JUDGMENT - R.G. DESHPANDE, J. :---The present petitioner - Vithoba Mankar is a tenant in respect of House CTS. No. 427 and also of some portion from CTS No. 428/1 situated in the township of Raver, Tq. Raver, Dist. Jalgaon, at a monthly rent of Rs. 26/-, whereas the respondent Nos. 1 to 5, the original plaintiffs, are the owners thereof. The present respondent Nos. 6 and 7 - Sitaram Narayan and Bansi Kisan, are the alleged sub-tenants of the present petitioner, who was the original defendant No. 1 in the trial Court. 2.The facts of the case are as under :- The petitioner/original defendant No. 1 (who is hereinafter referred to as "the petitioner" all through), had initiated an application bearing Miscellaneous Civil application No. 20 of 1971 on 29th September 1971 for fixation of standard rent of the suit premises. However during the pendency of the above-said application, the respondent Nos. 1 to 5, who were the original plaintiffs, issued a notice dated 22nd October, 1972 to the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner-tenant was in arrears of rent upto 22nd October, 1972 and, therefore,, by that notice, the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 asked for possession of premises in question as there was a failure on the part of the petitioner to comply with the said notice. The respondent Nos. 1 to 5 initiated Regular Civil Suit No. 162 of 1973 against the petitioner so also against the respondent Nos. 6 and 7 who were original defendants 2 and 3 in the civil suit. The civil suit was prosecuted in the Court of learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Raver. In this suit, it was the case of the respondent Nos. 1 and 5 that the petitioner was a tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 45/- and the tenancy did commence as per Marathi calender from Pratipada. It was further contended that the petitioner failed to pay the rent as also the Municipal taxes and Education tax after 4-1-1965, thereby landing the petitioner into the category of a defaulter in payment of rent for more than six months. The further contention of the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 was that inspite of the petitioner having preferred Misc. Civil Application No. 20 of 1971 for fixation of standard rent, he neither paid the interim rent nor asked for fixation of interim standard rent. The further contention of the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 was that inspite of the petitioner having preferred Misc. Civil Application No. 20 of 1971 for fixation of standard rent, he neither paid the interim rent nor asked for fixation of interim standard rent. Another ground on which the suit was filed was that the petitioner unauthorisedly sub-let part of the premises to respondent Nos. 6 and 7, as also the petitioner did cause damage to the suit premises. Another ground on which the suit was filed was that the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 needed the suit premises for their bona fide occupation as it was required by them for their own residence and for carrying on their business. In support of this contention, it was also further mentioned that one Ramdas Supdu had demanded possession of the premises which were in possession of the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 and this Ramdas Supdu had also initiated Regular Civil Suit No. 19 of 1972 against the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 for possession of the premises which they were occupying. The respondent Nos. 1 to 5 further contended that the respondents were running a grocery shop in the house of one Ladakabai, who happened to be their step-mother and that Ladakabai also had initiated proceedings for possession against the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 in which they were running their grocery shop. On these grounds, the possession of the premises was sought in the plaint. The above-said contentions of the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 in plaint were rebutted by the present petitioner by filing his written statement who resisted the plaint on all counts. It is denied by the petitioner that he was paying a monthly rent of Rs. 45/- or that he had not paid the rent after 4-1-1965. As regards sub-tenancy in favour of the respondent Nos. 6 and 7, the same was also denied. The allegation of damage to the property by the petitioner was also denied. The petitioner further contended in his Written Statement that some time in the year 1946, he took the entire house bearing CTS No. 427 plus some portion of CTS No. 428/1 for a period of three years on lease for Rs. 1000/-. The allegation of damage to the property by the petitioner was also denied. The petitioner further contended in his Written Statement that some time in the year 1946, he took the entire house bearing CTS No. 427 plus some portion of CTS No. 428/1 for a period of three years on lease for Rs. 1000/-. According to him, initially, one Shri Gabaji had let on lease the above-said portion i.e. CTS No. 427 and some portion of CTS No. 428/1 to one Vinayak Waman for Rs. 1,000/- for the period from 16-1-1946 to 14-1-1949 from whom the present petitioner had purchased the rights of said Vinayak Waman. This was how he came in possession of the said premises on the same terms and conditions which were agreed upon between Gabaji and Vinayak Waman. It was the case of the petitioner that the monthly rent of the suit premises was Rs. 26/- only. It was further contended that he had already parted with some portion i.e. six Choukya in favour of the respondents some time in the year 1952 itself. According to the petitioner, the rent for the premises in question which were left with him was only Rs. 20/- after deducting Rs. 6/- for the six Choukya, which were already handed over by him to the respondent Nos. 1 to 5. According to the plaintiff, he had already paid rent upto 30th October 1970. However, no receipts for the said payments were given by the landlord. 3.As regards the contention of the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 that Ramdas Supdu and Ladakabai had initiated proceedings against the respondents for eviction and possession, the plaintiff answered saying that the said suits were collusive one with an intention just to anyhow evict the petitioner from the premises in question. It was his contention that it was just by way of creation of evidence in support of the claim of respondent Nos. 1 to 5 for bona fide need, the plaintiff further contended that if a decree for eviction was passed, it would cause great hardship to the petitioner. The petitioner also had contended that the original defendant Nos. 2 and 3 i.e. the present respondent Nos. 6 and 7 are not the sub-tenants. 1 to 5 for bona fide need, the plaintiff further contended that if a decree for eviction was passed, it would cause great hardship to the petitioner. The petitioner also had contended that the original defendant Nos. 2 and 3 i.e. the present respondent Nos. 6 and 7 are not the sub-tenants. However, they were the persons who were allowed to install a pan shop in front of his hotel and that the Pan shop was run by the defendant No. 1 i.e. the present plaintiff himself through those two persons from whom he was not taking any rent. In short, the petitioner sought for dismissal of the suit on all grounds. 4.The present respondent Nos. 6 and 7, the alleged sub-tenants filed their Written Statement separately contending that they were not the sub-tenants of the petitioner but they were selling Pan with the permission of the defendant No. 1 i.e. the petitioner. The above-said Regular Civil suit initiated by the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 along with Misc. Civil Application No. 20/71 initiated by the petitioner were heard together by the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Raver who, by his judgment and order dated 29-1-1981 dismissed the suit of the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 and also simultaneously allowed the Misc. Civil Application No. 20/71 by fixing the standard rent at Rs. 26/- per month exclusive of taxes. While passing the judgment, the learned Judge of the trial Court held that the plaintiffs i.e. respondent Nos. 1 to 5 proved that they were the exclusive owners of the suit property. However, according to the learned trial Judge, the point as regards sub-tenancy was not proved as also the rent of Rs. 45/- was not proved. The trial Court held that it was not proved by the plaintiffs that the defendant No. 1, the petitioner had not paid rent since 4-1-1965 as also the education cess for last three years. In short, it was held that the petitioner was not a defaulter for more than six months as also according to the learned Judge of the trial Court, the bona fide need for personal occupation by the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 was also not proved. The creation of sub-tenancy was also held against the respondent Nos. 1 to 5. The learned Judge of the trial Court, therefore, dismissed the suit on all counts. 1 to 5 was also not proved. The creation of sub-tenancy was also held against the respondent Nos. 1 to 5. The learned Judge of the trial Court, therefore, dismissed the suit on all counts. 5.Being aggrieved by the judgment and order of the trial Court, the present respondent Nos. 1 to 5 preferred Civil appeal No. 144/1981 in the Court of District Judge, Jalgaon. The matter was dealt with by Second Extra Assistant Judge, Jalgaon who, after due appreciation of the evidence on the record and after giving due consideration to the findings recorded by the learned Judge of the trial Court, reached to the conclusion that the petitioner-tenant was not in arrears of rent for more than six months. It is also observed by the learned Judge that the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 - landlords failed to prove that the petitioner-tenant had not paid the rent regularly after fixation of standard rent. However, the learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court differed with the finding recorded by the learned Judge of the trial Court to reach to the conclusion that the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 did prove their case for bona fide need of the premises in question holding that they reasonably and bona fidely needed the premises in question for their occupation and, naturally the conclusion was arrived at by the learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court that in such a case, it would be the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 who would suffer greater hardship in case the decree for eviction is not granted. On the point of sub-letting also, the learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court reached to the conclusion that the point of sub-letting was proved, holding that the respondent Nos. 6 and 7 as sub-tenants and on that count, the learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court was of the opinion that the petitioner-tenant was liable to be evicted from the premises in question. Thus, the appeal which was filed by the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 was allowed directing the petitioner-tenant to deliver possession of the suit premises within two months of the date of Judgment by the lower Appellate Court. The point as regards fixation of standard rent at the rate of Rs. 26/- per month, however, was maintained by the lower Appellate Court. It is this judgment which is under challenge in the present petition. The point as regards fixation of standard rent at the rate of Rs. 26/- per month, however, was maintained by the lower Appellate Court. It is this judgment which is under challenge in the present petition. 6.Before proceeding with the matter on merits, it would be necessary to mention at this stage only that the petitioner, during the pendency of the present petition, had filed an affidavit bringing some subsequent facts on the record. This affidavit is dated 29th July 1991. By this affidavit, the petitioner wanted to point out that Ladkabai in whose premises the plaintiffs were running their shop and who had obtained decree for possession against the present respondent Nos. 1 to 5, was according to the petitioner a collusive decree to create evidence in favour of the respondent Nos. 1 to 5. The petitioner further wanted to suggest that since the decree was not executed at all by Smt. Ladkabai and since she had no other sons or daughters after her death, the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 have become the owners of the property in question and, on this count, according to the petitioner, there was no need of the suit premises to the respondent Nos. 1 to 5. According to the petitioner, this changed circumstance was required to be brought on the record for just, fair and proper decision. According to the petitioner, this Ladkabai expired some 10- years back and even till this day, the shop of the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 is run in the said premises only. 7.It was also brought on the record by way of an additional affidavit by the petitioner that the pan shop of respondent Nos. 6 and 7 are not in the suit premises at all and, according to him, no portion of the suit premises was given to the respondent Nos. 6 and 7. It is his contention that the said shops are outside the premises but on the Municipal gutters where the respondent Nos. 6 and 7 are running their pan shops. The abovesaid affidavit of the petitioner was countered on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 to 5 by way of an affidavit-in-reply by respondent No. 1. In his affidavit, it is his say that affidavit filed by the petitioner is a misleading one, particularly when it is said that after the death of Ladkabai, the respondent Nos. The abovesaid affidavit of the petitioner was countered on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 to 5 by way of an affidavit-in-reply by respondent No. 1. In his affidavit, it is his say that affidavit filed by the petitioner is a misleading one, particularly when it is said that after the death of Ladkabai, the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 are the owners of the property. To counter this contention, it is specifically mentioned in this reply-affidavit that Ladkabai who was the step-mother of the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 expired on 21-1-1982 i.e. before the judgment and order dated 30-9-83 passed by the lower Appellate Court and, according to him, this could have been brought to the notice of the learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court. Another important point mentioned in the reply-affidavit is that deceased Ladkabai had executed a Will wherein she had bequeathed all her property in favour of respondent No. 3 only and, therefore, the other respondents do not have any right, claim or title in the said properties. According to the respondents 1 to 5, therefore, their claim that they require the premises in question for personal occupation still subsist. It is also denied by the reply-affidavit that the decree which was obtained by Ladkabai against the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 was a collusive decree. As regards sub-tenancy of respondent Nos. 6 and 7, the contention of the petitioner is also specifically denied by the reply affidavit by the respondent 1 to 5. Since the subsequent facts are brought on record by way of an affidavit, the same would be considered at the relevant stage in this judgment. However, it is necessary to point out that along with their reply-affidavit, the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 also have produced relevant documents to which there was no objection by the petitioner in any manner. 8.Shri R.G. Karmarkar, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, vehemently contended that the entire judgment of the lower Appellate Court is based on two documents i.e. Exhs. 60 and 61 which are the decrees in Regular Civil Suit No. 18/72 decided on 20-2-1975 and in Regular Civil Suit No. 19/72 decided on 20-2-1975 respectively. Shri Karmarkar, tried to develop his arguments on the basis of these two decrees to show that the bona fide need which is tried to be put forward by the respondent Nos. 60 and 61 which are the decrees in Regular Civil Suit No. 18/72 decided on 20-2-1975 and in Regular Civil Suit No. 19/72 decided on 20-2-1975 respectively. Shri Karmarkar, tried to develop his arguments on the basis of these two decrees to show that the bona fide need which is tried to be put forward by the respondent Nos. 1 to 5, on the basis of these two decrees, is nothing but evidence created in support of the stand of respondent Nos. 1 to 5 of their bona fide need for the premises in question. According to Shri Karmarkar, the Regular Civil Suit No. 18/72 which was initiated by Smt. Ladkabai though was decreed in favour of her, she had not executed the decree and, therefore, according to Shri Karmarkar, the need for bona fide occupation of the suit premises by the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 could not be said to have been proved. According to Shri Karmarkar, the decrees, now, could not be executed as, according to him, the same was barred by time and, therefore, there could not be any imminent threat to evict the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 from those premises. As against this, Shri Barlinge, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1 to 5, specifically pointed out that so far as regards the decree obtained by Ramdas Supdu is concerned, it is already executed and in pursuance thereof the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 did vacate the premises of Ramdas Supdu. However, as regards the execution of the decree in the matter of Ladkabai, Shri Barlinge pointed out that they had given an undertaking to Ladkabai that the moment the suit premises are vacated by the petitioner, they would hand over the possession of suit premises to Ladkabai. According to Barlinge, therefore, the threat of eviction so far as regards the possession of the property of Ladkabai was concerned, was still there. Shri Barlinge, further, pointed out that in accordance with the Will executed by Ladkabai, the property has gone only to the share of respondent No. 3- Murlidhar and, therefore, the need of the rest of the respondents also cannot be said to have been satisfied, particularly when the respondent No. 3 alone has become the sole owner in view of the Will. Along with the reply-affidavit, the respondent Nos. Along with the reply-affidavit, the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 have produced the document showing that the decree in the case of Ramdas Supdu was executed by handing over the possession by respondent Nos. 1 to 5 to Ramdas. This Will executed by Ladkabai dated 27-2-1973 is also produced on the record which clearly indicates that the property which was held by Ladkabai is given by her to Murlidhar, the respondent No. 3 only. Shri Karmarkar, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, wanted to suggest that though the house of Ladkabai is given to Murlidhar, the respondent No. 3 alone, according to Shri Karmarkar since the need of one of the respondents is satisfied, it can be presumed that the need of all the respondents is satisfied and particularly when they are running their shop in the said premises. I find it difficult to accept this argument of Shri Karmarkar because, it is the case of the respondents that the suit property is needed by all the respondents together for their residence and for running their business. If the property is acquired by one of the respondents, it does not mean that it is acquired by all the respondents, still the necessity of rest of the respondents exists and particularly because it would be solely at the discretion of the respondent No. 3 alone whether to allow the residence and business to be continued in those premises or not. The business is of all the respondents together and not of one i.e. respondent No. 3 alone. 9.Shri Karmarkar, the learned Counsel for the petitioner tried to assail the judgment of the lower Appellate Court on this ground by saying that the learned Judge did not appreciate the evidence and facts on record properly. In fact, it is clear from the record that it was the case of the respondents that they were residing in a tenanted house of Ramdas and were running a grocery shop in the premises of Ladkabai. According to Shri Karmarkar, the decrees in the matter of Ramdas Supdu and Ladkabai could not have been taken into consideration as, according to Shri Karmarkar,. Ladkabai happened to be the family member. This argument of Shri Karmarkar is also difficult to digest, particularly when it is admitted position that the property did not belong to the respondent Nos. According to Shri Karmarkar, the decrees in the matter of Ramdas Supdu and Ladkabai could not have been taken into consideration as, according to Shri Karmarkar,. Ladkabai happened to be the family member. This argument of Shri Karmarkar is also difficult to digest, particularly when it is admitted position that the property did not belong to the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 and it was Ladkabai who was the sole owner thereof and who could dispose of the property as she wanted. In such circumstances, the bona fide need of the respondents 1 to 5 that the premises in question did belong to them only cannot be said to be false. Even otherwise, it has come on the record by way of an additional facts that the decree is already executed and even on the basis of the Will, it is Murlidhar who alone would be in a position to occupy the premises excluding everyone else. Shri Karmarkar further tried to argue that the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 were doing the business in some different locality and it would not be possible for them to run their shop in the present suit premises. In fact, the learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court has rightly considered this point and has reached to the conclusion by observing that the suit premises are also in the business locality and it was for the respondents to decide whether to run their business in their own premises or not, particularly when they were running their business in rented premises. The learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court taking into consideration all the relevant points in the matter, has reached rightly to the conclusion that the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 needed the suit premises bona fidely and they have proved their bona fide need for occupation. I do not feel that the learned Judge committed any mistake in reaching to the conclusion that the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 established their genuine need and requirement. 10.On the other hand, the respondents/plaintiffs had brought on the record that the present petitioner was also having another premises of his own for his business. I do not feel that the learned Judge committed any mistake in reaching to the conclusion that the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 established their genuine need and requirement. 10.On the other hand, the respondents/plaintiffs had brought on the record that the present petitioner was also having another premises of his own for his business. They have specifically pointed out that if the present suit premises are not given to the respondents/plaintiffs and since Ramdas had already executed the decree, it was necessary for them to have the premises else great hardship would be caused to the respondents/plaintiffs. It is on the record that the present petitioner was also running a hotel at ST stand and this was a separate business of the petitioner other than that with the present one in the suit premises. There was other property also with the present petitioner to which a detailed reference is made by the learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court in para No. 13 of his judgment. Taking into consideration all these facts and further that since there was no evidence on the record to show that at the relevant point of time the plaintiffs had no other house property at Raver, the learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court rightly observed that in the absence of decree for eviction, greater hardship would be caused to the respondents/plaintiffs and I do not see any justifiable reason to differ with the same. 11.As regards the point of sub-tenancy, in fact, it is abundantly clear from the plea of the petitioner himself that he, in fact, had introduced respondent Nos. 6 and 7 as sub-tenants and particularly when the petitioner himself has taken a contradictory stand. Initially, it was the case of the petitioner-tenant that he had only allowed respondent Nos. 6 and 7 to sit in the pan shop of his own to sell the pan on behalf of the petitioner himself thereby he wanted to suggest that they were not the sub-tenants of petitioner. Subsequently, the petitioner comes up with a case saying that the pan shops are run by the respondent Nos. 6 and 7 of their own and that they are on the gutter (drainage) which is flowing in front of the premises in question but touching to its projected verandah. Subsequently, the petitioner comes up with a case saying that the pan shops are run by the respondent Nos. 6 and 7 of their own and that they are on the gutter (drainage) which is flowing in front of the premises in question but touching to its projected verandah. However, this stand taken by the petitioner by way of an additional affidavit which he filed in this Court clearly shows that the respondent Nos. 6 and 7 are doing their own business and, in fact, it has come on the record that the Pan shops though some portion of the shop is on gutter under which drainage flows. However, a clear-cut case is made out by the plaintiff showing that the respondent Nos. 6 and 7 are the sub-tenants of the petitioner, This is more clear from the evidence on the record to which a due thought is given by the learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court. The learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court has also rightly observed that it was the petitioner who had admitted that there was no documentary evidence with him to show the ownership of the pan shops. On the other hand, he himself deposed that he had allowed the respondent Nos. 6 and 7 to deal in pan business which would be of help to the business of hotel of the petitioner. It is also clear from the record that the petitioner totally failed to show that he was the owner of the pan shops, but on the other hand, the record indicated otherwise. The story which was tried to be put forward by the petitioner that Bansi Kisan Bari and Sitaram Mahajan who were running the pan shops were his servants is also rightly negatived by the learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court. The whole story which was tried to be put forth by the petitioner that respondent Nos. 6 and 7 were not the sub-tenants was demolished by the petitioner himself by his additional affidavit dated 29th July 1991 which he filed in this Court. In clear words, it is admitted by the petitioner that the respondent Nos. 6 and 7 are running their pan shops though it is tried to be shown by him that it is outside the suit premises on the Municipal gutter. In clear words, it is admitted by the petitioner that the respondent Nos. 6 and 7 are running their pan shops though it is tried to be shown by him that it is outside the suit premises on the Municipal gutter. Shri Karmarkar, tried to suggest that this cannot be said to be sub-letting of the suit premises. However, the learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court having taken a correct view in the matter, I do not find it necessary to interfere in the finding arrived at on that point. 12.By another affidavit dated 12th July, 1996, the petitioner tried to suggest that there was sufficient area with the respondents to start their own business and there was no necessity for them to have the suit premises for their own business and residence. I do not think it necessary to go into this aspect, particularly when it is pointed out that it was only Murlidhar, the respondent No. 3 who has become the owner in view of the Will of Smt. Ladkabai. Shri Karmarkar, on the basis of this affidavit, wanted to suggest that the respondents have sufficient area in their possession for their business and residence. I do not think that Shri Karmarkar is right on this point also, because, it is not to be forgotten that it is the respondent No. 3- Murlidhar only who has become the owner and that does not mean that the need of the rest of the respondents is also satisfied. It has come on the record that the decree which was obtained by Ramdas is already executed and the respondents had already handed over the possession of those premises to Ramdas which is evident from the document which is produced on record by the respondents. Shri Karmarkar, wanted to suggest that the Will executed by Ladkabai is not proved and, therefore, it could not be taken into consideration. I do not feel that the question of validity of the Will is open for consideration in the present petition, particularly when that was not the plea taken by the petitioner in the Court below. Shri Karmarkar, wanted to suggest that the Will executed by Ladkabai is not proved and, therefore, it could not be taken into consideration. I do not feel that the question of validity of the Will is open for consideration in the present petition, particularly when that was not the plea taken by the petitioner in the Court below. 13.Shri Karmarkar, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of petitioner, in support of his contention that subsequent facts should be taken into consideration, relied on the decisions reported in A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1711 in the case of (Hasmat Rai and another v. Raghunath Prasad)1, and 1992 A.I.R. S.C.W. 336 in the case of (Ramesh Kumar v. Kesho Ram)2. It is no doubt true that it has been consistently held by the Apex Court of the country that in appropriate cases, relevant subsequent facts which can have a direct bearing on the judgment of the matter, can be and should be taken into consideration. However, in the present case, it would be clear that even after taking into consideration these events, it cannot be said that the plaintiffs were not in need of the suit premises for their genuine and bona fide need for occupation of the same. 14.Since both the points are held in favour of the respondents/plaintiffs, I do not think that the learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court was wrong in passing the decree in favour of respondent Nos. 1 to 5 and against the petitioner. In the result, the petition fails. The judgment and order dated 30-9-1983 passed by the learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court is maintained. Rule is discharged. However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.