JUDGMENT - VAIDYANATHA R.G., J.:---These three criminal writ petitions are filed by the three petitioners challenging the order of detention of the respective detenus. We have heard the learned advocates for the parties. 2. Cri.W.P. No. 87/96 is filed by the petitioner who is the son of detenu Kirtilal D. Jogani challenging the order of detention dated 2-4-1996 issued under section 3 of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Cri.W.P. No. 88/96 is filed by the petitioner, who is wife of detenu Kasam Merchant, challenging the order of detention dated 9-4-1996 under the Act. Cri. W.P. No. 134/96 is filed by the father of the detenu Suresh Sharma challenging the order of detention dated 4-5-1996 under the Act. The respondents have filed affidavits in reply in all these three petitions. It may be also mentioned here that there are six detenus who have filed six writ petitions. We have heard common arguments in all these six petitions. However, for the purpose of convenience, we are disposing of these three writ petitions under this common order and three writ petitions under other common order. 3. Few facts, which are necessary for the disposal of these writ petitions are as follows :- It appears that on getting information, the Officers of D.R.I., Mumbai, in association with the officers of Central Excise at Arnravati searched the factory premises of Messrs Vinit Organics Pvt. Ltd., Arnravati on 23rd and 24th November, 1995. During this raid and search they seized large quantities of Methaqualone powder (1215.900 Kgs.) of the value of Rs. 1,21,59,600/-. They also found and seized 1500 litres of Methaqualone liquid. They also seized many raw materials and Indian currency of Rs. 4 lakhs and odd. It is stated that this Methaqualone powder was being manufactured in the said premises which is a psychotropic substance. It is also stated that another premises situated in Survey No. 98/1 of Kumbhari village in Akola district belonging to one Ramesh Agarwal was searched on 24-11-1995. During that search large quantity of Mandrex tablets and Methaqualone powder were seized in addition to other raw materials. At that time the owner of the premises Ramesh Agarwal was present and was supervising, manufacture of mandrex tablets which is also a prohibited drug under the N.D.P.S. Act. During that search large quantity of Mandrex tablets and Methaqualone powder were seized in addition to other raw materials. At that time the owner of the premises Ramesh Agarwal was present and was supervising, manufacture of mandrex tablets which is also a prohibited drug under the N.D.P.S. Act. Then it is also stated in the grounds that some other residential premises of different detenus came to be searched from time to time and some incriminating documents were recovered. Then the detenus came to be arrested at different points of time and their statements came to be recorded. All detenus admitted their activity of manufacture, transporting and selling the psychotropic substances. The Sponsoring Authority viz. D.R.I. placed all these materials before the Detaining Authority viz. the second respondent Shri C. D. Singh, Principal Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra, Home Department, Bombay. The Detaining Authority in turn considered all the relevant materials and arrived at a subjective satisfaction that detention of these six detenus is very necessary in order to prevent them from engaging in illicit traffic in psychotropic substances. Accordingly six orders of detention of different dates have been issued against these six detenus, of whom, we are concerned with three detenus in this order. 4. The learned Counsel for the petitioners in these three petitions has questioned the legality and validity of detention orders on many grounds. Some of the grounds are common to all the three petitions and some are confined to each particular case. We will consider these contentions one by one. 5. The first contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners in all these three petitions is that the detenus were already in custody having been arrested for offences under the N.D.P.S. Act and, therefore, there was no necessity for the detention order. In other words, the submission is that when the detenus are already in custody and there is no chance of their coming out on bail, having regard to the gravity of the offence, there is no necessity for issuing the present orders and this shows that there was non-application of mind on the part of the Detaining Authority. On the other hand, Mr. Aney appearing for the State and Mr. On the other hand, Mr. Aney appearing for the State and Mr. Page appearing for Sponsoring Authority contended that though the detenus were in custody, there was likelihood of their applying for bail and coming out and then engaging themselves in the same nefarious activities of illicit traffic in Psychotropic substances and hence their detention was absolutely necessary. The learned Advocates for both sides invited our attention to number of decisions on the point. We will refer only to few cases. The learned Counsel for petitioners invited our attention to A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1196, (Dharmendra v. Union of India)1, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 1640, (Kamrunnisa v. Badmnnisa)2, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 2090, (Virendrasingh v. Dist. Magistrate)3 and 1995 Cri.Law Journal 265, (Suryaprakas v. State of U. P.)4 On the other hand, learned Counsel for the State relied on A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1763, (Smt. Azara Fatima v. Union of India)5, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 2261, (Abdul Sattar v. Union of India)6, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 810, (Smt. Havabi v. State of Maharashtra)7 and A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 962, (Virendrakumar v. Union of India)8. It is not necessary to refer to all the decisions cited on the point. We have been taken through all these decisions by the learned Counsel at the time of arguments. From reading of these decisions two points emerged viz. first that the Detaining Authority must have awareness that detenu is in custody and the second and most important point is that the Detaining Authority must have compelling necessity for issuing detention order when the detenu is already in custody. In all these cases, the Detaining Authority had opined that the dentenu may come out on bail. In some of the above cases, the Supreme Court has pointed out that there must be some material to show that the detenu may get bail or likely to get bail or possibility of getting bail etc. In our view, the test is whether the Detaining Authority was aware that the detenus were in custody and further whether Detaining Authority has applied its mind and given reasons for the necessity of issuing detention order against the persons, who are already in custody. On facts, we cannot have a direct authority. Each case depends on its own facts and circumstances. On point of law, there is no dispute and there are only two tests, which are mentioned above. 6. On facts, we cannot have a direct authority. Each case depends on its own facts and circumstances. On point of law, there is no dispute and there are only two tests, which are mentioned above. 6. As far the first point is concerned, admittedly, in all these three petitions, Detaining Authority has shown its awareness that the detenus are in custody. On the second point or second test, we find that the Detaining Authority has observed that in two cases, the detenus had applied for bail and subsequently withdrawn it. He has further mentioned that there is likelihood of detenus again applying for bail on some reason or the other. He has, therefore, felt it necessary to issue order of detention. We are not impressed by the argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioners that no accused can come out on bail for the offence under N.D.P.S. Act. Even under section 37 of N.D.P.S. Act, if the Court comes to the conclusion that there is no sufficient prima facie case and material against the accused that he has committed offence in question, the Court can grant bail. It is not a question whether they may actually get bail or not from the point of view of Court or legal efforts. We have to see from the point of view of Detaining Authority. He may feel that in a given case, the accused may move application for bail and get bail. His object is to see that the detenu should be prevented from indulging in similar activity after his release. We must also bear in mind the gravity of the charges alleged against the detenus. They are said to have been involved in a conspiracy to manufacture psychotropic substances and selling them and transporting them outside India. If in such a case, having regard to the gravity of charge and previous antecedents of the detenu, Detaining Authority feels that though detenu is in custody, he may again apply for bail and come out and in order to prevent him from indulging in such activity, he wants to detain him under the Act. It can not be said that there was any non-application of mind on the part of the Detaining Authority. The learned Counsel for the State Mr. It can not be said that there was any non-application of mind on the part of the Detaining Authority. The learned Counsel for the State Mr. Aney is, therefore, right in his submission that having regard to the previous conduct and past antecedents of the detenus, order of Detaining Authority on this ground can not be held to be bad for non-application of mind. Therefore, we reject the first contention urged on behalf of the petitioners. 7. The learned Counsel for the petitioners next contended that in these three petitions, detenus had retracted their confessions and in two cases it was not placed before the Detaining Authority and in the third case, Detaining Authority had not expressed any opinion about retracted confession and, therefore, the order of detention is vitiated. Before going to the facts of these cases, let us refer to law on the point. In an unreported judgment dated 23-2-1990 in Cri.W.P. No. 602/89, (Mohd. Mujaffar v. Additional Secretary to Government of T. N.)9 Supreme Court had occasion to consider a similar question. In that case, it appears that the detenu had filed bail application, in which he had retracted his earlier confession. In the grounds of detention Detaining Authority had referred to the bail application of the detenu but nowhere in the grounds of detention there was any reference to retraction of confession of the detenu as mentioned in the bail application. In addition to this, there was also a letter by the detenu to the Sponsoring Authority retracting confession. Even this letter was not placed before the Detaining Authority. The Supreme Court held that the Detaining Authority was not aware to the factum of retraction even though bail application which contained retraction was very much before the Detaining Authority. The Supreme Court also pointed out that the Detaining Authority should have referred to the retraction and could not have ignored it and still pass an order of detention order and then the matter would be different. It was, therefore, held that since Detaining Authority had not applied its mind and was not aware of retraction, it is case of non-application of mind and on this count the Apex Court quashed order of detention. Similar view is taken by the Delhi High Court in 1988 (3) (Criminal) 33, (Andrew v. Union of India and others)10. It was, therefore, held that since Detaining Authority had not applied its mind and was not aware of retraction, it is case of non-application of mind and on this count the Apex Court quashed order of detention. Similar view is taken by the Delhi High Court in 1988 (3) (Criminal) 33, (Andrew v. Union of India and others)10. Even our High Court has taken similar view in two unreported judgments viz. Judgment dated 15-3-1993 in Cri.W.P.No. 1487/92, (Gulab Patel v. D.K. Jain and others)11 and judgment dated 16-3-1993 in Cri.W.P. No. 1486/92, (Nainmal Jain v. J.D. Dange and others)12. This Court has also held that if Detaining Authority was not made aware of retraction of confession by the detenu, it amounts to non-application of mind and the order is liable to be quashed. 8. While not disputing the position of law that if retracted confession is not placed before or considered by the Detaining Authority, it affects the validity of order of detention. Mr. Aney, learned Counsel for the State contended that in such a case, the Court can apply doctrine of severance and ignore confession and then find out whether there is sufficient other material to sustain the validity of the order of detention. It is true under section 6 of the Act, if there are more grounds than one, and even if one or more grounds are found to be vague, invalid and not relevant then order of detention can still be held valid, if there are other valid grounds. He has also invited our attention to some authorities on this point. In particular, he has relied on A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 687, (Prakashchandra v. Commissioner of Police)13, 1992 Cri.Law Journal, 2460, (Udayvalia v. Joint Secretary and others)14, where it is pointed out that if retraction of the detenu or any other person is not placed before the Detaining Authority, still detention order can be sustained, if excluding the confession of detenu there is other valid material to support the grounds of detention. Therefore, the position of law is that if the retraction is not placed before the Detaining Authority, then there is non-application of mind and the order is liable to be struck down unless excluding confession of detenu, there is other material to support the order of detention. Now with this position of law being settled, we shall look to the facts of the case. 9. Now with this position of law being settled, we shall look to the facts of the case. 9. In Cri.W P. No. 87/96, the detenu had retracted confession before the learned Sessions Judge. The Sponsoring Authority does not dispute the factum of retraction. Its only reply is that it applied to the Sessions Judge for copy of the statement of detenu containing retraction and it could not get it and, therefore, it was not placed before the Detaining Authority. When once the Sponsoring Authority has come to know of the fact that detenu has retracted confession, then it should have made sincere efforts to take a copy of the statement and place it before the Detaining Authority. Even granting for a moment, that it could not succeed in getting a copy, the Sponsoring Authority could have at least sent a report or a letter to Detaining Authority that the detenu has retracted confession and that may be taken into consideration while passing order of detention. In Cri.W.P. No. 134/96, the accused had retracted confession in bail application. Though the bail application has been placed before the Detaining Authority and it has been referred to in the grounds of detention, there is no mention anywhere in the grounds of detention that the detenu has retracted the confession. That means there is no awareness of the Detaining Authority about retraction made by the detenu in the bail application, though it was placed before him. To such a case, the rule laid down by the Apex Court in Mujaffar's case mentioned above is attracted. It is, therefore, seen that both in W. P. No. 87/96 and 134/96, there is no awareness of the Detaining Authority about the confession being retracted by the detenu. However, in Cr. W P. No. 88/96, the Detaining Authority is aware of the retracted confession and makes a mention of the same in the order of detention, but does not say whether it is going to accept the same or reject the same. He could have at least stated that the retraction is an afterthought and it is not acceptable. That means, he should have expressed opinion about acceptance or rejection of retraction. Since it is not done, order of detention suffers from non-application of mind. 10. He could have at least stated that the retraction is an afterthought and it is not acceptable. That means, he should have expressed opinion about acceptance or rejection of retraction. Since it is not done, order of detention suffers from non-application of mind. 10. Now having reached the conclusion that in these three cases, order of detention is bad for non-application of mind for the reasons mentioned above, the question is whether the detention order can still be held valid by invoking doctrine of severance provided in section 6 of the Act as contended on behalf of the State. We have gone through three detention orders. No incriminating drugs have been seized from the possession of these three detenus. We find that as far as other detenus are concerned, with whom we are not concerned in the present three writ petitions, there is some material against them in addition to their confessional statements before the concerned Authorities. If in these three cases, we exclude the confessional statements of these three detenus to apply the test of severance, there is no other material in the grounds of detention to connect the petitioners with the illicit traffic in Narcotic drugs. Hence even if we apply the test of severance, since there is not other sufficient material to connect the detenus with the illegal traffic in drugs except their own confessional statements, which cannot be taken into consideration for the reasons mentioned above, we are constrained to hold that the order of detention is bad on the ground of non-application of mind for the reasons mentioned above. 11. Then there is one more common ground in all these three cases about the delay in disposal of representations sent by the detenus to the Government of Maharashtra. Before considering the facts of the cases, we may refer to the position of law on this point. The learned Counsel for the petitioners invited our attention to a number of authorities on this point touching the question of delay in disposal of representations. Before considering the facts of the cases, we may refer to the position of law on this point. The learned Counsel for the petitioners invited our attention to a number of authorities on this point touching the question of delay in disposal of representations. Few of the cases cited by him are : A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1455, (Maheshkumar v. Union of India and others)15; A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1983, (Smt. Icchudevi v. Union of India and others)16; A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1877, (Moinuddin v. District Magistrate)17; A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 1861, (Rambola v. V.K. Saraf)18; 1996 S.C.C. (Cri.) 470, (Kundanbhai v. District Magistrate and others)19 and 1994 (Supp.2) S.C.C. 716, (Rajendra v. Commissioner of Police)20 where the detention orders have been quashed on the sole ground that there was undue or unreasonable or unexplained delay in dealing with the representation of the detenu. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for State invited our attention to A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 575, (Noor Salam v. Union of India)21; 1991 Cri.L.J. 780, (K.M. Abdulla v. Union of India)22; A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1466, (Abdul Salam v. Union of India)23; 1993 Cri.L.J. 159, (Virendra v. Union of India)24; 1994 Cri.L.J. 63, (Shriram Mhatre v. R.D. Tyagi)25; and 1994 Cri.L.J. 2379, (Sadanand v. A.S. Sharma)26, where the Courts have held on facts that there was no delay in disposal of representations by the Government. In our view, the question whether there is delay in the disposal of representation in a given case is purely a question of fact. The question of delay necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 12. From the reading of the above decisions, the position of law that emerges is that under Article 22(5) of Constitution of India, there is a constitutional obligation on the part of the State to communicate the grounds of detention to the detenu as soon as may be and further afford the detenu earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. Now it is well settled that in view of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India there is corresponding obligation both constitutional obligation under Article 22(5) and statutory obligation under the detention law to consider and dispose of the representation at the earliest point of time. Now it is well settled that in view of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India there is corresponding obligation both constitutional obligation under Article 22(5) and statutory obligation under the detention law to consider and dispose of the representation at the earliest point of time. Now the question is whether in the present case on facts, whether there has been delay or not in disposing of the representation and if there is delay whether there has been any satisfactory explanation for the same. 13. We may take up Cr. W. P. No. 87/96 and 88/96 together, since the dates are common. In the first case, representation was received in the Home Department on 2-5-1996 and in the second case it was received on 4-5-1996. Both the representations were rejected by the Hon'ble Deputy Chief Minister on 31-5-1996. That means there is delay of nearly more than 3 weeks in disposing of the representation. We find that in both these cases, the Joint Secretary perused the file and submitted them to the Additional Chief Secretary on 14-5-1996. Then we find that the Additional Chief Secretary rejected both the representations on 18-5-1996. Then it is seen that both the files were re-submitted to the Deputy Chief Minister. Then it is stated that the Dy. Chief Minister was held up in Delhi from 21-5-1996 to 30-5-1996 and hence he could not attend to the files. He returns to Bombay and immediately rejects both the representations on 31-5-1996. If the Additional Chief Secretary had powers and had right to reject the representations on 18-5-1996, there was no necessity to send the files again to the Dy. Chief Minister. The learned Counsel for the State explained to us that because of Parliamentary elections, the Deputy Chief Minister had delegated his powers to the Additional Chief Secretary only for the election period i.e. upto 14-5-1996 or 16-5-1996. It was, therefore, argued that the Additional Chief Secretary had no power to pass any order on 18-5-1996. After that order, the office woke up and made a note that the Additional Chief Secretary's powers had come to an end since the election process had been completed and, therefore, resubmitted the files to the Dy. Chief Minister. In our view, there is callous and indifferent approach by the concerned officials in dealing with this matter. After that order, the office woke up and made a note that the Additional Chief Secretary's powers had come to an end since the election process had been completed and, therefore, resubmitted the files to the Dy. Chief Minister. In our view, there is callous and indifferent approach by the concerned officials in dealing with this matter. Either the Additional Chief Secretary should have passed the order on 14-5-1996 or he should have returned the files. We cannot expect that a senior bureaucrat like the Additional Chief Secretary would not be knowing his powers and keep the file with him and pass an order on 18-5-1996. If the office was at all diligent then files should have been sent directly to the Dy. Chief Minister on 14th or 15th May, 1996 and he could have passed the order in a day or two and that could have been the end of the matter. Even giving margin to the absence of Dy. Chief Minister from Bombay from 21-5-1996 to 31-5-1996, there is no explanation for the delay from 15-5-1996 to 20-5-1996 except routing the file in a wrong route with utter carelessness and negligence. Hence in the circumstances of the case, we are constrained to hold that undue delay has been caused in the disposal of representations in these two cases and on this ground, order of detention is liable to be quashed. 14. Now we come to the representation submitted by the petitioner in Cr. W.P.No. 134/96. Here the representation is dated 24-6-1996. It was rejected on 3-7-1996. Though the entire file was received on 26-6-1996, it was placed before the Dy. Chief Minister only on 3-7-1996. There is no sufficient explanation for this delay in placing the matter before the Dy. Chief Minister. Hence in this case also, we are not satisfied about the manner in which the paper has been processed and there is no proper and sufficient explanation for the delay in disposal of the representation and hence on this ground, the order of detention is liable to be quashed even in this case. 15. In Writ Petition No. 87/96, one of the points urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the detention order and the grounds of detention are signed on different dates and not simultaneously and, therefore, the order is liable to be struck down. 15. In Writ Petition No. 87/96, one of the points urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the detention order and the grounds of detention are signed on different dates and not simultaneously and, therefore, the order is liable to be struck down. It was pointed out that the grounds of detention have been signed on 29-3-1996 but the order of detention bears a rubber stamp dated 2-4-1996 and hence both were not prepared nor signed on the same day and on this ground the order of detention is liable to be set aside. Reliance was placed on 1987(1) S.C. (Crimes)811, (Mithalal v. State of Maharashtra)27; unreported judgment dated 7-3-1986 of Supreme Court in Cri. Writ Petition No. 97/86, (Sunderlal v. State)28; judgment dated 7-6-1994 in Cr. W. P. No. 685/94, (Abdul Kadar v. State of Maharashtra)29; judgment dated 14-9-1987 in Cri.W.P. No. 843/87, (Balkrishana v. State of Maharashtra)30 and judgment dated 6-10-1983 in W.P. No. 183/83, (Mahendrakumar v. Gawai and others)31. We have perused all these judgments. In all these cases, detention order has been issued first and subsequently the grounds of detention had come into being. It was, therefore, pointed out that the grounds of detention can never be subsequent to the order of detention and it must be contemporaneously along with the detention order. The learned Counsel appearing for the State, Mr. Aney produced the original file and pointed out that both the order of detention and the grounds of detention were prepared on the same day i.e. on 29-3-1986. We have perused the original file. In the original file, the concerned officer has made an entry that the detention order and the grounds are prepared and he directed the office to get their translation and this bears the signature and date as 29-3-1986. Then further entry on 2-4-1996 shows that the translation has been received and he has ordered to issue both the order and the grounds of detention. It is, therefore, seen that both the grounds of detention and the order were prepared on 29-3-1996 and they have been simultaneously issued on 2-4-1996. For this, there is also intrinsic evidence in the ground of detention itself. We may refer to para 57 of the grounds of detention, where it is mentioned that the Detaining Authority is hereby communicated the grounds of detention on which detention order has been made by him. For this, there is also intrinsic evidence in the ground of detention itself. We may refer to para 57 of the grounds of detention, where it is mentioned that the Detaining Authority is hereby communicated the grounds of detention on which detention order has been made by him. This also shows that the detention order was very much there and it means that both detention order and grounds of detention have been prepared at the same time and they have been issued at the same time. Hence we do not find any merit in this ground urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioners. 16. In Cri.W. P. No. 88/96, one more serious challenge is made to the grounds of detention to the effect that the order is bad for non-application of mind in referring to earlier revoked order of detention. In para 55 of grounds of detention, a reference is made to an earlier order of detention issued against the detenu in 1984 and it is stated that he has not learnt any lesson from the action taken against him and he is indulging in the same activities. The learned Counsel for the petitioners contended that when the Detaining Authority refers to an earlier revoked order of detention his subjective satisfaction is impaired and on this ground the order is liable to be struck down. He has relied upon three unreported judgments, which are : judgment dated 16-6-1996 in the case of (Mangesh Koli v. S. Ramamurthy and others)32 in Cri.W.P. No. 1614/92 of Bombay High Court; judgment dated 10-8-1986 in Cri.W.P. No. 1277/95, (Vijay v. Union of India)33 of Bombay High Court and judgment dated 3-3-1992 in Cri.W.P. No. 527/91 of Delhi High Court (Smt. Nashima v. Union of India)34, where it has been held that where the detention order makes a reference to and rely on an earlier revoked order or quashed order of detention, then it amounts to non-application of mind and it impairs the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority and on this ground order is liable to be set aside. The only reply by the learned Counsel appearing for the State is that this is a passing reference or a narration of fact and not the material which was taken into consideration by the Detaining Authority in forming subject satisfaction. The only reply by the learned Counsel appearing for the State is that this is a passing reference or a narration of fact and not the material which was taken into consideration by the Detaining Authority in forming subject satisfaction. He also relied on A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 1736, (Sonam Yongde v. State of Sikkim)35 but we find that the said decision has no relevance to the point under consideration. This decision does not refer to an earlier revoked or quashed order of detention. In our view, the learned Counsel for the petitioners is right in his submission that it is not a case of mere passing reference or mere narration of facts. A perusal of para 55 of grounds of detention shows that the Detaining Authority has referred to the earlier order of 1984 and further mentions that the detenu has not learnt anything from the legal action taken against him and he is still repeatedly dealing in the same business etc. Therefore, this is not a case of mere passing reference. The Detaining Authority has taken into consideration the previous revoked order while reaching the subjective satisfaction. Hence we hold that the subjective satisfaction has been impaired by considering impermissible and irrelevant matter while reaching subjective satisfaction. 17. In Cri.W. P. No. 134/96, one of the points urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that there was delay in issuing the order of detention. It is pointed out that when the detention orders regarding other detenus concerning the same case have been issued on 16-3-1996 and again on 29-3-1996, there is further delay in issuing the present order of detention against this detenu as late as on 4-5-1996. It is true that the detention order against three detenus was issued on 16-3-1996 and those orders were revoked and fresh orders were issued on 29-3-1996. Both the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners and State have invited our attention to few authorities on the point where there is discussion about delay in passing the detention order. There is no dispute that the detention order should be passed without any unnecessary delay. The question whether there is delay in a given case or not depends upon facts and circumstances of that case. Hence it is not necessary to refer to the decisions cited by both sides since there is no dispute on position of law viz. There is no dispute that the detention order should be passed without any unnecessary delay. The question whether there is delay in a given case or not depends upon facts and circumstances of that case. Hence it is not necessary to refer to the decisions cited by both sides since there is no dispute on position of law viz. that there should be no undue delay in passing the detention order. 18. In the present case detention order regarding three detenus were issued on 29-3-1996; against one detenu had been issued on 9-4-1996 and against the present detenu on 4-5-1996. The Detaining Authority has given some explanation as to how this delay occurred since he has to collect some more material against the detenu. Delay of one month and few days in a grave matter like this cannot be said to be undue or unreasonable delay so as to snap the live link between the order of detention and the purpose of detention. It cannot be said that because of delay of one month and few days, the matter has become stale. Having regard to the gravity of charges against the petitioners this delay of one month and few days can by no means be said to be unreasonable or undue delay so as to snap the live link between the prejudicial gravity and the order of detention. We, therefore, find sufficient force in the contention of Mr. Aney, learned Counsel for the State and Mr. Page learned Counsel for the Sponsoring Authority that this is not a case of undue or unreasonable delay at all. Hence we reject the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners in this case on the point of delay. 19. In view of the fact that the petitioners are entitled to succeed on two grounds, which we have mentioned above, it is not necessary to consider some other more contentions urged by the learned Counsel for petitioners. We are conscious of the fact that the order of detention of these detenus, who are alleged to be indulging in illicit trafficking of drugs are liable to be quashed on technical grounds. As far as the law of preventive detention is concerned, the law is very strict and the Courts have no choice if there is a violation of constitutional or statutory provisions in issuing the detention order. As far as the law of preventive detention is concerned, the law is very strict and the Courts have no choice if there is a violation of constitutional or statutory provisions in issuing the detention order. We are not unmindful of the gravity of the allegations made against the petitioners. Our reply to this can be best stated in the words of the Supreme Court in the case of (Ratansing and another v. State of Punjab)36 reported in A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1, where the Apex Court has observed as follows :- May be that the detenu is a smuggler, whose tribe (and how their numbers increase) deserves no sympathy since its activities have paralysed the India Economy. But the laws of preventive detention afford only a modicum of safeguards to persons detained under them and its freedom and liberty are to have any meaning in our democratic set up. It is essential that at least those safeguards are not denied to the detenus. Similar view is expressed by the Apex Court in A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 814, (Kamla v. State of Maharashtra)37 and also in A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 746, (Francis v. The Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi)38. There are many more decisions of the Apex Court expressing the same view and it is not necessary to refer to all of them. In all these three cases, the detenus are in custody not only as per the detention order but also in the regular criminal cases registered against them under N.D.P.S. Act. Hence there is no question of their being released immediately due to the detention order being quashed. They have to be in custody and face trial in two cases filed against them before the Sessions Court at Amravati and Akola. 20. In the result, all the three criminal writ petitions are hereby allowed. The impugned orders of detention pertaining to the three detenus concerned in these writ petitions are hereby quashed. All the three detenus shall be released forthwith, if not required in any other case. Petitions allowed. -----