Judgment :- Koshy, J. Petitioner in this original petition was appointed in the Government Analysts Laboratory of the Health Service Department as Technical Assistant Grade II on 3-9-1962. Later, he was promoted as Technical Assistant Grade I in 1964. He got further promotion as Junior Research Officer on 4-5-1966. Petitioner possesses Diploma in Food Technology. According to the seniority list published by order dated 18-10-1983 (Ext. PI) petitioner is given rank No. 14 and third respondent is given rank No. 44. By Ext. P2 G.O. (MS) No. 245/75/ Health dated 31-10-1974 there was quota for M.Sc. degree holders for promotion to the post of Research Officers. The ratio of 3:1 between M.Sc. degree holders and non-M.Sc. degree holders was prescribed by Ext. P2. By Ext. P3 G.O. No. 10/75/ Health dated 8-1-1975 it was clarified by the Government that Ext. P2 is applicable in the Government Analysts Laboratory also. Therefore, persons possessing B.Sc. in Chemistry, first or second class, and Diploma holders were considered for promotion in the non-M.Sc. quota. Thereafter, by Ext. P10 order, G.O. (MS) No. 36/85/HD dated 20-2-1985 Government prescribed 4:1 ratio for promotion to the cadre of Research Officers from candidates possessing M. Sc. in Chemistry or Bio-Chemistry or Associate ship Diploma of the Institution of Chemists or B.Sc. in Chemistry, first or second class, with five years experience in the analysis of food and water in one group and Diploma in Food Technology in the other group. The ratio was fixed as4;1. According to the petitioner, special rules prescribing quota between degree holders and diploma holders for promotion to the category of Research Officer is incorrect. All these persons were fused into one category of junior Research Officer and were discharging the same duties and functions. Therefore, there cannot be any quota for promotion to the higher category based on their qualifications. Based upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Mohammed Shajat All v. Union of India (A.I.R.)1974 SC 1631) and in Velappan v. Chandran & Others (1975 KLT 801) it was contended that fixation of quota is violative of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Based upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Mohammed Shajat All v. Union of India (A.I.R.)1974 SC 1631) and in Velappan v. Chandran & Others (1975 KLT 801) it was contended that fixation of quota is violative of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Since conflicting views were expressed in E. C. George & another v. State of Kerala (1983 KLT 746); in Raj an v. State of Kerala & others (1983 KLT 978) and in Pushpadharan v. Food Corporation of India (1983 KLT 987) the matter was referred to a Division Bench. 2. The challenge in this original petition is only with regard to the special rule proscribing quota between degree holders and diploma holders for promotion to the category of Research Officer in Government Analytical Laboratories by Ext. P10 order. By Ext. P10ordercandidatespossessingM.Sc. in Chemistry or B.Sc in Chemistry, first or second class, with five years experience in the analysis of food and water were treated as one category and holders of Diploma in Food Technology were treated as another category and 4:1 ratio was fixed. The earlier decisions of this Court mentioned earlier were now resolved by the Supreme Court decision in T.R. Kothandaraman & others v., Tamil Nadu Water Supply & Drainage BD & Others (1994) 6 SCC 282). It was held by the Supreme Court that there is no constitutional infirmity in the classification based on educational qualifications. In the above case between degree, holders and diploma holders, a ratio of 3:2 was fixed by Special Rules for Tamil Nadu Agricultural Engineering Service. Supreme Court found that the above classification based on educational qualification is reasonable and not violative of Article 14 of 16 of the Constitution. The entire case law on the subject were discussed by the Supreme Court. In paragraph 16 of the judgment the Court held as follows. "From what has been stated above, the following legal propositions emerge regarding educational qualification being a basis of classification relating to promotion in public service: (1) Higher educational qualification is a permissible basis of classification, acceptability of which will depend on (lie facts and circumstances of each case. (2) Higher educational qualification can be the basis not only for barring promotion, but also for restricting the scope of promotion. (3) Restriction placed cannot however go to the extent of seriously jeopardising the chances of promotion. (2) Higher educational qualification can be the basis not only for barring promotion, but also for restricting the scope of promotion. (3) Restriction placed cannot however go to the extent of seriously jeopardising the chances of promotion. To decide this, the extent of restriction shall have also to be looked into to ascertain whether it is reasonable. Reasons for this are being indicated later." As held by the Supreme Court at paragraph 23 of the judgment by maintaining the ratio between diploma holders and degree holders reasonableness of classification is maintained. 3. It was contended by the petitioner that the historical aspects also should be looked into, by fixing the ratio. The Supreme Court was categoric in holding mat educational qualifications can be raised for classification. In the very same department there was classification and quota based on educational qualifications from 1974 onwards, as can be seen from Ext. P2. Therefore it cannot be held that for historical reasons ratio cannot be maintained and quota cannot be given on the basis of educational qualification. 4. We are not given any material to hold that the ratio fixed is arbitrary or malafide. The decision of the Supreme Court of India in Chandran v. Board of Revenue (1995(1) KLT 12) also shows that prescription of ratio based on educational qualification is constitutionally valid. As the Supreme Court has categorically held that the ratio for quota can be fixed for promotion based on educational qualification, we see no ground for quashing Ext. P10 order. Therefore, we dismiss this original petition. Each parties are directed to suffer their respective costs.