Judgment F.I. Rebello, J. The appellant herein is the original defendant No. 1. Respondent Nos. 2 to 6 have been subsequently added as defendants in the suit. 2. The respondent No. 1 filed a suit on 15th January, 1992, praying therein for a declaration that agreements dated 28th June, 1982, Exhibits 'B' and 'C' to the plaint were valid, subsisting and binding on the appellant herein and that they stood renewed upto 30th June, 2000 and that the appellant here was bound and liable to specifically perform the obligations. A further prayer was sought for specific performance of the obligations under the two agreements by the appellant herein, and more so, the obligations not to act in any manner contrary to or inconsistent with the terms and conditions contained in the aforesaid agreements. A permanent injunction was also prayed for to restrain the appellant. her agents and servants from in any manner acting inconsistent with or contrary to the terms and conditions contained in the aforesaid two agreements or in any manner, disturbing the possession of the respondent No. 1 in respect of the mine delineated in red in Exhibit 'A' to the plaint, and or proceeding on a footing that the two agreements have expired or come to an end on 30th June, 1991 and or from extracting iron ore from the mine or permitting any person either than plaintiffs from extracting ore from the mines. Interim reliefs were also sought for. In fact, a separate application for interim relief under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 was filed on 16th January, 1992. 3. In the plaint, the respondent No. 1 alleged that the respondent No.1 by letter dated 20th June, 1991 addressed to the appellant had exercised the option to renew the said two agreements for a further period of 9 years. The respondent No. 1 has pleaded that the said letter was forwarded to the appellant by hand delivery and was duly received by the appellant on or about 28th June, 1991. The respondent No. 1 has pleaded that the said letter was forwarded to the appellant by hand delivery and was duly received by the appellant on or about 28th June, 1991. It was the contention of the respondent No. 1 that in spite of receipt of the said letter, the defendant has neither denied the contents thereof nor raised any protest and accordingly, the said two agreements have been duly and validly renewed and are valid and continue to remain in force for a further period of 9 years from 1st July, 1991 upto 30th June, 2000. The respondent No. 1, in para 27 of the plaint has further averred that on 11th January, 1992, when the employees of the respondents were operating the machinery for extraction of iron ore and were in process of extracting iron ore, the appellant herein through her servants and her agents or representatives prevented the respondent's workers from carrying on the extraction of iron ore on the false and untenable ground that the said two agreements had allegedly expired. It is further contended in the said paragraph that the workers, not being aware of the correct facts and not desirous to raise disputes left the mining concession and reported the matter to the Director of the respondents. In para 28, it is contended that these facts were communicated to the appellant by the respondent No. 1 by letter dated 11th January, 1992. 4. The plaint was lodged before the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Bicholim. On the relevant date, the charge of the post of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Bicholim was with the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Ponda. The appellant herein had filed a caveat before the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Bicholim. The Civil Judge, Senior Division, Pond a noted the fact that the caveat had been filed but relying on a judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court granted ad-interim ex parte relief on 17th January, 1992. It is necessary to reproduce a part of the ex parte order passed :- "I am satisfied with arguments of Ramesh Sardessai that this Court can grant ex parte injunction and relied on AIR 1981 Andhra Pradesh 246 where it is held that interim order passed without giving notice to caveator is not without jurisdiction and is operative till set aside in appropriate proceeding. He brought to my notice agreement of extraction and transport of iron ore dated 28th June, 1982 and particularly clause 1 of the agreement which reads that an agreement shall remain in force for a period of 9 years commencing from 1st July, 1982 and shall be renewable at the option of the second party for a further period of 9 years on the same terms and conditions, I have been shown the option letter dated 26th September, 1991. Prima facie, therefore, the lease is renewed for further period of 9 years. Assuming the said letter is not received by the defendant, the plaintiff is in possession of the property prima facie from the documents. The machinery of the plaintiff is in the said mine. The plaintiff has made one prima facie case." For the aforesaid reason, the trial Court granted the ex parte injunction. 5. At this juncture, it may be relevant to have a look at the two agreements based on which, the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division had granted ex parte injunction. First, between the appellant and respondent No.1, which is an agreement for extraction, and transport of iron ore dated 28th June, 1982. Clause 1 of the said agreement reads as under :- ''This agreement shall remain in force for a period of 9 years commencing from 1st July, 1982 and shall be renewable by mutual agreement between the parties for a further period of 9 years on the same terms and conditions as are contained herein." Clause (16) reads as under:- ''The second party does not claim any right in the said mine nor ownership in the iron ore underground and will not be called upon to directly or indirectly finance the mining operations of the first party." The second agreement dated 28th June, 1982 is between appellant herein and V.M. Salgaocar and Brothers Private Limited, which is the agreement for sale of iron ore. Clause 1 of the said agreement reads as under:- ''This agreement shall remain in force for a period of 9 years commencing from 1st July, 1982. Clause 1 of the said agreement reads as under:- ''This agreement shall remain in force for a period of 9 years commencing from 1st July, 1982. This agreement, may be renewed for a further period of 9 years subject to mutual agreement between the parties." These clauses have been extracted as at the time of grant of ex parte injunction, the Civil Judge, Senior Division, who passed the order had observed that the agreements shall remain in force for a period of 9 years commencing from 1st July, 1982, and shall be renewed for a period of 9 years at the option of the second party on the same terms and conditions. 6. Aggrieved by the said ex parte order, the appellant herein preferred an appeal before this Court which was numbered as Appeal From Order No.8 of 1992. An application was moved on 25th February 1992 before this Court annexing therewith an application dated 7th February, 1992 by respondent No. 1 filed before the civil Court and praying therein that the appellant does not press the appeal and the same may be dismissed as not pressed. The said appeal then was disposed of by order dated 28th February, 1992 by a single Judge of this Court. 7. Some other facts may also be noted. The late husband of the appellant was earlier the holder of the mining concession known as "Gulliam e Gaval", a concession/lease having a total area of 87.550 hectares. The said mining concession was divided into three parts. In one part, the extraction rights were given to Fomento. In the middle portion, M/s. Agarwal had the right and in one portion, it was the respondent No. 1 herein who had the right of extraction. In fact, the first agreement for extraction of the said portion which is known as the eastern portion of the mine was first entered into on 26th October, 1970 between Anil V. Salgaocar and late Manohar Parulekar with effect from 1st November, 1970 to 30th June, 1975. On 10th May, 1972, by an Addendum, it was agreed that the agreements would remain in force till 30th June, 1982. On 28th June, 1982, the agreement was entered into between the respondent No. 1 and the appellant. On 10th May, 1972, by an Addendum, it was agreed that the agreements would remain in force till 30th June, 1982. On 28th June, 1982, the agreement was entered into between the respondent No. 1 and the appellant. Similarly, there were agreements for sale of the ore extracted, the first such agreement being of 21st October, 1970 between the late husband of the appellant and V.M. Salgaocar and Brothers Private Limited for a period commencing from 1st November, 1970 to 30th June, 1975. By an addendum dated 10th May, 1972, the said agreement was to remain in force till 30th June, 1982. On 28th June, 1982, the agreement of sale was entered into between this appellant and V.M. Salgaocar and Brothers Private Limited, which was to expire on 30th June, 1991. A letter has been produced on behalf of the respondent No. 1 that and or from 1st July, 1989, the right of V.M. Salgaocar and Brothers Private Limited were assigned in favour of respondent No. 1. It is also an admitted position that between 1st July, 1982 to 30th June, 1991, there was no extraction done by the respondent No. 1. Subsequent to the grant of the ex parte injunction, there are some events which have to be noted. The ex parte injunction was granted on 17th January, 1992. There is a letter dated 22nd January, 1992 from the Director of respondent No. 1 addressed to the appellant. The clauses of the said letter are important and are, therefore, being extracted herein below. The said letter is purported to be with reference to the discussions the Director of respondent No. 1 had with the appellant on 20th instant at her residence and is to confirm according to the respondent No. 1 the acceptance and agreement to the following terms:- 1. That we will extract a minimum quantity of 150,000 metric tonnes of are per year from the area given to us of your Gulliam e Gaval situated at Pissurlem with effect from 1st April, 1992. 2. That we will pay you additional one rupee per tonne being the difference of cost of extraction and transport and the sale price which will provide you a guaranteed and minimum regular income of Rs.50,000/- every month. 3. 2. That we will pay you additional one rupee per tonne being the difference of cost of extraction and transport and the sale price which will provide you a guaranteed and minimum regular income of Rs.50,000/- every month. 3. That as agreed, we are enclosing herewith our cheque No.380985 dated 22nd January, 1992 drawn on Bank of India, Margao for Rs.5,00,000/- being the security deposit towards the extraction and transportation performance of yearly minimum quantity of 150,000 metric tonnes. This security deposit is to the adjusted against the quantity to be extracted during 1st April, 1992 to 31st March, 1993 by mutual discussions. The next letter is a letter dated 5th February, 1992 from the Director of respondent No. 1 to the appellant. This letter is supposed to be in furtherance of letter dated 22nd January, 1992 and pertains to discussion, the details of operation of the, mine. The said letter has four clauses which may be summarised as under:- Clause No. 1 pertains to short fall in extraction in terms of the agreement dated 3rd November, 1995 and for the short fall an amount of Rs.6,83,997/- at the rate of Re. 1/- per tonne has been paid by a Bank Draft to the appellant; By the second clause, the respondent No. 1 contends that though there was no stipulation for the minimum tonnage to be extracted during the period of agreement from 1st July, 1982 to 30th June, 1991, however, on discussion, the respondents agreed to pay a compensation at the rate of Re. 1/- per tonne for a quantity of 750,000 tonnes in respect thereof a Bank Cheque for an amount of Rs.750,000/- and payable to the appellant was given being the amount payable as penalty; In clause 3, it is set out that the period from 18th January, 1992 to 4th February, 1992, the respondents had extracted and transported a quantity of 360813.4 tonnes of iron ore and as per the understanding, the respondents had agreed to pay the difference at the rate of Rs.4.50 per tonne of iron ore extracted of grade 62% and for that purpose, a Bank Cheque for an amount of Rs.165,660/- was enclosed drawn in favour of the appellant. The last clause is important and is being reproduced as under :- "You have also agreed to submit immediately necessary application to the Hon'ble Civil Judge, Senior Division, Bicholim and the Hon'ble High Court of Judicature, Panaji with prayer for granting 6 months time for all parties to the suit 3 of 1992 at Bicholim to arrive at an amicable settlement whilst the present operation of the mine would be maintained and continued uninterrupted as per ex parte order dated 17th January, 1992 passed by the Hon'ble Judge, Senior Division, Bicholim." Thereafter, another cheque in an amount of Rs.8,00,000/- was issued in exchange for the cheque in an amount of Rs.750,000/- and a payment voucher setting out that the said amount of Rs.8,00,000/- is as a security deposit for operating Pissurlem mine. Pursuant to the last letter dated 5th February, 1992, both the parties have been moving application before the Courts. On 11th February, 1992, an application was moved on behalf of the respondent No. 1 before this Court in Appeal From Order No.8 of 1992 setting out therein that the appellant has settled the dispute with the respondent and the settlement is reflected in two letters dated 22nd January, 1992 and 5th February, 1992 and praying that under these circumstances, the appeal be dismissed. Earlier to that, on 7th February, 1992, an application was moved on behalf of the respondent No. 1 herein setting out that the parties are trying for a settlement out of the Court and to adjourn the matter to some other date. Thereafter, one more application was moved on behalf of the respondent No. 1 herein on 27th February, 1992, setting out therein that the parties in the above suit are negotiating settlement and it was mutually agreed that time of 6 months be given for filing the terms of settlement, failing which the respondent No. 1 will file rejoinder. The consent given by the appellant for adjournment was noted on the said application. Time was, therefore, sought. On 17th June, 1992, another application was moved on behalf of the respondent No. 1 that the matter is likely to be settled and to adjourn it to some further date. Subsequent to that, there is one letter written by the appellant herein dated 1st August, 1992. Time was, therefore, sought. On 17th June, 1992, another application was moved on behalf of the respondent No. 1 that the matter is likely to be settled and to adjourn it to some further date. Subsequent to that, there is one letter written by the appellant herein dated 1st August, 1992. In the said letter, the appellant herein wrote to the Director of the respondent drawing the attention of the Director of the respondent to the various events that have taken place and more specifically setting out that there was an understanding between the appellant and the Director of respondent No. 1 that the matter would be amicably settled within a period of 6 months. Attention of the Director of the appellant was drawn to the last paragraph of letter dated 5th February, 1992. Thereafter, attention has been invited to the various applications moved for adjournment of the matter for arriving at a settlement. Attention was also invited that the matter stood posted on 7th August, 1992. It was further informed that till date, no effective steps have been taken by the Director of respondent No. 1. It was further pointed out that no works had been carried out in the mine from March, 1992 and until the monsoons. The appellant informed that if no settlement is arrived at, the matter would be proceeded with on 7th August, 1992, unless the matter is finalised before that date. In the said letter, it was also informed that the basic idea was that extraction costs works out to Rs.70/- per wet ton and the sale price is fixed at Rs.85/- and the minimum quantity that must be compulsorily extracted should be 2,00,000 ton of grade 56% Fe above per annum. The letter ended by the appellant informing the Director of respondent No. 1 that she hoped that he will amicably settle the matter and get executed the necessary agreements before 5th August, 1992 or at least before 7th August, 1992, the day on which the matter was posted before the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Bicholim. There was no reply to the said letter, 8. The respondent No. 1 on 7th August, 1992, moved an application for amendment of the plaint as also for addition of parties. There was no reply to the said letter, 8. The respondent No. 1 on 7th August, 1992, moved an application for amendment of the plaint as also for addition of parties. On behalf of the respondents, a reply was filed on 26th August, 1992 setting out therein that even though the ex parte order which had been issued cannot be sustained on the facts which were existing as on the date of the ex parte order, since the plaintiff has brought out some new facts which occurred after filing of the suit, the defendant does not oppose the introduction of the amendment as per schedule and reserves her rights to file affidavit-in-reply to the same. The said amendment was allowed and in fact, the amendments were carried out to the plaint on 9th September, 1992 as can be seen from the plaint itself. The amendments carried out were based on the correspondence exchanged by the respondent No. 1 subsequent to the ex parte order. One of the important amendments was to prayer (b) to which, the following modifications were made:- 1. The plaintiff shall be required to extract a minimum quantity of Rs.1,50,000/- metric tonnes of ore per year from the said mine with effect from 1st April, 1992; 2. The first defendant would be entitled to receive an increase of Re. 1/- per metric tonne in addition to the net difference payable to the first defendant by the plaintiffs under the said two agreements dated 28th June, 1982 for all the grades of ore having 58% Fe and above; 3. The first defendant would be entitled to a minimum sum of Rs.50,000/- per month or Rs.6,00,000/- per year whether any ore is extracted and transported or not; and 4. Any sum short paid or not paid by the plaintiffs under the said agreements, would be adjustable against from the security deposit of Rs.13,00,000/- placed by plaintiffs with the first defendant. Consequent to the addition of the parties with whom the appellant herein had entered into agreements dated 12th October, 1991 as well as the agreement dated 26th August, 1992, whereby agreement of 12th October, 1991 was modified, prayer for cancellation of the said agreements was also prayed for. An additional prayer prayed for was Prayer EE which needs to be reproduced as it is also material for the disposal of this interim application. An additional prayer prayed for was Prayer EE which needs to be reproduced as it is also material for the disposal of this interim application. Prayer EE reads as under:- "The first defendant herein be ordered and directed to specifically perform her obligations under the said two agreements dated 28th June, 1982 by forthwith executing an agreement/agreements with regard to the Western part of the said mining concession delineated in brown colour boundary lines on the plan Exhibit 'A' hereto on the same terms and conditions as contained in the above two agreements dated 28th June, 1992 as modified above." 9. In sum and substance, it was the contention of respondent No. 1 that before the ex parte injunction dated 17th January, 1982 pursuant to the exchange of correspondence and payment of monies by the respondent No.1 to the appellant, the agreements dated 28th June, 1982 stood renewed for a further period upto 30th June, 2000, The modifications to the agreement dated 28th June, 1982 were pleaded as set out in prayer (b). That apart, besides the Eastern portion which was given to the respondent No. 1 for extraction and transportation of ore, the Western portion which was earlier with Agarwals and the subject matter of an agreement with added defendant No.2, present respondent No.2 was claimed as a part of the modified agreement on the same terms and conditions as the two agreements dated 28th February, 1982. Insofar as the payments made, it was pleaded that earlier along with letter dated 22nd January, 1992, an amount of Rs.5,00,000/- had been paid as security deposit. That subsequently, a cheque in an amount of Rs.7,50,000/- had been returned by the appellant as she did not want to claim compensation by way of penalty and instead, a cheque in an amount of Rs.8,00,000/- as security deposit for operating Pissurlem mine was issued, which was received by the Power of Attorney of the appellant and as such, an amount of Rs.13,00,000/- for the operation of the mine had been received by the appellant from the respondent No. 1 in acceptance of the renewal of both the agreements dated 28th June, 1982. 10. The appellant herein filed her Written Statement to the plaint as amended. The Written Statement was filed on 25th September, 1992. 10. The appellant herein filed her Written Statement to the plaint as amended. The Written Statement was filed on 25th September, 1992. It is not necessary to advert in length to the contents of the Written Statement except briefly referring to the sum and substance of the said Written Statement. It was the contention of the appellant herein that the original agreement dated 26th August, 1992 had expired and had not been renewed. That is fact, the appellant thereafter had entered into agreements which included agreement dated 12th October, 1991 to extract and transport ore with Kala Mines and Minerals, a Partnership Firm and a sale agreement of 12th October, 1991, between the appellant and Shri Shantaram A. Kantak. That the agreement for extraction was for a period of 7 years commencing from 12th October, 1991 and ending on 11th October, 1998 and included the portion earlier which had been contracted to the respondent No. 1 and the Western portion thereof, which is Exhibit 'A' had been shown as contracted to with M/s. Agarwal. That the sale agreement was in respect of the ore extracted from the said portion. It was further pleaded that after the ex parte injunction was obtained on 17th January, 1992, the Director of respondent No. 1 approached the appellant and pleaded that she should settle the matter with him as otherwise, he would lose face. The appellant agreed that she had received an amount of Rs.5,00,000/- but denied the receipt of letter dated 22nd January, 1992. The appellant has explained that though she had received the cheque in an amount of Rs.5,00,000/- yet the appellant did not encash the same as at the relevant time, the agreement with respondent No. 2 was still in force. The agreement with Kala Mines was modified by agreement dated 26th February, 1992, which has been described as amendment to the agreement dated 12th September, 1991, by which amendment, the portion earlier from which the respondent No. 1 was allowed to extract ore and wherein permission was granted to respondent No. 2 was excluded. It is then pointed out that the cheque was presented for payment thereafter on 27th February, 1992 and payment thereof was received on 6th March, 1992. The appellant admits the receipt of the various amounts as contained in letter dated 5th February, 1992. The respondent. It is then pointed out that the cheque was presented for payment thereafter on 27th February, 1992 and payment thereof was received on 6th March, 1992. The appellant admits the receipt of the various amounts as contained in letter dated 5th February, 1992. The respondent. However, denies that the cheque for Rs.7,50,000/- was returned and the cheque for Rs.8,00,000/- was in turn received in terms set out by respondent No. 1. In fact, in the Written Statement, in answer to paragraph 36K under sub para 36K(q)(d)(vi), the appellant has averred as under:- "The defendant would return the cheque of Rs.7,50,000/- not to say that the figure of Rs.7,50,000/- under second head was accepted, and plaintiff would issue cheque of amount different than Rs.7,50,000/- that is either Rs.7,50,000/- or Rs.8,00,000/- so that this amount is considered as security towards payment of past dues during the extraction until the terms are settled or 6 months period, is over whichever is earlier." In para 36K, the appellant has stated that there was no agreement but discussions with the Director of the respondent No. 1 and pursuant to which certain agreements were arrived at which are incorporated in paragraph 36K(q)(d). It is the case of the appellant that as such there was no concluded contract between the respondent No. 1 and the appellant. In fact, the various applications moved by the respondent No. 1 before the trial Court were by itself an indication that parties were yet to arrive at a settlement. The appellant has further denied that the only controversy a in dispute which remained to have been resolved was the Western portion earlier with M/s. Agarwals as was sought to be contended by the respondent and that was resolved on the appellant receiving the sum of Rs.8,00,000/- as security deposit. The appellant further contended that at any rate, the respondent has no right as the contract of 1982 had come to an end and at the highest, the contracts were contracts for raising and transporting of ore which ore belongs to the appellant and the subsequent sale of the ore to the respondent No. 1. The appellant further contended that at any rate, the respondent has no right as the contract of 1982 had come to an end and at the highest, the contracts were contracts for raising and transporting of ore which ore belongs to the appellant and the subsequent sale of the ore to the respondent No. 1. It is, therefore, contended that there being no right in the respondent No. 1 and moreso, as set out in the letter of the appellant dated 1st August, 1992, no extraction of ore had been carried out since March, 1992 till the monsoons and according to the respondents themselves from April, 1992 no injunction can be granted in favour of the respondent. The appellant further points out that in terms of the contract of 28th June, 1982, no ore was extracted upto the end of the period of the contract and as such, the equities were not in favour of respondent No. 1 and on the contrary, it is the appellant who was suffering injury. The appellant along with the Written Statement has filed a counterclaim and in respect of the counterclaim has preferred a temporary injunction. The temporary injunction was prayed for in an ex parte form and reads as under:- "It is, therefore, prayed that by way of ex parte temporary injunction the plaintiff/non-applicant be restrained from removing and transporting, beyond the area of the mine, the ore extracted on the strength of the ex parte injunction dated 17th January, 1992." The said application is dated 3rd October, 1992. Insofar as the counterclaim is concerned, the appellant herein has sought an injunction against the respondent No. 1 from extracting ore from the portion marked in red of Exhibit 'A' to the suit and further from removing and transporting ore from the mine beyond the said area of the mine. The appellant also prayed that the respondent be directed to pay the amount of Rs.12,34,292/- towards past dues upto 30th June, 1991 with interest at the rate of 18% per annum. A further prayer was sought to direct the respondent No. 1 to pay an amount of Rs.12,00,000/- payable by the appellant to Kala Mines and Minerals, respondent No.2 with interest at 18%. A further prayer was sought to direct the respondent No. 1 to pay an amount of Rs.12,00,000/- payable by the appellant to Kala Mines and Minerals, respondent No.2 with interest at 18%. The last prayer is important and reads as under :- "The plaintiff be directed to pay the compensation rate of Rs.23/- per tonne (i.e. Rs.15/- difference in selling price and cost of extraction plus Royalty Rs.8/- plus Cess Re. 1/-) for ore already extracted and removed or in case of non extraction minimum compensation of Rs.2,50,000/- per month considering the minimum quantity of Rs.2,00,000/- tonnes per year at the rate of Rs.15/- per tonne with interest at the rate of 18% per annum." Both the appellant and respondents have thereafter filed affidavits-in-reply and rejoinder to the respective pleadings. 11. Certain other materials on record may also be considered. In the first instance, it is seen that the ex parte injunction granted by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Bicholim was challenged before this Court by the appellant. A perusal of the pleadings in the Memo of Appeal From Order shows that the appellant herein had specifically pleaded that the agreement could be renewed only by mutual consent and that the order of the trial Court inasmuch as it proceeded on a footing that the respondent No. 1 had exercised the option, disclosed total non application of mind. In fact, a grievance was made by Shri Zaiwalla at the hearing of this appeal that a perusal of the order would show that the Court proceeded on the footing that there was a provision for renewal of the agreement at the option of the respondent No. 1. That it seemed that the Court was given a different copy of the agreement. I called for the records of the trial Court. In the file containing the plaint as also the miscellaneous files, xerox copies of the agreements are on record. In none of the said contracts is there any such clause which, the trial Court has relied on to pass the order. I have also queried the counsel as to whether after the cheques which were received by the appellant, any further monies have been paid more so, after the ex parte injunction dated 17th January, 1992. Counsel for the parties inform me that no further payments have been made by the respondent No. 1 to the appellant. I have also queried the counsel as to whether after the cheques which were received by the appellant, any further monies have been paid more so, after the ex parte injunction dated 17th January, 1992. Counsel for the parties inform me that no further payments have been made by the respondent No. 1 to the appellant. On 12th October, 1991, the appellant No. 1 entered into an agreement with Kala Minerals for extraction of ore for a period of 7 years from 12th October, 1991 upto 11th October, 1998. On the same date, another agreement for purchase of ore was entered into by the appellant with Shri S.S. Kantak, the respondent No. 3 herein for sale of the ore extracted. The agreements with Kala Minerals and Shri S.S. Kantak pertain to two areas of the mine, one in respect of which the respondent No. 1 had an earlier agreement with the appellant and the other portion on the Western side which in plan Exhibit 'A' is shown as to with Agarwals. Pursuant to the cheque of Rs.5,00,000/- received by the appellant from respondent No. 1, the appellant entered into an agreement with Kala Mines and Shri S.S. Kantak to delete the portion which was earlier contracted to respondent No.1 and for that purpose, in fact paid an amount of Rs.10,00,000/- and agreed to pay the balance of Rs.2,00,000/- thereafter to exclude the area from the agreement with Kala Mines and S.S. Kantak. It is only after this agreement that the appellant No. 1 deposited the cheque in an amount of Rs.5,00,000/- which was subsequently encased. These facts are material for disposal of the appeal. 12. The application for injunction that is Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 10/92 filed by the respondent No. 1 and Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 189/92 filed by the appellant herein were disposed of by a common order dated 6th February, 1993. By the said order, the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Bicholim was pleased to a confirm the ex parte temporary injunction granted in favour of respondent No. 1 and was pleased to dismiss Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 189/92 filed by the appellant herein. 13. By the said order, the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Bicholim was pleased to a confirm the ex parte temporary injunction granted in favour of respondent No. 1 and was pleased to dismiss Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 189/92 filed by the appellant herein. 13. In para 9 of the judgment, the trial Court has observed that if there was no agreement between the parties to renew the agreements of 1982, the defendant that is appellant herein should not have received the huge amount of Rs.21,49,637/- from respondent No. 1. In para 10, it is observed that after the expiry of the agreement of 1982, the appellant did not send any notice to respondent No. 1 terminating the agreements and that it was incumbent upon the appellant to inform the respondent No. 1 and V.M. Salgaocar and Brothers Private Limited before entering into the agreement with third parties that is Kala Mines and Minerals, respondent No. 2 herein. The trial Court accepted the case of respondent No. 1 that a letter dated 11th January, 1992 was sent by the respondent No. 1 to the appellant informing the appellant that the agreements of 1982 had been duly renewed pursuant to the letter of 20th June, 1991 and that the mines continued in possession of the respondent No. 1. In para 12, the trial Court has accepted the contention of respondent No. 1 that the agreements of 1982 had been renewed. In para 13, the trial Judge has addressed itself to the question whether the agreements of 1982 can be read as one. After addressing itself to the said issue, the trial Court went on to discuss the issue as to whether the offer made by respondent No. 1 to the appellant was conditional or not and held that once conditional offer was made and cheque accepted and encashed, the parties were stopped by doctrine of estoppel. Dealing with the issue of the validity of the assignment relied on by the respondent No. 1 insofar as the contract for sale of iron ore is concerned, the Court went on to hold that under the family settlement between the families of the Director of respondent No.1 and those of V.M. Salgaocar and Brothers Private Limited, the respondent No. 1 had proved that under the family settlement and individual capacity, both the agreements of 1982 had been renewed by him. The trial Court further proceeded to say that at any rate, evidence of the parties is required to be adduced on that issue. Thereafter, the Court has dealt with the issue of letters dated 5th February, 1992, under which, payments were made as contended and explained by the appellant and the amount of Rs.8,00,000/- and the voucher dated 3rd April, 1992 as contended on behalf of the respondent to explain the return of cheque of Rs.7,50,000/- for the purpose of holding that the respondent No. 1 had proved prima facie case to confirm the ex parte injunction. Addressing itself to the issue of balance of convenience, the Court held that the same is in favour of respondent No. 1 as the appellant had received Rs.21,49,637/- from the respondent No. 1 during the pendency of the temporary injunction application and that a the respondent No. 1 had paid amounts for previous years which in law, he was not bound to pay and further that the terms and conditions of the agreement by the respondent with the third parties are moderate compared to what the terms sought for by the appellant from the respondent. The Court further proceeded to set out that the respondent No. 1 had agreed to pay Rs.50,000/- per month as per para 2 of the letter dated 29th February, 1992, even if the respondent does not extract any minimum quantity from the mine. The Court further proceeded to hold that even if the appellant had entered into agreement with Kala Mines, the same cannot bind the respondent No. 1 as the dispute between the respondent No. 1 and the appellant is sub judice for the Court. The Court rejected the contention of the appellant that possession of the suit mine was given to third party after the agreement, as the third party had not come forward to seek injunction against the respondent No. 1 and on the contrary, it is the respondent No.1 who had approached the Court. The Court thereafter proceeded to confirm the ex parte injunction which was granted in favour of the appellant as otherwise. The respondent No. 1 would suffer injury and consequently the order. 14. At the hearing of the appeal, Shri Zaiwalla on behalf of the appellants contended:- 1. The Court thereafter proceeded to confirm the ex parte injunction which was granted in favour of the appellant as otherwise. The respondent No. 1 would suffer injury and consequently the order. 14. At the hearing of the appeal, Shri Zaiwalla on behalf of the appellants contended:- 1. That the respondent had failed to make out a prima facie case either of extension of agreement of 82 or that there was any oral settlement that the agreement was to continue upto 2002 in terms of the letters dated 22nd January, 1992 and 5th February, 1992; 2. That the acceptance of the amount towards the past dues and as set out in the said letter by itself created no contract because the letter of 5th February, 1992 expressly provided that parties would arrive at an amicable settlement within 6 months and that the settlement was not arrived at; 3. That the balance of convenience was not in favour of the respondent looking at the past conduct of the respondent No. 1 wherein the respondent No. 1 from 82 onwards had hardly extracted any ore and the fact that the ex parte order was obtained based on purported terms which in fact did not exist as also the conduct of the respondent during the pendency of the hearing of the proceeding pertaining to ex parte injunction in not extracting ore on the premises that place had not been given for dumping of the ore. For all these reasons, Shri Zaiwalla contended that the order of the trial Court must be set aside. In addition, it was pointed out as per the grounds taken in the Memo of Appeal even the new agreement pleaded by letter dated 22nd January, 1992 starts from 1st April, 1992 and its life was for one year that is till March, 1993, which has a since expired. It is the contention of the counsel that this at the highest was a new agreement and not a renewal of the old contract. It is the contention of the counsel that this at the highest was a new agreement and not a renewal of the old contract. In support of his contentions, Shri Zaiwalla has relied on the judgment of a single Judge of this Court in Union of India v. M/s. Babulal in AIR 1968 Bombay 294 for the proposition that a conditional, acceptance would not amount to an acceptance of a contract in terms of Section 8 of the Indian Contract Act and the judgment of the Apex Court in purang Singh Sahni v. Sundari Bhagwandas Kripalani (Smt.) and others reported in 1991 (2) SCC 180 , for the proposition that in terms of the agreement, the Courts had to consider what had transpired before and after the agreement. 15. Shri Dwarkadas appealing on behalf of the respondent No. 1 contended:- 1. That the conduct of the appellant from 1st January, 1992 clearly demonstrates that the contract in question has been renewed; 2. That payments had been made conditionally by the respondent No. 1 to the appellant and had been accepted unconditionally and as such, the conditions on which the payment is made is deemed to have been accepted and as such, there is a concluded contract; 3. That the terms of renewal having been reduced to writing, oral evidence which is at variance cannot be looked into or considered; 4. In any event, by the letter of 20th June, the contract stood renewed and that pursuant to the various documents exchanged the renewal contract is on modified terms as can be spelled out from the various documents: 5. That there was no infirmity in the order of the trial Court dated 6th February, 1993, nor does the order indicate that the trial Judge had acted perversely or had committed any gross irregularity and as such, this Court should not interfere with the said order: 6. That the stand and pleadings of the appellant were such, as also disentitled them to the equitable relief of injunction. It was, therefore, the contention of the learned counsel that the appeal should be dismissed. That the stand and pleadings of the appellant were such, as also disentitled them to the equitable relief of injunction. It was, therefore, the contention of the learned counsel that the appeal should be dismissed. The learned counsel relied on the following judgments Amrit Banspati Company v. Union of India, AIR 1966 Allahabad 104, for the proposition that if an offer is made subject to a condition, the offeree cannot accept the benefit under the offer without accepting the condition and in such a case, the provisions of Section 8 of the Contract Act would apply. In the matter of Navnitlal and Company v. Kishanchand and Company, reported in AIR 56 Bombay 151 for the proposition as to in what manner a contract should be construed. In the case of Delhi Cloth and General Mills Limited v. Union of India, reported in 1988 (1) SCC 86 for the doctrine of promissory estoppel and in the case of M/s. Gujarat Bottling Co. Limited v. Coca Cola Company, AIR 1995 SC 2372 for the proposition that a party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court for equitable relief has to show that he himself was not at fault and that he himself was not responsible for bringing about the state of things complained of and that he was not unfair or inequitable in his dealings with the party against whom he was seeking relief and that his conduct was fair and honest and that these considerations arise not only in respect of person who seeks an order of injunction under Order XXXIX Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure but also in respect of the party approaching the Court for vacating the ad-interim or temporary order already granted in the pending suit or proceedings. The learned counsel for the respondent No.1 has also pointed out that though, a single Judge of this Court had considered the judgment of the Allahabad High Court reported in AIR 1966 Allahabad 104 nonetheless it could not be said that the single Judge had disagreed with the ratio of the judgment in the Allahabad case. 16. The learned counsel for the respondent No.1 has also pointed out that though, a single Judge of this Court had considered the judgment of the Allahabad High Court reported in AIR 1966 Allahabad 104 nonetheless it could not be said that the single Judge had disagreed with the ratio of the judgment in the Allahabad case. 16. The first point to be considered is whether it can be said that the agreement of 28th June, 1982 for the extraction and transport of ore between the respondent No. 1 and the appellant and the agreement of the same date in respect of sale of ore by the appellant to V.M. Salgaocar and Brothers have been renewed on account of the letter dated 20th June, 1991 sent on behalf of the respondent No. 1 to the appellant herein. It may be noted that Shri Zaiwalla at the stage of hearing has not seriously raised a dispute that there has been an assignment in favour of the respondent No. 1 by V.M. Salgaocar and Company insofar as the agreement for sale is concerned. Coming to the agreements themselves, it is seen from clauses already reproduced, that the agreements provided for renewal. in terms of clause 1 of both the agreements, for a further period of 9 years on the expiry of the period of 9 years commencing from 1st July, 1982 by mutual consent. However, what is material to be seen is that the contracts were to be renewed by mutual agreement between the parties. Admittedly, there has been no mutual agreement between the parties. It is, however, the contention of the respondent No. 1 that the agreement had been renewed pursuant to letter of 26th June, 1991 and that the appellant having not protested about the fact and subsequently having accepted monies in furtherance of the old contracts, the same amounts to renewal by implication and or by conduct and consequently, it should be held that the contract stood renewed. The appellant has denied the receipt of letter dated 20th June, 1991, which according to respondent No. 1 was delivered by hand. There is no acknowledgement of receipt of the said letter. The appellant has denied the receipt of letter dated 20th June, 1991, which according to respondent No. 1 was delivered by hand. There is no acknowledgement of receipt of the said letter. Pursuant to the said renewal, the respondent No. 1 has not acted on the contract nor has any correspondence been a exchanged by the respondent No. 1 to the appellant until the letter dated 11th January, 1992, wherein the respondent No.1 complained to the appellant of obstruction at the time of extraction of ore. The respondent No. 1 being a Corporate Body ought to have produced some documentary evidence to show that in fact, the letter dated 20th June, 1991 had been received by the appellant and or some exchange of correspondence to the same effect. On the contrary, the appellant has produced two agreements of 12th October, 1991 one entered into between the appellant and Kala Mines for extraction and transport and the other agreement between the appellant and Shri S.S. Kantak, respondent No. 3 for sale of the ore from the area from which the respondent No. 1 was earlier allowed to extract ore. These contracts would indicate there has been no renewal by mutual consent. The letter of 20th June, 1991 is of no consequence as the appellant has denied receipt of the said letter and apart from that, there was no provision in the contract providing for unilaterally extending or exercising the option to renew the contract. On the said correspondence, therefore, it could not be said that the contract was renewed for a further period of 9 years ending ill the year 2000 as contended by the appellant. More so, considering that the renewal was not by mutual consent and in writing to bind the respondent No. 1 a company. 17. The next question is whether on account of the letters dated 22nd January, 1992. 5th February, 1992 and the voucher dated 3rd April, 1992 can it be spelled out that the contract has been renewed. These documents will have also to be read with the application for adjournment made by the appellant and the respondent before the trial Court and this Court in the earlier Appeal From Order. The applications before the trial Court are dated 7th February, 1992, 27th February, 1992, and 17th June, 1992. These documents will have also to be read with the application for adjournment made by the appellant and the respondent before the trial Court and this Court in the earlier Appeal From Order. The applications before the trial Court are dated 7th February, 1992, 27th February, 1992, and 17th June, 1992. All those applications are for adjournment on the ground that parties were working out a settlement and were made by respondent No. 1. Similarly, an application was made to this Court on 11th February, 1992 in Appeal From Order No. 8/92 by the respondent No. 1 and by the appellant on 25th February, 1992 enclosing a copy of the application for adjournment dated 7th February, 1992 made by the respondent No.1 before the trial Court. Also relevant is the Addendum dated 26th February, 1992 by the appellant with Kala Mines and Minerals in respect of extraction of ore and the letter dated 1st August, 1992 by the appellant to the respondent No. 1 are also relevant. My attention was also invited by counsel for respondent No. 1 to the prayer in the counterclaim by the appellant which has been reproduced in paragraph 10A of the judgment. It may be mentioned that it is the contention of the respondent No. 1 that the agreements of 1982 were renewed with the modifications as contained in the letters dated 22nd January, 1992, 5th February 1992 and the voucher referred to above. The modified contract is in terms of para 49 of the plaint as amended on 9th September, 1992. 18. Insofar as the appellant is concerned, their version of the case is spelled out in para 36K(q) and as summarised in the same under sub-para (d). From the averments, it can be said that it is the contention of the appellant that some discussions had taken place and that what the respondent No. 1 is contending is not correct. According to respondent No. 1, the discussions got bogged on the issue of the Western portion of the mines which earlier were allotted for extraction to Agarwals and which, in terms of the agreement of 1982 itself, the appellant was to permit the respondent No. 1 to extract ore. Let me now discuss the letters. According to respondent No. 1, the discussions got bogged on the issue of the Western portion of the mines which earlier were allotted for extraction to Agarwals and which, in terms of the agreement of 1982 itself, the appellant was to permit the respondent No. 1 to extract ore. Let me now discuss the letters. The first is the letter dated 22nd January, 1992 from the Director of respondent No. 1 informing the appellant that respondent No. 1 would extract a minimum quantity of 1,50,000 metric tonnes of ore per year from the area given to the respondent No. 1 of the mine situated at Pissurlem with effect from 1st April, 1992. It is the contention of the appellant that as on 22nd January, 1992, in fact, the appellant had an agreement with Kala Mines in respect of the area earlier allotted to the respondent No. 1 as also to the area allotted to Agarwals. That thereafter, there is an Addendum dated 26th February, 1992 between Kala Mines and the appellant whereby the area of the mines which the respondent No. 1 was to extract was excluded from the agreement. In fact, even in terms of the agreement of 1982 and plan 'A' to the plaint, it is only this area constituting the Eastern portion of the mine that respondent No. 1 could extract from. Therefore, it is clear that clause 1 of the letter only pertains to the same area which was covered by the agreement of 1982, Clause 2 spells out that an additional Re. 1/- per tonne being the difference between the cost of extraction and transport and the sale price would be given, which would assure the appellant regular income of Rs.50,000/- every month. It could be said that this clause has some correlation with the earlier agreement of 1982 as otherwise, the question of speaking about cost difference would not arise. Clause 3 refers to the cheque of Rs.5,00,000/- given by respondent No. 1 to the appellant as security or the purpose of extraction and transportation of yearly minimum quantity of 1,50,000 metric tonnes. Clause 3 refers to the cheque of Rs.5,00,000/- given by respondent No. 1 to the appellant as security or the purpose of extraction and transportation of yearly minimum quantity of 1,50,000 metric tonnes. The last sentence of this clause is being reproduced:- "This security deposit is to be adjusted against the quantity to be extracted during 1st April, 1992 to 31st March, 1993 by mutual discussions." In other words, this clause was as a security deposit for extraction of ore between the period 1st April, 1992 to 31st March, 1993 and to be adjusted by mutual discussions. The appellant has denied the receipt of this letter but has accepted the receipt of cheque of Rs.5,00,000/-. 19. The next important letter is the letter dated 5th February, 1992. By his letter, the respondent No. 1 pursuant to the discussions that respondent No. 1 had with the appellant agreed to pay to the appellants an amount of Rs.6,83,997/- being penalty under clause a 23 of the agreement for extraction and transport of iron ore dated 3rd November, 1975. This clause, therefore, pertains to past arrears. Under clause 2, it is mentioned that in the agreement dated 28th June, 1992, there was no stipulation for the minimum tonnage to be extracted during the period of agreement from 1st July, 1982 to 30th June, 1991, as the same was to be fixed after the Western part of the mine was included in the contract. It is pointed out in the said clause that after discussions, the respondent No. 1 agreed to pay compensation at the rate of Re. 1/- per tonne being the quantity of 7,50,000 tonnes which according to the respondent No. 1, the appellant had accepted the respondent No. 1 to extract during the period of contract and for the said period. Rs.7,50,000/- has been paid to the appellant, being the amount payable as penalty. The third clause pertains to extraction between the period 18th January, 1992 to 4th February, 1992, wherein a quantity of 3,60813.4 tonnes of iron ore extracted as per statement attached for which the respondent No. 1 has agreed to pay the difference at the rate of Rs.4.50 per tonne and in respect of which, a cheque was given for Rs.1,65,660. The third clause pertains to extraction between the period 18th January, 1992 to 4th February, 1992, wherein a quantity of 3,60813.4 tonnes of iron ore extracted as per statement attached for which the respondent No. 1 has agreed to pay the difference at the rate of Rs.4.50 per tonne and in respect of which, a cheque was given for Rs.1,65,660. From the amount paid, it is reasonable to presume that the ore extracted is not 3,60813.4 tonnes and on a query to the counsel, it is pointed out that it should be 36,081.34 metric tonnes. In fact, according to the appellant, this was the ore extracted by Kala Minerals and not respondent No. 1 and which was on site. The fourth clause of the letter sets out that the appellant had agreed to move an application before the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Bicholim and before this Court with a prayer for granting 6 months time for all parties to the suit to arrive at an amicable settlement while the present operation of the mine be maintained and continued uninterrupted as per the ex parte order dated 17th January, 1992 passed by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Bicholim. From this letter, it can be seen that clause 1 pertains to an amount to be paid in terms of the agreement dated 3rd November, 1975. Clause 2 pertains to an amount as penalty for non extraction during the period of the contract dated 28th June, 1982. Clause 3 pertains to payment of ore extracted after the order of ex parte injunction. Therefore, none of these clauses have any relation or co-relation to show that they relate to extension of the agreement of 20th June, 1982. The three payments made are in respect of either past dues or for ore extracted after the ex parte injunction. Clause 4 of the letter is material. Clause 4 stipulates that a period of 6 months will be taken for settling the matter by mutual discussion and until such time, the ore will be extracted. This clause read with clause 3 of letter dated 23rd January, 1992 has relevance inasmuch as terms in clause 3 of letter dated 22nd January, 1992, an amount of Rs.5,00,000/- has been deposited as security deposit for extraction of ore between the period 1st April, 1992 to 31st March, 1993. This clause read with clause 3 of letter dated 23rd January, 1992 has relevance inasmuch as terms in clause 3 of letter dated 22nd January, 1992, an amount of Rs.5,00,000/- has been deposited as security deposit for extraction of ore between the period 1st April, 1992 to 31st March, 1993. Clause 4 of letter dated 5th February, 1992 permitted the respondent No. 1 to continue to extract ore in terms of the ex parte injunction dated 17th January, 1992 and a period of 6 months was to be taken from February, 1992 for the purpose, of settling the matter by amicable settlement. This letter has been received by the respondent No. 1 and she has acknowledgement the same. This letter also refers to letter dated 22nd January, 1992. The appellant has acknowledged receipt of letter dated 5th February, 1992 but has nowhere protested that the had not received the letter dated 22nd January, 1992 referred to in the letter dated 5th February, 1992. 20. The next relevant document is the voucher dated 3rd April, 1992 whereby a cheque for Rs.8,00,000 has been given in lieu of the cheque for Rs.7,50,000. It is the contention of the respondent No. 1 that Shri Patkar who was holding a Power of Attorney for the appellant had received the cheque for Rs.8,00,000 after returning the cheque for Rs.7,50,000/- and that a sum of Rs.8,00,000/- taken was towards security deposit for operating, Pissurlem mine, in other words, it is the contention, of respondent. No. 1, that as of 3rd April, 1992, a further amount of Rs.8,00,000/- as security deposit has gone for operating the mine. This by itself according to respondent No. 1 shows that all disputes had been resolved save and except for the dispute regarding Western portion of the mine. The appellant has naturally denied this version of the respondent No. 1. The amount of Rs.7,50,000/- which was given to the appellant by respondent No. 1 by letter dated 5th February, 1992 was towards penalty for non extraction for a period of contract commencing 1st July. 1982. It is unbelievable that the appellant would return the said sum of Rs.7,50,000/- and instead accept a cheque for Rs.8,00,000/- as security deposit. In fact, the appellant had already paid to Kala Mines an amount of Rs.10,00,00. In what manner the appellant would benefit by receiving Rs.50,000/- more as security deposit and forfeiting Rs.7,50,000/- is unexplainable. 1982. It is unbelievable that the appellant would return the said sum of Rs.7,50,000/- and instead accept a cheque for Rs.8,00,000/- as security deposit. In fact, the appellant had already paid to Kala Mines an amount of Rs.10,00,00. In what manner the appellant would benefit by receiving Rs.50,000/- more as security deposit and forfeiting Rs.7,50,000/- is unexplainable. All this shows that the version pleaded by respondent No.1 is prima facie not acceptable. On the contrary, the version as pleaded by the appellant, the said cheque was returned as the matter pertaining to the penalty was under discussion and that the said cheque was returned so that the sum of Rs.7,50,000/- would not be seen as corresponding to the extraction of 7,50,000 tonnes. On the facts and circumstances, the version as spelled out by the appellant has to be accepted. A grievance has been made by Shri Dwarkadas, counsel for the respondent that Shri Patkar, who had received the cheque and who is the Power of Attorney of the appellant has not denied this version. A further grievance is made that in the verification clause, this has been verified as true to knowledge. We are at a stage of prima facie consideration. Mere non filing of the affidavit by Shri Patkar is of no consequence because it is unbelievable that the transaction as pleaded by the respondent No. 1 namely that the appellant surrendered the cheque in an amount of Rs.7,50,000/- as penalty in exchange for a security deposit of extraction in an amount of Rs.8,00,000/- to be adjusted against future dues can be accepted. From an analysis of the aforesaid correspondence exchanged and monies received, it can be seen that all that the appellant has received is an amount of Rs.5,00,000/- as security deposit for extraction. Even the said amount is conditional. The letter of 22nd January, 1992 speaks about adjustment of the said amount for the ore to be extracted during 1st April, 1992 to 31st March, 1993 by mutual discussions. In other words. what can be spelled out that even if the parties were negotiating for a renewal of contract or a fresh contract for a period of 9 years nonetheless initially the discussions pertain to extraction of ore for the year 1st April, 1992 to 31st March, 1993. It is in this context that a period of 6 months had been taken to settle the matter. It is in this context that a period of 6 months had been taken to settle the matter. If the version of the respondent No. 1 is to be accepted that a dispute which remained to be resolved was only regarding the western portion. It is not understandable as to why the appellant would pay Rs.12,00,000 to Kala Mines to free herself from the contract with Kala Mines and could not have done so in respect of the smaller portion on the western side. This to my mind shows that there is no renewal of the contract till the year 2000, but at the highest what can be said was that there was an understanding between the parties initially that the respondent No. 1 would be permitted to extract ore from 1st April, 1992 to 31st March, 1993 subject to mutual discussions. If that be the case, the question of the contract having been renewed for a further period of 9 years from 1991 does not arise nor is a prima facie case spelled out. 21. The counsel for the respondent has pointed out that there is no perversity in the findings given by the trial Court and or of that matter, the appellant could always be compensated in terms of money and that the appellant has so understood in fact while making a prayer in the counterclaim and that as such, this Court should not interfere with the order passed by the trial Court. I have earlier discussed the ex parte order of the trial Court as also the order which has confirmed the ex parte order dated 6th February, 1993. The ex parte order was given against all canons of justice by the trial Court. It is not understood as to how the trial Court could spell out words in a contract which did not exist in the contract. There are certain other circumstances which are disturbing. There was a caveat filed by the appellant which the trial Court did not give heed to relying on the judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court. It is true that there can be circumstances under which a situation may arise that in spite of a caveat application, justice would require that status quo be maintained and for that purpose, an ex parte injunction be granted in spite of a caveat application. In this particular case, there was no extraction of ore. It is true that there can be circumstances under which a situation may arise that in spite of a caveat application, justice would require that status quo be maintained and for that purpose, an ex parte injunction be granted in spite of a caveat application. In this particular case, there was no extraction of ore. The contracts filed before the Courts and as available on record did not show that respondent No. 1 could suo motto renew the contracts. The claim for renewal of the contract were by mutual agreement, yet the trial Court proceeded on a footing that respondent No. 1 could unilaterally renew the contract. 22. The respondents have also contended that they are in possession and their possession should not be interfered with. I fail to understand what possession the respondent No. 1 is pleading. There are only two agreements. One by the respondent No. 1 with the appellant for extracting and transporting the ore in other words, the appellant has permitted the respondent No. 1 on her behalf to carry out the extraction of the ore from the mines. The respondent No. 1 in the agreement itself admits that they have no right in the said mine and that is specifically contended in clause 16 of the agreement for extraction of iron ore dated 28th June, 1982. The second agreement of 28th June, 1982 is for the sale of the ore extracted by the appellant to V.M. Salgaocar and Brothers, who have assigned these rights in favour of respondent No.1. In other words, the ore extracted belongs to the appellant and the said ore extracted is to be sold by the appellant to V.M. Salgaocar and or to its assignee the respondent No. 1. In such a situation, what possession the respondent No. 1 is claiming is not at all understandable. This is a case pure and simple of a specific performance of contract if there is one. The only question is whether the contract is capable of being performed or whether compensation in money would be adequate. The contract as I have spelled out had expired and there had been no renewal whatsoever. If at all, at the highest what is spelled out is an agreement to extract ore for the year 1st April, 1992 to 31st March, 1993. This period has already expired. The contract as I have spelled out had expired and there had been no renewal whatsoever. If at all, at the highest what is spelled out is an agreement to extract ore for the year 1st April, 1992 to 31st March, 1993. This period has already expired. The respondent No. 1 has no further right to extract or carry on extraction in the mine belonging to the appellant. The fact that there being machinery belonging to the respondent No. 1 brought for the purpose of extraction of ore is of no consequence. Like, any other contractor on the contract coming to an end, the respondent No. 1 has to take away the machinery from the area of operations. That merely because machinery exists on site by no stretch of imagination can lead to the conclusion that the respondent No. 1 is in possession of the mine. The entire case of the respondent has been that the contract has been renewed and is subsisting and that the conduct of appellant is blameworthy. In fact, for the entire period from 1982, nothing was extracted on the plea that the Western portion of the mine had not been given. If one looks at the agreement of 28th June, 1992, all that could be said is that the minimum quantity would be decided only after the terms regarding the Western portion is negotiated. This did not mean that the respondent No. 1 was not to extract ore. It is now the case of the respondent that the agreement has been extended for a further period of 9 years. The appellant has alleged that from March, 1992, there is no extraction. The respondent now contends that no extraction could be done as the appellant has not given the place of storing the ore extracted and as such, from April, 1992, no extraction could be done. On the one hand, it is pleaded that the contract is renewed for a period of 9 years and on the other that ore cannot be extracted as no place is given for dumping. The respondents have relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Gujarat Bottling Company Ltd. (supra) to point out that even a party who comes for vacating the ex parte injunction must also show that he was not at fault. The respondents have relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Gujarat Bottling Company Ltd. (supra) to point out that even a party who comes for vacating the ex parte injunction must also show that he was not at fault. When the appellant approached the Court, there was an ex parte injunction granted based on no material and on clause in a contract which did not exist. The appellants were justified in moving the Court under the circumstances and their conduct cannot be said to be blameworthy. The respondents have also relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Wander Limited v. Antox India Limited, 1990 (Supp) SSC 727, for the proposition as to when the appellate Court should interfere. In this case after considering the facts and material on record, I am of the opinion that this is a case where the appellate Court must interfere. After the ex parte injunction was obtained initially, the agreement was to extract ore for a period of one year after mutual discussion. This period is over. The case of renewal till 2000 AD cannot be accepted. If this be the case, the respondent has no right whatsoever in respect of the mine belonging to the appellant. The trial Court has proceeded on a footing that the appellant could be compensated by payment of Rs.50,000/- per month right from April, 1992. There has been no extraction according to the appellant from April, 1992. No further payments have been made by the respondents to the appellant. It is true that subsequent to the filing of this appeal, right from 25th June, 1993 there is an interim stay granted by this Court staying the impugned order and directing the respondents not to create third party lights. The record shows that thereafter on behalf of the respondent No. 1, an undertaking was recorded that they would not extract ore. This was confirmed by order dated 8th October, 1993 till the disposal of the appeal. At any rate, right from March, 1992 till the order of injunction, no ore has been extracted by respondent No. 1. The balance of convenience cannot be in favour of the respondent No. 1 nor will respondent No. 1 suffer irreparable injury. Reliance was placed on the judgment of Allahabad High Court. At any rate, right from March, 1992 till the order of injunction, no ore has been extracted by respondent No. 1. The balance of convenience cannot be in favour of the respondent No. 1 nor will respondent No. 1 suffer irreparable injury. Reliance was placed on the judgment of Allahabad High Court. The said judgment was considered by a single Judge of this Court in the case of Union of India (supra). The single Judge of this Court has questioned the correctness of the said judgment on the facts in the said judgment and has departed from the view taken by the Allahabad High Court. At any rate, the said judgment pertains to acceptance of a conditional offer without demur. In the present case, there is no offer conditional or otherwise placed which can spell out the existence of a contract. For that reason also, the judgment of this Court in M/s. Navnitlal and Company is of no consequence. 23. For the aforesaid reasons, I am of the view that the trial a Court did not address itself to the real questions involved. The findings of the trial Court and the reasons thereof cannot be sustained in law for the reasons already discussed in the body of this judgment. The mere fact that the appellant in the counterclaim has claimed compensation/damages cannot be an answer to defeat the rights of the appellant. The counterclaim can be understood in the context of the proceedings being pending before the trial Court and the right of the appellant to claim damages till such time as the proceedings are decided. To my mind, the counterclaim as prayed for and as set out by me earlier would not in any way further the case of respondent No. 1. For the aforesaid reasons, the order of the trial Court dated 6th February, 1993 confirming the ex parte order dated 17th January, 1992 is set aside. The application for injunction dated 3rd October, 1992 is dismissed. Insofar as the application for temporary injunction prayed for by the appellant, the same does not survive as it was related to the ex parte injunction granted in favour of the appellant. No order, therefore, need be made on the application for ex parte relief prayed for by the appellant herein. Insofar as the application for temporary injunction prayed for by the appellant, the same does not survive as it was related to the ex parte injunction granted in favour of the appellant. No order, therefore, need be made on the application for ex parte relief prayed for by the appellant herein. The respondent No. 1, if he has any machinery on the mines is allowed to remove the same on or before 30th October, 1996. It is made clear that permission for entry on the mines given to respondent No. 1 to remove the machinery does not in any manner give the respondent No. 1 a right to interfere with the possession of the appellant over the mine or the exercise of right by the appellant in extracting ore from the mines through its servants, officers or agents. 24. An additional para has to be added before this matter is finally concluded. As I have pointed out earlier, the Civil Judge, Senior Division who was holding charge of the Bicholim Court granted ex parte temporary injunction purporting to act on terms in a contract which were not contained therein. The matter is serious insofar as the ex parte injunction was granted in spite of a caveat application and that too by a Judge holding temporary charge of the Bicholim Court. An enquiry will have to be conducted into the matter. The Additional Registrar of this Court to send a copy of this judgment to the Hon'ble The Chief Justice for the purpose of taking appropriate steps in the matter. 25. Appeal allowed. Order of trial Court is set aside. In the circumstances of the case, costs to be borne by the respondent No. 1. Appeal allowed.