Judgment : 1. By means of this writ petition, the Award dated 19. 12. 1984 passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Gorakhpur has been challenged by the petitioner on the ground of its being perverse. 2. Sri Sudhir Chandra Agrawal, learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the workman was employed on 1. 6. 1975 in the muster roll as daily wage and continued to be a muster roll worker on daily wage with intervention from time to time till 22. 7. 1978 when his services were terminated. The workmen did not question or challenge the said order of termination. On the other hand he had applied for re-employment. Pursuant to such an application by a letter dated 23. 11. 1978 which is annexure 10' to the writ petition (Ext. 4), the workman was directed to be re-employed and accordingly he was re-employed in December, 1978 and he worked till 31. 1. 1979 upon such re-employment. His services were dispensed with on account of a Circular dated 17. 1. 1979 by which the muster roll daily wage workmen's services were to be dispensed with. Respondent No. 2 raised an industrial dispute on account of his termination on the ground that the said termination is illegal on account of violation of Section 6 N of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. Accordingly a reference was made, pursuant to which Adjudication case No. 126 of 1981 was registered before the learned Labour Court, Gorakhpur. The said dispute has ultimately ended in the impugned Award dated 19. 12. 1984 by which the workman was reinstated upon a finding that the termination of the service was bad on account of non-compliance of Section 6 N of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as the Art ). Sri Sudhir Chandra Agarwal, learned counsel for the petitioners contends first that since the engagement of the workman was terminated on 22. 7. 1978 and he was re-employed in December, 1978 pursuant to his application, therefore, the workman having accepted the termination on 22. 7. 1978 was estopped from challenging the same particularly when he had accepted re-employment and thus the period of his engagement should be granted from the date of re-employment and his earlier engagement should be ignored. 3. The second point as contended by Mr. 7. 1978 was estopped from challenging the same particularly when he had accepted re-employment and thus the period of his engagement should be granted from the date of re-employment and his earlier engagement should be ignored. 3. The second point as contended by Mr. Agrawal is that even if the earlier engagement is taken into account, the workman on actual calculations, does not appear to have worked for 240 days during the period of 12 months preceding the termination, namely, from 1st February, 1978 till 31st January, 1979. According to the record of the petitioners during the said period the workman had worked for 235 days, therefore, the finding of the Labour Court is perverse. 4. He contends next that it is the workman, who has raised the dispute and if no evidence is led, it is he who would fail and had to discharge the onus. The burden of proving the case of the workman was on the workman and by reason of the evidence led, the onus has never shifted to the petitioners since the workman was unable to discharge his burden. According to them the workman had admitted that his service was terminated on 22. 7. 1978. In his written statement he had never made his case that his services were terminated on 31. 1. 1979. Only by means of amendment the date 22. 7. 1978 was substituted after the petitioners had filed their written statements by the date of 31. 1. 1979 and 1. 2. 1979 respectively at different places. He contends further that the Labour Court has not addressed itself to all the materials placed before it particularly the oral evidence of the workman and he has not, in fact, considered the totality of the evidence and the materials before him and has come to a finding which is not based on materials and is perverse. Therefore, this court is competent to interfere even with the finding of fact on account of its perversity. On these grounds he has assailed the impugned Award. Mr. Shyam Narain, learned counsel for the workman, on the other hand, contends that the petitioner had never made out the case which is now being made by Mr. Agrawal. He referred to the written statements of the petitioners and pointed out that nowhere a case was made out that the service of the workman was terminated on 22. 7. Mr. Shyam Narain, learned counsel for the workman, on the other hand, contends that the petitioner had never made out the case which is now being made by Mr. Agrawal. He referred to the written statements of the petitioners and pointed out that nowhere a case was made out that the service of the workman was terminated on 22. 7. 1978 and he was re-employed only in December, 1978. The only statement that has been made is that no document relating the engagement of the workman is available after 22. 7. 1978. Such a statement cannot be taken to be a case as has been sought to be made by Mr. Agrawal. He also points out from the evidence of the workman while translating the same at the Bar that nowhere any question was put by way of cross examination to the workman in order to elicit the case made out by the petitioners herein. He also refers to the evidence adduced on behalf of the petitioners while translating the same at the Bar that nowhere the petitioners have made such a case. Unless such a case is made and proved and unless there are sufficient materials to prove such a case as has been sought to be made out by the petitioners, it cannot be said that the finding of the Labour Court is perverse. According to him the finding is a finding of fact on the materials placed before the labour Court. If the same has come to a particular finding, even if on the same material, this Court is of the different view, it cannot substitute its view to that of the labour Court. In the facts and the circumstances of the present case it is not a case of perversity at all. 5. Mr. Agrawal relied upon a decision in the case of M/s Airtake Pvt. Ltd., Ghaziabad v. State of U. P. and others, (1984 UPLBEC 21) in respect of his contention that if the workman is unable to discharge the burden to prove the case referred to Labour court for adjudication which lays on him, the employer is not required to lead any evidence at all. 6. Relying on the said decision, Mr. 6. Relying on the said decision, Mr. Agrawal attempts to contend that since in the present case the workman has not been able to discharge his burden, therefore, even if the employer has not led any evidence to that extent to prove the employer's case the same would be immaterial and, therefore, the Labour Court ought to have decided the case on the basis of the evidence led by the workman and according to him the evidence available on record does not at all justify the finding arrived at by the Labour Court and as such the said finding suffers from perversity. So far as the case of M/s Airtake Pvt. Ltd. (supra) is concerned, the same does not help Mr. Agrawal in the facts of the present case inasmuch as the said decision was given while considering the question as to who would lead evidence. In the said case the employer was directed to lead evidence. On that context, it was held that it is the employee who is to fail in the absence of any evidence, has to lead evidence and the same was put forward as reasoning. It was observed that if the workman does not lead any evidence, then his case fails and the employer is not called upon to prove the case of the workman or to dispute the case of the workman when the workman has not led any evidence. 7. In the present case the workman has led evidence and some materials are on record, whether the same is sufficient or not to arrive at the conclusion on which the Labour Court has arrived at, cannot be gone into while sitting in writ jurisdiction unless it is shown that the finding is perverse and no reasonable man would arrive at such a conclusion. In the present case admittedly even after the amendment of the written statement by the workman, the petitioners did not file any additional written statement. At least my attention has not been drawn to any such additional written statement by Mr. Agrawal. Mr. Agrawal laid stress on the rejoinder to the written statement filed by the workman wherein it has been stated that no document relating to the engagement of the workman after July, 1978 is available. But the said statement is not clear and free from ambiguity. Agrawal. Mr. Agrawal laid stress on the rejoinder to the written statement filed by the workman wherein it has been stated that no document relating to the engagement of the workman after July, 1978 is available. But the said statement is not clear and free from ambiguity. 3esides no such case as sought to have been made very efficiently by Mr. Agrawal here before this Court, was not made out before the Labour Court. Nothing could be drawn to my attention showing that even by way of cross-examination, the workman was confronted that his service was terminated on 22. 7. 1978 and that he was never employed within 15 days from the said date and that the employment pursuant to the letter dated 23. 11. 1978 was a re-employment effecting from December, 1978 and the period in between 22-7-1978 and December, 1978 was a period of non-engagement of the workman. 8. Sri Shyam Narain relying on the decision in the case of M/s. National Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. and others v. The State of West Bengal and another, (1967 14 FLR 356= air 1967 SC 1206 ) contended that unless a plea is taken in the written statement by the employer, he cannot be allowed to take such plea in proceeding before the Tribunal. Here in the present case, the case, which has been sought to be made out before this court was not even attempted to be made before the Labour Court and no such plea was taken even in the written statement. In the case of M/s National Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. (supra), the apex court did not differ from the view taken by the Tribunal rejecting the contention of the employer on the ground that the said plea was not put forward in the written statement of the Company. In the present case this plea which is being sought to be raised only before this court, was never raised before the learned Labour Court. The principle of pleading requires to set out to the defence available in the written statement which the employer or the defendant, whoever he is, would be relying upon and that no surprise is. sprung upon the other side. The principle of pleading requires to set out to the defence available in the written statement which the employer or the defendant, whoever he is, would be relying upon and that no surprise is. sprung upon the other side. Putting in of pleadings and or statements either by way of plaint or written statement are drafted in order to confine the controversy between the parties within the pleadings so that the same may not work prejudice to either of the parties and the parties do understand the case of each other and court is not called upon to decide something which is not present within the pleading placed before it. The pleading is not dependent on the question of discharging of burden or not. The question of discharging burden comes on much later than the stage of putting in the pleadings. The question of burden would come up only when the pleadings are there. If the defendant chooses not to put forward the plea, he cannot succeed on the basis of any weakness on the other side unless there are some materials on the basis of which the Labour Court could have arrived at a conclusion on the basis of his belief or disbelief. In the facts and the circumstances of the present case, it cannot be said that on the basis of the material placed before the Labour Court, no reasonable man can arrive at the conclusion, the labour Court has arrived. The Labour Court has believed the case of the workman and the employer had not made out the case which Mr. Agrawal has attempted to put forward before this Court. Mr. Shyam Narain had also relied upon on the decision rendered in the case of Workmen of American Express International Banking Corporation v. Management of American Express International Banking Corporation, (1985 51 FLR 481) in order to substantiate contention that the Industrial Disputes Act is a welfare statute must, of necessity, receive a broad interpretation and where legislation is designed to give relief against certain kinds of mischief, the Court is not to make inroads by making etymological excursions. In the present case as has been held in the said decision in the case of Workmen of American Express International Banking Corporation (supra)if this court wants to enter into the findings of fact by the Labour Court in the facts and the circumstances of the present case, in that event it would launch etymological excursions as has been warned by the apex court in the said judgment. 9. In that view of the matter, I am unable to pursuade myself, despite erudite and well mannered arguments advanced by Mr. Sudhir Chandra Agrawal, who had justified his presence beyond measure but due to the unfortunate situation prevailing in the case when the case sought to be made out has not been put forward in the court below, he could not improve upon the same to the level where he wanted to put his case, to agree with his contention that there is perversity in the finding by the learned Labour Court on account, of the grounds canvassed by him. 10. In the result, this writ petition fails and is dismissed. There will, however, no order as to costs. Petition Dismissed.