific, categorical and unambiguous noting that none of the candidates who were called for and appeared in the interview was found suitable for the post in question. The remaining three members of the Selection committee selected Ms. Naynaben Jani, ms. Kailashben C. Oza and Ms. Meenaben l. Mehla in that order. None of the aforesaid selectees did possess the requisite qualifications required for the post in question and as such neither of the selectees could have been given appointment pursuant to the recommendation of the Selection committee. Apart from this, the posts were reserved for SC/st and other backward class and Baxi Panch candidates, whereas none of the selectees belonged to any of the aforesaid categories. ( 6 ) THE petitioner has further come up with the case that respondent No. 2 on his own totalled up the marks which were given by the Selection Committee to all the candidates and had found that Ms. Meenaben L. Mehta obtained 90 marks and ms. ( 6 ) THE petitioner has further come up with the case that respondent No. 2 on his own totalled up the marks which were given by the Selection Committee to all the candidates and had found that Ms. Meenaben L. Mehta obtained 90 marks and ms. Kailashben C. Oza obtained 92 marks, and the merit list has been prepared in that order. From the mark-sheet which is produced on record by the petitioner it is evident that the representative of the District education Officer has given 20 marks to respondent No. 3, but the marks awarded to her were altered and the same has been increased to 24. The alteration which has been made in the marks awarded to respondent no. 3 is clearly evident from the mark- sheet. The alteration which has been made is only in the ease of respondent No. 3 and not in the case of other candidates. The petitioner stated that as a result of this alteration of marks, respondent No. 3 has ranked higher in merit. Otherwise Ms. Meenaben L. Mehta who has been given 23 marks by the representative of the District education Officer would have been at serial no. 2 in the merit list. The petitioner has made categorical statement that alteration of marks has been done to give respondent no. 3 an edge over Ms. Meenaben l. Mehta who was given 23 marks by the representative of the District Education officer. ( 7 ) HOW fast things moved is also stated by the petitioner in the Special Civil Application. The interview were taken on Sunday. The interviews were completed by 5. 45 p. m. on 10th July 1983. Results of the interview were finalised on the same day. Over and above that, on the same day permission of respondent No. 4 was also obtained and appointment order was also issued in favour of Ms. Naynaben Jani. On the next day, i. e. llth July 1983, Ms. Naynaben Jani expressed her inability to join the post. Not only this, she has also given it to respondnet No. 2 in writing that she has no objection if any other person is appointed in her place. How fast the things rolled is evident from the fact that on 1 1 th july 1983 respondent No. 3 was given appointment. Naynaben Jani expressed her inability to join the post. Not only this, she has also given it to respondnet No. 2 in writing that she has no objection if any other person is appointed in her place. How fast the things rolled is evident from the fact that on 1 1 th july 1983 respondent No. 3 was given appointment. On 11th July 1983 the Secretary of the Society made attempt to get the original applications of the candidates as well as the letters sent to the candidates. He instructed respondent No. 2 that appointment on the post in question be made only under his signature. Despite this, respondent no. 2 has not complied with any of the instructions of the Secretary, and he himself has given appointment letters firstly to ms. Naynaben Jani on 10th July 1983 and to his own daughter (respondent No. 3) on 11th July 1983. Respondent No. 3 joined duty on 15th July 1983. The Secretary of the Society has come to know about this appointment only on 17th July 1983. On 18th July 1983 the Secretary of the petitioner-Society sent letter to respondent No. 4 informing him about the circumstances under which respondent No. 3 was given appointment. The Secretary opposed the appointment of respondent No. 3 as she was not a SC/st or other backward community candidate and further she did not possess the requisite qualifications and also on the ground that the Selection Committee was not properly constituted and that the appointment was made in clear contravention of his express instructions. He had also pointed out that representative of the management and outside educationist opined that none of the candidates called for interview was suitable for the post. Respondent no. 4 in his letter dated 18/20th July 1983 informed respondent No. 2 that as the Selection committee was not constituted as per the rules, appointment of respondent no. 3 is not approved. On non-approval of the appointment of respondent No. 3, Secretary of the petitioner-Society, under order dated 27th July 1983 terminated her service. ( 8 ) RESPONDENT No. 3 challenged the order of termination of her service before the tribunal constituted under the Gujarat Secondary education Act, 1972. The Tribunal, by its judgment dated 30th March 1984 allowed the application and declared the order of termination of respondent No. 3 to be invalid and inoperative. Hence this Special civil Application. ( 8 ) RESPONDENT No. 3 challenged the order of termination of her service before the tribunal constituted under the Gujarat Secondary education Act, 1972. The Tribunal, by its judgment dated 30th March 1984 allowed the application and declared the order of termination of respondent No. 3 to be invalid and inoperative. Hence this Special civil Application. ( 9 ) THOUGH respondent No. 2 has been impleaded as party in his personal capacity, he has not chosen to file any reply to the special Civil Application. The averments made by the petitioner in the writ petition stand uncontroverted by respondent No. 2. Respondent No. 3 has also not filed any reply to the Special Civil Application, and so far as other respondents are concerned, they have also not filed any reply. ( 10 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner contended that the Tribunal has committed serious illegality in declaring the order of termination of service of respondent No. 3 to be invalid and inoperative. He contended that there is error apparent on the face of the order of the Tribunal, and as such the order made by the Tribunal deserves to be quashed and set aside by this Court. Carrying further this contention, learned Counsel for the petitioner urged that though the tribunal accepted the position that respondent no. 2 was the person who did all these things with clear intention and object to make way for his own daughter to be selected and appointed on the post in question, proceeded to decide the application in favour of respondent No. 3 only on the ground that whatever misdeeds and manipulations of respondent No. 2 may be there, respondent No. 3 cannot be made liable for the same and she cannot be allowed to be a sufferer for the misdeeds of respondent No. 2. That was the only consideration weighed with the Tribunal in deciding the matter in favour of respondent no. 3. ( 11 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner further contended that present is the case of favouritism and nepotism. It is a case where there is sufficient material on record that respondent No. 2 has not only manipulated the advertisements to get the requisite qualification fitted to the qualification possessed by his own daughter, but also restricted the number of candidates to be called for interview. It is a case where there is sufficient material on record that respondent No. 2 has not only manipulated the advertisements to get the requisite qualification fitted to the qualification possessed by his own daughter, but also restricted the number of candidates to be called for interview. He proceeded in the matter of making appointment in hot haste and manipulated the marks given by the Selection Committee to his daughter so that she could rank high in the merit list. It is true, as contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, that technically there may not be any defect in the constitution of the Selection committee. Respondent No. 2 had withdrawn himself from the Selection Committee as his own daughter was appearing for interview, but there are other important aspects which cannot be ignored. Respondent no. 2 had not disclosed this fact either to the Managing Committee of the School or even to the District Education Officer that his own daughter was one of the candidates appearing for interview. Instead of nominating his own person on the Selection committee he should have left this matter to the Managing Committee of the school or the District Education Officer to substitute some other member in his place. In accordance with the provisions of the Secondary education Act, Headmaster of the concerned school has to be there as one of the members of the Selection Committee, but where his own relation appears in the interview, the nomination should have been not by him but the either by the Managing committee or by the District Education officer. He deliberately did this so that he may get his own person in the Selection committee as his nominee. ( 12 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner lastly contended that respondent No. 2 has not only manipulated things, but ultimately achieved the result of his manipulation and arranged appointment of his own daughter. According to the Counsel for the petitioner, the appointment of respondent no. 3 which is the result of manipulations and mala fide action of respondent no. 2 who was the Headmaster of the school is void ab initio and the Tribunal should not have interfered with the order of termination. According to the Counsel for the petitioner, the appointment of respondent no. 3 which is the result of manipulations and mala fide action of respondent no. 2 who was the Headmaster of the school is void ab initio and the Tribunal should not have interfered with the order of termination. ( 13 ) ON the other hand the Counsel for respondent No. 3 contended that the termination of services of respondent No. 3 was ab initio bad as the same has been made without taking prior approval of the District education Officer. It has next been contended that respondent No. 3 was appointed after selection made by a Selection committee and there was no justification for the petitioner-management to terminate her services. Merely because some wrong has been done by father of respondent No. 3, Counsel for the respondent No. 3 coin- tended, she could not have been made a victim thereof. The Counsel for respondent no. 3 next contended that the only illegality found by the District Education Officer in the selection was that the Selection committee was not properly constituted. The selection Committee, in the facts which have come on record, was properly constituted because the Headmaster, father of respondent No. 3, could not have participated in the Selection Committee. In his place some other person has to be taken and respondent No. 2 has nominated the seniormost teacher of the school as his nominee. Lastly the Counsel for the respondent contended that appointment of respondent no. 3 was made in the year 1983. The tribunal has given judgment in her favour and the order of termination has been set aside. In view of this position human consideration desires that she should be allowed to continue on the post, more so when respondent No. 2 has already retired from service. ( 14 ) I have given my thoughful consideration to the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties. The substance of the findings recorded by the Tribunal, briefly stated, are as under : (I) From the papers produced on record it appears that the Headmaster deliberately tried to manipulate the appointment of applicant (respondent No. 3 herein) who happens to be his daughter. (II) If one reads the tenor of the. The substance of the findings recorded by the Tribunal, briefly stated, are as under : (I) From the papers produced on record it appears that the Headmaster deliberately tried to manipulate the appointment of applicant (respondent No. 3 herein) who happens to be his daughter. (II) If one reads the tenor of the. three advertisements it will be clear that the headmaster, in order to accommodate his daughter, deliberately did not call for interview the persons belonging to SC/st and other backward class who had applied for the post of teacher, and dropped the word hindi from the last advertisement. (III) Even though the posts were required to be filled in by members of SGst and other backward community, no person from the reserved category was called for interview. (IV) The applicant, in her evidence recorded by the Tribunal, was not able to produce any certificate showing that she possessed G. B. T. C. qualification. She had passed B. A. with Gujarati and Sociology and in B. Ed, her subjects were Gujarati and geography. In these circumstances it cannot be said that she was a qualified teacher for Hindi. The Department had given no objection certificate for the post of Hindi teacher. (V) The Department did not accede to the request of the Headmaster to change the no objection certificate. Under the circumstances it was not open to the Headmaster to go on giving different advertisements inviting applications from candidates to teach subjects other than Hindi without even obtaining the formal consent of the management. (VI) The Headmaster also had not carried out the direction given by the management of the school. (VII) From the papers produced before the Tribunal, it appeared that representative of the Management and outside Educationist did not select any candidate. (VIII) The Tribunal recorded that the representative of the District Education Officer, social Welfare Officer and the senior teacher gave marks according to which smt. Nayanaben Jani and respondent No. 3 herein were placed at seriol Nos. 1 and 2 respectively. (IX) The Tribunal further noticed that according to the Secretary, Nayanben Jani and the Headmaster were colleagues in coba Training College where they were serving together. The Management urged that the Headmaster seemed to have obtained a letter from Nayanaben Jani about not being able to join the school. The tribunal has not given any finding on these aspects. (IX) The Tribunal further noticed that according to the Secretary, Nayanben Jani and the Headmaster were colleagues in coba Training College where they were serving together. The Management urged that the Headmaster seemed to have obtained a letter from Nayanaben Jani about not being able to join the school. The tribunal has not given any finding on these aspects. The Tribunal further recorded the finding that the Headmaster has manoeuvred to see that his own daughter was appointed to the post. ( 15 ) OTHER facts which have comc on record are also to be noted. Respondent No. 2-Headmaster of the school, though he was impleaded as party to the application before the Tribunal, did not produce any evidence. He had taken time for his examination, but he remained absent. Respondent No. 3 moved application before the Tribunal on 23rd March 1984 challenging the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to permit the Management to lead evidence to show that her appointment was not valid. The applicant (respondent No. 3) did not want the petitioner -Management to produce any evidence to show and establish that her appointment was valid. ( 16 ) THE fact undisputed is that respondent no. 4 had not approved the appointment of respondent No. 3. Termination of services has been made by the petitioner on is approval of her appointment by respondent no. 4. I find sufficient merit in the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that though the Tribunal has accepted the fact that the Headmaster was instrumental in getting his daughter appointed by manipulating the things, the order of termination has been set aside. The tribunal found that the constitution of Selection committee was not proper. But the constitution of the Selection Committee was held valid on the ground that the Headmaster could not have been a member of the selection Committee and secondly no other members including the representative of the District Education Officer have raised any objection regarding constitution of the selection Committee. The Tribunal proceeded further to say that when the representative of the District Education Officer has not raised any objection regarding constitution of the Selection Committee, it was not open to the District Education Officer to raise objection. ( 17 ) IT is true that as per Government resolution, Headmaster of the school would have been one of the members of the selection Committee. ( 17 ) IT is true that as per Government resolution, Headmaster of the school would have been one of the members of the selection Committee. In the present case the Headmaster could not have remained in the Selection Committee as his daughter was one of the candidates, some other person had to be there in place of Headmaster and such person may not be an objectionable one. The Tribunal is right to say that the objection would have been to the Headmaster siting in the Selection Committee. The matter was not as simple as it was taken by the Tribunal. I am constrained to observe that the Tribunal has proceeded in a manner as if it was predetermined to decide the matter in favour of respondent no. 3. The most serious aspect of the matter has not been considered in correct perspective. It is a case where it was the duty of the Headmaster to see that in the matter of selection to the post of assistant teacher, in which his own daughter was one of the candidates, everything was taken and proceeded fairly, impartially and without there being any interest of his own. Respondent no. 2 not brought the fact to the notice of the District Education Officer or the Managing Committee of the school that his own daughter was one of the applicants and that he has nominated the seniormost teacher on the Selection Committee. To show himself to be unbiased, impartial and fair person, instead of undertaking on his own to nominate a person to the Selection committee in his place, he should have left the matter to the discretion of the Managing committee or the District Education Officer. In such cases it would have been more proper and impartial for respondent No. 2 to leave the matter to the discretion of the district Education Officer. There is no explanation whatsoever given by respondent no. 2 either before the Tribunal or even before this Court why he has himself nominated a teacher in his place on the Selection committee. ( 18 ) THE matter assumes more importance if it is considered from another angle. It is a case where respondent No. 2 had changed the advertisement from time to time. He has not called SC/st and other backward class candidates for interview though the post was reserved for them. ( 18 ) THE matter assumes more importance if it is considered from another angle. It is a case where respondent No. 2 had changed the advertisement from time to time. He has not called SC/st and other backward class candidates for interview though the post was reserved for them. In the last advertisement he had left it open to consider other candidates with qualification other than B. A. with Hindu and Sociology. On the basis of the evidence which has come on record an inference follows that he manipulated the advertisement so as to gel his daughter selected. In the presence of these facts it was more imperative for respondent no. 2 to leave it to the discretion of the Management or the District Education officer to decide who should be the person to be nominated in his place in the selection Committee. The finding of the tribunal that the Selection Committee was properly constituted is perverse. Merely because the nominee of the District Education officer has not objected to the constitution of the Selection Committee the Selection committee will not ipso facto be considered to be validly constituted in view the facts which have come on record of this case and which are not in dispute also. ( 19 ) THE Tribunal has ignored another fact that the nominee of the District Education officer was one of the three members who recommended for the selection of respondent no. 3. The Tribunal also ignored the fact that there was alteration made in the marks awarded to respondent No. 3 by the representative of the District Education officer. In view of these facts the Tribunal is not justified in holding that constitution of the Selection Committee was valid only on account of the fact that the representative of the District Education Officer hail not objected to the constitution of the Selection committee. The finding of the Tribunal that the Selection Committee was properly constituted is not legally sustainable. ( 20 ) THE Tribunal has held the order of termination of services of respondent No. 3 to be invalid on the ground that the management could not have terminated her services on the ground that her father had committed irregularity and the Selection committee was not properly constituted, without taking proper approval under Section 36 (l) (a) (b) of the Act. The Tribunal further held that the provisions of Section 36 are mandatory and under no circumstances the services of a teacher could be terminated without following the procedure prescribed therein. . ( 21 ) FIRST of all I may proceed to examine how far the Tribunal was correct to observe that the Management has not raised any objection that the appointment of respondent no. 3 was invalid since inception and therefore it was not necessary to follow the procedure prescribed under the provisions of Section 36 (l) (a) (b) while terminating her services. The Management has raised a serious issue, but I am constrained to observe that the same has been taken casually and in cursory manner by the Tribunal. The tribunal repelled the contention by observing that in case the Headmaster has failed to call all the candidates who had applied for the post the applicant could not be blamed for the same. It has given another reason to justify its order by stating that it is for the Management and the department to take suitable action against the Headmaster for doing so, but there is nothing wrong if his daughter is appointed if she possessed the requisite qualification. Before doing so it would have been better if he had brought to the notice of the Management that his daughter was going to appear in the interview. It would have been open to the management to take appropriate proceedings against the Headmaster, but the sins of father should not be visited upon the daughter who apparently does not seem to have played any part in the machination of her father. The Tribunal concluded that in any case the order of appointment given to her being as per rules on the recommendations of the Selection Committee her services could not be terminated without following the proper procedure under Section 36 (l) (a) (b) of the Act. The Tribunal further observed that the appointment of the applicant could not be said to be void ah initio, and that it would not be proper to penalise the applicant (respondent No. 3) for the alleged acts of irregularity by the Headmaster who happens to be her father. ( 22 ) THE Tribunal has given the finding that the Headmaster, respondent No. 2, has manoeuvred to see that his own daughter was appointed to the post in question. ( 22 ) THE Tribunal has given the finding that the Headmaster, respondent No. 2, has manoeuvred to see that his own daughter was appointed to the post in question. From the facts which come on record and the finding recorded by the Tribunal it is clear that the respondent No. 3 could have been appointed only as a result of machination of her own father who was the Headmaster of the institution at the relevant time. I have also held above that the Selection Committee was not properly constituted. In view of this finding of this Court, one of the reasons given by the Tribunal that the appointment of respondent No. 3 was made by properly constituted Selection Committee and her services could not have been terminated without following the procedure laid down under Section 36 (l) (a) (b) of the Act cannot be allowed to stand. It is really shocking that in a case where the Tribunal has found that father of respondent No. 3 had manoeuvred the things to get her appointed, but even then the order of termination has been set aside on the ground of non-compliance of the provisions of Section 36 (l) (a) (b) of the Act. In case the appointment itself is bad or invalid, then the question does arise whether the provisions of Section 36 ( 1 ) (a) (b) of the Act has to be followed before terminating the services or not. ( 23 ) ANOTHER question which falls for consideration on this Court is that whether it was a case of invalid appointment or an appointment ab initio void. Before considering these two aspects I would like to consider two other important questions which further arise in the present case. The first question is regarding tampering with the marks awarded to respondent No. 3 by nominee of the District Education Officer. The chart of marks has been produced and i have gone through it. As observed by me in the earlier part of the judgment, marks given to respondent No. 3 were found tampered with. Though there is no material on record from the side of the petitioner as to who had tampered with the marks, i. e. whether it was done by the person who had given the marks or by the Headmaster, the fact remains that the marks were tampered with. Though there is no material on record from the side of the petitioner as to who had tampered with the marks, i. e. whether it was done by the person who had given the marks or by the Headmaster, the fact remains that the marks were tampered with. If one glance at the chart of the marks it is visible that the original marks awarded to respondent No. 3 were 20, which has been corrected to be 24. I do not consider it proper to go into the question as to who did it, since there is no evidence on record to establish it. But sufficient-evidence has come on record that respondent No. 2 has not made available these documents to the managing Committee. From the facts which have come one can safely infer that the records remained in possession of respondent no. 2 himself, and the marks obtained by respondent No. 3 were improved by tampering with the mark-sheet to bring respondent no. 3 at serial No. 2 in the merit list. ( 24 ) BEFORE proceeding further I may pose here and go to another question. Evidence has been produced and point has also been raised by the management before the Tribunal that the candidate who was placed at serial No. 1 in the merit list and the Headmaster were colleagues in Coba Training college where they were serving together. It is a fact that respondent No. 2 has not appeared in the witness box. In the presence of this evidence which is uncontroverted, I find sufficient merits in the contention that there are possibilities, that the Headmaster, respondent No. 2, himself would have obtained the letter from the candidate who stood at serial No. 1 expressing her inability to join the school. The Tribunal has not decided this issue. This is an important issue on which the tribunal should have given finding. This issue has relevance to tampering with the marks given by the nominee of the District education Officer to respondent No. 2. Respondent No. 2 may come up with justification that in case it was the intention to increase the marks given to his daughter, by tampering with the marks to bring her at serial No. 2 in the merit list, the marks could have been increased to bring her at serial No. 1 in the merit list. Respondent No. 2 may come up with justification that in case it was the intention to increase the marks given to his daughter, by tampering with the marks to bring her at serial No. 2 in the merit list, the marks could have been increased to bring her at serial No. 1 in the merit list. However, things were done in a planned and considered way. From the facts which have come on record it appears that things have been manipulated in such a way as to appear that there was reasonableness and fairness in the selection. Another fact has to be noticed here before proceeding further with the judgment. Ms. Nayanaben Jani was interviewed on 10th July 1983. On the same day she was given appointment. On the very next day she has shown her inability to join the post. If we consider this fact with the material which has come on record it would show the guilt of the Headmaster and inference can be drawn that Ms. Nayanaben Jani has been brought on merit list at serial No. 1 to show some fairness in selection, knowing very well that she will not accept the appointment. Another inference which conveniently follows is that by placing Nayanaben Jani at serial No. 1 in the merit list will not create any obstacle for respondent No. 3 as her father (respondent no. 2) will be able to get the letter from Nayanaben of her inability to join the post. ( 25 ) I may now revert back to the point which I was considering. It is not a case of irregularity. It is a case of mala fides of the Headmaster who has deliberately and purposely manipulated the advertisement as also excluded the candidates belonging to reserved categories from appearing before the Selection Committee. There is also tampering in the mark given to his daughter. Any appointment by selection which is the result of mala fides of some interested person or close relation of the candidate is not only invalid but it is an appointment void ab initio. If the appointment is the result of favouritism and nepotism or it is a case of manoeuvreing of appointment by some interested person or close relation, then such appointments should be considered as void ab initio. If the appointment is the result of favouritism and nepotism or it is a case of manoeuvreing of appointment by some interested person or close relation, then such appointments should be considered as void ab initio. The Tribunal has committed an error in taking it to be a case of irregularity committed by father of respondent No. 3. The reasons given by the Tribunal that the applicant could not be penalised for the acts of irregularity of her father and that the sin of the father should not be visited upon respondent No. 3 with the consequence of termination of service are extraneous considerations taken by the Tribunal. When the appointment of respondent No. 3 was manoeuvred by her father, then it cannot be maintained on the aforesaid considerations. ( 26 ) THE Supreme Court in the case of gurdeep Singh v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, reported in 1995 Supp (1) SCC 188, held that sympathy or human considerations should not weigh with court in a matter where selection is procured by illegal means. In the case before the Supreme court eligibility criteria was changed after conclusion of the selection process on the basis of the eligibility declared by the sports Council of the State. It was a case of admission to medical courses for the year 1991-92 in the State of Jammu and kashmir. The eligibility in the sports category was decided by the Sports Council of the State, after inviting applications and conducting interviews. On that basis the appellant before the Supreme Court would have been entitled to admission against the sports category. But in November 1991 the Council sought to recognise "mountaineering" as an additional sports activity. There was only one candidate in this category and that was respondent No. 6 therein. Respondent No. 6 who was not considered eligible earlier was selected due to the change in the eligibility, and the appellant was not selected. The appellant has challenged the selection of respondent no. 6 before the High Court, but the petition has been dismissed. The matter was taken before the Supreme Court. The question raised for consideration was whether a sport not having been included in the list of approved sports at the cut-off date when the applications were invited and on the basis of which candidates responded, could later be introduced to provide eligibility retrospectively to a single candidate. The matter was taken before the Supreme Court. The question raised for consideration was whether a sport not having been included in the list of approved sports at the cut-off date when the applications were invited and on the basis of which candidates responded, could later be introduced to provide eligibility retrospectively to a single candidate. In that case "mountaineering" was included as an approved sporting activity for that year alone and it was promptly deleted in the subsequent year. In that context the supreme Court held that denial of seat to the appellant in the sports category cannot be justified. It was observed that as respondent no. 6 was not eligible, there was no question of a tie. The respondent authorities were directed to admit the appellant to the course in question. The Supreme court also considered whether the selection of respondent No. 6 should be quashed or not. While considering that question in para 12 of the judgment the supreme Court observed that unduly lenient view of the courts on the basis of human consideration in regard to such excesses on the part of the authorities has served to create an impression that even where an advantage is secured by stratagem and trickery, it could be rationalised in courts of law. In that context the Supreme court observed as under:"courts do and should take human and sympathetic view of matters. That is the very essence of justice. But considerations of judicial policy also dictate that a tendency of this kind where advantage gained by illegal means is permitted to be retained will jeopardise the purity of selection process itself; engender cynical disrespect towards the judicial process and in the last analysis embolden errant authorities and candidates into a sense of complacency and impunity that gains achieved by such wrongs could be retained by an appeal to the sympathy of the court. Such instances reduce the jurisdiction and discretion of courts into private benevolence. This tendency should be stopped. "in view of this decision of the Supreme court how far the Tribunal was justified in setting aside the termination of services of respondent No. 3, wherein the earlier part of its judgment the Tribunal held that her father was the person who has manoeuvred her appointment. This tendency should be stopped. "in view of this decision of the Supreme court how far the Tribunal was justified in setting aside the termination of services of respondent No. 3, wherein the earlier part of its judgment the Tribunal held that her father was the person who has manoeuvred her appointment. ( 27 ) IT is not only a case of manoeuvring the appointments by the Headmaster but it is a case of fraud played by him with the: candidates belonging to reserved category. The post which was reserved only for SC/ st and other backward community candidates has not been filled in by selecting candidates belonging to those categories. Respondent No. 3 has not called any of the candidates of reserved category who applied in response to three advertisements. It is not the case where suitable candidates belonging to reserved category were not available. In response to the first advertisement where posts were shown to be reserved, nine applications were received out of which seven were persons belonging to reserved class who possessed the requisite qualifications for the post advertised. In response to other advertisements further applications should have been received, details of which have not come on record. Twenty-seven applications were received in total. But the Headmaster has called only seven candidates. In fact, as discussed above, he has called only five persons, because one was his own daughter and another was his own person who had to decline the appointment after her selection. Section 34 of the Act provides that 15% of the vacancies of the teaching staff of a registered private secondary school shall be filled up by persons belonging to SC/st. Proviso to the said Section provides that where a person belonging to SC or ST is not available for filling in such vacancy, the vacancy shall be filled up as otherwise provided in the Act. The validity of that provision has been challenged before the supreme Court, and in the case of Bharat sevashram Sangh v. State of Gujarat, reported in air 1987 SC 494 , the Supreme court held the said provision to be valid and in public interest, leaving apart the provisions contained in Article 16 (4) of the constitution of India. The validity of that provision has been challenged before the supreme Court, and in the case of Bharat sevashram Sangh v. State of Gujarat, reported in air 1987 SC 494 , the Supreme court held the said provision to be valid and in public interest, leaving apart the provisions contained in Article 16 (4) of the constitution of India. The import of this provision is clear that only in the case of non-availability of eligible candidates from reserved category, recruitment could have been made from the general category, though subject to other provisions of the act. In this case, as stated earlier, eligible candidates were available and as such respondent no. 2 should have called candidates only from reserved category. Non- filling of this post by a reserved category candidate is not only contrary to the provisions of Section 34 of the Act but is a fraud committed by respondent No. 2 on the constitutional provisions. Appointment of respondent No. 3 was made in violation of the provisions of Section 34 of the Act and the provisions contained in Article 16 (4) of the Constitution of India. The appointment of respondent No. 3 is void ab initio on this ground also. ( 28 ) THE only question which now remains to be dealt with is whether the provisions of Section 36 of the Act are attracted in the present case. Relevant portion of Section 36 reads as under:"36. (1 ). No person who is appointed a headmaster, a teacher or a member of non- teaching staff of a registered private secondary school shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank nor shall his service be otherwise terminated by the manager until (a) he has been given by the manager a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him, and (b) the action proposed to be taken in regard to him, has been approved in writing by an Officer authorised in this behalf by the Board : provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any person who is appointed for a temporary period only. . . . "sub-section (1) of Section 36 casts twofold obligation on the management in regard to dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of a person who is appointed as a headmaster, teacher or a member of non- teaching staff. . . . "sub-section (1) of Section 36 casts twofold obligation on the management in regard to dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of a person who is appointed as a headmaster, teacher or a member of non- teaching staff. The first obligation is to give a reasonable opportunity to the teacher of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. The second obligation is that the action proposed to be taken in regard to that teacher has to be got approved in writing by an Officer authorised in that behalf by the Board. It is not in dispute that before terminating the services of respondent No. 3 a reasonable opportunity of showing cause was not given to her by the petitioner. It is also not in dispute that the action taken against respondent No. 3 has also not been approved in writing by an Officer authorised in that behalf by the Board. ( 29 ) SUB-SECTION (6) of Section 35 of the act reads as follows:"35. (1 ). . . . Whenever the persons from amongst whom a teacher or a headmaster is to be selected includes a person who is related to any member of the governing body or other body in charge of the management of the school or to any member of the school staff selection committee or, as the case may be, the special school shall disclose the fact of such relationship to the members of the committee and if any such person is selected by the Committee, his selection shall be subject to approval by an officer of the board authorised in that behalf. Such approval shall be sought by the Committee within a week from the date of selection of the persons concerned and the authorised officer of the Board shall communicate his decision within fifteen days from the date of receipt of the reference by him. "sub-section (6) of Section 35 nowhere puts restriction or bar on a member of the staff Selection Committee to sit in the committee before which a person related to him is to appear as a candidate. "sub-section (6) of Section 35 nowhere puts restriction or bar on a member of the staff Selection Committee to sit in the committee before which a person related to him is to appear as a candidate. What this provision contemplates is that such a member of the Selection Committee has to disclose the fact of such relationship to the members of the Committee and if such person is selected by the Committee, his or her selection shall be subject to the approval of an Officer of the Board authorised in that behalf. It is interesting to look at how respondent No. 2 has proceeded in the matter. On 10th July 1983 appointment was given to Ms. Nayanaben jani who was not a relative of respondent no. 2. Her appointment was not required to be got approved from the District Education Officer as provided in sub-section (6) of Section 35. As stated above, that appointment was not materialised. On 11 th july 1983 appointment was given to respondent No. 3 who is the daughter of respondent No. 2. But respondent No. 2 has not got approval of this appointment from the authorised Officer of the Board who, in this case there is no dispute, is the district Education Officer. This clearly goes to show the fraud which has been committed by respondent No. 2 for his own gains of giving appointment to his daughter. Any appointment of relation of a member of the Staff Selection Committee made in contravention of the provisions of sub- section (6) of Section 35 shall be ineffective. Reference in this respect may have to be made to sub-section (7) of Section 35 of the Act which reads as follows :"s. 35 (7 ). Any appointment of a headmaster or a teacher made in contravention of the provisions of this section shall be ineffective. Explanation; For the purpose of sub- section (6), a person shall be said to be related to a member if he is related to him in any of the following capacities, namely: son, grandson, son-in-law, brother, daughter, granddaughter, wife, nephew, first cousin (paternal or maternal), wifes brother, husbands sister, wifes sister, daughter-in-law, and sister-in-law. "appointment of respondent No. 3 is void ab initio as it is an appointment procured by her own father for her. Otherwise also under sub-section (7) of Section 35 of the Act the appointment of respondent no. "appointment of respondent No. 3 is void ab initio as it is an appointment procured by her own father for her. Otherwise also under sub-section (7) of Section 35 of the Act the appointment of respondent no. 3 is ineffective. It is not the case of respondent No. 2 or respondent No. 3 that selection of respondent No. 3 was approved by the Officer authorised by the board in that behalf. No material has been produced on record by any of the respondents to show that respondent No. 2 had sought approval of appointment of respondent No. 3 from the officer authorised by the Board. ( 30 ) THE Tribunal, while deciding the question, has not considered the provisions of Section 35 of the Act. Respondent No. 2, as per the provisions of sub-section 2 of section 35 of the Act, was a member of the staff Selection Committee in which respondent No. 3 was to appear as a candidate for selection. Sub-section (6) of Section 35 casts duty upon respondent No. 2 to disclose the fact of his relationship with respondent No. 3 to the members of the committee. Sub-section (6) of Section 36 further provides that in case such a relation of a member is selected by the Selection committee, then his or her selection shall be subject to the approval of an Officer authorised by the Board in that behalf. Respondent No. 2, in order to gain benefit for his own daughter, has played a trick here. He got the approval of appointment of ms. Nayanaben Jani who was not his relation, but he has not got approval of the selection of respondent No. 3 who is his own daughter. Respondents No. 2 and 3 have not produced any material on record that selection of respondent No. 3 was got approved by the authorised Officer of the board. Even otherwise, when Ms. Nayanaben Jani has shown her inability to join the post, and respondent No. 3 was sought to be appointed in her place, it was obligatory on the part of respondent No. 2 to get approval of the same by the authorised Officer of the Board. Where appointment of respondent No. 3 was void ab initio and ineffective, even if the termination of service is made in contravention of the provisions of Section 36 of the Act, no interference is called for. Where appointment of respondent No. 3 was void ab initio and ineffective, even if the termination of service is made in contravention of the provisions of Section 36 of the Act, no interference is called for. ( 31 ) THE provisions of Section 36 are normally attracted in a case where the appointment was legal. In case the provisions of Section 36 are pressed in service to quash and set aside the order of termination of the services where the selection itself was void ab initio and illegal, the Tribunal perpetuated an illegality. In case the decision of the Tribunal is affirmed, it will be a case where void ab initio and inoperative selection and consequent appointment will be restored. This Court sitting under Articles 2267227 of the Constitution of India would certainly not allow restoration of an appointment which is the result of void ab initio and ineffective selection. ( 32 ) THE judgment of the Tribunal rendered in Application No. 184 of 1983 cannot be allowed to stand. The Special Civil application succeeds and the same is allowed. The judgment of the Tribunal rendered in Application No. 184 of 1983 on 30-3-1984 is quashed and set aside. Rule made absolute accordingly. Respondent No. 2 is the person who has committed fraud and manoeuvred the appointment of respondent No. 3, whose this Act has compelled the petitioner to come before this court. Respondent No. 2 is, therefore, directed to pay Rs. 2,000/- (two thousand only) by way of cost of this petition to the petitioner -Society. .