Judgment Dharampal Sinha, J. 1. In this civil revision filed under Sec.14 (8) of the Bihar Buildings Lease, Rent and eviction) Control Act, 1982 (the Act for short), the judgment and order dated 11- 3-1993 passed by Munsif-III, Patna in Title Eviction Suit No.34 of 1989 has been assailed by the petitioner (defendant ). 2. The opposite party instituted the suit for eviction of the petitioner (tenant) from a building bearing No.336/321 situated in Mohalla-Muradpur, patna alleging that the building was required bona fide for the use and occupation of two of his nephews (sisters sons), namely, Parwez Gani and Javed gani, who intended to start a business (of embroidery) in that premises. The petitioner-defendant contested the suit after obtaining necessary leave to contest as provided under Sec.14 (4) of the Act and the learned court below after considering the evidence adduced has decreed the suit and has ordered the petitioner-defendant to vacate the suit premises and handover vacant possession of the same. It is not necessary to give any details of the facts of the suit for the disposal of this revision-petition because the contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the parties during hearing of this revision-petition do not relate to the finding of facts but on some other aspects which will be noticed hereafter. 3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has assailed the decision by raising the following contentions : His first contention is that the suit had been brought only by solitary opposite party and he being a Mohammedan could not represent the interest of his nephews, parvez Gani and Javed Gani, whose bona fide and reasonable requirement was alleged to be ground of eviction in the suit and so he was not competent to file the suit; and the suit ought to have been dismissed on this ground. In support of his contention on this aspect he has cited the decisions reported in a. I. R.1936 Allahabad 94 Manni Gir V/s. Amarjoti Chela and another and Article, 41 of the Principles of Mohammadan Law by Mulla. 4. In support of his contention on this aspect he has cited the decisions reported in a. I. R.1936 Allahabad 94 Manni Gir V/s. Amarjoti Chela and another and Article, 41 of the Principles of Mohammadan Law by Mulla. 4. His second contention is that the alleged personal necessity has vanished because the opposite party-plaintiff has, in the meantime, obtained decree in two other eviction suits, which had been instituted on the same day, on which the suit out of which this revision-petition has arisen, had been instituted and one of the premises relating to which the opposite party has obtained decree for eviction is lying vacant for a long time. According to him that vacant premises could be easily used for the intended opening of embroidery shop by the two sisters sons, which was alleged to be necessity for eviction. 5. His another argument on this very aspect is that the necessity could not be considered to be bona fide when the opposite party- plaintiff instituted as many as three suits on the same day seeking relief of eviction from the three suit premises. According to him the finding of the learned court below for bona fide requirement must be held to wrong in view of this very fact. 6. His further contention is that while considering the question of partial eviction in the impugned order the learned court below has made a wrong approach in throwing the burden of proving that only partial eviction will satisfy the need alleged, on the head of the petitioner-defendant. 7. On the other hand learned counsel for the opposite party has contended that the opposite party was competent to bring suit for the benefit of his sisters sons, who had also share and interest in the suit premises along with others including the opposite party. 7. On the other hand learned counsel for the opposite party has contended that the opposite party was competent to bring suit for the benefit of his sisters sons, who had also share and interest in the suit premises along with others including the opposite party. According to him even if the persons governed by Mohammedan Law are not joint tenants and theory of representation, which is applicable to Hindu joint family, is not applicable to them, even then each of such persons, who are heirs, on opening of any inheritance on the death of any previous owner, acquires right to the extent of his share in each and every part of the property relating to which inheritance has opened, and so any of the co-sharers including the opposite party, according to him, was competent to institute the suit on the ground that his other co-sharers, sisters sons, who had also interest according to their shares in the property, needed that suit premises for starting a business. 8. As regards the contention relating to vanishing of the ground of personal necessity, the learned Counsel for the opposite party has submitted that three suits had been brought for different necessities, which had arisen for different persons who had inherited the property and had share in the different suit premises. One of the suits had been brought on the ground of personal necessity of the opposite party himself and that related to shop, and the other suit related to a residential building, which was not suitable for the purpose of business. He has further submitted that though one shop was vacated through eviction suit, the tenant of that shop made extensive damage to it and unless it is thoroughly prepared, for which the opposite party for the present has no means, it cannot be used for the purpose of doing any business and so it is lying vacant and the opposite party could not start his business: 9. In this connection it may be noticed that a supplementary petitioner and rejoinder had been filed giving some details of the three suits, two of which admittedly have already been disposed of in favour of the opposite party. Learned Counsel for the opposite party also controverted the contention that the necessity could not be considered to be bona fide because three suits had been instituted on the same day. 10. Learned Counsel for the opposite party also controverted the contention that the necessity could not be considered to be bona fide because three suits had been instituted on the same day. 10. As regards partial eviction the contention of the learned Counsel for the opposite party is that that aspect has been considered by the Trial Court and in view of the decision reported in 1993 (1) PLJR 57 (Mis Bata India Ltd. V/s. Dr. Md. Qamruzzama) the burden of showing that partial eviction will satisfy the requirement of the nephews of the opposite party had to be discharged by the petitioner-defendant, which he has failed to discharge and the finding of the learned court below in this regard is, therefore, un-assailable. 11. Now as regards the first contention raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it cannot be doubted that till separate allotment is done to different persons governed by Muslim law, after they have acquired interest by inheritance on the death of the person to whom the properties belong, each of the co-sharers will continue to be the owner of each item of proportions, which is included in the estate, to the extent of their respective shares. It has not been disputed by the. learned counsel for the petitioner that a suit can be brought by one co- owner for eviction of a tenant, if the tenant had made default in payment of rent or on the ground of expiry of the terms of lease under which the suit premises in question has been let out. But he makes a distinction between those types of suits brought on any other ground than personal necessity, and his contention is that since the necessity that was alleged by the plaintiff-opposite party was not on his own, but that of his nephews on the doctrine of representation is not applicable to mohammedan as is applicable to the persons governed by Hindu Law the suit must be held to be not for personal necessity in terms of the expression used in Sec.11 (1) (c) of the Act reading "the building is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the building is held by the landlord". According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner unless nephews, whose necessity was alleged to be the ground for eviction had also joined as the plaintiff in the suit, the suit was not competent because the interest of those no shows could not be represented by the opposite party, who instituted the sale. 12. I do not think that this line of argument can be accepted. If one coowner can bring a suit for eviction of tenant on any other grounds and the eviction if allowed would naturally be for the benefit of all the co-owners, who have shares in the concerned suit premises, there is no reason why benefit of any other co- sharers cannot be made a ground by one of the co-owner for evicting the tenant, when the expression of Sec.11 (1) (c) already quoted above indicated that the bona fide need of any person for whose benefit the building is held can be a ground. Unless the partition is made by metes and bounds among the co-sharers, who are governed by Mohammedan Law, they are entitled to get benefit of such part of the estate according to their respective share. So, in this view of the matter, I reject the first argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner. The provision of Article 41 of the moham-medan Law, or the two decisions, 1936 allahabad 94 and 1971 Patna 83 no doubt shows that the persons governed by Mohammedan Law while inheriting property take as tenants-in-common and not as joint tenant and doctrine of representation is not applicable to them. But nonetheless such persons acquire interest to the extent of their respective share in each part and item of property and so 1 do not think the aforesaid authorities can be of any avail to the petitioner in this case. 13. I may also mention in this connection that from the supplementary petition and rejoinder filed in this civil revision-petition, it would appear that the two nephews for whose requirement the eviction was sought are sons of the sisters of the opposite party-plaintiff and the sister as well as her husband, that is, father of the two nephews had also died. I may also mention in this connection that from the supplementary petition and rejoinder filed in this civil revision-petition, it would appear that the two nephews for whose requirement the eviction was sought are sons of the sisters of the opposite party-plaintiff and the sister as well as her husband, that is, father of the two nephews had also died. So, in such a situation for all practical purposes, the opposite party, who was co-owner (co-sharer), was expected to look after the interest of comparatively junior co-sharer, whose both parents were dead.1 do not think that this suit can be considered to be incompetent only because those two nephews did not also join in the suit as plaintiffs. It also appears difficult to agree with the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the requirement alleged could not be taken to be bona fide requirement within the meaning of Sec.11 (c) of the Act. 14. As regards the contention that the necessity has vanished because two other evictions suits have been disposed of in favour of the opposite party, it may be mentioned at the very outset that from the facts asserted in the supplementary petition and rejoinder filed thereto it would appear that although three suits were admittedly filed on the same day, the necessity alleged in the three suits were different and the requirement of each suit premises was on the ground of necessity for different persons. So far the bona fide requirement or necessity alleged in the suit with which this revision is concerned that remains intact. In this connection it may also be mentioned and it is alleged in the petition and admitted in the rejoinder that the two nephews have taken shops on rent at Patna Market where they have started business. On this fact the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that their personal necessity for starting a business has already been satisfied and so the ground on which the ground for eviction was sought for has vanished. In reply, however, it has been submitted convincingly, that since they could not got the suit premises vacated by the petitioner, for several years after the institution of the suit in the year 1989 some how to earn their livelihood they has to take a shop and to start sons business though that place is not all suitable. In reply, however, it has been submitted convincingly, that since they could not got the suit premises vacated by the petitioner, for several years after the institution of the suit in the year 1989 some how to earn their livelihood they has to take a shop and to start sons business though that place is not all suitable. In this connection, it has been also submitted by the learned Counsel for the opposite party that the very facts that another shop had been taken on rent to earn their livelihood, would indicate that there was bona fide requirement for the suit premises as has been held in the decision reported in 1982 patna 190 : 1982 BLJ 584 (Mis. Tip Top and ors. V/s. Indira Mani Devi (Smt. ). So, I do not find any merit in the contention of the learned Counsel for petitioner made on this ground. 15. I may also notice here that it has been said in the supplementary petition that after getting a shop vacated on the ground of personal requirement of the opposite party, the shop has been allowed to remain vacant for a long time and that shop could be used by the nephews of the opposite party. But about this aspect, as already noticed, the, explanation given by the learned counsel for the opposite party is that some extensive damage has been made by the previous tenant of that shop, and heavy expenditure is required for thorough repair of it to make it fit for running a shop and due to paucity of fund it could not be done. In any case that shop was vacated for the purpose of starting business by the plaintiff himself, who after repairing could use it but his nephews are requiring the suit premises involved in this case. I am inclined to agree with the explanation given in this regard by the Counsel for opposite party. 16. Now coming to the last argument regarding partial eviction, it appears that on this aspect a separate issue has been framed in the impugned judgment (as issue No.4 ). On this issue the learned court below has made discussions in one paragraph, which is as follows: "according to the plaintiff the partial eviction of the suit premises will not satisfy the need of plaintiff and therefore he requires the entire suit premises. On this issue the learned court below has made discussions in one paragraph, which is as follows: "according to the plaintiff the partial eviction of the suit premises will not satisfy the need of plaintiff and therefore he requires the entire suit premises. I find that the defendant has stated that the plaintiffs version is not true. Of course there is no description regarding the dimension of the suit premises but there is no positive statement on behalf of the defendant that partial eviction of the suit premises is possible. On the other hand the plaintiff has categorically stated that the partial eviction of the defendant from the suit premises is not possible, because the work of embroidery requires more space. Further other PWs. have also corroborated the testimony of the plaintiff (RW.6 ). Therefore, I agree with the submission of the plaintiff and accordingly I hold that the partial eviction of the suit premises will not satisfy the need of the plaintiff. Hence, issue No.4 is also decided in favour of the plaintiff. " It would appear from the observation of the learned court below on this point that the evidence on the record was only meagre and no positive statement was made on behalf of the defendant (petitioner) in this regard, while there was some evidence to the effect that the business of the embroidery intended to be done required more space and so the learned court below has decided this issue in favour of the plaintiff. I do not think that there is any scope for interference with this finding, in the facts and circumstances of the case. No doubt it would appear from the decision of the Hon ble Supreme Court reported in A. I. R.1994 S. C.129 (Krishna murari Prasad V/s. Hitesh Singh) that "this enquiry has to be made by the court after reaching the conclusion that the landlords requirement for (sic) of the premises set up by him has been made out". In this case enquiry was made and issue was framed and the learned court below has considered this aspect and decided the issue in favour of the plaintiff. It appears that there was no proper description of the suit premises, nor its length or width was given in the pleadings and evidence and it was only admitted that it considered for a shop. It appears that there was no proper description of the suit premises, nor its length or width was given in the pleadings and evidence and it was only admitted that it considered for a shop. From the rejoinder filed, it appears that room is surrounded from three sides by other building with opening on only one side and that opening is of 8 feet width. In such a situation, there is hardly any scope lift for the landlord getting partial eviction, and allowing partial occupation of the room by the defendant. So, in this view of the matter also, it does not seem to be a fit case in which partial eviction could be ordered. So, the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner on this score also fails. 17 In the result, therefore, I find that this civil revision-petition has got no merit and it is, accordingly, dismissed. Revision Dismissed.